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The origin of this book is rooted in a seminar held in April 1995 at EIASM 
(European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management), in Brussels. 
Under the theme of ‘Institutional Changes in the Globalized Food Sector’, 
the seminar gathered academics studying the pattern and nature of 
changes in food production and marketing, the causes of these changes 
and their implications. 
As can be seen from the chapters of this book, the changes which are 
currently occurring are being studied by a wide range of disciplines and 
with an equally wide range of methods. The book not only gives an over-
view of current trends in the agro-food industries, but also the theories 
and methods that are used to make our knowledge consistent and testable. 
Change in the industries which ensure us of our daily bread is truly 
fundamental. Today we are confronted with BSE, or Mad Cow Disease. 
This shows us how sensitive consumers are and the volatility of consump-
tion patterns – in the UK alone more than one million people have 
excluded beef from their daily diet. This is a massive change in a short 
period of time. No such dramatic developments are analysed in this book. 
However, forces of change are taken into consideration in many of the 
contributions. Related to the BSE case, there is the emphasis on food 
safety, health and well-being. Consumer sensitivity to such quality 
dimensions has stimulated many innovations in production systems and 
production chain management. These developments have encouraged the 
application of information technology, and quality measurement and 
monitoring. Apart from the hardware and control methodology, it has 
also led to institutional and structural changes. Among examples of such 
changes is the diversification of farm production for specific market 
segments, creating links between products and firms throughout the proc-
essing and distribution chain.  
Research on institutional change in the agro-food industries enjoys the 
growing interest of academics. They not only attempt to explain the 
dynamics and causal relationships; sometimes they also want to make 
predictions on the basis of extrapolations of present patterns. In view of 
these aims (explanation and prediction) perhaps the most exiting obser-
vation about this book is that the academic disciplines are changing as 
well. Especially the attention given to the transaction cost and agency 
theories is striking. The growing interest seems to signify that food 
industries are moving from hierarchically organised structures to more    Preface 
 
VI 
‘loosely-knit’ networks. This has implications for the organisation of 
research and innovation, for risk sharing and for the role of distribution 
and marketing throughout the chain.  
This theoretical development has not, however, resulted in one domi-
nant theoretical perspective – neo-classical, neo-institutional and insti-
tutional paradigms exist side by side, also in this volume. The neo-clas-
sical approach of deducting hypotheses from theory and then applying 
econometric techniques to a sample of data is less dominant today than it 
used to be. The transaction cost theory and other neo-institutional 
approaches are more often used as an heuristic model of thought than as a 
theory in the strict meaning of the word. Institutional studies are tra-
ditionally wide in scope and ambition. So, if a common denominator for 
the current research on the agro-food industries should be identified, this 
is rather an observation that modern researchers tend to relate to practice 
and choose their economic tools accordingly. By combining observations 
from cases with statistical evidence they try to develop a new ‘language’. 
This ‘language’ will help other researchers and, in due time, also 
practitioners so that they can streamline their work into ‘normal business’. 
However, this language of today's ‘normal business’ is not yet available, 
and current developments are not ‘normal business’. ‘Normal business’ is 
by definition understood by ‘normal science’. The future will tell us what 
the paradigm of change in the food industries in the late 1990s was and 
what ‘normal science’ is in the 2000s. 
A few trends can already be discerned. Economists are now in the proc-
ess of collecting empirical information to develop a new selection of 
hypotheses. First, transaction cost theory is telling us that various types of 
loosely organised systems, open to continuous innovation and new busi-
ness entities, are gaining ground in the market place. Even large mono-
lithic companies, usually multinational enterprises that control a wide 
range of activities, integrating or surpassing markets at will, have to adapt 
to this operational mode. 
Second, farmer-businesses, often structured as co-operatives, are forced 
to change to maintain their market position and preserve their significance 
for their farmer-members. Questions arise about whether they can 
maintain their co-operative identity, and if they will still be able to reduce 
the farmers' transaction costs irrespective of varying governmental 
policies. Perhaps we will see a split between consumer-oriented busi-
nesses and co-operatives that do the initial processing of raw produce. At 
least this is plausible when considering business conduct based on tradi-
tional co-operative principles, as these are restrictive when, for instance, 
doing business in the branded foods sector. However, co-operatives are 
efficient in creating a market structure that offers farmers the opportunity 
to focus their professional ability on producing quality products that can 
be processed into new products with added value. Anyhow, the way 
agricultural co-operatives will operate in the future will be mainly 
decided by their ability to develop new financial models with new forms 
of equity.  Preface 
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Third, it is striking how little attention business academics pay to issues 
of public policy on farming and food production. The role of government 
is mainly restricted to legislation and regulations on minimum standards 
of quality and safety. Raising the competitive pressure in the various 
industries is often considered to be a sufficient condition for this to 
happen. Still, we know that a host of governmental regulations are of 
profound importance to the agro-food sector, not only antitrust legislation 
but also the broad area of agricultural policies.  
Fourth, as always, final demand is best understood by confronting the 
consumer with new products and applying new marketing techniques. 
Today, however, there is also new information technology to facilitate in 
measuring the consumers' response. Again, this can be viewed as trans-
action cost reduction, having repercussions throughout the chain of pro-
duction, distribution and marketing. The firms – farmers, processing en-
terprises, retailers and others – are through these new technologies more 
closely linked to consumer demand and, thereby, also to one another.  
In conclusion, agro-food business is in a state of flux that demands 
attention. Businessmen have a good understanding of market trends in 
their own industries, but for a deeper understanding economic analyses 
are required. The research presented in this book describes interesting 
new developments and even indicates some new paradigms. However, no 
clear prospects can be expressed yet. More research must be done and 
more academics have to participate in the ongoing debate.  
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Institutional and Organisational Change in the European Food Sector:  
A Meso-Level Perspective 
Torben Bager, South Jutland University Centre, Esbjerg, Denmark 
 
Since 1980 the European agro-food sector has experienced profound 
restructuring. Mergers and cross-border investments have been the daily 
order. 
While macro-level theory tends to understand agro-food restructuring 
deterministically as a result of techno-economic change spreading 
gradually downwards from global level, the European process should 
rather be understood as a complex and open-ended process which not 
only flows top-down but also down-top, deserving to be labelled 
Europeanisation rather than Globalisation. Doubtless there are some 
universal trends in the agro-food sectors world-wide, but socio-political 
processes – or to be more precise, institutional and organisational 
processes at national and European level – are also important, and call for 
a meso-level perspective.  
The article supports this basic argument by empirical analysis of 
developments in the European retail and food production sectors since 
1980, and by application of neo-institutional organisation theory to the 
issue of why agricultural co-operatives increasingly convert into hybrid 
organisations and limited companies.  
 
 
The International Cooperative as a Partnership: Legal Aspects 
Ruud Galle, Faculty of Law, Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, Tilburg, The 
Netherlands 
 
The paper seeks to answer the question whether the cooperative structure 
as such forms an obstruction in participating in the process of inter-
nationalization. Which legal instruments are available? The new European 
Cooperative Society as proposed by the European Commission is 
assessed. Discussing the internationalization of the cooperative business is 
not possible without paying attention to the anti-trust law implications. 
  Abstracts 
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Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives:  
A Transaction Cost Explanation 
Laurence N. Harte, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland 
 
Although presented as a funding mechanism, the transformation of some 
leading Irish co-operatives into public companies with farmers' co-op-
eratives as controlling shareholders has established a means by which 
these enterprises can be progressively changed into ordinary for profit 
corporations. In this paper a transaction cost approach is used to argue 
t h a t  t h i s  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  c h a n g e  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a  d i m i n i s h e d  n e e d  f o r  
vertical integration (especially vertical ownership) in the Irish agricultural 
sector, limitations of the co-operative organisation form, and a shift in 
favour of market mechanisms in business and the economy generally. 
Based on an assessment of the current competitive structure of the Irish 
milk market, it is reasoned that this change away from co-operatives is an 
efficiency enhancing development. 
 
 
The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool in the Globalized Food Sector:  
Can They Remain True to Their Roots? 
Lou Hammond Ketilson, Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, University of 
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada 
 
This paper poses the question: what will be the implications for the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool as it makes the transition from a co-operative, 
owned and controlled by its 78,000 farmer members, to a publicly traded 
co-operative, owned by its members and investors, controlled by whom? 
The paper starts with a review of relevant literature on ownership 
structure, goal setting, and decision-making. The case of Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool is then presented. The paper closes with some very 
preliminary conclusions regarding the potential impact of conversion. 
Observations and conclusions are drawn from an analysis of interviews 
with key informants, organization documents, and secondary sources. 
 
 
Organizational Structure and Globalization:  
The Case of User Oriented Firms 
Michael L. Cook, University of Missouri-Columbia, U.S.A 
 
Leaders of U.S. agricultural cooperatives face two overriding strategic 
questions as they plan for the 21st century: can their organizations com-
pete in an increasingly global market place, and can their organizations 
compete in an increasingly industrialized food and fiber sector. The 
answers to these questions are, of course, complex and multifaceted. 
Trade and agricultural policy factors, economic endowments, human 
resource, financial and market strategy all influence the answer. But, 
perhaps as important an element for cooperative leaders to consider is the 
organizational structure factor. Is the traditional organizational form of a Abstracts 
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user owned, user controlled, user benefited cooperative the most effective 
in achieving producer objectives in an increasingly industrialized and 
globalized food and fiber market place? 
This paper addresses the globalization issue although the causes and 
implications of industrialization and globalization are not mutually 
exclusive. However, before exploring the globalization challenge and its 
implications for U.S. agricultural cooperatives, a brief review of the 
strategic and structural evolution of rural collective action is presented. 
 
 
Implementing the Sixth Reason for Co-operation:  
New Generation Co-operatives in Agribusiness 
Gert van Dijk, Department of Marketing,    
Landbouwuniversiteit Wageningen, Wageningen, The Netherlands 
 
This paper discusses the reasons for the formation and existence of co-
operatives in agribusiness. Firstly, the five historical reasons, that is, 
countervailing power, scale economies, risk management, income 
improvement, and access to capital markets on favourable terms for the 
formation of co-operatives are presented. The Sixth Reason for co-opera-
tives restates their raison-d’être in the context of a globalised economy, 
technological development, concentration in the food processing and 
retailing sectors, and heterogeneous consumer behaviour.  
The response of co-operatives to these trends is twofold. The birth of 
New Generation Co-operatives in North America, which are investor-
driven and focusing on value-added activities, reflect the need to revive 
the rural communities. Re-engineering occurs within existing co-opera-
tives where membership and equity are redefined.  
 
 
Marketing Cooperatives as a System of Attributes 
George W.J. Hendrikse, Rotterdam School of Management,    
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
Cees P. Veerman, Tilburg University; Erasmus University, Rotterdam; chairman 
of the Dutch Cooperative Council; farmer,    
The Netherlands 
 
The marketing cooperative is analyzed with an emphasis on incomplete 
contracts and system complementarities. It is argued that the disap-
pearance of shortage markets in agricultural and horticultural markets 
poses a serious threat to the survival of the marketing cooperative. 
 
  Abstracts 
 
XII 
The Position of Agricultural Cooperatives in the Changing Food 
Industry of Europe 
Petri Ollila, the Academy of Finland, Helsinki, Finland 
Jerker Nilsson, Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural 
Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden 
 
If cooperatives have a role to play in the future agrofood industry, which 
types of cooperative will prosper, and in which types of business? These 
questions are topical in an era of European integration, an agricultural 
policy under attack, changing consumer preferences and rapid tech-
nological change. 
The enlarging markets mean that the prevailing ways of organizing the 
food industry, especially cooperatives, face increasing challenges. In many 
areas of production multinationals are able to use economies of scale, 
complex manufacturing processes, and advanced management. 
Cooperatives, where member control is connected with the interests in a 
single raw material, and the division of results is according to deliveries, 
have difficulties to compete with the multinationals.  
However, cooperatives may be superior in coordinating the supply and 
demand between the producers and the first stage of processing. Hence, 
the first processing, i.e., getting the products into a non-perishable form, 
will be maintained inside the cooperatives, while part of the further 
processing will be separated into investor owned firms. The largest 
cooperatives will grow in order to gain competitiveness. Other coopera-
tives appeal to local markets. Still others take a role as suppliers of 
unprocessed products to processing firms or as suppliers of processed 
products to retail chains.  
 
 
Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on Structure and Performance in 
U.S. Food Industries in the 1980s 
Francis Declerck, ESSEC-Institut de Management International    
Agro-Alimentaire, Cergy-Pontoise, France 
 
Articles in business magazines allege excessive premiums paid to acquire 
food companies – a premium is the difference between a target firm's 
takeover value and pretakeover value. These firms operate in industries 
characterized by a high level of concentration. Acquirers may pay a higher 
premium because they expect higher profits. However, such a theme has 
not been studied yet. 
The objective of the paper is to estimate whether premiums are high in 
the food sector, especially for companies in sectors with a high level of 
concentration taking into account the food industries specificities. The 
paper is organized as follows. First, theoretical and empirical consid-
erations through several specificities of food industries will be presented, 
because they may explain firms' behavior in mergers and acquisitions. The 
following section provides methodology, and data are then presented. 
Results are given and conclusions are drawn.  Abstracts 
 
XIII 
Economic and Financial Performance of Cooperatives and Investor-
Owned Firms: An Empirical Study 
Anastassios Gentzoglanis, Department of Economics,     
 University of Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke, Canada 
 
This study examines empirically the financial and economic performance 
of dairy cooperatives and investor owned firms in Canada for the period 
1986-1991 and compares the results to the ones obtained in comparable 
European studies. The aim is to verify whether the traditional cooperative 
principles give rise to differences in economic and financial performance 
between cooperatives and IOFs.  
For the sample and period examined, it is found that performance, as 
measured by profitability, productivity and the use of new technologies, is 
not significantly different between these two types of organizations. 
However, performance differs in terms of liquidity and working capital 
management. These findings corroborate the growing recognition that 
financial differences in performance between cooperatives and IOFs are 
not significant despite their differences in their organizational structure. 
These results differ, however, from the ones obtained in some European 
studies. 
 
 
Mergers and Structural Reorganization of Agricultural Co-operatives in 
Japan 
Hideki Tanaka, Faculty of Applied Biological Science,    
Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan 
 
In Japan, multi-purpose agricultural co-operatives have held a dominant 
position. They have covered almost all farmers in their districts, and 
carried out a wide range of business. They have been exclusively located 
in the government's control system for rice as a collection agency, under 
the recently abolished Staple Food Control Law. Under this system 
control, during the three decades from the 1950s, mergers of agricultural 
co-operatives had been aimed at reaching the size of a municipality. 
Under the recent import-liberalized process for farm products, agricul-
tural co-operatives decided again to promote mergers and structural re-
organization. The model of mergers which is presented is based on one as 
reasonable as a financial company's model. Therefore we have a new stage 
of mergers. As the primary co-operative societies are enlarged by mergers, 
their affiliated organizations are going to be reorganized by being reduced 
from three tiers to two tiers. 
 
  Abstracts 
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Diversification, Vertical Integration and Profitability in the Greek Food 
Manufacturing Industries 
Constantine A. Bourlakis, Leicester University Management Centre, Leicester, 
U.K. 
 
This article seeks to analyse the effects of diversification and vertical 
integration strategies on firm profitability in the Greek food manufac-
turing industries. The analysis is conducted using a set of 540 firms 
observed annually over the period 1986–1992.  
The findings reveal that concentric and conglomerate diversification 
strategies are a potential source of competitive advantage in the local 
market. Firms that are vertically integrated seem to experience a sig-
nificantly lower rate of return on capital, but firms that combine vertical 
integration and diversification strategies manage to reverse such a trend. 
Larger food manufacturing companies enjoy higher rates of return via 
conglomerate diversification strategies and combined conglomerate 
diversification and vertical integration strategies. Smaller companies raise 
their profitability via concentric diversification strategies. A concentric 
diversification strategy can also be beneficial to smaller companies with a 
vertically integrated structure. 
 
 
Intense Competition, Revised Strategies and Financial Performance in 
the U.K. Food Retailing Sector 
Ken Bates, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, U.K. 
Mark Whittington, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, 
U.K. 
 
A major impact on the E.U. food retailing industry is the internationali-
sation of previously domestic markets. It is increasingly important for 
domestic food retailers to appraise their performance, not only against 
historic domestic competitors, but also against potential future competi-
tors from the E.U. and U.S. 
The U.K.-based retailers have been forced to revise their competitive 
strategies in the face of these international threats. The change in com-
petitive climate and strategies are likely to have a dramatic effect on future 
financial performance and hence on shareholder wealth. This paper 
demonstrates how CORE, an integrated financial appraisal framework, 
can be utilised, not just to explain the effects of historic strategies, but also 
to predict the effect of revised strategies on future financial performance. 
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Internal and External Coordination and Organizational Structures:  
The Case of a Leading European Company in the Canned and Frozen 
Vegetable Market 
Louis-George Soler, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, Paris, 
France 
Egizio Valceschini, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, Paris, France 
 
European food industries are confronted with large technological, organ-
izational and commercial changes. Among the present problems, those 
concerning product quality are important. Indeed, the gap between the 
quality of agricultural raw materials and the quality of required food 
products may be great, whereas the maintenance of competitive advan-
tages may reduce this gap. Moreover, food industries have to face an 
unstable and heterogeneous demand of quality, varying according to 
country and consumer market. 
The search for more flexible systems of production and management 
can contribute to solving these problems, but they are difficult to design 
and carry out due to the nature of agricultural supply: instability of raw 
produce, a great number of suppliers and variability in supplier skills. 
Hence, the supply function is getting more complex in the food industries 
and cannot be boiled down to a simple action of purchase and sales. 
To get a better understanding of the evolution of the supplying func-
tion, the authors have set up a research program with a firm. They present 
some results in the paper. They show that the evolution of the economical 
context leads to deep changes at two levels: (1) the internal coordination 
within the company between processing plants, and between commercial 
and agro-industrial actors; and (2) the external coordination between 
farmers and processing plants. 
 
 
Strategic Behavior and Interrelationships in the Food Chain:  
The Case of the Finnish Market 
Saara Hyvönen, Department of Economics and Management,    
University of Helsinki, Viikki, Finland 
Raija Volk, Pellervo Economic Research Institute, Helsinki, Finland 
 
The opening and internationalization of the food markets have stressed 
the importance to examine the relationships in the entire food chain as a 
source of competitiveness. Our study aims at analyzing cluster structures, 
interrelationships and the competitive strategies of firms in the food chain. 
The paper is devoted to two issues concerning interrelationships within 
the food chain. The structure and interrelationships are described at the 
industry level. Based on survey data collected from food manufacturing 
firms, we examine competitive advantages, bargaining power and 
organizational performance in the intermediate sector of the food chain. 
The field study might be characterized as firm level analysis rather than 
industry level analysis.   Abstracts 
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Quality Certification as a Key Success Factor in International Marketing 
of Food Products 
Niels Jørgensen, Department of Marketing,    
Southern Denmark Business School, Sønderborg, Denmark 
 
The paper deals with the importance of quality control certificates among 
suppliers of processed pork, and their importance when large customers 
from Sweden, Britain and Germany choose/reject suppliers. Important 
groups of purchasers of processed meat were interviewed about their 
criteria for their choice of supplier and their opinion of the significance of 
the ISO 9000 certificates in this connection. 
There are differences between the countries. The Germans attach more 
importance to quality certification than the British and the Swedes. There 
are also differences between the customer groups and within the various 
customer groups. 
A clear picture emerges of the importance large purchasers attach to the 
suppliers' quality certification. Quality control is of crucial importance and 
control is checked closely. Inferior quality in one or more dimensions will 
make the customer change supplier. This could be with regards to 
hygiene, variations in quality, delivery service or ability to supply. A 
certification can be a means of securing the desired quality level. 
For marketing reasons, international suppliers of processed meat will 
be compelled to get certification as soon as possible if they are not to lose 
market shares.  
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Conditions for Cooperative Business 
  
 
1  Institutional and Organisational Change 
in the European Food Sector:  
  A Meso-Level Perspective 
 
Torben Bager 
 
 
 
Since 1980 the European food industry has moved rapidly towards a more 
concentrated and internationalised structure. Some countries and food 
branches have felt this trend more strongly than others, but no country or 
branch has remained unaffected.  
This trend raises a number of profound questions. Does it imply that 
we are near the final victory of the transnational companies (TNCs) in the 
food sector, with small and medium-sized firms vanishing? Will food 
regulatory bodies weaken and be transferred from national to interna-
tional levels? Will the limited company form become increasingly domi-
nant, pushing other organisational forms such as family units and co-op-
eratives into marginal positions? In other words, are we moving towards 
true globalisation, or is it a more modest phenomenon which should be 
labelled Europeanisation rather than Globalisation? 
The answer to these questions relates to theoretical perspectives. The 
rich neo-Marxist literature on globalisation, food regimes, post-Fordism 
and state regulation – sometimes labelled Agricultural Sociology – sug-
gests that the changes seen in Europe and other regions of the world must 
be understood through macro-level analysis of global patterns (Friedmann 
and McMichael, 1989; Friedland et al., 1991; Goodman et al., 1987). By 
contrast, the literature on business economics usually departs from the 
micro-level, assuming that structural changes occurring are the 
aggregated outcome of individual actions.  
Neither of these approaches appears convincing vis-à-vis the European 
process. Micro-level economic theory tends to be blind to structural 
perspectives as well as to the socio-political aspects of the process. Macro-
level analysis of agro-food restructuring tends to neglect the fact that new 
global challenges within technology and economy more often than not 
meet with inertia on the part of institutions and organisations as well as 
collective action which may hinder or reshape them, or formulate new 
agendas to which techno-economic structures have to respond. Neglecting 
such social, organisational and institutional responses and challenges 
creates a ‘missing link’ in social research on agro-food restructuring and a 
risk of false generalisations being based on techno-economic determinism.  
Rather than viewing agro-food restructuring as a result of techno-eco-
nomic change flowing gradually downwards from global level, it should 
be seen as a complex, open-ended process with flows up as well as down, Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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and with meso-level socio-political structures sometimes acting and 
macro-level techno-economic structures reacting rather than the other way 
round. The ‘greening’ of agricultural politics and the rise of the organic 
farming movement during the 1980s illustrate such upward-moving 
processes. 
To understand the process better we need to bring institutional and 
organisational change within nation states and Europe into the analysis, 
focusing on the meso-level rather than the micro- and macro-levels. In 
other words, to grasp the European reality we need to understand the 
dynamics of ‘in between’ institutions and organisations better. 
The aim of this contribution is to demonstrate the importance of meso-
level analysis by outlining how the European agro-food sector has been 
restructured in recent years. It points to the fact that retailing, as well as 
food production, remain heterogeneous in Europe and predominantly na-
tional or European in orientation. Further it explores the issue of the 
present and likely future roles played by European co-operatives, bearing 
in mind that they were historically able to oppose, or at least weaken, the 
expansion of TNCs which are often claimed to be the ‘winners’ in agro-
food restructuring. Based on neo-institutional organisation theory, it 
focuses particularly on the question of conversion of co-operatives into 
limited companies, which seems to be a fairly open-ended process rather 
than the one-way one it is often assumed to be. 
 
 
Restructuring of the European Retail Sector 
 
The retail structure of Europe is currently undergoing rapid change. The 
old pattern dominated by local outlets, predominantly organised as in-
dependent family stores, is disappearing in favour of company-owned 
chains operating large numbers of integrated, or at least closely co-ordi-
nated, outlets.  
Supermarkets emerged in Europe in the 1950s, but only in recent dec-
ades an oligopolistic retail structure has appeared. In most countries a few 
national retail chains dominate the retail sector, increasingly competing 
with each other on the basis of positional logic. In such a structure, 
profiling is a must for retailers. Each of them elaborates his specific 
business strategy and attempts to create chain loyalty among customers, 
e.g. by using retailer brands or by pursuing a low cost strategy (Porter, 
1985).  
In addition to this old tendency towards concentration, Europeanisation 
became a marked trend in the 1980s. It deserves to be labelled Euro-
peanisation rather than Globalisation because cross-continental invest-
ments remain few, and because trade bloc building characterised the 
European economy more during the 1980s and 1990s than did true 
globalisation (Hirst and Thompson, 1992). Most European retailers remain 
national (or local) operators only, and those investing abroad have pre-
dominantly invested in other European countries. Few European retailers Institutional and Organisational Changes in the European Food Sector 
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have more than 50% of their activities abroad. Some European retailers 
have invested outside Europe, particularly in the USA, and some US re-
tailers in Europe, but such moves are the exception rather than the rule. 
The Europeanisation trend, which can be perceived as the next logical 
step for large national companies operating in saturated national markets, 
can be observed in two ways: (1) through increasing cross border 
investments and (2) through increasing cross border collaboration be-
tween retailers, particularly in the form of joint buying.  
Cross border investment is no new phenomenon, but it certainly 
intensified during the 1980s and 1990s: French corporations such as 
Carrefour and Promodès have invested in Spain, Portugal and Italy; the 
German company ALDI, which is the leading discount retailer in Europe, 
has invested in a number of neighbouring countries; the Danish company 
NETTO has invested in the UK and Germany, etc.  
Some observers have tended to exaggerate this process, arguing that a 
truly de-nationalised European retail structure is likely to occur within a 
few years. In fact it is not, since most food is still distributed by national 
retailers and since significant variations in consumer demands and re-
tailing traditions persist from one country to another. On the other hand it 
is certainly a marked trend, and the retail structure seems ripe for for-
mation of true European companies. 
The 1980s and 1990s have also been characterised by intensified cross-
border collaboration in the form of joint buying and marketing. Numbers 
of European associations of grocers and retailers were formed during the 
late 1980s, such as Associated Marketing Distribution, European Market-
ing Distribution, and European Retail Alliance. Joint buying is no new 
phenomenon (Nordic consumer co-operatives have organised joint buying 
since the 1920s), but it has intensified and is now the normal situation for 
large-scale retailers in Europe rather than the exception. The European 
associations mentioned above control an impressive potential buying 
power but they are fairly loose associations of national grocers and re-
tailers, not integrated companies. They may evolve into that, just as 
integrated retail companies have emerged at national level through 
increasing integration of once federative associations, but this is not the 
present situation and not the only option for federative organisations 
(Søgaard, 1994a). 
In spite of the Single Market and the trend towards Europeanisation 
mentioned, wide variations still exist between retailing methods in the EU 
member states. Retailers remain influenced by national trajectories in 
addition to the trends towards concentration and Europeanisation men-
tioned. An illustration is the way UK and German retailers developed 
during the 1980s. The leading and rapidly expanding UK food retailers 
(Sainsbury, Safeway, Tesco, Marks & Spencers) pursued a quality strategy, 
emphasising high quality and a high proportion of own label products, 
whereas the leading German retailers (particularly ALDI) pursued a low 
price strategy for standard goods.  Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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The difference between British and German retailing not only influ-
enced the way it developed but also the shaping of the relationship be-
tween retailers and food suppliers. Low-cost retailers generally prefer 
pure competitive relations with many suppliers, while high-quality re-
tailers tend to develop dependencies and institutional relations with only 
few suppliers. 
High-quality retailers in the UK illustrate this point in that they tend to 
interact with a limited number of fairly large, innovative suppliers over 
long periods of time (Shaw et al., 1992). This process leads UK retailers to 
employ large staffs in special departments, as do the innovative 
producers. Over the years ‘sticky knowledge’ therefore tends to build up 
on both sides concerning technology, products and organisational ‘secrets’ 
which create dependencies between the parties and contribute to their 
positioning as unique firms: the retailer can profile himself as selling 
unique products of guaranteed quality, and the supplier can benefit from 
improving his innovative abilities and from the prestige flowing from 
interaction with the advanced UK retailers (which in the terminology of 
innovation theory can be characterised as lead users or lead distributors 
(Von Hippel, 1988)). 
 
 
Restructuring of the European Food Industry 
 
The structure of the European food industry remains heterogeneous. On 
the one hand, Europe contains some of the world food production's giants. 
On the other, the number and market share of small and medium-sized 
producers is still very high, particularly in Southern Europe. 
Many observers have predicted that European food production will be-
come dominated by a few giants. Doubtless the concentration and Euro-
peanisation process will tend in this direction, but it is likely to be fairly 
slow. A heterogeneous industry structure will probably persist for many 
years to come, as most food in the EU still is produced by local, regional 
and national producers for their own local, regional and national markets. 
Italy may serve as an illustration. In 1981 Italian food companies em-
ployed an average of only nine persons each, 42% of all employees work-
ing in food companies with less than 20 employees. The dairy sector con-
sisted of some 3000 production units in 1985, handling on average only 1% 
of the milk processed by an average dairy unit in the Netherlands; and the 
price paid to an Italian farmer for a litre of milk was, and still is, 
substantially higher than that paid to other EU farmers, in spite of the 
common regulatory framework (Galizzi, 1990). 
With such a fragmented industry structure, one might expect Italian 
producers to have been outcompeted by or merged with foreign food 
companies since 1980. Generally speaking, this has not been the case. The 
process of concentration in Italy was rapid during the 1980s, but no more 
rapid than in the northern EU countries. Some Italian companies have 
been bought up by foreign companies but the asymmetry in foreign in-Institutional and Organisational Changes in the European Food Sector 
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vestments in Italy compared to Italian investment abroad is quite small, 
and smaller than in some other EU countries (Table 1). 
Table 1  Cross Country Mergers and Acquisitions in the Food Industry, 
1987–89 
 
 Acquisitions  Sales 
 
Belgium 7  15 
Denmark 12  7 
Germany (West)  8  45 
Greece 0  8 
France 160  113 
Ireland 8  7 
Italy 42  56 
Netherlands 75 51 
Portugal 0  7 
United Kingdom  299  255 
Source: Panorama of EC Industry, 1991/92 
 
The ‘secret’ of the Italian food companies seems to be their innovative 
character, paired with a fragmented retail structure and the international 
popularity of Italian food which has enabled medium-sized Italian food 
companies to become more international. 
This suggests that the process of concentration and Europeanisation in 
the EU, particularly marked since the Single Market was agreed on, is not 
likely to imply that small and medium-sized food companies will wither 
away, for which there are at least three good reasons. 
Firstly, not only large enterprises can become international. Small and 
medium-sized firms not only frequently succeed in exporting their goods; 
many succeed in establishing subsidiaries abroad. According to a survey, 
almost half of Danish companies with subsidiaries abroad have less than 
500 employees (Pedersen et al., 1993: 20).  
Secondly, the food sector differs from other economic sectors in that a 
lot of food is highly perishable and difficult to transport over long 
distances without impairment of quality. Combined with consumer 
worries over additives, industrial production methods etc., this gives local 
producers an advantage over foreign ones.  
Thirdly, food companies may follow different basic strategies with 
different implications for their optimal size and their need to interna-
tionalise. The basic strategic options for food companies seem to be (1) 
standard producer, (2) brand label producer, and (3) speciality producer 
(Bager and Sørensen, 1992). 
Standard producers are characterised by low R&D expenditure and low 
marketing costs. Their export rate may be high but they rarely have 
substantial production activities in other countries. Brand label producers 
are typically big companies with high R&D costs, high marketing costs, 
and exports and production abroad. Speciality producers are often 
neglected in the discussion of strategic options for food firms. Such pro-
ducers may be quite small, e.g. wine or cheese producers in a limited dis-Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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trict, but they may nevertheless sell their produce to high-price markets 
abroad, or they may be advanced subcontractors to retailers or brand label 
producers. 
This does not, of course, mean that the trends towards concentration 
and Europeanisation are an illusion. Both trends can be observed in all EU 
countries. It is also a fact that a significant proportion of the small 
companies are heavily dependent on bigger ones. The trends should not, 
however, be exaggerated to give an unrealistic picture of the likely food 
industry structure. The conclusion is not that a few giants are likely to 
produce most food in the EU in a few years but rather that the food 
industry will continue to be heterogeneous and that national or local ori-
entation will continue to play an important role. 
 
 
Agricultural Co-operatives and the Trends Towards Europeanisation and 
Concentration 
 
The heterogeneity of European food production also relates to organisa-
tional forms: limited companies, co-operatives and family enterprises all 
play important roles. 
Variations in European agricultural co-operatives among branches and 
countries are enormous. In some countries agricultural co-operatives play 
but a marginal role while in others, such as the Nordic countries, Ireland, 
France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, they control high market 
shares; furthermore, agricultural co-operatives are nearly absent in some 
agricultural branches while they are highly significant in others, 
particularly in dairying, in which market shares for co-operatives exceed 
50% in a number of European countries. Table 2 illustrates these 
variations. 
Table 2 indicates that the strength of co-operatives correlates with farm 
structure in that countries and branches characterised by a high 
proportion of family farms tend to have the strongest co-operatives: 
throughout Western Europe and in the USA dairying is characterised both 
by the dominance of family farming and high market shares for co-
operatives, while grain production, for instance, is typically dominated by 
big farms and estates, with low markets shares for co-operatives. 
Similarly, family farm dominated countries like the Nordic ones and the 
Netherlands tend to have high market shares for co-operatives while for 
instance the UK and Spain, with a prevalence of big farms and estates, 
have lower shares. The probable reason for this structural correlation is 
that family farmers can overcome the difficulties associated with the 
formation of co-operatives more easily than differentiated farmers, being 
many producers who share the same basic interests.1 
Transaction Cost Economics add a cost dimension to the structural 
argument (Williamson, 1975; 1985). The high share of co-operatives in the 
dairy sector seems to relate to the high transaction frequency in this 
industry. Even with cooling techniques, daily delivery of milk is normal. Institutional and Organisational Changes in the European Food Sector 
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The farmer cannot hold back if prices are low, and delivery to the nearest 
dairy was frequently the only realistic option in the old days, due to 
transport difficulties. This created, and still creates, a particular need for 
trust between the two parties in this sector in order to keep the flow of 
milk going and to protect investments (Bonus, 1986). 
 
 
Table 2 Cooperatives' Shares of Agricultural Marketing Activity 
in the Late 1980s, Selected Countries and Commodities (%) 
 
 Dairy  Slaugh-  Grain  Poultry  Fruits  and  Country 
   tering      vegetables  average 
 
Sweden  99 80 80 70  - 82 
Finland  97 94 73 60  - 81 
Norway  100 74  - 73 40 73 
Denmark  87 90 48 55  - 70 
Ireland  100 35  - 64 34 58 
W.  Germany  79 30 55  - 46 53 
Netherlands  87 25  - 17 80 52 
France  44 37 52  - 28 40 
United  States  78 37 52  - 17 40 
Sector  average  86 58 58 50 41   
Source: After Cobia 1989:86 
 
The variations observed cannot, however, be explained solely on the basis 
of structural and techno-economic factors. Co-operatives are more than 
merely a special type of business organisation which arises and prospers 
when certain structural conditions are fulfilled and their organisational 
advantages outweigh those of other business organisations (Bager, 1996). 
They are also the result of historical events, heavily influenced by social, 
political and institutional factors. 
The reason these ‘soft’ factors must be considered has to do with the 
very reason for the formation of marketing co-operatives: the large num-
bers of small family farms confronting large corporations in the supply 
and processing parts of the food chain and in need of protection. Protec-
tion can either be achieved through political strength and resulting 
legislative and regulatory measures, or economic strength achieved by the 
formation of co-operatives or bargaining associations, i.e. by building up 
countervailing economic power (Galbraith, 1980).  
The building of farmers' political and economic strength is two sides of 
the same coin in many countries. Agricultural co-operatives add to farm-
ers' political strength by controlling part of the food industry, and farmers' 
political influence often results in certain economic privileges for 
agricultural co-operatives, e.g. tax reduction and the right to form 
monopolies.2  
Interrelated structures of this kind are particularly common in small 
European countries like the Nordic ones and the Netherlands, character-
ised by family farm dominance, powerful farmer associations and high 
market shares for co-operatives. In such countries a fairly closed regula-Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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tory system for the agro-food sector has emerged, with agricultural min-
istries, farmer associations and agricultural co-operatives collaborating 
closely under the hegemony of farmers who set the institutional ‘rules of 
the game’ (North, 1990; Just, 1990). 
These national regulatory systems for the agro-food sector have been 
increasingly challenged in recent years. As argued below, the fading of 
agricultural co-operatives add to this development, but there are at least 
three other important factors influencing it: (1) increasing free trade, (2) a 
decreasing number of farmers, and (3) the agro-environmental problem. 
Free trade leads to cross-border trade and investments as well as to 
decreasing agricultural prices in the protected European countries, unless 
full compensation is allocated to agriculture – which is not a likely option, 
not even in home-market oriented countries, because farmers' political 
strength is weakening. The agro-environmental issue was high on the 
agenda in most European countries during the 1980s, particularly in the 
Northern ones, and tended to break up the national regulatory systems in 
that environmental ministries and organisations became strong players, 
interfering in decision-making in the agro-food system and to some extent 
reducing farmers' hegemony over agricultural ministries (Just, 1994). 
 
 
Agricultural Co-operatives and the International Challenge 
 
Agricultural co-operatives link together farm production, food processing 
and food marketing. This linkage may in principle be established at all 
geographical levels, but historically it has only been applied at local, 
regional and national levels, not the international one. With few excep-
tions, European agricultural co-operatives have members in one country 
only. They participate in nation-building to such an extent that they 
hardly even consider the option of becoming truly international co-op-
eratives. 
The national regulatory systems are, particularly in EU member states, 
challenged by the Europeanisation of the food industry and retailing. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s cross country mergers were frequent 
within these sectors, resulting in a process of increasing concentration in 
both, according to the logic of countervailing power. 
In some EU countries, particularly Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland 
and France, agricultural co-operatives have been international for many 
years in the sense that they exported a significant proportion of their 
production, though not in the sense that they produced abroad. In the 
1980s this began to change. Some co-operatives decided to expand abroad 
or to diversify their activities, and for such purposes they needed to find 
new ways of attracting capital. Table 3 provides an overview of the 
international activities of the major co-operatives in France, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark in 1993. 
Agricultural co-operatives with heavy international involvement and 
production abroad tend to apply new financial models, of which three Institutional and Organisational Changes in the European Food Sector 
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may be identified: conversion to a limited company; formation of a limited 
subsidiary, and the issue of high-interest shares to members and non-
farmers.  
 
Table 3  Internationalisation of Major Agricultural Cooperatives in 
Selected European Countries, 1993 
 
Name of cooperative  Country  Turnover  Production 
   abroad  (%)  abroad 
 
Arkadie France  10 no 
Cana France  17  no 
Socopa France  20  yes 
Sodiaal France  19  yes 
Unicopa France  22 no 
Campina Netherlands  47 yes 
Coberco Netherlands  53 no 
Coveco Netherlands  44  no 
Cehave-Encebe Netherlands  38  no 
Friesland Netherlands  66 yes 
Avenmore Ireland  66    yes 
An Bord Bainne  Ireland  100   yes 
Dairygold   Ireland  30  no 
Golden Vale  Ireland  58   yes 
Kerry Group  Ireland  66   yes 
Waterford Ireland  70    yes 
Danish Crown  Denmark  70  no 
ESS-Food   Denmark  99   yes 
Kløver   Denmark  25  no 
MD Foods   Denmark  61   no 
MD Foods Int'l   Denmark  100   yes 
Vestjyske   Denmark  80   yes 
Source: Hybholt 1994 
 
The first method was applied by a number of the Irish dairy co-operatives, 
which have reorganised their organisations since 1986 into limited 
companies and thus attracted non-farmer capital through the Stock 
Exchange (Butler, 1989). Although in formal terms farmers remain 
majority shareholders, their control seems likely to decrease over the years 
(Harte, 1995; Jacobsen, 1992).  
One of the major ‘co-operatives’ in Ireland, the Kerry Group, serves to 
illustrate this point. Since its reorganisation into a limited company in 
1987, it has expanded its international involvement and diversified its 
activities significantly, increasing its turnover from EIP 291 in 1987 to EIP 
827 in 1992. 
Some co-operatives in Denmark and France applied another model: the 
formation of subsidiaries for international activities organised as limited 
companies. The Danish dairy co-operative MD Foods illustrates this 
strategy. In 1989 it established a subsidiary, MD Foods International, 
based on 50% non-farmer capital. MD Foods International has since 
invested in a number of foreign countries, particularly the UK. In the long 
run the turnover of the subsidiary might exceed that of the parent Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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company, and it is doubtful whether farmer control in such a situation 
could be maintained if the subsidiary needs a major injection of capital.  
The third model for capital attraction has been applied by some Dutch 
and French co-operatives, which issued high-interest shares to members 
and non-farmer investors. This model does not change the member 
controlled organisation, since shareholders have no voting power. 
The trend for food producers increasingly to engage in product innova-
tion and diversification tends to weaken agricultural co-operatives for two 
reasons: co-operatives are less experienced in product innovation than 
their limited competitors, as they have hitherto emphasised low risk 
standard goods production (Søgaard, 1994b); and diversification is 
difficult for agricultural co-operatives as it weakens the link between 
members' production and the processing and marketing activities of the 
co-operatives: the backbone of the co-operative construction. 
To sum up, there are a number of reasons for the observed trend 
towards conversion of agricultural co-operatives. Some have to do with 
competitive pressure; others with softer types of internal or external 
influence which, over the years, undermine their identity as member-
controlled, member-oriented enterprises (Bager, 1992). 
Conversion of co-operatives seems particularly likely when vigorous 
environmental pressure is combined with weak internal reproduction of 
identity (Stryjan, 1989), as in many old, large-scale co-operatives. Market 
and state pressures have tended to increase, and the emergence of large, 
complex co-operative organisations has challenged the democratic 
structure of the co-operatives and empowered employees to control 
information flow and influence decisions. Member orientation – the true 
touchstone of the co-operative identity – has tended to become increas-
ingly mixed up with profit orientation. This is probably the key to 
understanding the observed trend towards conversion. 
It ought to be stressed, though, that the conversion trend is a long term 
process and that conversion into the limited organisational form has 
hitherto been the exception rather than the rule. The dominant feature has 
been conversion from genuine co-operatives to hybrid forms. 
 
 
Applying Neo-institutional Organisation Theory in the Analysis of the 
Conversion of Agricultural Co-operatives 
 
The observed trends in the European retail and food producing sectors 
suggest that macro-level analysis, based on system determinism and the 
hypothesis of globalisation and TNC expansion, is insufficient to under-
stand the European process. Such macro-level analysis needs additional 
meso-level analysis of agro-food restructuring in countries and large 
regions such as Europe, based on theories on how economic and technical 
change interact with collective action and with institutional and organ-
isational change. Macro-level analysis needs to be combined with research 
into how institutions and social actors in countries and regions react Institutional and Organisational Changes in the European Food Sector 
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against or reshape global agro-food challenges, or formulate new agendas, 
bearing in mind that the bulk of social action and institutional 
restructuring takes place at lower levels than the global one. 
Neo-institutional organisation theory forms a promising point of de-
parture for such an endeavour. This theory draws attention to the ‘softer’ 
types of pressures and influence coming from outside as well as inside 
organisations rather than to economic or technical ones, suggesting that 
there are two basic types of isomorphism: competitive and institutional. 
Early formulations suggested the former being of particular relevance in 
business organisations and the latter in non-profit organisations and 
public organisations predominantly shaped by political and social 
processes. More recent research has questioned this early tendency to 
identify technical and competitive issues with for-profit organisations and 
institutional issues with non-profit organisations. It is increasingly 
recognised that the cultural, political and normative processes which neo-
institutionalism has called attention to are also relevant to business 
organisations3; and, conversely, that technical-competitive issues are 
relevant to non-profit organisations.4 
By means of the concept of institutional isomorphism the theory par-
ticularly seeks to explain, “why there is such startling homogeneity of 
organisational forms and practices” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148). The 
basic hypothesis is that homogeneity is produced by organisations 
influencing one another and being influenced collectively by external and 
internal processes. The concept refers both to the direct, power-based 
influence which may leave an organisation in a few-choices or a no-choice 
situation, and to the ‘softer’, non-power-based influence which in informal 
ways transfers the characteristics of one organisation to the other or 
operates from within the organisation itself. 
The theory further suggests that there are three basic forms of institu-
tional isomorphism: “(1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political 
influence and the problem of legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from 
standard responses to uncertainty; and (3) normative isomorphism, associated 
with professionalisation” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150).  
Neo-institutional organisation theory and the concept of isomorphism 
promise to further our understanding of why for-profit organisations, co-
operatives, non-profit organisations and other types of organisation 
operating within the same societal sector, increasingly tend to resemble 
one another (Scott and Meyer, 1991). That is what makes it appropriate for 
the analysis of the trend towards conversion of co-operatives selected in 
this article as the prime ‘test field’ for the theory.  
Isomorphic processes influencing co-operatives are mediated by a num-
ber of sources, including the members and the co-operative institutional 
framework, but in ambiguous ways. Some tend to strengthen the 
reproduction of their identity while others undermine it. The co-operative 
institutional framework, i.e. co-operative legislation and the myriad 
federative co-operatives at sectorial, national and international level 
(Søgaard, 1994a), tends for instance to strengthen the identity of co-op-Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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eratives, while sectorized institutional frameworks tend to weaken it 
where non-co-operatives dominate. It is therefore important to focus on 
the balance between these two adverse processes which result in either 
homogenisation with other co-operatives (congruent isomorphism) or 
homogenisation with non-co-operatives (non-congruent isomorphism) 
(Bager, 1994). 
The observed trend to conversion of co-operatives seems to be caused 
by a long-term shift in the balance between congruent and non-congruent 
isomorphism. Congruent isomorphism has tended to weaken, and this, 
with decreasing member control, paved the way for increasing non-con-
gruent isomorphism. There are, though, significant variations in this trend 
from country to country and sector to sector.  
Faced with the challenge of analysing the conversion of co-operatives, 
neo-institutional theory suffers from three major shortcomings: (1) its 
focus on activity rather than form, implying a neglect of the co-operative 
institutional framework, (2) its focus on normative isomorphism rooted in 
the employees and neglect of normative isomorphism rooted in the 
members, and (3) its narrow focus on institutional aspects and neglect of 
competitive aspects which, due to the double character of a co-operative 
as enterprise and association, ought to be replaced by a more balanced 
approach. 
Qualitative empirical analysis of isomorphic processes affecting co-
operatives seems possible through three stages: (1) identification of the 
sources of isomorphism, (2) categorisation of these sources into congruent 
and non-congruent forms, and (3) evaluation of their importance. 
The sources of isomorphism may be grouped according to their 
position in society and their position as congruent or non-congruent 
isomorphism as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1  Sources of Congruent and Non-Congruent Isomorphism 
Affecting Agricultural Cooperatives 
 
  Congruent Isomorphism  Non-Congruent Isomorphism 
 
Political/  Protective legislation on  General company legislation; 
    Administrative       co-ops and family farms;   
    System  National cooperative associations  National business associations  
Economic System  Competition with  Competition with 
      co-operatives      non-co-operatives 
Social System  Normative isomorphism Normative  isomorphism 
      stemming from members      stemming from employees 
 
Taken together, the importance of congruent isomorphism on European 
agricultural co-operatives seems to be stable or decreasing, while that of 
non-congruent isomorphism appears to be growing. The importance of 
normative isomorphism mediated by employees seems growing through-
out Europe, while competitive isomorphism mediated by non-co-
operative competitors or coercive isomorphism mediated by sectorised 
institutional frameworks also appear to be growing in importance. Institutional and Organisational Changes in the European Food Sector 
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The impact on the agro-food system of an overweight of non-congruent 
isomorphism, and hence a trend to conversion of agricultural co-opera-
tives, is different in countries with farmer-dominated regulatory systems 
from that in countries with less farmer influence. In the former, the fading 
of co-operatives does not necessarily imply less farmer control over the 
agro-food sector, since they also control the sectorised institutional 
framework, while in other countries it may undermine the economic and 
institutional protection of family farms.  
 
 
An Illustration: The Consequences of Isomorphic Pressures on Danish 
and Norwegian Dairy Co-operatives 
 
Danish and Norwegian dairy co-operatives may serve to illustrate these 
points. In Norway the corporatist, agro-industrial regulatory system is 
highly comprehensive and has a substantial direct and indirect bearing on 
dairy co-operatives. They are granted privileges and even monopolistic 
rights, e.g. by appointing co-operative dairies as the sole suppliers of dairy 
products within their districts; they are obliged to perform administrative 
duties for the public authorities to such an extent that they “have tended to 
lose their co-operative character, i.e. their identity as organisations which promote 
the interests of the members” (Røkholt, 1982: 159); they are subordinated to 
the farmer associations, which have the biggest say in negotiations with 
the Government, and they seem generally to have lost competitiveness 
and innovativeness as a result of their clientilist relation to the regulatory 
system.  
In Denmark the national and EU regulatory system also has a bearing 
on the dairy co-operatives, but the influence is more modest. They enjoy 
some tax advantages compared to limited companies, but the government 
does not provide them with any sort of monopolistic position. It collabo-
rates closely with the co-operatives and farmer associations, and some-
times delegates administrative duties to them, e.g. EU milk quota regu-
lation, but this collaboration has not placed the co-operatives in a clien-
tilist position as in Norway. Furthermore, they have not been subordi-
nated to the farmer associations but have co-operated with them on equal 
terms.  
While coercive isomorphism mediated by the institutional framework is 
more modest in Danish dairy co-operatives than Norwegian ones, the 
opposite applies to competitive isomorphism. Danish dairy co-operatives 
face severe competition from other EU enterprises, co-operative as well as 
non-co-operative. Though co-operatives still influence one another 
markedly, e.g. by copying each others' organisation strategies, the 
influence of non-co-operatives on co-operatives through the mechanisms 
of market and technology seems to be growing. 
Taken together, non-congruent isomorphism seems to dominate the 
Norwegian dairy co-operatives, while Danish ones enjoy a more balanced 
situation. In Norway the important sectorised institutional framework, the Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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dominance of farmer associations, and the close collaboration between 
farmer associations and the State, have undermined the identity of the 
dairy co-operatives. Their important role as administrators of public 
regulations has, in combination with their monopolistic position, 
transformed them into quasi-public bodies. In Denmark the greatest 
challenge is a combination of increasing isomorphic pressure from private 
competitors and growing normative isomorphism mediated by 
employees, pulling agricultural co-operatives in the direction of quasi-
corporations. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Macro-level theory on agro-food restructuring has focused rather 
narrowly on globalisation, the expansion of the TNCs, and the role of 
macro-level institutional frameworks. It has tended to perceive agro-food 
restructuring as a top-down process induced by techno-economic change 
at global level.  
The present contribution questions the macro-level approach and its 
basic assumptions. Down to top change is also an option, as is global agro-
food restructuring induced by socio-political change. Socio-political 
change is particularly important at the geographical meso-level. Insti-
tutions and organisations such as consumer pressure groups, the organic 
farming movement and national agro-food regulatory systems are pri-
marily located at the meso-level. 
This makes analysis of ‘in between’ institutions and organisations in 
nations and regions important in the sense that they mediate between the 
macro- and the micro-levels, improving our understanding of meso-level 
responses to global challenges as well as inducement of meso-level socio-
political change at macro-level. 
Neo-institutional theory appears appropriate for the analysis of 
institutional and organisational change. This is illustrated here by an 
analysis of the tendency of agricultural co-operatives in Europe to convert, 
arguing that this trend is not only caused by ‘hard’ techno-economic 
factors, but also by ‘soft’ ones such as the growing importance of non-
congruent isomorphic pressures on co-operatives. 
Empirical investigation of the European agro-food sector and analysis 
of the conversion of co-operatives point to a number of conclusions which 
question some of the results of macro-level analysis: 
•  The European agro-food sector remains heterogeneous and rather 
fragmented. Most food still comes from national producers and is dis-
tributed by national retailers. The ‘winners’ during the 1980s and 1990s 
were large national corporations with an European outlook rather than 
the TNCs, and the ‘losers’ were small-scale family enterprises. 
•  The present trend towards internationalisation in the European agro-
food sector ought to be labelled Europeanisation rather than Globali-
sation. Cross continental investments remain the exception rather than Institutional and Organisational Changes in the European Food Sector 
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the rule, and trade bloc building is an important feature in Europe as 
well as in America and Asia. 
•  European farmers have long had a significant influence on the agenda 
of the agro-food sector significantly, at least in Central and Northern 
Europe. In a number of European countries national regulatory 
systems, in which farmer associations, agricultural co-operatives and 
agricultural ministries participate, have dominated the scene for 
decades, and to some extent this applies to the EU. These national 
regulatory systems are challenged by the free trade trend, decreasing 
political influence on the part of farmers, the agro-environmental 
problem and the tendency of agricultural co-operatives to transform. 
Yet, farmer influence remains substantial. 
•  Though they are challenged by the trends towards concentration and 
Europeanisation, co-operatives remain important in Europe. The 
Europeanisation trend creates a dilemma for agricultural co-operatives 
a s  t h e y  w e r e  c o n s t r u c t e d  a s  p a r t  o f  n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g  p r o c e s s e s .  T h e  
process of concentration in the food industry further aggravates the 
situation. 
•  These challenges open co-operatives to long-term, gradual conversion 
into hybrid organisations or convergence into limited companies. The 
dominant feature hitherto has been conversion into hybrid organisa-
tions, in some cases quasi-public organisations, in other cases into 
quasi-corporations. Yet the expectation that co-operatives will dis-
appear completely, and with them a channel for farmer influence, is 
dubious. National and European regulatory systems, farmer associa-
tions, and hybrid ‘co-operatives’ are likely to continue influencing the 
restructuring of the agro-food sector. 
 
Bringing meso-level perspectives and theories such as neo-institutional 
organisation theory into macro-level analysis of agro-food restructuring, 
as attempted in this analysis, promises to help reformulate, enrich and 
strengthen the interesting field of Agricultural Sociology. Based on its 
macro-level, political economy approach, Agricultural Sociology has 
identified important features of contemporary agro-food restructuring 
such as the globalisation of commodity systems and the prominent role of 
the TNCs. Yet it has also tended to exaggerate and generalise these fea-
tures and trends, thereby opening itself to criticism. Meso-level ap-
proaches, focusing on institutional and organisational change as well as 
collective action, may help to overcome these weaknesses. 
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Notes 
 
1  On the basis of US data and of microeconomic reasoning, Caves and Petersen (1986) reach 
a similar conclusion, saying that market shares of cooperatives vary with farmer 
homogeneity and closeness of cooperative activities to farmers’ production and interests.  
 
2  In the USA and EU farmer cooperatives are exempt from general anti-trust legislation. 
The EU has largely copied US legislation in this respect, dating back to the Capper-
Volstead Act (1922). Similar legislation exists in other European countries, but is not 
unquestioned. In Sweden an Act of 1993 limited the right of farmer cooperatives to build 
national associations. 
 
3  A study of business organisations in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea illustrates this point, 
concluding that “institutional arrangements have a paramount role and can be observed at the 
very core of market-regulated, technically dominated environments” (Orrù et al., 1991: 362). 
 
4  Many organisations belonging to the so-called Third Sector – or l’Économie Sociale (the 
Social Economy) – illustrate this point in that they combine economic, social and political 
goals. The economic side of Third Sector organisations is particularly evident in the case of 
identity between the dominant and beneficiary categories (Gui, 1991: 555ff).  
 
2  The International Cooperative as a 
Partnership: Legal Aspects 
 
 
Ruud Galle 
 
 
 
The playing field of the international food industry is ever changing. 
Internationalization, globalization, mergers and takeovers, on the side of 
supply as well as demand, change the picture daily. These developments 
do not pass the cooperatives active in the food section. They, too, are being 
confronted with internationalization, mergers and takeovers. The question 
arises whether the cooperative structure as such can form an obstruction 
for an active participation in this process. Does the cooperative structure 
play a positive or a negative part in cross-border adventures? Which are 
the special (legal) aspects of international forms of cooperation, meaning 
cooperative joint-ventures as well as international legal amalgamation 
between cooperatives? 
 
 
The Cooperative as an Ideological Formula and/or as an Enterprise and 
Legal Entity 
 
Ever since the middle of the last century the cooperative has strongly 
developed, in particular in the food industry. Initially, the cooperative 
formula served mostly as a countervailing power. In this sense the coop-
erative has been very successful in many countries. Small entrepreneurs, 
often farmers, joined forces in order to obtain a strong position in the mar-
ket. The purpose was, of course, to obtain such a significant position in the 
market that a fair price could be negotiated. Quite often the cooperators 
chose a forward integration into the processing chain. In that case the 
cooperative no longer functions only as a commercial link but operates 
their own factories in which the raw materials are processed into 
consumer products, and the members/producers get the possibility to de-
termine themselves in what form and at what price the products were 
eventually offered on the market. Roughly, big, often internationally 
operating cooperative food industries arose in this way. Ideology played a 
part as well. However, the many cooperative schools which existed at the 
end of the last century all preached different theories. Whereas in 
Southern Europe the consumers' purchasing cooperatives and employees' 
cooperatives mostly developed, in Western and Northern Europe mainly 
entrepreneurs' cooperatives came into being. The smaller entrepreneurs 
were driven to their cooperative association by their ideal of freedom. The International Cooperative as a Partnership: Legal Aspects 
 
21 
What has remained of these ideologies? Study of the legislation on 
cooperatives of several Western European countries leads to the conclu-
sion that this ideology is of a relative significance only. This certainly 
seems to be the case for the respective cooperative laws of the Central and 
Northern European countries and to a less extent for those of the Southern 
European countries. In the further analysis I abstract from ideology. In the 
context of this paper, I see the cooperative mainly as an enterprise formula 
which is assumed by small entrepreneurs; these entrepreneurs are linked 
to their cooperatives not on the basis of ideological considerations but 
exclusively for economic reasons. These days a member of a cooperative is 
not a cooperator in the ideological sense but a cooperator who does not 
apply the ideological doctrine but prefers to use his calculator. 
The cooperative is a hybrid legal form. It is an enterprise form, a legal 
entity, a special type of association. The cooperative is defined as such in 
the different laws, whilst – as argued – the legislator mostly abstracts from 
ideology. However, in some countries, for instance Belgium and certain 
American States, the ancient ideological principles are still of importance 
if the cooperative wants to qualify for tax or anti-trust-related benefits. 
 
 
National Legal Definitions: Essential Elements 
 
Each time a specific object appears to be the decisive factor for the co-
operative. Whereas in the legal systems of most countries, the founders of 
a legal entity like a foundation, a company, or an association are free to 
determine the object themselves, this is different in case of a cooperative. 
Here it is the legislator who has determined the object. The cooperative 
has a ‘Förderungsauftrag’, as it is called in German. The cooperative is 
supposed to function exclusively for the benefit of its members by 
reaching agreements with these members and thus providing their eco-
nomic needs. Such need may be a highest possible price for the agrarian 
products supplied, a lowest possible price for the fertilizer supplied by the 
cooperative, or the granting of credit at the lowest possible interest rate. 
Thus the cooperative conducts business for the benefit of the members, 
not for the benefit of shareholders. Hence, the cooperative is not 
considered to be an association of capital but an association of persons. 
This makes the cooperative a ‘non-profit enterprise’ to the extent that 
the object is not to make profit for the benefit of third parties but to render 
services for the benefit of the members against the most favorable tariff. 
The cooperative is an ‘operation at cost’. Thus, the cooperative is a 
commercial enterprise because it is, of course, the economic result that 
counts. This is not different if, like in Belgium, the cooperative is indicated 
in the law as a company and not as an association. In many countries, also 
in Germany, the cooperative has the obligation to issue shares. Sometimes 
this was a reason for the legislator to indicate the cooperative as a 
company/societé/Gesellschaft, while in other instances, like in Germany, 
alliance is sought with the notion of association/association/Verein. In Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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this sense the cooperative is what is referred to as 
‘Rechtsformunabhängig’. Decisive factors are the object and thus the act-
ing as a non-profit enterprise in the above-mentioned sense. In view of the 
specific object, it is not surprising that the member ownership and thus the 
member control always appear as an essential element. The cooperative 
exists for the sake of the members and not for the sake of third parties.  
Payment is made on the basis of proportionality. The extent of the 
economic activity between a member and the cooperative determines to 
what degree the member enjoys the advantages which the cooperative is 
able to provide to him. This does not alter the fact that certain legal 
systems also know the possibility, sometimes in addition, to settle on the 
basis of contribution of capital. 
It appears that in most law systems the following elements are essential 
for the cooperative: 
•  The objective – the ‘Förderungsauftrag’, 
•  Commercial activity; non-profit enterprise, 
• Operation  at  cost, 
• Member  ownership, 
• Member  control,  and 
•  Principle of proportionality. 
 
It is significant that especially in those countries which have chosen the 
association structure and not the company structure, there exists a large 
flexibility – when organizing any form of cooperative cooperation, one 
may strongly deviate from the above-mentioned essential elements. Such 
deviation from the legal standard type may give rise to the question 
whether at any moment one can still speak of a cooperative. Such 
questions must, of course, be answered according to national law. In view 
of the abstraction from ideology as mentioned above – and as has 
appeared that the cooperative is ‘Rechtsformunabhängig’ – this is not of 
interest in this context. 
 
 
Private Character 
 
As stated above the cooperative functions exclusively for the benefit of the 
members. In many countries this is a legal starting point. However, quite 
often the legislator allows to a limited extent that transactions are 
concluded with third parties which are of the same nature as those 
concluded with its own members. Sometimes this limitation is of a quan-
titative nature, sometimes of a qualitative nature. This option may be of 
great significance, in particular for agricultural cooperatives, for instance 
in order to prevent factories from not being utilized to the maximum. 
Assuming that doing business with third parties is allowed, it is possible 
to divide the cooperative business activities in three segments, namely (1) 
the primary, (2) the secondary and (3) the tertiary business. The primary 
business consists of concluding transactions with the members. The The International Cooperative as a Partnership: Legal Aspects 
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members must – as the Americans call it – ‘patronize their cooperative’. 
They are constantly concluding transactions with their cooperative, mostly 
on an exclusive basis. The secondary business of the cooperative consists 
of the processing of the supplied products in the cooperative's factories. If 
considered a separate management operation, the nature and organization 
of the secondary business does not differ from those of a non-cooperative 
enterprise. The difference is, of course, that the secondary business is not 
conducted for the benefit of shareholders, but is to be considered a 
continuation of the primary business, thus an exploitation with the object 
to obtain for the members the highest possible price for raw materials. The 
tertiary business consists of concluding similar transactions, not with 
members but with third parties. For reasons of a legal nature, this tertiary 
business will remain of limited extent. 
In view of the economic characteristics of the cooperative, with its 
limitations resulting from legal provisions, the cooperative must be 
considered to be of a private nature. 
In most countries there is privacy to the extent that the member is sup-
posed to do business with his cooperative on an exclusive basis. This is 
not so everywhere. In a country like the Netherlands, for instance, the 
obligation to supply or to purchase, depending on the type of cooperative, 
must explicitly be agreed on. The exclusivity leads to a certain privacy. 
The same applies to the legal object. The cooperative functions for the 
benefit of the members exclusively or, in case of a tertiary business, 
mainly for the benefit of the members. Therefore it is not strange that the 
cooperative is financed by the members. Self-financing has always been a 
characteristic of the cooperative form of association, having as a logical 
consequence the member ownership and member control, referred to 
above. 
Does the private character lead to the conclusion that a venture fi-
nancing with the assistance of third parties is impossible? The answer is 
‘no’. Of course, a question like this should be considered per jurisdiction. 
However, in general it can be stated that, certainly in Western Europe, the 
legislator allows several financing instruments to the cooperators. An 
exception may be Belgium. In most cases the association form has its 
limits. Of course, the participant in the equity formation requires a 
dividend as well as a vote. Both are possible, but only to the extent that the 
principles of member ownership and member control remain in force. 
 
 
Internationalization of the Cooperative 
 
The term internationalization focuses on primary business. Internation-
alization of the secondary businesses was never a problem. If we study the 
activities of the major agricultural cooperatives, it appears that they 
belong to the major exporters and importers. Internationalization of the 
primary business arises if cooperatives have members at the other side of Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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the border or because cooperatives of a different nationality exploit 
together a secondary business for the benefit of their respective members. 
 
 
Legal Instruments – European Cooperative Society (SCE) 
 
Which legal instruments are available? The most simple form of inter-
nationalization of primary business is, of course, the international mem-
bership. The agrarian domiciled in country A can be a member of a coop-
erative established in country B. Private international law, in particular if 
somewhat harmonized, like in the European Community, can offer a 
solution. The parties will make a choice of law, probably in favor of the 
laws of the country where the cooperative is established. Then this law 
governs the membership relation. 
Internationalization may furthermore be affected by cooperatives 
established in different countries, working together. Of course, a contrac-
tual joint venture is always a possibility. Feasible is also a joint venture 
having legal entity. In this event one may opt for a joint subsidiary but 
also for a joint cooperative mother. The problem, of a more psychological 
nature, is that this cooperative mother, the head or top cooperative, will be 
a legal entity according to the laws of either country A or country B. The 
solution is, of course, a harmonized international entity, that is to say, a 
legal structure which has the same identity in several countries. In the 
European Community we know only one such entity, namely the EEIG 
(European Economic Interest Grouping). This European Economic Interest 
Grouping certainly has some characteristics of a cooperative. Yet, the 
EEIG did not become a success because of the many restrictions which 
apply to this legal structure. 
The outcome of the above-mentioned international cooperative through 
a cooperative international holding is the European Cooperative Society 
(SCE)1. It is the intention of the European Commission that the European 
Cooperative Society, abbreviated SCE, will become an additional 
cooperative legal structure in all member states of the European 
Community, consequently next to the own cooperative. The establishment 
of such an SCE is possible if the activities are spread over several member 
states.  
The first draft for a ‘Regulation of the Council of the European Com-
munity concerning the status of the European cooperative society’ was 
published in Pb EC C99 (1992, p. 17 u/i 35). The amended proposal was 
published in Pb EC C236 (31 August 1993, p. 17 ff). 
According to Article 1, paragraph 2, of the draft Regulation, to be called 
hereinafter ‘the Regulation’, the SCE is “a company, the capital of which 
has been divided into shares”. According to paragraph 1 of this Article, 
SCEs may be established under the name of European cooperative society 
everywhere within the Community under the terms of and in the way as 
prescribed by the Regulation. The object of the SCE has been prescribed by The International Cooperative as a Partnership: Legal Aspects 
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the Regulation (paragraph 3), viz. “fulfilling the needs and stimulation of 
the economic and/or social activities of its members”. 
In view of the contents of Article 1 and the name European Cooperative 
Society, the society referred to is a company with a cooperative objective. 
This society does have members. The conclusion must be that the SCE is 
also an association. Upon closer consideration of the cooperative business 
enterprises, the distinction company/association appears to be less 
important than often assumed. The partnership structure indicates, like it 
does here, that the participants must contribute in a capital which is 
divided into shares. However, here the capital is variable, as is the number 
of members (Article 1, paragraph 4). 
If the SCE is established by legal entities, then the capital must amount 
to at least 100,000 ECU. If the SCE is established by private persons, then 
the capital must amount to at least 50,000 ECU. The shares are nominal. 
There can be different kinds of shares (Article 15). A member must take 
shares. According to Article 15, paragraph 5, the articles of association 
should determine how many shares one has to buy at least in order to 
obtain the membership. Upon study of the different provisions of the 
Regulation in this respect it is concluded that the share can certainly not 
be compared with the share known from company law. The most 
significant difference is that the share can be cashed upon termination of 
the membership, just like with the German ‘Genossenschaft’ and the 
Belgian cooperative company. The exposure of the member is in principle 
the same as the exposure of the shareholder of a company; that is to say 
that he can only be called to fully pay up the share, or as the Regulation 
puts it in Article 1, paragraph 5: “The members may be called to account 
for the commitments of the SCE only up to the amount of their share in the 
capital”. However, it may be determined in the statutes that the liability – 
not towards third parties but towards the legal entity SCE, as may be 
assumed – can be extended to a multiple of the capital taken or to any 
other amount determined in the statutes. This facility corresponds with 
regulations existing in member states where, unlike in the Netherlands, a 
legal regulation of a cooperative with shares also exists. 
Another important difference with shares of a company consists of the 
possibility to pay dividend on the shares, independent from the results of 
the company (which, for cooperatives, is difficult to determine), but on the 
basis of the size of the economic interaction between the cooperative on 
the one hand and its separate members on the other (Article 52). 
In the Regulation a choice has been made for the traditional cooperative 
characteristic ‘one man one vote’ (Article 22). However, here too, like in 
the legislation of most of the European member states, the possibility is 
explicitly offered to deviate from this in the statutes. If a plural voting 
right is created, the statutes should mention the further conditions. The 
basis for this seems to be that the authority is coupled to the extent to 
which the members participate in the activity of the SCE, and thus not to 
the amount of the capital contributed. In the revised draft the possibility is 
offered – and in my opinion wrongly – of a differentiated voting right if Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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the membership substrate of the SCE does not consist of private persons 
only. 
Third parties (non-members) may, as appears from the Regulation, 
participate in the (risk-bearing) capital of the SCE. This is a very current 
cooperative issue. This may be put in the shape of issuance of shares 
without vote (Article 49). Contrary to what is possible in the Netherlands, 
the Regulation does not provide an opportunity for third parties to 
participate in the general meeting having a voting right. Nevertheless, 
Article 51 provides that the SCE should have access to all financing means 
which are allowed for cooperatives in the member state in which the SCE 
has its seat. The question how these two articles relate to each other 
deserves further attention.  
If maximal flexibility with respect to the financing of the SCE is really 
aimed at, then Article 21, paragraph 1, can better be deleted from the draft. 
However, this will encounter resistance from those who advocate absolute 
control of the members from an cooperative ideology, which in view of 
the object of the SCE, is similar to the object of any other form of 
cooperative cooperation: exclusively or virtually exclusively supplying the 
needs of its own members, is not incomprehensible. 
Conversion of a cooperative established in a member state into an SCE 
is possible, if this cooperative has had a subsidiary or a branch office in 
another member state for at least two years and if the cooperative has 
proven that it has been carrying out real activities in several member 
states. If two cooperatives established in different member states would 
desire maximal integration, then the larger of the two could convert itself 
into an SCE, and subsequently the individual members of the smaller 
cooperative could accede to this SCE. More natural in this case would, of 
course, be a legal merger of these two with a new SCE, or between the 
new (converted) SCE and the smaller cooperative. Unfortunately the 
Regulation does not know the possibility of establishment by means of 
such an international legal merger of national cooperatives, unlike the 
draft regulation concerning the European Company (SE). 
For larger national cooperatives, with many hundreds or even thou-
sands of members the absence of the possibility of an international legal 
merger is definitely a disadvantage. An integration of several national 
cooperatives into one SCE is presently only possible when the members 
subscribe again to the SCE. The mechanism of the international legal 
merger has the big advantage that the memberships of the cooperatives 
established in different member states are transferred by law to one and 
the same SCE. Therefore, in particular for the larger cooperatives, the 
optimal ultimate goal, one SCE with members in several member states, is 
not that easy to achieve.  
The issue of internationality may not be forgotten when establishing an 
SCE. The founders must be seated in different member states. Which law 
is governing the relation between the SCE and its members, being private 
persons, or members-legal entities which may perhaps be considered as 
(national) daughter cooperatives? The International Cooperative as a Partnership: Legal Aspects 
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The SCE will be subject to the Regulation under review and to what has 
been provided for in the statutes and which is in accordance with the 
contents of the Regulation. The national law on cooperatives of the 
member state where the SCE has its seat shall be applicable permissively 
in as far as necessary. Pursuant to private international law the laws of the 
place of establishment, like e.g. the (further) laws pertaining to legal 
entities, bankruptcy law, labor law etc., shall otherwise be applicable as 
well, which is also endorsed in the Explanatory Note to the Regulation, 
page 47. 
The SCE can certainly fill the needs which exist in the practice of the 
international cooperative business community. The advantage of the SCE 
is that it will better fit in with the structure of the national cooperatives 
involved than the EEIG. Since the Commission has distanced itself from 
the ideology – although the individual character of the cooperative is still 
too much emphasized by giving less flexibility to SCEs with members-
legal entities than to SCEs with only private persons as members – there 
are ample possibilities to organize the SCE, and thus the relation between 
this legal entity and its members, in the manner desired by such members. 
This flexibility must be more reason to give this Regulation a fair chance.  
The fact that the proposed model deviates from the model of any 
national cooperative is only of relative significance, as has appeared. It 
has, however, a lot of conformity with the Belgian cooperative company 
because it is not only an association but a company as well.  
The cooperative nature of the SCE, and which also applies for the na-
tional cooperatives of several European member states, is guaranteed by 
(1) the specific (cooperative) object, (2) an administrative organization 
based on the association model, and (3) the flexible starting point that the 
members are the parties which finance the cooperative and (consequently) 
are in control. Also, in case only the national law on cooperatives is taken 
as a starting point when assessing the SCE – which is dubious as this is an 
additional international law system – there is no reason for criticism of a 
really fundamental nature.  
Hopefully, the fate of the European Company will not befall SCE and 
hopefully, we may soon welcome this new European legal structure. 
 
 
Anti-Trust Law 
 
It is necessary to make some remarks with respect to the Anti-Trust law 
aspects. As all persons familiar with cooperatives are aware of, binding 
the members – or to put it nicely, the members' loyalty – is of utmost im-
portance for the cooperative formula. The member is supposed to do busi-
ness exclusively with his cooperative for a longer period of time and he is 
also to finance this cooperative. Only if the ranks are closed can the 
cooperative become a success.  
This binding of members is organized differently in the different coun-
tries. Whereas in one country a minimum duration of membership of five Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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or ten years is permitted, in another country the freedom of withdrawal 
exists in accordance with the principles pertaining to associations. In the 
latter case, compensations are often charged in case of a premature ter-
mination of the relationship without making withdrawal impossible. 
The European Commission as well as the European Court of Justice 
expressed themselves several times about the allowable extent of binding 
the members. These days, the structuring of contractual relations, at least 
in case of companies of some extent, should also be considered from a 
competition law point of view. A far-going binding of members may have 
as an effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition as is 
prohibited by Articles 85 and 86 of the E.C. Treaty. 
As member loyalty is an exponent of the cooperative formula and the 
cooperative may stimulate the competition, as was recently held by the 
Court in the DLG case, a moderated anti-trust regime should apply to co-
operatives2. Whilst the United States introduced a specific cooperative 
anti-trust legislation already in 1922, the Capper-Volstead Act, relatively 
little attention was given to the position of cooperatives in competition 
laws in Europe. Germany seems to take the lead, both in the legislation 
and in the doctrine. There are presently some interesting cases pending 
before the Court in Luxembourg in which the extent of the so-called 
cooperative exception of Regulation 26 of 1962 is discussed.  
This Regulation indicates to which extent Article 85 –  which forbids 
agreements between undertakings and also decisions by associations of 
undertakings, like cooperatives, which may affect trade between the 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction, or distortion of competition within the common market – is 
applicable to agricultural cooperatives. Article 86, which forbids abuse of 
a dominant position, always applies for agricultural cooperatives.  
The DLG case in my opinion is a very important one. It was concluded 
that the derogation provided for in Regulation 26/62 does not apply to a 
cooperative that confines itself to distributing products not listed in Annex 
II to the Treaty, such as fertilizers and pesticides. Nevertheless, the Danish 
agricultural cooperative in question – DLG – managed to get the 
approbation of the Court. The issue of the proceedings was, as described 
by the Advocate General Mr. Tesauro the following question: ‘Is a clause 
in the statutes of a cooperative association set up to purchase agricultural 
products, under which the association may expel members who become 
members of competing organizations, compatible with the Treaty 
competition rules?’ 
DLG claims that loyalty of the members is a characteristic feature of 
cooperatives and is the natural quid pro quo for the advantages of mem-
bership of an association pursuing communal objectives. The fact that a 
member who buys outside the cooperative, becoming involved with 
organizations competing with that cooperative, may be expelled for that 
specific reason, is therefore to be regarded as a logical reaction by the 
association to conduct which is liable to undermine its financial standing The International Cooperative as a Partnership: Legal Aspects 
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and commercial efficiency, and therefore falls entirely outside the ‘scope 
of Article 85 (1)’.  
The Advocate General endorses that some restriction of the independ-
ence of the members may be regarded as inherent in its very membership. 
The protection of the common interest may not, however, be regarded as 
absolute. Against that background it is assessed that the contested clauses 
in the statutes of the cooperative are not anti-competitive in intent for the 
purpose of Article 85 (1). The cooperative does not involve, by virtue of its 
object, a restriction of competition. Then, the analysis must proceed to the 
question whether, although the object is not anti-competitive, the impact 
which the binding of the members has on competition is acceptable or not.  
In the DLG case it was considered most important that the cooperative 
by its collective purchase of agricultural products can counterbalance the 
contractual strength of other (investor-owned) suppliers on the specific 
market. 
By means of the cooperative collective purchasing, the inherently weak 
contractual position of the individual farmer is exchanged for a workable 
competition. It is emphasized that in principle the loyalty clauses at issue 
are consistent with the requirement of ensuring that the association 
functions properly. The clauses ‘constitute a normal way of obtaining 
protection, through the statutes, against situations in which there is a 
conflict of interest and are therefore not anti-competitive in intent for the 
purposes of Article 85 (1)’. The factual and legal circumstances, however, 
could make these clauses unacceptable because of the too strong anti-
competitive effects. In order to avoid excessive inflexibility of the market 
the members of the cooperative should have the possibility to withdraw 
from it at reasonable intervals. If a member desires so, the loyalty has to be 
limited in time.  
The Court in this case deemed a membership period of five years 
appropriate. A ten-year period was transferred into a five-year period 
when deciding to insert the contested clauses in the statutes. 
The second factual circumstance that has to be taken into account is the 
cooperative's position in the relevant market. If a cooperative holds a very 
high market share, the members' loyalty resulting from the statute clauses 
could create a significant barrier for competitors to access the market in 
question. Also, as contemplated by the Advocate General in the DLG case, 
the cooperative that holds such a strong competitive position has less need 
for protection against members doing business with a competitor. 
Finally the Court held that subject to the findings to be made by the 
national court relating to the factual circumstances, a clause in the statutes 
of an agricultural cooperative that prohibits members to purchase from a 
competitor does not have the object or effect of preventing, restricting or 
distorting competition within the meaning of Article 85 (1) of the Treaty. 
That binding members is an exponent of the cooperative form and that 
this type of cooperation generally leads to a stimulation of competition 
now has been ruled by the Court, must yet be explained over and over 
again. Maybe we are hindered by the fact that, unlike in the United States, Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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the original ideology has been left far behind. Binding the members is 
inherent to this special type of business enterprise. The binding of course 
must be linked to the cooperation itself, that is to say, necessary for the 
object of the cooperative and the specific way in which this object is 
achieved. The extent of loyalty as required by the cooperative's statutes 
should be, as the Germans call it, ‘Genossenschafsimmanent’; it should be 
crucial for the equilibrium of the cooperative. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The legal structure of the cooperative in itself does not constitute an ob-
stacle for internationalization of the primary business in the above-
mentioned sense. Being a member of a foreign cooperative may be some-
what more complicated than being a shareholder of a foreign company. 
However, well developed private international law certainly enables us to 
work with an international membership. Effective international co-
operative integration, by means of cooperative joint ventures or even 
mergers, is only possible within the European Community by working 
with daughter or mother cooperatives organized according to the laws of 
any member state, thus national law. The efforts of the European Com-
mission to create a European Cooperative Society (SCE) deserves a lot of 
praise. It is recommendable that the Commission does not only consider 
the civil law aspects of the international forms of cooperative cooperation 
but certainly also the aspects relating to anti-trust law. The Commission 
has many times shown to adopt the standpoint that the cooperative 
deserves sympathy and certainly not only for reasons of economic nature. 
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The Irish co-operative movement celebrated its centenary in 1994. Agri-
cultural co-operative organisation has been a success story in the Republic 
of Ireland, especially in the dairy sector where co-operatives or co-
operative controlled firms currently account for virtually all of the milk 
purchases from farmers. Over the past ten years however the traditional 
co-operative has come under some threats with the formation of the Co-op 
PLCs1 (public companies with farmer co-operatives as the controlling 
shareholders) and other developments s u c h  a s  t h e  s a l e  b y  f a r m e r  
members of dairy co-operatives: Bailieboro, Westmeath and Premier Tir 
Laoighean, and the conversion of a further co-operative, Donegal 
Creameries, to a public company.  
Although the effect so far on overall co-operative control has been 
small, the fact that the change occurred at all is significant, especially 
because the new co-op PLC structure provides a means by which farmer 
co-operative control of the sector can be progressively reduced over time. 
The changes in voting control structure of four of these Co-op PLCs since 
establishment is shown in Table 1. While a special resolution receiving 
75% majority support at two consecutive extraordinary general meetings 
is required to allow farmer co-operative shareholding go below 50%, it is 
very likely that when the time is right, the organisations concerned could 
put a sufficiently attractive package of incentives in place to get farmers' 
agreement. Already, some farmer board members of the Co-op PLCs have 
expressed the view that effective co-operative control could be exercised 
by holding 30–50% of the equity (O'Donohoe, 1993). Thus the scene is set 
for a progressive reduction of co-operative control of these enterprises. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider why the decline in farmer co-
operative control and the corresponding increase of private interest 
ownership is occurring and to assess whether this development is positive 
or negative in terms of the economic efficacy.  
In surveys conducted amongst co-operative chairmen and chief execu-
tive officers, the need to gain additional capital for growth and the need to 
provide shareholders with a current market value for their shares were 
identified as the two primary reasons for the change to Co-op PLC, and 
the need to provide a mechanism to motivate and reward executive staff 
was considered a further but secondary motive for conversion (Jacobson 
and O'Leary, 1990; O'Donohoe, 1993). While accepting these reasons, I 
wish to argue that the change to PLC is part of a wider and more Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives 
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fundamental shift away from the co-operative organisation form and that 
it is justified on transaction cost grounds. 
 
Table 1  Proportion of Ordinary Share Capital Held in Co-operative 
Control at Year End for Four Co-op PLCs (% of Issued Share 
Capital) 
 
  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
 
Kerry  Group  plc  83.1 78.7 66.0 60.0 60.0 57.7 57.7 54.8 
Avonmore  Foods  plc  100.0  100.0 71.9 71.6 71.6 63.6 63.5 63.5 
Waterford  Foods  plc  100.0  100.0 84.7 78.6 78.5 78.5 68.6 68.6 
IAWS  Group  plc*  100.0  100.0  100.0 78.4 78.4 63.1 63.4 63.4 
  * Year ends 31 July 
  Source: Annual Reports, 1986 to 1993, for each company 
 
Agricultural co-operatives are a means by which farmers club together to 
accomplish vertical integration, either upstream (a purchasing co-op) or 
downstream (a marketing co-op) (Sexton, 1986). The discussion therefore 
begins with a review of the modern theory of vertical integration and its 
base in transaction cost economics. Evidence on current vertical 
integration practices and trends in modern business are presented. This is 
followed by a critique of the co-operative organisation form. Two parallel 
developments of the 1980s, privatisation of public sector enterprises and 
the emergence of the management buy-out mechanism, are then presented 
to illustrate the wider context of the change in governance structure in the 
co-operative sector. This is followed by a review of the circumstances in 
which the Irish Co-op PLC structure first emerged in 1986 and finally 
conclusions are drawn.  
 
 
Vertical Integration and the Transaction Cost Approach 
 
The process of production and marketing of all goods and services 
involves a number of different activities. Consider, for example, the 
various stages through which a food product such as cheese moves before 
it is purchased at the local supermarket. Here we can distinguish between 
the production of the dairy feed, dairy farming, the assembly and 
processing of the milk and the provision of retail services. Vertical 
integration (VI) involves the joint administration, in the same firm, of two 
or more of these stages. The decision of a firm located in one stage to 
become involved in the production of its raw materials or other inputs is 
referred to as backward (or upstream) integration, while expansion into 
subsequent stages in the production and marketing process is termed for-
ward (or downstream) integration.  
Individual stages in the process however could be further subdivided. 
For example, the assembly and pasteurisation of milk and the manufac-
ture of cheese could be carried out in two separate firms, or the rearing of 
replacements, the production of winter feed, and the keeping of milking Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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cows could be conducted in separate farm businesses. Given a fine enough 
definition of the various stages, it follows therefore that virtually all firms 
are integrated to some extent. For this reason an understanding of VI is 
fundamental to our understanding of the role of firms in the economic 
system and it is now very much part of the modern economic theory of the 
firm. 
The question as to why firms emerge at all was among the earliest 
approaches to the study of the theory of the firm. Coase (1937), in his now 
famous article, put forward the proposition that firms and markets are 
alternative methods of co-ordinating production and that the firm 
displaces market exchange when the costs of using the market are high. 
Resources are allocated in the market system by the forces of supply and 
demand without the guidance of any authority (the ‘invisible hand’ of the 
market). The firm, on the other hand, involves the internal allocation of 
resources by the authority of its management, the ‘visible hand’ of the 
manager.  
Coase's view was that managerial co-ordination would replace market 
co-ordination wherever the costs of using the market system exceed the 
costs of organising the transactions concerned within a firm. Thus, for 
example, a dairy farmer would be more likely to rear his own 
replacements than buy them because the costs of using the market might 
be high in terms of the risk of buying in diseased or unreliable stock and 
the uncertainty of not being able to get the type of stock required at a 
competitive price. By contrast, the farmer is less likely to get involved in 
the manufacture of dairy feedstuffs because feed can be more easily 
sourced on the market where there are a number of suppliers, quality 
standards are easily specified and price levels are transparent. In this way 
VI has been conceptualised as a means of avoiding the costs of external 
market failure (Casson, 1984). 
 
 
Costs of Using the Market 
 
Taking Coase's ideas, Williamson (l975, l981) attempted to specify the 
circumstances under which the costs of using the market tend to be high 
and where integration is therefore more likely. Williamson predicts that 
VI is more likely in circumstances where (1) the assets required are highly 
specific to the transaction, (2) there is a high degree of uncertainty 
involved and (3) the transaction recurs frequently.  
Highly specific assets arise in situations where an activity is unique to a 
particular process or product. It is similar to the concept of sunk costs in 
that such assets would not have acceptable alternative uses. Suppose the 
manufacture of a particular type of cheese requires a process which is not 
used for other cheese products. It would be unlikely under these cir-
cumstances, even if technically possible, that this process would be sub-
contracted to an outside company because of the possibility of opportunis-
tic re-contracting by one of the parties. Opportunistic re-contracting occurs Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives 
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if one party to the contract changes the terms of the contract once the other 
party is committed in some way.  
In the cheese product example, this could arise if the subcontractor, 
having supplied for a number of months asked for better terms, safe in the 
knowledge that he was the only supplier with the required equipment and 
expertise. The processor might find himself in a weak negotiating position. 
On the other hand, if after the subcontractor installed the special 
equipment and trained employees in the process, the processor was to 
plead that the original price was too high and seek to renegotiate, the 
supplier, who is locked into this single outlet, may have little choice but to 
reduce the price below what would leave a reasonable return on 
investment. It is argued therefore that these conditions tend to favour in-
house solutions.  
If however this process or ingredient for cheese manufacture was one 
that applied to a number of cheese products, produced by a number of 
dairy processors, and a number of possible subcontractors were available, 
then competition in the market would serve as a safeguard against the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour and reduce the incentive to inter-
nalise the transaction. In these circumstances where the market may be 
said to work well, the cost of using the market is considered to be lower 
and the need for VI is less.  
Williamson's second condition for VI is uncertainty about future out-
comes, such as input or product prices. He argues that this makes it 
expensive to use the market because it is difficult to design market 
contracts that will safeguard the interests of all parties. Such circum-
stances facilitate speculative behaviour and allow the possibility that one 
party will behave opportunistically and exploit the other and so there is 
an incentive to integrate rather than depend on market exchange. For 
example, if future prices for the cheese ingredient could be predicted with 
a high degree of certainty, then even if there was only one supplier it 
would be possible to write a contract for the supply of this product that 
would be acceptable to both parties. 
The third condition which Williamson associates with VI is transaction 
frequency. Even where highly specific assets are required and there is an 
element of uncertainty, it would not be worthwhile integrating an activity 
unless it occurred frequently. For example, a large construction project 
may involve specific investments and have an element of uncertainty as to 
the outcome, but it would not necessitate the acquisition of a construction 
firm.  
 
 
Internal Organisation Costs 
 
Central to the theory of VI is the concept that organising an activity in a 
firm, making rather than buying or further processing rather than selling, 
is not cost-less, and as implied above the optimum level of integration is 
decided in a trade-off between market transaction costs and internal Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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organisational costs. Internal organisational costs include funding costs, 
the costs of acquiring new skills, managerial and monitoring costs, and the 
positive or negative effects on the existing business (Levy, 1985). The 
modern thinking on VI is that these costs are often underestimated, especially 
those related to managerial and monitoring costs, and that firms too often opt for 
VI solutions when some form of market contract would be more efficient.  
The nature of the internal organisational inefficiencies as compared 
with market systems have also become better specified and understood. 
The market system is regarded as a much more direct and efficient 
mechanism for communicating information and inducing change than 
managerial planning within an organisation (Williamson, 1991). Given a 
disturbance in the market, individual buyers and suppliers who are 
directly exposed to market forces reposition automatically. In terms of the 
incentive to change, these actors receive all the gains or losses associated 
with their response. Within an organisation on the other hand, signals are 
more indirect and the gains and losses associated with actions are diluted 
and shared with others often in some arbitrary way so that incentive and 
accountability is weakened. Exchange within an organisation therefore 
lacks the direct competitive signals and pressures of the market.  
VI increases the span of control in organisational terms leading to 
communication difficulties and so reducing management effectiveness. VI 
is in effect a diversification strategy in that entering upstream or down-
stream activities requires different skills and inexperience may lead to 
comparatively high internal costs (Harrigan, 1986).  
Furthermore, there are particular incentive effects associated with the 
ownership of assets. Ownership confers residual rights of control i.e. 
rights to the surpluses generated by the assets owned. Where an activity 
requires effort that is not easily measured, as in most management situa-
tions, the incentive to perform is higher where the manager owns the 
assets, and so has rights to the residual benefits, than in the case where the 
manager is an employee (Hart, 1989; Grossman and Hart, 1986). For 
example, where a supplier is bought out, the owners/managers lose 
ownership rights and their incentive to invest time and energy in the 
business diminishes. The management now become agents of the larger 
firm with potentially conflicting interests and, according to agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), the firm will incur 
agency costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding the contractual 
relationship. Conversely, where a part of a business is split off, the new 
owners/managers will have greater incentives than before to invest their 
time and energies in the independent company and the parent will not 
have to incur the agency costs. 
These incentive effects of ownership have direct implications for the co-
operative organisation structure. Through the co-operative, farmers retain 
ownership of the enterprise and all rights to residual surpluses. Co-
operative management act as agents, for which they are paid salaries, but 
the gains or losses from over or under performance accrue to the farmers. Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives 
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Greater awareness of the limitations of the organisation has led to a 
strong preference for market mechanisms over internal governance struc-
tures in the past 10–15 years. Williamson (1986) counsels that market 
intermediation is generally to be preferred to internal co-ordination within 
a firm in circumstances in which markets may be said to work well. It is 
put more strongly by others who regard VI as a last resort, to be used only 
if absolutely necessary (Stuckey and White, 1993).  
This approach to VI attributed to the work of Coase, Williamson, and 
others is the transactions cost theory and is based on achieving trading 
mechanisms which minimise the cost of transacting business. It provides a 
framework which sets boundaries to the scope of the firm, predicting the 
activities a firm should perform itself and those that it should leave to 
others. 
A review of empirical studies in support of the transactions cost 
approach to VI is provided by Mahoney (1992). In general the research 
associates VI with small numbers bargaining (few buyers and sellers), 
environmental uncertainty, product complexity and asset specificity. 
According to this theory of VI, therefore, the need for co-operative 
vertical integration is dependent on the extent of dysfunction or failure in 
the market concerned, and the degree to which this would deteriorate if 
the influence of co-operatives in the market was to decline. If the milk 
market in Ireland, for example, can be regarded as competitive and is not 
likely to change if co-operative influence diminishes, then the need for co-
operative vertical integration does not exist and deintegration would 
enhance the sector's performance. On the other hand, if the market cannot 
be regarded as working well, or would not be competitive in the absence 
of the co-operatives, then the sector is justified in retaining the structure, 
albeit at some cost. In this respect, the agreement of the farmers concerned 
with the move to Co-op PLC could be interpreted as their judgement that 
the market works well and will continue to do even when co-operative 
involvement is reduced. 
 
 
Modern Vertical Integration Practice 
 
In competitive market economies, inefficient governance structures may 
be expected to give way to efficient systems overtime. Accordingly, study 
of modern VI practices and trends in the wider business world provide a 
further means by which the efficiencies of alternative co-ordinating forms 
can be assessed.  
VI is a business strategy and as such is a response to competitive condi-
tions, and so should change as these conditions change (King, 1992; 
Stuckey and White, 1993). For example, there is some evidence that the 
need for VI tends to diminish over the life of an industry (Casson, 1984). 
New products often require involvement upstream in special processes, 
because of the lack of skills of outside suppliers, or downstream into 
market development because of the need to provide new marketing serv-Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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ices (Lowes, Pass and Sanderson, 1994). In the early stages of the devel-
opment of personal computers for example, some of the pioneering 
companies like Texas Instruments opened electronics stores to 
demonstrate their new products (Harrigan, 1986). Later the phenomenal 
progress of this industry was partly attributed to its high degree of 
deintegration allowing an unprecedented rate of innovation at all levels. 
The automobile industry provides a similar example of change in VI 
strategy over its life cycle (Langlois and Robertson, 1989). The modern 
auto industry has deintegrated to the extent that Mercedes-Benz is 
planning a model for 1997 for which everything except the German-made 
engine and transmission will be manufactured and even partly assembled 
by outside suppliers (Fortune, 1994). 
 
 
A Move Away from Vertical Ownership 
 
Recently, research has broadened the VI concept and focused on a range 
of methods of achieving vertical co-ordination, of which ownership of an 
upstream or downstream activity is but one. For example, Frank and 
Henderson (1992) distinguished between five different means used by 
farmers and food manufacturers in the US to achieve vertical co-ordina-
tion of their activities: spot market, market specification, production 
management agreements, resource providing agreements, and full vertical 
ownership. Williamson (1991) included intermediate or hybrid modes 
such as various forms of long-term contracting, reciprocal trading, 
regulation, franchising and the like, in between the two polar modes of 
markets and vertical ownership.  
The past 15 years have witnessed a strong movement to deintegration 
in business generally, especially away from full vertical ownership. An 
influential article on vertical integration by Hayes and Abernathy (1980) 
which argued that too much backward integration by American 
manufacturers was a contributory factor to poor performance in the US 
economy, was credited with stimulating new interest in deintegration in 
the manufacturing industry in the US in the early 1980s. The argument 
was simply that commitment of time and resources needed to master 
technology back up the channel of supply was distracting companies from 
doing their own jobs well.  
Greater awareness of the competitive success of the Japanese model of 
manufacturing, where a small number of very large organisations 
surround themselves with a much larger but still limited number of 
supporting subcontract firms, has increased the momentum of the deinte-
gration and out-sourcing trend (Dwyer and Ouchi, 1993). The Japanese 
system fosters a very ‘hands on’ supportive and obligational contracting 
relationship between buyers and suppliers which contrasts with the 
traditional adversarial approach of western companies. It offers the benefits 
of vertical integration with the market efficiency of an arms length 
relationship (Morris and Imrie, 1993). Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives 
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Organisations of all types are finding it cost effective to subcontract 
more and more of their operations. Some of the most common include 
routine operations such as office cleaning, catering, landscape mainte-
nance and transport, but non-routine functions that were often guarded 
tightly are also increasingly farmed out as companies focus more and 
more on their core strengths (Huber, 1993). Whereas large companies in 
the past tended to have many specialist such as engineers, lawyers, 
economists and scientists on their payrolls, the trend more recently is to 
minimise such staff roles, maintain simple and lean management struc-
tures and out-source these functions.  
The reasons for the greater efficiencies derive to some extent from 
economies achieved by the subcontractor in servicing more than one 
organisation, but also, if not mainly, from the greater attention given to 
the performance of the task. An outside contractor can make better use of 
specialists and is usually in a better position to motivate staff because it 
has career structures and reward systems that are designed specifically for 
the task in hand. It is also more likely to develop and adopt the best 
techniques since all of its energies are focused on this area of activity 
(Drucker, 1993). Furthermore, many mature companies are weighed down 
with trade union agreements and inflexibility whereas the subcontractor is 
free. 
 
 
Closer Vertical Co-ordination Without Vertical Ownership 
 
A high degree of vertical co-ordination however has been preserved in 
many of these new arrangements through hybrid forms of contractual and 
co-operative working relationships. Through such mechanisms and the 
building of trust between buyers and suppliers, companies are finding 
ways of dealing with uncertainty and the need for idiosyncratic invest-
ments without having to resort to full vertical ownership (Smith Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1992). In a sense, while ownership is not the preferred option, 
closer vertical co-ordination is assuming greater importance and is being 
achieved through mechanisms such as ‘just-in-time’ deliveries, ‘total 
quality’ and ‘right first time’ practices, and continuous improvement 
schemes, all with the help of modern information technology and a more 
co-operative approach. 
The need for more vertical co-ordination in the food chain is also 
evident with greater product differentiation, emphasis on product quality 
and on environmental and animal welfare issues. Food retailers in 
response to consumer demand wish to trace the origin of food products 
upstream to the farm and beyond to be assured of wholesomeness and 
quality. Food product differentiation in the future will not be achieved 
solely by new processing techniques, it will require a co-ordinated change 
in practices and processes right back to the farm. For example, a new milk 
product may require milk which has been physically handled in a 
particular fashion or cooled or stored in some special way. An increasing Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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demand is therefore expected for product differentiation at farm level 
which can only be achieved by greater vertical co-ordination and co-
operation (Barkema et al., 1991; Barry et al., 1992; Sporleder, 1992).  
In summary, therefore, the current approach to the VI decision is to use 
market mechanisms as far as possible and, where closer vertical co-ordi-
nation is necessary, obligational contracts and other co-operative 
mechanisms are to be preferred to full vertical ownership. This seems to 
be supportive of the trend to rolling back farmer ownership of the dairy 
processing and marketing businesses and the emergence of new structures 
such as the Co-op PLC. The challenge for the industry however is to find 
the most efficient way of allowing this while at the same time facilitating 
the continuing need for close co-ordination between processors and 
farmers at an operational level.  
 
 
The Co-operative Organisation Form 
 
Many agricultural co-operatives in Ireland and elsewhere have more then 
a century of trading behind them. As a development movement and an 
organisation structure, the co-operative has stood the test of time. Yet in 
the wider economy the co-operative is a minority organisation form 
compared with the joint stock company. The efficiency of co-operatives is 
not proven by their survival and development over so many years, as co-
operatives in most countries have been favoured by government policies 
(and sometimes have been used as instruments of government policy) 
through tax breaks and other direct and indirect supports. This support 
has now all but disappeared in the Irish case. Neither is the literature 
satisfactory in resolving the issue of co-operative efficiency, mainly 
because of data and methodological difficulties in comparing co-
operatives with companies. Theoretical differences between the two 
organisation forms however have been well articulated. The deficiency is 
in the empirical evidence on the relative performances of the two 
governance structures.  
The great advantage of the co-operative is that it provides a means by 
which its members can come together to achieve sufficient scale to 
conduct activities that would otherwise be out of the reach of individual 
members. However, this benefit does not come without some organisa-
tional disadvantages. Over the years problems such as confused objec-
tives, ineffective direction, poor management and under capitalisation 
have been associated with co-operatives (LeVay, 1983). Based on Jensen 
and Meckling (1979) and Porter and Scully (1987) these weaknesses may 
be specified more precisely in terms of three generic problems: (1) a hori-
zon problem, (2) a portfolio problem and (3) a control problem. 
 
The Horizon Problem.  
A horizon problem arises when an investor's claim on the net cash flow 
generated by an asset is shorter than the productive life of the asset. The 
return to the investment decision is less than the return generated by the Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives 
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asset. This results in underinvestment in these assets or the requirement to 
pay above average rates of returns to encourage investment. Consider a 
dairy co-operative which distributes its profits to members on some 
patronage basis such as a better milk price or a patronage dividend. A 
farmer member investing in this co-operative is unlikely to feel that he can 
participate fully in the potential benefits because part of the net cash flow 
will be retained in the business and so shared with future members.  
Fellow members who increase their use of the co-operative and non-
members can also receive more than their fair share. The latter is similar to 
the so called ‘free-rider’ problem where members who invest less or 
perhaps do not invest at all also receive benefits. It is predicted that the 
horizon problem will affect the decision to invest in long-term assets most 
severely. Investments in intangible assets such as research and 
development and marketing which have very long or perpetual lives are 
considered most vulnerable. 
 
The Portfolio Problem 
In so far as members of a co-operative are obliged to invest in proportion 
to their use of the co-operative, they are said to have a portfolio problem 
as their claims on the assets (share in a co-operative) cannot be freely 
bought or sold and so they are inhibited from diversifying or 
concentrating their investment portfolio to take account of their personal 
wealth and their preferences for risk-taking. Also by excluding outside 
investors, co-operative members are forced in aggregate to bear risks that 
outside investors could diversify. Because of this portfolio problem, it is 
predicted again that co-operative members will require higher returns on 
their investments or will be more reluctant to invest than shareholders in a 
company. 
Farmers' reluctance to invest in co-operatives is well known, but it has 
always been presented as illogical and as an inability to take the long-term 
view. This of course is a misrepresentation, farmers are simply acting in 
their own best interests and behaving rationally given the horizon and 
portfolio problems. 
 
The Control Problem 
It is widely accepted that the objectives and interests of managers and 
shareholders in an organisation do not always coincide. This is referred to 
as the ‘principal-agent’ problem and is encountered in all organisations 
where managers (agents) conduct business on behalf of members 
(principals). However, it is considered to be more severe for co-operatives 
for two reasons: one related to the lack of freedom to transfer shares 
between members, and the other to the absence of the range of equity-
based management incentive mechanisms available to companies. 
Lack of freedom to concentrate claims (shares in the co-operative) in the 
hands of a few shareholders dilutes the incentive to take difficult 
decisions. In a co-operative, only a very small proportion of the gains or 
losses from decisions can be captured by an individual member. Accord-Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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ingly, individual members or even boards of directors have a low 
incentive to innovate or to take unpalatable decisions such as disciplining 
management or initiating management change. With many members 
having similar stakeholdings, the responsibility falls to the many rather 
than the few and the ‘agent-principal’ problem expands to an ‘agent-many 
principals’ problem. By contrast, in a company, one or a few shareholders, 
by acquiring a substantial proportion of the equity, can capture a 
substantial proportion of the benefits of an innovation or a management 
change and will therefore be more likely to take such action. 
For this reason, co-operatives are often regarded as poor innovators and 
likely to have greater difficulties in complex and dynamic business 
environments. The co-operative is also regarded as an ineffective organ-
isational form for new business entry. Perhaps this explains why co-
operatives have been so unsuccessful in establishing in new areas of 
activity even with significant head starts in the form of government 
support and grant aid. In the fruit and vegetable sector for example, group 
marketing has been highly favoured by EU aids and promoted by 
virtually every government initiative on produce marketing but with very 
limited success. Corbett and Street (1993) have recently questioned the 
wisdom of persisting with the group marketing philosophy in the UK 
because there have been ‘only some successes, a proliferation of failures and 
many organisations that are clearly going nowhere’. Similar criticisms have 
been levied at the group marketing philosophy as a mechanism of 
improving produce marketing in Ireland (Harte, 1987). This is also in 
keeping with Tetzschner's (1991) observation that the entrepreneurial 
phase of co-operative development in Europe has effectively faded away 
over the last two generations with few truly new co-operatives started 
over the past sixty years.  
As for management incentives, co-operatives cannot use share owner-
ship and share option schemes to compensate and motivate management. 
Traditionally co-operatives have not provided for share ownership by 
management and since share transfer is inhibited and there is no market 
in the shares, co-operatives do not have this mechanism available as a 
management incentive. It makes it more difficult to attract and hold good 
management in a competitive labour market, and for incumbent co-
operative management it could be an incentive to encourage conversion to 
a public or private company.  
The absence of a market in the shares is a further control handicap in 
that it deprives members of an objective means of monitoring the value of 
a co-operative and this adds to the difficulty of evaluating the 
performance of management. 
By comparison with the joint stock company structure therefore, the co-
operative organisation form involves higher transaction costs associated 
with the horizon, portfolio and control problems. Accordingly, in the 
absence of a need for vertical integration, the co-operative would not be 
the organisation form of choice on transaction cost grounds. Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives 
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Conflicting Evidence on Co-operative Performance 
 
Although the theoretical problems with the co-operative structure have 
been well specified, the significance of these problems in practice is far 
from being conclusively proven. Two studies of milk processing firms in 
the US, each using the same data set and similar methodologies but 
relying on somewhat different measures of efficiency, found that co-
operatives were less efficient than non-co-operatives on all of the 
efficiency criteria used (Porter and Scully, 1987; Ferrier and Porter, 1991). 
The authors concluded that co-operatives would not emerge under free 
market conditions and that they owe their existence to favourable 
treatment in the form of tax breaks, interest subsidies and gratis services 
from the US Department of Agriculture. “Co-operatives once functioned to 
overcome market failure in the agricultural sector of the US economy..... Modern 
transportation and communication systems have placed many more buyers and 
sellers of farm inputs and products in proximity to one another. The role of co-
operatives as a countervailing force no longer exists” (Ferrier and Porter, 1991, 
p. 172–173).  
By contrast, Lerman and Parliament (1990) found that co-operatives in 
the US dairy industry performed as well or better than comparable 
investor-owned firms, although in a later study the authors attributed this 
to a higher proportion of ‘pass-through’ sales of liquid milk by this sector 
and presented evidence that co-operatives seem to be less efficient in 
higher value-added food processing (Lerman and Parliament, 1991). This 
agrees with the view that co-operative organisations are ill-suited to 
entrepreneurial and complex tasks that entail activities far removed from 
the direct interests and experiences of members (Caves and Petersen, 
1986).  
A simple financial ratio comparison of co-operatives registered as 
companies and non-co-operative agribusiness companies was conducted 
by Hind (1994) in the UK. No significant difference between the perform-
ances of the two groups was found and it was concluded that “co-
operatives do not perform differently to non-co-operatives, despite being required 
to balance member needs with the attainment of corporate goals”. 
A pro-competitive effect on non-co-operative firms has long been 
claimed as a benefit of co-operative involvement in a market. This is 
referred to as the ‘pacemaker’ or ‘yardstick’ role of the co-operative. 
Sexton (1990) has demonstrated this pro-competitive role for open 
membership co-operatives in an oligopsonistic market and has presented 
this as justification for continued favourable policies for co-operatives in 
the US and as a counter to the Porter and Scully criticisms. Similarly, 
Tennbakk (1995) demonstrated that if the cost structure of co-operatives 
and other firms is assumed to be the same, a mixed duopoly of co-
operative and private firms is more efficient in overall welfare terms than 
a pure private duopoly, although both would be inferior to a mixed 
duopoly of nationalised and private firms. 
Although not a true measure of performance as such, there is also 
evidence that co-operatives may be limited in their capacity to grow. Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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Fulton et al (1995) found that the growth rate for a sample of large US and 
Canadian agricultural co-operatives over the past 40 plus years has been 
low or perhaps zero. 
 
 
Co-operative Life Cycle 
 
In so far as co-operatives are considered a means of correcting or mitigat-
ing market failure, as market performance improves, the need for co-
operatives will diminish, and in so far as the co-operative organisation 
form may be regarded as less efficient than its corporate counterpart, a 
transition from co-operative to company structure would be expected in a 
competitive market. The co-operative form therefore would exhibit a life 
cycle, the progress of which is determined by the dynamics of the market 
structure. Only in the special case of chronic market failure would an 
infinite life be predicted.  
LeVay (1983) lamented the limited attention that has been paid to the 
concept of a co-operative life cycle, arguing that not all disillusions of co-
operatives should be characterised as failures and that co-operatives can 
be dissolved when their specific objectives have been achieved. LeVay 
concedes however that once an organisation has been set up, incentives 
will exist to keep it in being. “Survival becomes important to members and 
they will find a succession of raisons d'être to maintain it.” The need to 
maintain the co-operative as a ‘pacemaker’ in the market is often the main 
and most unassailable reason put forward for the continued existence of a 
co-operative. This of course is a very legitimate reason, but has the 
disadvantage that it is difficult to prove or disprove absolutely without 
dissolving the co-operative. Two types of mistake are possible: type 1 is to 
dissolve the co-operative while it is still acting as an effective pacemaker 
and type 2 is to maintain it much longer than is justified on organisation 
efficiency grounds.  
The issue therefore is to decide whether the Co-op PLC development in 
Ireland represents a change in organisational form at the end of the life of 
the co-operative and so logical on organisational efficiency grounds, or a 
change away while the co-operative is still acting as ‘pacemakers’ and so 
will ultimately lead to a deterioration in market performance. 
Certainly some co-operative experts and researchers do not agree that 
the Irish dairy enterprises which have turned PLC were approaching the 
end of their co-operative life cycles. Jacobson and O'Leary (1990), Garoyan 
(1991) and O'Donohoe (1994) argued that it occurred because Irish co-
operatives had departed from co-operative principles to some extent in 
particular by failing to allocate profit on a patronage basis and not 
providing a means for share redemption for members retiring or ceasing 
to trade with the society. They urged Irish co-operatives to remedy these 
weaknesses and claimed that ‘co-operatives as businesses can do anything a 
PLC can do’. Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives 
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The claim that co-operatives as businesses can do anything that a PLC 
can do should not be accepted without question. Promoters of co-
operation should consider the possibility that there are some functions for 
which co-operatives are not suited or can only accomplish at a higher cost, 
and that a point may be reached when co-operative enterprises attain a 
level of development and complexity where further progress can be best 
achieved under a corporate organisation form. 
There is a danger that the high level of educational, intellectual and 
research investment devoted to the co-operative ideal over the years, by 
the co-operative movement itself and by aligned co-operative researchers, 
may act as a type of exit barrier leading to the type 2 mistake of retaining 
the co-operative structure longer than can be justified on organisation 
efficiency grounds. Perhaps it is overstating it to suggest that this is 
analogous in technical terms to getting locked into the wrong technology.  
 
 
The Conditioning Business Environment of the 1980s 
 
If the part privatisation of Irish co-operatives is because there is no longer 
a need for vertical ownership of these enterprises by farmers or because of 
weaknesses in the co-operative organisation form, or even because of 
failure to properly implement co-operative principles, why did it take 90 
years to be discovered, why did the conversion begin in the 1980s and not 
earlier? I wish to argue that the timing was influenced by a general change 
in economic and organisational thinking which took hold in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s and led to a new emphasis on the efficiency of market 
mechanisms and a greater awareness of the limitations of organisations 
and planned systems. The vertical deintegration trend and shift away 
from vertical ownership already discussed is a product of this thinking. 
Two further products of this new ethos, public enterprise privatisation 
and the use of management buy-out as a mechanism for reorganisation 
also have interesting parallels with the changes in the Irish co-operative 
sector.  
 
 
Privatisation of Public Sectors Enterprises 
 
The role of the state in the economy was a major preoccupation of gov-
ernments throughout the 1980s and many countries, both developed and 
developing, introduced policies to reverse the nationalisation programmes 
of past years. (For a review, see Fraser and Wilson, 1988). At the forefront 
of these developments was the Conservative Government in the UK 
which took over from Labour in 1979. The Conservatives, under Margaret 
Thatcher, pursued a very aggressive programme of privatisation of state 
industry, and their long period in office has allowed this to continue 
uninterrupted for 15 years. The accepted policy objectives of this 
programme were to increase competition and improve consumer choice, Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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to reduce public sector borrowing, to give the public and the work-force a 
stake in industry, and to allow nationalised industry to escape the ‘dead 
hand’ of government (Hatch, 1988).  
The success or otherwise of the privatisation programme must be 
judged on the extent to which economic efficiency of the enterprises and 
services improves. According to agency theory, the transfer of ownership 
from public to private sector increases employee and management incen-
tive and facilitates performance monitoring in the enterprise. It predicts 
that these effects are most likely where product markets are competitive 
and reasonably free from externalities. Most of the earlier UK pri-
vatisations satisfied these conditions and the subsequent records of the 
companies involved were generally good, with some excellent perform-
ances. In the utility industries, however, the position is much less clear as 
it is much more dependent on the design of the regulatory environment 
and how effective it is in promoting competition (Yarrow, 1989; Meredith, 
1992).  
Privatisation of public sector enterprises is not directly comparable with 
the conversion of co-operatives to PLCs since the co-operatives have 
always been in the private sector. In fact the conversion of the Irish co-
operatives is generally referred to as ‘going public’ whereas the same 
process in the case of public enterprises is referred to as ‘privatisation’. 
However, there are a number of similarities. In each case control is 
changing from a democratic governance structure to an investment-based 
control system. Financial ownership is transferred to commercial investors 
which includes employees, management and other stakeholders. Also in 
each case quotation on the stock market provides a new means for 
monitoring performance and share ownership and stock options may be 
used as management incentive instruments. Under the new structure core 
management can share directly in the gains or losses associated with the 
performance of the enterprise. The privatisation movement was gathering 
momentum at the same time in the 1980s as the Co-op PLC structure 
emerged.  
 
 
Management Buy-Out 
 
Management buy-out (MBO) is another phenomenon of the 1980s which is 
relevant to the current discussion. Although part of the business scene in 
the United States since the early 1970s, it was only in the 1980s that it 
became important in Europe. A management buy-out is a means by which 
existing professional management of a business unit acquire a significant 
equity stake in the business (usually alongside a venture capital partner) 
and in time may take full control of the independent venture. Opportuni-
ties for MBOs arise mainly through divestments of subsidiary companies 
or divisions by large companies who no longer consider these functions a 
vital part of their core businesses. Divisional divestitures have accounted 
for about two-thirds of MBOs in the UK (Wright et al., 1987; Wright et al., Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives 
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1994). Other MBO opportunities arise through receiverships and 
retirements of owners of family businesses. MBOs are usually 
characterised by a highly leveraged capital structure but offer venture 
capitalists and management the possibility of very high capital gains if the 
venture succeeds. Because of the need to pay down a high level of debt in 
a relatively short time, the MBOs tend to suit relatively mature business 
enterprises generating free cash flow.  
As with privatisation, the MBO is a device to reduce the agency cost of 
control over corporate assets. MBOs provide an entrepreneurial oppor-
tunity for management to effectively take control and use the assets of the 
enterprise more efficiently. The overall record of MBOs is very good with 
only about one in ten failing to survive and most succeed in their goal of 
“releasing management talent and energy and thus increasing shareholder value” 
(Carroll, 1990). 
The conversion to Co-op PLC has much in common with the MBO in 
that it was pioneered by management, and senior managers through share 
entitlements and options emerged in all cases as the biggest individual 
shareholders (other than the co-operative and institutional shareholders). 
Like many of the classical MBOs it required considerable entrepreneurial 
and managerial skills, offered the possibility of substantial capital gain 
and a means for senior management in particular to break from salary-
only compensation. This of course is no more than the senior management 
team would expect in any public company. In this respect there is a strong 
incentive for co-operative management to go the PLC route. 
The Co-op PLC differs however from the MBO in that the transition 
was made without the involvement of venture capital partners or the need 
for high levels of debt and the inevitable pressures on cash flow in the 
early years, and management were not at any time aiming for majority 
shareholdings. Many MBOs however, having successfully been acquired 
by management, are later taken public to provide capital for growth and 
to provide an exit mechanism for the venture capital partner and for 
employee and management shareholders who are retiring or who wish to 
realise some of their capital gains. In this way the buy-out management 
team may again find itself with a minority shareholding alongside 
institutional shareholders. In a way Co-op PLC management has 
effectively achieved this while avoiding the high risk, high leveraged 
venture capital stage. 
The parallels between the Co-op PLC developments, public enterprise 
privatisation and MBOs are presented to illustrate the signals and the 
business strategies that were current at the time of the formation of the 
Co-op PLCs. 
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The Agribusiness Environment of the 1980s 
 
The main agribusiness event of the 1980s was the introduction of the EU 
Milk Quota Scheme in 1984 which capped milk production. This was a 
major discontinuity following a period of continuous production growth. 
As well as placing a limit on milk production, the new regime weakened 
the intervention support mechanism and was one of the first signals that 
market forces would become more important in the future. Moving more 
strongly into the market was a daunting prospect for agribusinesses which 
hitherto were heavily dependent on intervention products, and in Ireland 
many observers were concerned about the small size and weak 
competitive position of the firms. This weakness was emphasised in many 
reports and the companies were urged to achieve larger scale by mergers, 
joint ventures, strategic overseas investment and growth through 
diversification (IDA Ireland, 1987; Moloney, 1987/88; Gill and Igoe, 1990; 
Igoe, 1993). 
 
 
The Diversification Strategy 
 
Although the preference of the co-operative movement was to achieve 
scale by merger to form three large dairy co-operatives (Maloney, 
1987/88), the main co-operatives, with the notable exception of 
Mitchelstown and Ballyclough dairy co-operatives, opted for independent 
growth by international and product diversifications which they set out to 
achieve by domestic and foreign acquisitions. It is well known that 
diversification is not without its dangers, especially if it takes an 
organisation away from its own area of capability. Yet it is preferred by 
most companies to a strategy of managing decline, even if the latter may 
be more desirable from a purely profit and shareholder value point of 
view.  
This new approach to growth represented a major change for compa-
nies which up to then had grown organically and confined themselves 
almost entirely to domestic processing and commodity exports. It 
required a completely new approach on the part of the organisations 
concerned and new funding instruments. It is to the credit of the 
managements of these organisations, virtually all of which were home-
grown, that the subsequent developments were so successful. 
 
 
The Entrepreneurial Event: The Kerry Group Case 
 
The pioneer in this new growth strategy was the Kerry Group. Kerry co-
operative was the first of the large dairy co-operatives to experience a 
downturn in its milk supply, which fell by 15.5% between 1978 and 1981; 
and even after some recovery, Kerry milk supply in 1983 was still 6% 
below that achieved in 1978 (Kerry Annual Reports, 1981 and 1983). Faced 
with the milk supply problem, Kerry co-operative embarked on a plan to Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives 
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diversify away from complete dependence on milk. Although it had 
earlier experimented with a joint venture in packaging in 1981, Kerry's 
first significant diversification came with its venture into pigmeat 
processing in 1982. At the end of 1983 it opened its first office in Chicago 
to further develop its casein business in the US.  
In 1985 Kerry considered the “legal, tax and commercial implications of a 
number of options to increase its share capital” and brought forward and 
obtained shareholder approval for the Co-op PLC structure in February 
1986 (Kerry Annual Reports, 1984 and 1985). In March 1986, Kerry 
acquired the beef processing business of the Cork Marts/IMP Group. It 
also started manufacturing and sourcing raw material in the US in 1986, 
and it added further production facilities in the US in 1987. In 1988 Kerry 
made its first acquisitions in the UK and US and later in the same year the 
group acquired Beatreme Food Inc., giving it a very significant stake in the 
US food ingredient business (Kerry Annual Report, 1988). 
Perhaps in retrospect the conception of Co-op PLC structure by Kerry 
and its advisors in 1985 will be regarded as a true entrepreneurial event of 
the Schumpeterian or catalytic type (Binks and Vale, 1990). It gave rise to a 
new combination of resources, and as a catalytic event, it subsequently led 
to allocating and refining events through the formation of the other Co-op 
PLCs and the sales of co-operatives such as Bailieboro, Westmeath and 
Premier Tir Laoighean. It is likely that most if not all of these events will 
be judged to have had positive economic effects.  
Although Kerry's expressed objective was to design a new funding 
mechanism, the solution had much more far reaching effect. As well as 
solving the funding problem, it provided a means by which many of the 
problems associated with vertical ownership by farmers and with the co-
operative structure could be overcome. Incentive was enhanced through 
staff equity participation and the use of stock options. Management in 
particular could now share in the benefits of any improved performance 
of the organisation. Shareholders could begin to solve their investment 
portfolio problem and it was no longer necessary to be concerned about 
members' horizon problem, because outside investors could be relied 
upon to provide any additional equity needed. In effect it provided a 
mechanism by which the straight jacket of the co-operative form could be 
shed and the growth potential of the enterprise realised.  
Kerry Group plc increased its sales at an average annual rate of 18.7% 
between 1986 and 1993, and the values of the shareholdings offered at a 
preferential price to its farmer members prior to public flotation have 
increased by a factor of ten over the eight year period. 
Non-funding considerations of the Co-op PLC structure would seem to 
have been a much more important part of the reasons why other Irish co-
operatives took the PLC route two years later. While the need for funding 
was again the issue emphasised in most of these cases, the conversions 
came at a time when the domestic dairy sector was generating historically 
high cash flows, while the investment needs of its core business were 
relatively low. Gearing levels in the sector were also at historic low levels Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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by this time. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the core dairy sector was 
generating and retaining an estimated £21 million annually in excess of 
requirements to maintain its capacity (Harte, 1992). This agrees with the 
findings of Collins (1991) who has presented evidence that the need for 
equity funding was not the reason for reorganisations in the cases of five 
large American agricultural co-operatives that have taken on 
characteristics of publicly held corporations. 
It is likely however that the strong cash flow in the Irish case played no 
small part in the success achieved by these firms after going public. For 
example, of £310 million spent by Waterford Foods plc (formerly 
Waterford Co-operative) on acquisitions and capital expenditure in the 
1988–93 period, cash flow provided £118 million, £112 million was funded 
by debt, and £80 million was raised by share placings, rights and 
preference share issues (Maddock, 1993).  
 
 
The Current Competitive Structure of the Irish Milk Market 
 
On transaction costs grounds it has been argued that the need for co-
operative vertical integration hinges on the efficiency of the agricultural 
market concerned. In the Irish dairy sector case, therefore, it is dependent 
on how well the milk market works, and how well it would work if the 
influence of the co-operatives was to decline. How well a market works is 
usually thought of as dependent on its structure in terms of the numbers 
of buyers and sellers, and the extent to which they compete with each 
other. In 1994 there were 54 registered purchasers of milk in the Republic 
of Ireland and the concentration ratio for the four largest buyers was 
estimated at 52%. This market is a long way from being too concentrated 
or one which provides conditions for individual purchasers to exploit 
suppliers. It is a long way from the Irish dairy market of the last century 
and from the world of Horace Plunkett (one of the founding fathers of the 
Irish Co-operative Movement) and his followers. 
It might be claimed however that milk purchasers can exercise local 
monopsony power as they have very substantial shares of milk purchases 
at local level. With a relatively homogenous product and high market 
transparency, through the use of yardstick measures for milk price 
comparisons such as the Irish Farmers Journal Milk League and the Craig 
Gardner Milk Price Audit, scope for local exploitation is severely 
restricted. Nevertheless, farmers may feel vulnerable or at a competitive 
disadvantage since their number is large (49,068 at the time of the 1991 
Census of Agriculture) and average size is small. But the power of milk 
producers has been enhanced by the milk quota regime in that it created a 
higher entry barrier in dairy farming. Farmers in this situation, far from 
being vulnerable or in a weak bargaining position, have found their milk 
supplies more actively and competitively sought after than had been the 
case before.  Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives 
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Perhaps a more legitimate concern is how the market will behave in the 
future with a further weakening of EU agricultural support mechanisms 
and with the inevitable rationalisation and decline in the number of milk 
processors. The likely dynamics of the market in this respect are 
impossible to predict, but the concerns about lack of competition in this 
market are no more justified than they would be in the markets for cattle, 
sheep, cereals or other farm products. In fact, with a PLC structure and the 
threat of an outside take-over always hanging over poor performers, 
competition and good performance in the sector would be more assured 
with the presence of publicly quoted companies.  
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Transaction cost economics provides a theoretical framework to critically 
evaluate the vertical integration decision in agribusiness. On transaction 
cost grounds, greater confidence in the efficiency of market mechanisms 
over co-ordination within organisations has emerged over the past 15 
years. In particular better specification and awareness of internal 
organisation costs and the importance of ownership of assets as an 
incentive has led to a general shift away from full vertical integration as a 
business strategy, and especially away from vertical ownership of 
upstream or downstream activities. 
In the modern Irish dairy market where the new Co-op PLC structure 
first emerged, there is little evidence of poor market structure or market 
dysfunction. The need for Irish farmers to vertically integrate into down-
stream processing and marketing is therefore weak or non-existent. 
Persisting with a VI strategy in such circumstances is inefficient on 
transaction cost grounds. 
The use of the co-operative organisation as a means of achieving VI 
adds further to the inefficiency. The traditional co-operative suffers from a 
number of theoretical weaknesses, although the effect of these in practice 
has not been well proven by the available empirical evidence. These 
performance weaknesses, which represent higher transaction costs by 
comparison with the joint stock company, are unlikely to be important 
where the co-operative is on familiar ground in terms of technology and 
markets, but when the enterprise steps out of this role the weaknesses 
begin to limit potential. In general the co-operative is a self-help 
instrument, usually backed by government support, which is used to miti-
gate the problems of poor market structure, and when this need becomes 
weak or no longer exists a change in organisational form is predicted.  
It is against this background that privatisation of Irish agricultural co-
operatives began in the 1980s and may be expected to continue in the 
years ahead. In this context it could be thought of as a development which 
was waiting to happen, but was inhibited by organisational inertia and the 
absence of effective conversion mechanisms. Its timing in the 1980s in the 
Irish case was triggered by changed circumstances in agribusiness and the Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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diversification strategies adopted by the leading dairy companies. The Co-
op PLC structure chosen however owes much to the general economic and 
business thinking of the time, and the parallels with privatisation of public 
sector enterprises and with the increased popularity of management buy-
out mechanisms are striking.  
The conversion of co-operatives to public limited companies is there-
fore much more than just a new funding mechanism. It is a rolling back of 
VI in the agribusiness sector; it is a preference for the joint stock company 
structure over the co-operative; it is a solution to the short-run investment 
horizon of the co-operative; it begins to solve farmers' investment 
portfolio problem, and it provides a means by which management 
performance can be monitored and rewarded. 
In so far as modern agribusiness markets can be regarded as efficient 
and continue to be so, this privatisation of agricultural co-operatives must 
be considered an efficiency enhancing development in the agribusiness 
sector. 
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Note 
 
1  The general method by which the traditional co-operatives were converted to Co-op 
PLCs is as follows: A new public company was formed with two types of share capital, 
'A’ and 'B’ shares, having equal ranking. The 'B’ shares were issued to the original co-
operative in exchange for its assets and subsidiary companies. Some of 'A’ share were 
then offered to farmers and employees at a discount on the expected market price of the 
shares. Further 'A’ shares were placed in public flotation. As currently constituted, the 
shareholding of the co-operative in the public company must be maintained above 50% 
giving the co-operative majority control. This control structure is copper fastened by 
requiring agreement by 75% of the farmer members in two consecutive extraordinary 
general meetings to permit the co-operative shareholding to fall below 50%.  
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Managers in today's organizations are constantly exhorted to break with 
the past and meet the new demands of a global economy and a post-
industrial society. The point is generally that globalism heralds increased 
competition and increased capacity for and reliance on the flow of vast 
quantities of information. Crucial for survival are increased 
responsiveness and flexibility of organizational structures. The key 
question, of course, is how this responsiveness and flexibility are to be 
achieved. On this the literature is divided.  
One position holds that responsiveness and flexibility will be achieved 
by decentralizing authority and decision making, respecting and 
empowering workers at the various levels of the organization (Kanter, 
1990; Chandler, 1990; Clegg, 1990). Some writers even suggest that 
democratization, not just decentralization is a likely and appropriate 
response to current needs (Nightingale, 1982; Bennis, 1993). This view has 
been embraced and lauded by many who believe that the social and 
economic structures of the industrial revolution are now fragmenting into 
diverse networks held together by information technology.  
Conversely, there is another literature developing that suggests 
increased competitiveness and flexibility in some companies has come at 
the expense of employee democracy (Clegg, 1990; Sayer and Walker, 
1992). Strategies such as the increased standardization of procedures, 
increased control over managers, and the elimination of half of the middle 
management positions by removing the need to have many personnel 
with information processing responsibilities have been chosen. This has 
been accomplished through ‘hyperquantification’, more elaborate 
computerization, and other changes which serve to centralize con-
ceptualization and decentralize only the execution of tasks.  
The overall conclusion is that no one model for improving flexibility 
can be prescribed, and that to the extent an organization has control over 
its own responses to a changing environment, each will have to consider 
its own context, its own values and corporate culture. For co-operatives, 
due to their long tradition of focusing on ways to strengthen democratic 
practices, the literature communicates the message that increased par-
ticipation, decentralization, and democratization are likely to be changes 
that foster success.  
Co-operatives have always held that democracy was a defining feature; 
a feature which could readily be called upon to identify what it was that Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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distinguished them from other privately owned corporations and small 
businesses. Indeed, this was true for co-operatives in the early years of 
their formation. For the first half of the twentieth century the premise that 
in a co-op, democracy is practiced in a setting of face-to-face interaction 
and common needs, was the accepted basis on which many co-operatives 
were organized and managed. This premise became less practical with 
changes in the social, economic, and political environments. Not only 
were co-op members more geographically dispersed, but the degree to 
which they shared, or acted upon, needs in common became less clear. 
The core idea that co-operatives were premised upon a group of people 
coming together to solve common problems shifted to the concept of co-
operatives as organizations that supply goods and services to individual 
consumers to meet individual needs. This has been a profound shift with 
many consequences, one of which is that consumers of the co-operatives 
p r o d u c t s  a n d  s e r v i c e s  n o  l o n g e r  n e e d e d  t o  i n t e r a c t  w i t h  o t h e r s  i n  a n  
association of members.  
And while democracy continued as an ethical imperative for co-opera-
tives, the lack of face-to-face interaction and the increased diversity among 
members meant that opportunities for spontaneous direct and par-
ticipatory democracy were reduced or absent altogether. Coupled with 
these changes we saw the ‘professionalization’ of management, including 
boards. In consequence, co-ops now tend to emphasize formal represen-
tative democracy where election at an annual meeting is all that is needed 
to provide legitimacy to a board of directors, who then work with paid 
management to run the co-op (Travena, 1983).  
 
 
Democratic Practice and the Management of Co-operatives 
 
Briscoe (l97l) argues that the organizational structures initially put into 
place in order to facilitate participatory decision-making1 have themselves 
become reified. He suggests that in the early days of development the 
institutional form of democracy was instrumental in attaining certain 
changes and improvements, such as providing access to participation in 
the economic system to those who might not otherwise have access. 
However, he suggests that currently the democratic structure has taken on 
institutional value without possessing instrumental2 value in terms of 
business operation, and concludes that democracy is valued for its moral 
superiority and, as an institutional value, “resists change and exerts 
normative restrictions on business activities – burdens not borne by the co-op's 
competitors”.3 
This necessity of having to juggle the membership's right of access to 
participation in organizational decision-making4 with the imperatives of 
efficient business operation has contributed to the development of rather 
elaborate mechanisms for member participation (Brown, 1985). As a result 
the various organizational structures currently in place in co-operatives, 
and the processes established for facilitating participation have evolved The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool in the Globalized Food Sector 
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from the initially instrumental and possibly now institutional value placed 
on the ideal of democratic models for participation (Ehrenreich and 
Edelstein, 1983). Goalsetting and decision-making processes are key 
variables affecting structure within co-operative organizations. The 
democratic nature of co-operatives is reflected in these two processes. 
 
 
Goal Setting 
 
A natural system model recognizes that ‘domain consensus’ (Thompson, 
1967), or the claims recognized by those elements in the environment able 
to provide necessary support to the organization, defines the set of expec-
tations about what the organization will or will not do, and thus effec-
tively defines operational goals. Accepting this perspective leads one to 
conclude that the official5 goals of co-operatives can potentially be 
undermined by agencies in the external environment whose operative goals 
differ from the official goals of the focal organization, but who do control 
resources essential to the organization.  
Goals are not static but evolve, reflecting the influence of a variety of 
interest groups (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and the power of the domi-
nating elite (Perrow, 1968). By identifying the groups in control of re-
sources central to the focal organization, the evolution of operative goals 
throughout the co-operative's history can be traced.  
Consumer co-operatives, for example, were dominated in the early 
years by the members who contributed financial resources and legitimi-
zation to the co-operative as a social and economic institution. Power over 
decision-making and goalsetting rested with the Board of Directors, who 
acted as trustees for the membership. As the consumer co-operatives grew 
in size and complexity, reliance for financial resources shifted from the 
members to other financial institutions, and to suppliers of goods and 
technical services. The membership's power over decision-making and 
goalsetting diminished as board decisions began to reflect the desires of 
these external agents. Organizations which drew financial resources from 
retained earnings tended to remove decision-making further from the 
membership by allowing management to assume that role. This con-
sequence is also a reflection of the importance currently attributed to the 
managerial task area. As co-operatives have grown in size and complex-
ity, it has become more difficult for the lay board to possess the technical 
and administrative skills necessary for decision-making. Increasingly 
management has been allowed to assume this role, thereby obscuring the 
lines of responsibility drawn between elected and paid officials 
(Ostergaard and Halsey, 1965). 
Further developments in the study of goals have expanded the external 
dependency concept introduced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) to include a 
broader range of stakeholders exerting influence over the goalsetting 
process (Ackoff, 1981; Mason and Mitroff, 1981; Mitroff, 1983). Perrow 
(1968) set the stage for this perspective by identifying a variety of goal Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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categories, delineated by external (societal, output and investor goals) and 
internal (system, product characteristics and derived goals) reference 
points. An examination of each of these goal categories in the context of 
who influences the identification of the goals contributes further to the 
understanding of the behavior of co-operative organizations. 
Societal goals are expressed in terms of the function co-operatives 
perform for society. Some individuals consider co-operatives to be agents 
for social change capable of undertaking the complete reformation of 
society; others see the movement as a corrective to abuses apparent in the 
existing society; some view co-operation as an aid to specific occupational 
groups or classes (MacPherson, 1977); while still others see co-operative 
organizations functioning to improve the competitive performance of the 
total economic system (Nourse, l957). 
Goals as output can be identified by asking the question, ‘Who bene-
fits?’ Originally, and in the eyes of many co-operators today, this was seen 
to be the membership, who also, in the case of co-operatives, constitute the 
owners. Adding to the complexity of the situation, we find that the 
member/owners of many co-operatives are also the clients or consumers. 
In terms of the idealized conceptualization of the purpose of co-operatives 
(that of social change agent), society in general also benefits, thereby 
having an additional influence over goalsetting. 
The traditional investor goal, return on investment, is the goal most 
often cited as the primary directive for privately-owned corporations, and 
is often advocated as the normative directive for co-operative 
organizations. However, capital is not the only item of value invested in 
co-operatives. Labour and legitimization are also contributed, and thereby 
command a position of responsiveness on the part of goalsetters. As a 
result, maximization of profit may be a necessary but not sufficient 
characterization of the goals of a co-operative organization. 
System goals include such variables as size, growth, market share and, 
ultimately, survival. Increasingly, such goals are established by top 
management, with input from the co-operative's board of directors. A 
long-standing debate in the co-operative community has centred on the 
issue of size versus democratic participation in decision-making (Craig, 
1977; Laidlaw, 1977). One school of thought has advocated increases in 
organizational size as a means for achieving economies of scale and com-
petitive power within the market place. Another believes that ‘small is 
beautiful’, and advocates the democratic process for participation in 
decision-making as the co-operative raison d’être. 
Product goals, as a subset of system goals, can be useful as a means for 
comparing co-operative organizations to similar privately-owned corpo-
rations. For example, the product and service policies of consumer co-
operatives as compared to other supermarket chains or independents can 
be utilized to identify how the ‘co-operative difference’ is interpreted in 
terms of quality of goods, disclosure of information or additional services 
provided. The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool in the Globalized Food Sector 
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Finally, derived goals, defined as such because “the ability to pursue them 
is derived from the existence and behavior of the organization but is not 
considered essential to its conduct” (Perrow, 1968, p. 308), may be considered 
to be the social goals of the organization. It is assumed of co-operatives 
that they have a greater obligation to their membership, to their 
employees, and to society in general, than do privately-owned 
organizations. In recognition of this obligation, co-operatives have 
pioneered the social audit as a means for measuring achievement of social 
responsibility goals. 
According to Perrow (1968), the use of goal categories underscores the 
characterization of organizations as “coalitions or sets of interacting interest 
groups”, rather than as integrated entities. It can be concluded that, unlike 
the picture of goal setting and behavior posited by rational models of 
organizations, not all behavior in the co-operative organization is 
completely integrated or functionally indispensable, contributing to the 
achievement of an ultimate goal. Rather, the co-operative pursues a 
variety of goals, some of which may be in competition with each other. It 
is possible that conflict can be resolved only by serial attention to this 
multiplicity of goals, but the end result may be that no one goal is ade-
quately achieved. In order to understand what therefore is perceived as 
seemingly erratic or non-rational behavior, a multi-constituent perspective 
regarding goal setting and decision-making is required. 
 
 
Decision Making  
 
Traditional conceptualizations of the decision-making process accepted a 
rational model, assuming that authority over decision-making rested with 
the owners, or in larger organizations, with the representatives of the 
owners, the board of directors and management. It was assumed that 
decisions taken by such representatives were carried out with the best 
interests of the owners in mind. It soon became apparent, however, that as 
ownership and control were effectively separated, the degree to which the 
former was proven to be true was dependent upon the degree to which 
the self-interest of those in control ran parallel to the owners' interests, 
and, if this was different, the degree to which there were checks on the use 
of that power (Berle and Means, 1968). 
In theory, the ‘powers of control’ or the power to exercise virtually all 
the rights of ownership (Mace, 1971), should rest with the board of 
directors, as the trustees of the member/owners in a co-operative organi-
zation. In reality, such powers of control are more likely to rest with senior 
management officials. Decisions ultimately taken by the directors will be 
influenced and possibly determined by those who possess these powers. If 
the powers of control rest with top management, and they in turn are 
oriented toward an agent in the external environment other than the 
membership, it is unlikely that the needs of the members will be given top 
priority in decision-making. Indeed, the rather tenuous nature of the Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
 
60 
organization as a discrete entity is underscored when the discretion of the 
organization is challenged, and other elements in the task environment 
assume control over its activities.6 
What has emerged in many co-ops is a situation where the Board plus 
senior management control the co-operative. They define issues and make 
the decisions. Conceptually, a separation between the association of 
members and the business side of the organization has emerged. The 
tension between the two tends to be resolved by concentrating on the busi-
ness and becoming ‘market oriented’ rather than member oriented. Con-
sumer co-ops in particular, but many others as well, picked up on this 
mode of thinking through the lean and mean 1980's, substantially down-
sizing the resources put into member education and democratic structures 
and processes. The consequence, members tend to become pure customers 
and to judge co-ops today mostly by their performance compared to other 
businesses.  
But what does this mean for co-operatives in the future? Are we to 
assume that the patterns that appear to be developing will only continue 
and that co-operatives of necessity must move away from the democratic 
notions that have been a defining feature for so long? And what of the co-
operatives that choose to adopt models of financing that introduce outside 
investors? How will this affect member control? This paper will explore 
such issues by examining the case of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, a 
large Canadian agricultural co-operative which has recently converted to 
a publicly traded co-operative. 
 
 
The Case of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
 
Current Situation 
 
Saskatchewan is located in the middle of the three prairie provinces of 
western Canada. Since the turn of the century, local and provincial 
development in Saskatchewan has been largely centred around primary 
products. In the southern portion of the province, agriculture has been the 
mainstay, with the development of the oil and potash industries favoring 
districts where the wells (south and west) and mines (central corridor) are 
located. In the north of the province development has been based largely 
around forestry, fishing and trapping.  
With a population that fluctuates around the one million mark, the 
province has struggled over the years to establish alternate industry to 
supplement its agricultural base. Despite some progress in this direction, 
the state of agriculture continues to have a major impact on the overall 
provincial economy. Cereal grain prices, once the mainstay crop, have 
dropped dramatically over the past ten years. The number of farmers has 
decreased and the size of farms has increased. The poor return from cereal 
crops has resulted in a move by farmers to diversify into oilseeds, pulse, 
and more exotic crops, such as spices and canary seed. Concurrent with The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool in the Globalized Food Sector 
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these diversification moves has been an increased development of food 
processing initiatives around the province.  
After ten years of depressed grain prices the provincial economy would 
appear to be experiencing a turnaround, with the support of improved 
potash sales and slightly improved grain prices. Yet Saskatchewan 
continues to be one of the more disadvantaged parts of Canada, with high 
out migration a testament to the lack of employment opportunities for 
young people.  
 
 
History 
 
The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool was formed in 1924. Its history is colorful, 
rooted as it is in the struggle of individual farmers who chose collective 
action to redress the imbalance in power existing in the market place in 
the early history of the province. With the influence of the Territorial 
Grain Growers Association, an educational and political organization, 
farmers turned to co-operatives as a means of obtaining farm supplies and 
gaining greater control over the marketing of their produce. In 1911 
farmers launched the Saskatchewan Elevator Company with the aim of 
building an elevator system owned and controlled by farmers. Positive 
experiences with centralized selling of grain through the Canadian Wheat 
Board established by the government during World War I, but later 
disbanded, convinced farmers that this form of centralized control would 
provide greater benefit for all than could be achieved individually. The 
formation of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, to pool and market the 
production of all members was the final step in achieving this objective.  
 
 
Current Context 
 
The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool began as a marketing co-operative, 
collecting and moving its members' grain from elevator point to market. 
Over the years the Pool has evolved from being primarily a grain 
marketing co-operative to providing a major supply function in farm 
inputs to its members, with farm inputs distributed through over twenty 
seven farm service centres and one hundred C. P. I. 7 Sheds around the 
province. The Pool currently supplies approximately 40% of the farm 
input market, and markets 58% of the province's grain through 410 ele-
vator points. In recent years, diversification into food processing has con-
tributed significantly to revenues during years of poor harvests and 
depressed grain prices. Fully one half of 1994–95 earnings came from 
value-added activities. 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has historically been the largest co-operative 
and business in Saskatchewan; within Canada, the Pool ranked 64th in the 
1992 Financial Post 500, and is the largest agricultural co-operative. At its 
July 31 1996 year end Saskatchewan Wheat Pool reported net earnings of Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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32.6 million, fixed assets of 1.1 Billion, and members equity of 443.7 
million.  
The Pool's operating divisions include farm supplies, livestock, termi-
nal elevators, flour milling, and publishing the nation's largest farm 
weekly newspaper, the Western Producer. Over the years the Pool has 
also entered into strategic alliances with associated companies, with 
ownership arrangements varying from a 22% investment in Pound-Maker 
Agventures Ltd., an ethanol and feedlot venture, to 100% ownership of 
InfraReady Products Limited, a value added processing plant for raw 
cereals, legumes and oilseed. In all the Pool has invested in a total of 17 
companies, some joint ventures with other co-operatives such as Inter 
provincial Co-operative Limited, some with private industry, such as 
Northco Foods. (See Figure 1 for the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool Organ-
izational Structure.) 
Within recent years in the food and grain marketing industry, compe-
tition has increased exponentially. The rapid pace of merger and acqui-
sition has challenged the Pool's traditional position of dominance within 
the province. Recently constructed oilseed processing plants by 
international giants Archer Daniels Midland and Cargil within the 
province present further challenges to Saskatchewan Wheat Pool's 
historical position. Nationally and internationally the Pool will have to 
continue to grow to sustain any kind of presence in the farm supply, food 
processing and grain marketing industries.  
In addition to changes in the competitive environment, significant 
changes to the regulatory and sociocultural environment are having a 
major impact on the way in which the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has 
traditionally run its operations and served its members.  
Agricultural reform driven by both trade agreements and fiscal 
constraints has resulted in the loss of the ‘Crow Benefit’, a transportation 
subsidy historically paid directly to the rail companies, dramatically 
reducing producers' incomes and subsequently, the Pool's. The future 
abandonment of rail lines currently frozen to the year 2000, will 
dramatically change the face of the prairie grain delivery system.  
Greater diversity of producers, producer needs and market segments 
has augmented a move to increased individual freedoms. A growing per-
centage of the producers in the province feel that their individual mar-
keting opportunities are being impaired by centralized selling models, 
challenging a cornerstone principle of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool.  
In response to these changes and in anticipation of even more, Board 
and management of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool concluded that two central 
strategies were required to move the Pool into the next century in a 
renewed position of strength provincially, nationally and internationally.  
A new CEO in January of 1994 has been instrumental in implementing 
the new direction approved by the Board of Directors. Becoming more 
effective at the core business of grain handling through reducing costs and 
by increasing the flexibility with which the company was managed, was 
deemed essential. It was proposed that these two objectives would best be The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool in the Globalized Food Sector 
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achieved through reorganization of the Country Services Division and a 
revised collective agreement. To strengthen the Pool's capital position, 
financial restructuring was deemed necessary. Both employees and 
members have been affected by these decisions.  
Relations with the employees representative, the Grain Services Union, 
have historically been quite good. During negotiation of the recent 
collective agreement, however, provisions regarding contracting out were 
challenged by management (and ultimately achieved) and became a 
central issue of dispute. An agreement was not reached and a thirteen day 
strike ensued in September, 1994. Occurring as it did in the middle of 
harvest put the elevator managers in an impossible situation of wanting to 
serve the members during the most critical time of the year, and wanting 
to retain loyalty to the union. Loyalty to the members prevailed and the 
work stoppage strategy was unsuccessful in the country. The strike ended 
in a very bitter fashion.  
Within this context of labor difficulties, the Board of Directors and 
management of the Pool took what was to become a very controversial 
proposal to the delegate body in July of 1994. The primary source of fund-
ing for Saskatchewan Wheat Pool ventures and reinvestment in infra-
structure and other aspects of the business had traditionally been retained 
earnings in the form of members equity8 and debt financing. In recent 
years reductions in working capital have impeded the Pools ability to 
move quickly with investment decisions. An increased demand for payout 
of members equity with the average age of Pool members increasing in the 
future, was predicted to aggravate an already difficult situation.  
The proposal put to the delegates was to transform Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool from a solely member-owned co-operative to a co-operative 
offering two types of ownership. Current members would continue to 
have voting membership in the Pool by retaining a portion of their equity 
in a voting share account. Only active farmers would be allowed to 
purchase this type of share. A second type of nonvoting share would be 
offered to the public, with members having the opportunity to convert the 
balance of their current equity in the Pool to nonvoting shares, able then to 
be traded on the open market. This proposal was decided upon by a 
meeting of the delegate body9, and was passed with the support of 80 
percent of the delegates. 
From the outset, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool President Leroy Larsen, 
and the Board of Directors made it very clear that converting equity to 
shares would not mean the Pool would stray from its original principles of 
being farmer-controlled. This promise was a major selling feature for the 
proposed conversion with the members.  
An in-house trading period from January 15 to February 14, 1996 
enabled members to convert existing equity (or to divest in exchange for 
cash), and to purchase additional Class B non-voting shares. From 
February 15 to March 14, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool employees and 
Saskatchewan residents had an opportunity to purchase shares. On March 
15, the shares were listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.10 Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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Saskatchewan Wheat Pool's Democratic Structure and Processes 
 
Democratic Processes 
 
Since its inception, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has envisioned its role as a 
co-operative to be a voice for its farmer members in the formation of 
agricultural policy, as well as providing a marketing and supply mecha-
nism whose objective it was and is to enhance direct economic benefit to 
its members. This role has been carried out through lobbying and advo-
cacy to alter the legislative and policy environment within which its 
farmer members run their businesses; and through the development of a 
grain collection and marketing infrastructure which could enhance the 
individual bargaining power of the farmer member through collective 
strategies, and deliver to the member a greater share of the end product of 
their farm output. A further objective of the Sask Wheat Pool has been to 
ensure the future of farming for the family farm as well as the viability of 
rural communities. 
 
Volunteer Activities  
Volunteerism is central to the success of the Pool's democratic structure 
and processes. The primary entry point for volunteers is at the local 
committee level. Each elevator point has a local committee whose man-
date it is to represent the issues of that point and community, via the 
delegate system, to the Board and management within the Pool. Livestock 
and other special interest committees also function within the Pool's 
committee and democratic structure. Agricultural policy issues have been 
the primary focus of most committees, as well as operational matters 
pertaining to that community. Each committee holds an average of four 
meetings throughout the year. Local annual meetings traditionally held in 
the fall, and other member activities provide additional opportunities for 
member involvement. 
In addition to providing a mechanism for receiving and distributing 
policy and operational information to the membership, the local com-
mittees provide input and advice to delegates, the Board of Directors, and 
managers. This input includes product and service needs or problems, 
proposed positions on agriculture policy for the Pool to advance on behalf 
of its farmer members, cropping information and status, and concerns of a 
more general nature.  
Local committees also provide a mechanism for recruiting delegates. 
Recruitment is encouraged by two programs in particular sponsored by 
the Member Relations Division; the Farmers for the Future Program and 
the Advanced Committee Leadership Program. The former is a seminar 
designed for farm couples to develop interpersonal, leadership and farm 
management skills, and to learn more about Pool operations and direc-
tion. The latter provides an opportunity for members with an interest in 
becoming more involved in Pool leadership to learn about the democratic 
structure of the Pool, and to attend a portion of the fall Annual Meeting. The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool in the Globalized Food Sector 
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The local committees have also been central to delegate recruitment and to 
recent efforts to encourage more women and aboriginal people to par-
ticipate in the Pool's democratic processes and to attend informational 
meetings.  
In 1994, 71% of members participated in at least one of the six kinds of 
activities identified in the member survey; attending the local annual 
meeting, voting for the delegate, signing the delegate nomination form, 
attending other SWP meetings, attending a SWP sponsored social event, 
or serving on a local committee. Approximately 14% of all members serve 
on local committees. More than 51% of members surveyed discussed 
issues with a local committee member or delegate, and 89% read the 
member's newsletter.  
 
Surveys of the Membership 
Regular surveys of membership knowledge and attitudes has been a tra-
dition of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool since the early 1980's. The survey 
instrument is quite comprehensive and covers topics ranging from general 
attitudes toward the Pool's functioning as a co-operative, opportunities for 
member participation, to Pool services and operations, to positions taken 
on a range of agricultural policy issues. Results of the survey are 
incorporated into the Police and Member Services Division planning 
process.  
Women's participation in the Pool has received specific attention since 
the early 1990's, and a separate survey of women in Pool households has 
been conducted in the last two surveys to increase the total number of 
women respondents in the membership survey. In the past two years 
women claiming membership in the Pool has risen from 28% to 46% of 
respondents. Despite the increase in membership, actual participation in 
Pool activities is not high, and interest in involvement remains low. It 
would appear that Saskatchewan Wheat Pool initiatives to increase 
women's participation have not had a major impact, and more work will 
have to be done in this area.  
 
Member Education 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool is strongly committed to member education 
and development. The Pool's delegate development program, as an 
example, provides a variety of opportunities for delegates to participate in 
knowledge and skill development seminars and workshops, as well as to 
attend industry and co-operative conferences. The Pool is also an active 
supporter of the Co-operative Youth Program and 4H, encouraging local 
committees to sponsor youth developmental opportunities.  
The Western Producer, published by the Pool is a weekly newspaper 
devoted to farm policy and related information, received by members and 
non members alike on a subscription basis. All Pool members receive a 
quarterly newsletter called Pool Today, which covers a wide variety of 
topics ranging from farm practice and policy to Pool operations. A com-
mittee newsletter, the Committee Communicator, is also published quar-Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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terly to provide committee members with Pool, industry, co-operative and 
policy information. In addition, the Pool also makes available to delegates 
and management, on a monthly basis, audio tapes covering a wide range 
of topics such as policy updates, marketing and commercial information, 
and information about educational and other programs available to 
members.  
The Responsible Stewardship program recently introduced by Pool 
management provides information for farmer members to examine and 
modify their current farming practices to improve their impact on the 
environment. For example, the Farm Environmental Assessment Guide is 
a workbook aimed at helping farmers audit their operations. The Guide's 
easy to follow process allows producers to examine current practices and 
conditions, identifies areas needing upgrading, and looks at issues related 
to health, both personal and financial.  
Finally, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool provides financial contributions to 
the Centre for the Study of Co-operatives at the University of 
Saskatchewan dedicated to research and teaching about co-operatives.  
 
Participation of Members in Decision Making; Local Committees 
The first point of access to participating in the Pool's decision making 
process is the local annual meeting, where members meet to elect repre-
sentatives to the local committee, receive reports on financial and opera-
tional results, and discuss policy issues. There are typically two to four 
committees in a subdistrict. Committee and member meetings offer 
opportunities for district delegates to provide information to the 
membership regarding upcoming issues, as well as to gather feedback 
from members about issues of concern to that subdistrict. The Pool has a 
very clear system of representation, with each delegate having to be 
elected in subdistrict elections (by mail ballet) held every two years. 
Elections for the 8 odd numbered districts and 8 even numbered districts 
are held on alternating years. Once elected, district delegates elect one of 
their district delegate group to serve on the Board of Directors for a two 
year term. Through resolutions advanced at the local committee level, and 
delegate voting at the annual meeting held in the fall, as well as the 
election of delegates and directors, members exert their control over the 
decisions made by the Pool.  
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool committee renewal is a major initiative 
planned for 1995. Committee focus groups revealed that members believe 
committees have an important role to play in the Pool's future, but that 
improvements are needed to make involvement and the role more inter-
esting and meaningful to a larger number of members, in particular 
younger members. In addition, there is a perception on the part of mem-
bers that staff and delegates do not listen well. Planned changes include 
looking at a local process to introduce new ideas, strengthen leadership, 
and generally help committees refocus. The Member Relations Division 
has just completed the consultation phase, will be piloting new initiatives, The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool in the Globalized Food Sector 
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and if successful, hopes to have changes implemented beginning in 1995–
96. 
Early indications suggest that there will be a move away from local 
delivery point-oriented committee activity, to a regional focus in keeping 
with a structure adopted by the Country Services Division and their 
marketing teams approach. Multicommunity collaboration rather than 
competition is seen as a way of best using all current resources or what 
may be there in the future. With changes to rail lines and elevator delivery 
points anticipated following recent federal government changes to the 
Western Grain Transportation Act, services are more likely to be provided 
on a regional basis, so input from members will also need to have a 
regional orientation. This change will not undermine the work of the 
committees at the local level, however, as they are seen as providing 
important contributions in the area of customer data and responding to 
the unique circumstances in a specific area.  
 
 
Democratic Structures 
 
The importance of member input into Pool operations and farm policy 
positions is demonstrated by the structure of the organization. The Pool 
has a dual reporting structure with two senior executive officers, one for 
the commercial divisions of the organization, one for the policy and 
member services divisions. The latter contains the communications, policy 
and economic research, and member relations divisions.  
 
Governance Structures 
The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has a very elaborate democratic system. 
The province is divided into 16 districts, with seven to nine delegates in 
each district. Resolutions from committee and member meetings are 
reviewed at the district level before being referred to the Provincial 
Resolutions Committee of Delegates which manages the resolutions 
process leading up to and during the Annual Meeting. A total of 134 dele-
gates, including 16 directors met at last year's annual meeting to discuss 
and debate Pool operations and agriculture policies. The president and 
two vice presidents, all full time positions and two executive members of 
the Board, are elected every year. The Board of Directors normally meets 
monthly. 
 
Member Relations Division 
The elaborate democratic system is supported and serviced by the 
Member Relations Division (M.R.D.). With a staff of twenty six SWP 
provides one of the most extensive support systems of any co-operative in 
North America.  
District representatives serve as liaison with the democratic and 
commercial structures across the province, providing information, train-
ing and facilitation in a variety of areas. The role of the Member Relations Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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Division has been modified recently as a result of internal reviews. There 
will be an increased involvement with commercial operations as a result 
of the restructuring of the Country Services Division (C.S.D.), an emphasis 
on team models for management, and commitment to continuous 
improvement in member communications and participation. As part of 
the team, the Member Relations representative, will act to advance the 
concerns of the member more directly in decisions made by C.S.D. manag-
ers.  
 
Annual Meeting 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool holds an eight day annual meeting attended by 
134 delegates. Management undergoes intensive scrutiny by the delegates 
presenting their divisional reports and responding to questions. This 
scrutiny is extended to the CEO and Executive Director as well, who 
conduct what is essentially a bear pit session with the delegates. Delegates 
then have an opportunity to debate and vote on resolutions coming 
forward from the districts, providing direction to the Board and 
management for the oncoming year on both internal operational and 
external public policy issues.  
 
Figure 1  Saskatchewan Wheat Pool's Democratic Structure  
 
Board of Directors The Board of Directorsel ects the President and First
and Second Vice-President annually
16 Districts,each
District elects a
director annually
7–9 Subdistricts
form a District
Local committeesarea ttached to delivery points,each
group of four electing one delegate every two years
Each member can bee l e c ted to a position on the local
committee, elected on an annual basis, approximately
8 members per local committee  
 
 
The Impact of Conversion to a Publicly Traded Co-operative 
 
What has been described is the way in which Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
has functioned to date. With conversion many of the accepted practices 
may be changed completely. The decision by Saskatchewan Wheat Pool's 
elected officials and management to convert to a publicly traded co-
operative is a decision to move into uncharted territory. Just how 
successful they will be in retaining their functioning as a co-operative 
within the context of pressures from the open market remains to be seen. 
Issues arise in a number of areas. The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool in the Globalized Food Sector 
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Ownership Structure 
 
Ownership and control have been central to the debate among members 
over the conversion decision. The legislation supporting conversion has 
been drafted in such a way as to leave voting control in the hands of the 
farmer/members, while ownership rests in the hands of as many farmer/ 
members who choose to convert their equity into Class B non-voting 
shares.  
In order to retain maximum control of the Pool, it is imperative that as 
many Class A farmer/members retain as much of their equity in the 
organization as possible. Initial polling of the membership indicated that 
older members were more likely to take their equity out rather than 
convert. This created concern for Board and management. A concerted 
campaign was waged in the countryside from December 1995 until just 
prior to the in-house trading period (January–February 1996) to ensure 
that members did not sell their shares. During in-house trading, most sell 
orders were issued by older members. Of those 60 years or older, 12,000 
members offered to sell 43% of all shares sold. This amounted to $60 
million and underscored the fact that under the Pool's previous equity 
arrangement, a huge majority of dollars was held by those over 60 years. 
As a result of the major marketing campaign waged by the Member 
Relations Division, 51,000 of 78,000 equity holding Pool members chose to 
retain all or some of their Class B non-voting shares. The vast majority 
were younger members. This portion represented 54% of $165 million of 
existing share capital, and was considered substantial enough for the 
Board of Directors to authorize management to proceed with the final 
steps of conversion.  
Unlike the stability of past, ownership will now be dynamic, changing 
as the Class B shareholders change. Ownership and control, both 
previously held in the hands of the farmer member, will now be divided. 
Farmer members currently hold 54% of existing share capital; Pool 
employees hold another small portion, and the people of Saskatchewan 
the bulk of the remaining. What this pattern will be in the future is a 
matter of great interest to the previous owners of the Pool who believe 
that control is now out of the hands of the Class A shareholders.  
 
 
Goalsetting  
 
The ability of co-operatives to redress the inequalities within the 
marketplace stems from the essential difference in transactional per-
spective inherent in co-operatives. As Thompson and Jones (1980, p. 386–
387) state, “even though co-operatives perform functions similar to those of 
traditional business firms, they have unique differences in their relationship to 
their owners. The co-operative organization does not buy, process and sell to make 
a profit as a separate entity; instead, it procures services for the benefit of its 
members – who hope to increase their savings if it is a consumer co-operative, or Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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to increase the profits of their own separate business if it is a farmer or business 
co-operative”. 
Will this description ring true of a publicly traded co-operative? Whose 
objectives will come into prominence under the new model.  
Sask Wheat Pool Board will be legally bound to serve the interests of 
the corporation. In the past, decisions which have been taken in the 
interest of the member welfare, such as a decision to keep freight tariffs 
low to reduce costs to producers, will no longer be possible. In the future 
the interests of the shareholders will take precedence. If the majority of 
shareholders are not farmers, or those who share the interests of the 
farmer/members, the goals set for the Pool may diverge from that of the 
past. This causes particular concern related to positions taken by the Pool 
on agricultural policy issues. It very possible that observers will note a 
sharp reduction in agricultural policy lobbying by Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool in the future.  
 
 
Decision-Making 
 
The annual meeting has traditionally been an opportunity for delegates to 
receive a tremendous amount of information about the Pool's operations. 
How this tradition will be affected by the issuing of public shares is still 
not certain. Whether more or less information and of what type can and 
will be made available to the delegate body remains one of the unknowns 
as the Pool goes ahead with restructuring. Preliminary discussions 
indicate that two annual meetings will be required, the first for Class B 
shareholders, then for Class A.  
Another associated issue is whether the relationship of the Board with 
members, which is currently seen as representative, will be possible in 
future. The way in which the Board is able to use the delegate body may 
be substantially modified in light of insider information regulations, and 
may effectively nullify the representative nature of the current democratic 
system. 
Provisions have been made in the new legislation11 to allow for the 
appointment of a board member who is not a member of the delegate 
body, in other words, not a farmer/member. Such a decision, however, re-
quires the support of 2/3 of the voting delegates to amend the bylaw. This 
provision does open the way to non farmer members on the Board, and is 
seen by many as an indication of the future direction of decision-making. 
Another provision of the legislation that has caused tremendous 
controversy, and resulted in legal action12 by a group calling themselves 
the Co-operating Friends of the Pool, has to do with changes to the deci-
sion-making process. Past bylaws of the Pool required delegates, rather 
than a general plebiscite of members, to vote on major decisions facing the 
co-operative. With conversion to a public company, it is mandatory that 
non voting shareholders be allowed to vote on decisions that 
fundamentally change the course of the Pool. The CFP have charged that The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool in the Globalized Food Sector 
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all members should have had a chance to vote on changes of such 
significance. It is bitterly ironic for them that in the future non farmer 
members will have more right to participate in such decisions than did 
farmer members prior to conversion.  
 
 
A New Generation Co-operative 
 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool had its origins in a fight by farmers for fairness 
in the marketplace. They desired the ability to procure for themselves a 
greater share of the returns associated with the end products made from 
their grain. At the time that the Pool was formed, all members shared a 
common vision of the role that the Pool would play in supporting 
members' needs. Within today's membership, however, there appears to 
be two views as to the role that the Pool specifically, and co-operatives in 
general, should play in society and in serving their members.  
The Pool represents for many of its farmer members a way of 
enhancing the profitability of their farm business. It is a means to achieve 
‘collective independence’.13 The financial restructuring decision is seen as 
an opportunity for greater profit on the part of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 
with benefits flowing to its membership and investors. Their concern is for 
the sustainability of the Pool as a viable player in the agrifood industry, 
thus contributing indirectly to the long term sustainability of farming in 
Saskatchewan. In this view, the Pool takes on a role very similar to any 
other significant employer and investment opportunity. Jobs will be 
created by expansion, members will benefit individually through their 
investment, and the economy of the province will be strengthened.  
For another portion of the current membership, and those most 
opposed to the conversion process, the Pool represents a means to alter 
the structure of the marketplace and a mechanism for economic and social 
development in rural communities. In their view, it is imperative that the 
Pool hold firm on agricultural policy issues which have a major impact on 
the small farm, such as central desk selling. Such positions may be 
controversial, and in some circumstances, even in direct contradiction to 
what is commercially advantageous for the Pool, but these positions have 
been upheld historically because direct benefit to members was seen to 
outweigh direct benefit to the organization. For those holding this latter 
view, opening up the control of the Pool to nonfarmers, and those who 
invest for speculative reasons is not only anathema to the essence of a co-
operative, but is believed to undermine the objective of local control and 
decisions made for the benefit of Saskatchewan farmers.  
The tension between these two viewpoints has fueled the controversy 
surrounding the financial restructuring decision. Board and management 
would appear to moving away from a view that the Pool has a responsi-
bility to fundamentally change the marketplace, as it did in its origins, to 
one where the role of the co-operative is to supplement the market while 
trying to serve its members effectively.  Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has identified itself as a New Generation 
Co-op, now with a broadened base of participation. Board and manage-
ment appear to remain committed to sustaining the elaborate and 
tremendously expensive member services side of the organization, thus 
demonstrating a willingness to fight to retain its ‘co-opness’ in the midst 
of its struggle to become larger and more competitive. As the Pool moves 
into its 71st year of operation it faces a primary challenge: to continue to 
operate as a co-operative as it moves forward to face challenges from its 
competitors as a publicly traded co-operative.  
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Notes 
 
1  Many co-operative organizations currently have elaborate mechanisms in place for facili-
tating participation by the membership in the decision-making process. These very elabo-
rate systems of representative democracy are often criticized by co-operators who 
support the participative democracy to be found in town meetings. 
 
2  Briscoe cites Allen Wheelis, Quest for Identity (Norton, l958) p. 73. He defines institu-
tional values as being those associated with myth, mores and status within society. These 
values claim absolute status and immunity to change, as they are seen to be in accord 
with the dominant institutional directive. Instrumental values are related to relative 
adequacy of function for an implied or specified function. 
 
3  Briscoe, R. l97l, p. ll0. Briscoe found in his study that many managers and directors of co-
operatives perceived co-op values to be incompatible with business success. Co-
operatives with managers who held this view suffered from what he termed the ‘frozen 
co-op syndrome’ and failed to formulate long term goals and strategies which would 
enable them to move out of this situation. The more successful co-operatives had 
managers who had found a way to transcend this dilemma and were able to embody co-
operative values in their business operations. 
 
4  Despite having the right of access to participation in decision-making, not all members 
will exercise that right. Some Canadian research indicates that only a very small per-
centage of members could be considered to be active in this process (Apland, 1987). 
 
5  Perrow (1961) defines official goals as the general purposes of the organization as put 
forward in the charter or public statements. Within the context of a co-operative these 
might be referred to as the ideological goals of the organization. Operative goals 
designate the ends sought through the actual operating policies of the organization; 
providing a picture of what the organization is trying to do regardless of what the official 
goals identify as the aim. 
 
6  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) define the boundaries of an organization on the basis of 
where the discretion of one organization ends and that of another takes over. Thus, an 
organization can be viewed as a separate, autonomous entity to the extent that it controls 
discretion over decision-making. The point at which this discretion ends, and the 
discretion of another takes over, is the boundary of that organization. Co-operatives have 
a rather amorphous quality because of their close (sometimes highly dependent) 
relationship with other co-operative organizations within the system. 
 
7  C. P. I. refers to the Crop Protection Institute formed by major chemical suppliers to 
ensure compliance with stringent federal environmental protection and chemical storage 
legislation. 
 
8  Members equity accumulates over the years as a result of purchases made through the 
Pool, and is held in the individual member's name. This equity is returned to the member 
upon reaching the age of retirement or if the individual divests of all interest in the 
business of farming; or to the member's estate upon death. The member pays income tax 
annually on the amount of equity earned, and at the age of retirement can withdraw the 
full amount of equity which is considered nontaxable income. 
 
9  A general vote of members was not held because the Pool's Act and bylaws legally give 
the decision making authority to the delegate body. The decision to not hold a vote of the 
general membership has contributed to much of the controversy around the decision. A 
group of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool members calling itself the Co-operating Friends of 
the Pool was formed with the intent of preventing the conversion. Part I: Conditions for Cooperative Business 
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10  The decision to convert was made very attractive by valuing members equity at $10.00 
per share, then immediately increasing that value to $12.00 per share upon conversion. 
Shares have since traded as high as $16.00. 
11  Changes were required to the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool Act to enable conversion to 
proceed. This sparked another round of debate and controversy as legislative committee 
hearings allowed dissenters to air reasons why changes to the legislation should not 
proceed. The act was passed in the Legislative Assembly in March, 1995. 
 
12  The Co-operating Friends of the Pool did not proceed with the legal action, but continued 
to use the media and public meetings in their attempt to stop the conversion process. 
 
13  From the speech to the delegates by Don Loewen, Chief Executive Officer, December 
1994.  
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Leaders of U.S. agricultural cooperatives face two overriding strategic 
questions as they plan for the 21st century: can their organizations 
compete in an increasingly global market place, and can their organizations 
compete in an increasingly industrialized food and fiber sector (Barkema et 
al., 1993; Handy and Henderson, 1991; Torgerson, 1990; The Economist, 
1991; Urban, 1991; Sexton, 1991; Cook 1995; Sporleder 1992). The answers 
to these questions are, of course, complex and multifaceted. Trade and 
agricultural policy factors, economic endowments, human resource, 
financial and market strategy all influence the answer. But, perhaps as 
important an element for cooperative leaders to consider is the 
organizational structure factor. Is the traditional organizational form of a 
user owned, user controlled, user benefited cooperative the most effective 
in achieving producer objectives in an increasingly industrialized and 
globalized food and fiber market place? 
 
 
Background 
 
Most U.S. agricultural cooperative organizations originated in the early 
1900s due to a combination of economic, farm organization and public 
policy factors. During the ensuing years, U.S. farmer cooperatives slowly 
but consistently increased their aggregate market shares of inputs 
handled, farm marketings, and services provided. That is, until reaching a 
peak in the 1982–1984 period. Subsequent to the 1982–1984 period U.S. 
cooperatives market share decreased for the rest of the 1980s as they 
adapted to the worse economic depression since the 1930s. Nevertheless, 
as the end of the 1980s approached, cooperatives began to reverse the 
decline and by 1994 aggregate market shares had reached or surpassed 
1982–1984 levels of inputs handled (Table 1).  
 
Table 1  U.S. Farmer Cooperatives' Share of Farm Marketings and Farm 
Production Expenditures, 1950–1994, in Percentages 
 
  1950 1960 1970  1982–84  1990 1994 
 
Percent of Cash Receipts of Farm Marketings  17  24  26  30  27  31 
Percent of Farm Production Expenditures  14  15  16  28  27  30 
Source: USDA-ACS, Farmer Cooperatives, and Cooperative Historical Statistics.    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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Market shares by commodity exhibited a wide range from a low of 9 per-
cent in livestock to a high of 82 percent in dairy. Market shares for grains 
and oilseeds were 38 percent, cotton 34 percent, fruits and vegetables 18 
percent, fertilizer 41 percent, petroleum 45 percent, and feed 22 percent. 
 
 
Public Policy Support for Cooperatives 
 
Public support for agricultural cooperatives in the U.S. includes (a) limited 
immunity from antitrust laws, (b) beneficial tax treatment, (c) access to 
favorable credit terms, and (d) technical assistance. 
 
Limited Immunity from Antitrust Laws 
Since the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914 and the Capper-Volstead Act 
in 1922, U.S. agricultural producers are free to “act together in asso-
ciations” to collectively process, market, bargain and handle commodities 
and products they produce. Furthermore, farmers, through their 
associations, may contract, initiate agreements, and/or establish 
marketing agencies in common, subject to member definition and 
organizational conditions. Nevertheless, as broad as these two federal 
laws (most states have complementary provisions in their antitrust legisla-
tion) are in permitting agricultural producers to participate in collective 
action, they do not fully exempt cooperatives' antitrust provisions. Neither 
may farmer cooperatives be used by nonfarmers to fix prices nor can 
farmer cooperatives engage in predatory practices harmful to other 
business organizations (Knapp, 1973). 
 
Beneficial Tax Treatment 
At the federal level, net income of farmer cooperatives is generally taxed 
according to the single-tax principle instead of the double-tax principle 
usually applied to investor oriented firms. This single-tax principle 
ensures that cooperatives' net income is taxed at either the cooperative 
firm level or the member-patron level, but not both. This favorable tax 
treatment evolved out of provisions first passed in the 1909 Corporation 
Tax Statute. This law placed a tax on corporate and joint-stock firms' net 
income but exempted agricultural and horticultural associations operating 
on a mutual basis (Knapp, 1969). 
 
Access to Favorable Credit 
The U.S. government helped create and implicitly supports the Farm 
Credit System. The System is a nondepository, structurally complex, 
farmer-owned-and-controlled agricultural lender entirely dependent for 
its loanable funds on sales of debt instruments in financial markets. Its 
origins can be traced to European roots and the 1916 birth of the Federal 
Land Bank System followed by the legislated emergence of two siblings, 
the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank and its companion Production 
Credit Associations and the Banks for Cooperatives. In addition to the 
initial seed money provided to start each of these banks, the federal Organizational Structure and Globalization: User Oriented Firms  
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government has supported the system by maintaining its ‘agency status’ – 
a set of unique characteristics that help ensure the financial markets will 
remain receptive to the amount of system securities needed to be sold. 
 
Technical Assistance 
Dating from the 1926 passage of the Cooperative Marketing Act, the U.S. 
government has supported the development of agricultural cooperatives. 
The U.S. government provides technical assistance to individuals 
interested in forming or improving cooperatives by conducting economic, 
legal, financial and governance analysis; by assisting in the establishment 
of cooperatives; by expanding the concept of cooperative development to 
assist in rural development; by supporting research into the theoretical 
foundations of American agricultural cooperation; by conducting 
international comparisons of cooperative policies, strategies and structure; 
and by collecting, analyzing and maintaining a large historical and 
statistical data base (Torgerson, 1993). 
 
Guiding Principles of U.S. Agricultural Cooperatives 
In the struggle to attain legal recognition and approval, U.S. cooperative 
advocates relied on economic and philosophical arguments. The two most 
frequent economic justifications for forming cooperatives cited to legisla-
tive sponsors of collective action were: (1) individual producers needed an 
institutional mechanism by which to bring economic balance under their 
control and because of excess supply induced prices, and (2) individual 
farmers needed countervailing power when confronted with mono-
psonistic and/or monopolistic market structures (Cotterill, 1984). 
The 40-year evolution of major cooperative legislation, which lasted 
from 1890 to 1930, produced more than 85 state cooperative incorporation 
laws, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, and the Capper-
Volstead Act, each in some way attempting to address these real and 
perceived market failures (Suhler and Cook, 1993). 
The philosophical arguments evolved from the principles and practices 
developed by the Rochdale Society members during the mid-1800s in 
England. By the 1920s these rules had been consolidated into the three 
hard-core principles of democratic control, service at cost, and limited 
return on equity. Further refinement of the cooperative principles was 
summarized by the U.S. Senate-requested study coordinated by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Cooperative Service in 1987 
(USDA, 1987). From that study the current cooperative principle semantics 
have evolved: a cooperative is a user-owned, user-controlled, user-
benefited agricultural producer organization. More explicitly: 
• The  farmer  stockholding  owners are the major users of the cooperative; 
• The  benefits received by the farmer-owner stockholder who contributed 
equity capital to a cooperative are tied to the concept of use of the 
cooperative in the form of patronage; 
• The  control of the cooperative by the owner stockholder user must be 
structured democratically in that voting power is not proportional to    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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equity investment although it may be in certain situations structured in 
proportion to usage. 
 
These principles ultimately define the property rights of the user member 
in the U.S. agricultural cooperative organization. Consequently, these 
property rights establish incentives and disincentives as to the investment, 
patronage and control behavior of the user-member. These incentives-
disincentives in some cases are quite distinct from the investment, 
patronage, and control behavior of non cooperative (IOF) structured 
business organizations. These differences present governance, man-
agement, and financing challenges to cooperative leaders. Some of these 
challenges are explored in more depth in the second part of this paper. 
 
 
A Taxonomy of U.S. Agricultural Cooperatives 
 
U.S. business structures are legally, financially, and organizationally 
complex. Current agricultural-related cooperatives are no different. Their 
structural evolution has created a plethora of formations and clas-
sifications. In order to simplify this maze, a simple taxonomy is intro-
duced. In developing a taxonomy it is preferable to utilize a paradigmatic 
or theoretical model to serve as the basis for identifying separable 
categories. Unfortunately the multitude of agricultural cooperative types 
encumbers meaningful categorization. Consequently, function-based, 
geography-based, and commodity-based elements are combined with 
neo-institutional arguments in the development of the taxonomy 
advanced in this paper. Seven cooperative types are described: (1) Farm 
Credit, (2) Rural Utilities, (3) Sapiro I (Bargaining Cooperatives), (4) Sapiro 
II (Marketing Cooperatives), (5) Nourse I (Local Supply and/or 
Marketing), (6) Nourse II (Regional Supply and/or Marketing), and (7) 
New Generation Cooperatives. 
Farm Credit System: Twelve Federal Land Banks were the first com-
ponents of the Farm Credit System when it was chartered by Congress 
under the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916. Subsequently the Federal 
Intermediate Credit Banks were created in 1923 to provide short- and 
intermediate-term credit; the Production Credit Association in 1933; the 
Banks for Cooperatives in 1933; and the regulator, the Farm Credit 
Administration. The motivating forces behind the efforts to organize the 
system came from concerns about the unavailability of agricultural and real 
estate loans, extremely high rates and the length of terms (federal law 
prohibited national banks from making loans with maturities beyond five 
years). After an initial surge of lending, the Farm Credit System loan 
volume continued to increase steadily until hitting a peak of more than 
$80 billion in outstanding loans during the 1980s. 
Since 1987 the Farm Credit System has restructured through consoli-
dation and merger. Currently there are eight banks remaining (two of 
them lending to agricultural cooperatives and six lending to cooperative Organizational Structure and Globalization: User Oriented Firms  
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credit associations). When the restructuring began, there were 37 Farm 
Credit System banks. 
Rural Utilities. Formed to provide a missing service due to the high per 
unit cost of serving a low density customer base, the rural electric and 
telephone cooperatives were formed in 1936 and 1949. The resulting 
systems are a combination of approximately 1,200 cooperatives and 950 
non-cooperatives providing telephone and electric service to more than 45 
million rural customers. 
Sapiro1 I Cooperatives: Bargaining Cooperatives. Bargaining cooperatives 
address market failures through horizontal integration. Producers 
organize these Sapiro-inspired associations in an attempt to affect the 
terms of trade in favor of members when negotiating with first handlers 
(Sapiro, 1921). The functions of bargaining cooperatives can be described 
as twofold: (a) to enhance margins and (b) to guarantee a market. These types 
of associations are found most often in perishable commodities in which 
temporal asset specificity creates a situation of potential post-contractual 
opportunism. The most recent activity in bargaining cooperatives is in the 
growth of poultry growers associations – a reaction to the 
industrialization of the broiler sector. 
Sapiro II Cooperatives: Marketing Cooperatives. Marketing cooperatives are 
a form of producer vertical integration pursuing a strategy of 
circumventing and competing with proprietary handlers. They usually 
can be categorized in one of two ways, single or multiple commodity. The 
objectives are similar – to bypass the investor-owned firm, enhance prices, 
and in general, pursue the Sapiro goals of increasing margin and avoiding 
market power. Because of property rights and benefit distribution issues, 
management and governance functions are considered more complex in a 
multiple commodity marketing cooperative. 
Nourse2 I Cooperatives:  Local Associations. Local cooperatives are 
economic units operating in geographical space where achieving scale 
economics in commodity assembly (usually grains or oilseeds) and input 
retailing might dictate the presence of a spatial monopolist/monopsonist. 
Founded to provide a missing service or to avoid monopoly power or to reduce 
risk or achieve economies of scale, they epitomize the Nourse philosophy of 
cooperation Ð that of a ‘competitive yardstick’ with the objectives to keep 
investor-oriented firms competitive (Nourse, 1992). Today, after much 
consolidation, local associations still are the most numerous type of U.S. 
agricultural cooperative in number. 
Nourse II Cooperatives: Multi-functional Regional Cooperatives. Competitive 
yardstick-driven regional cooperatives usually perform a combination of 
input procurement, service provision, and/or product marketing. Many 
integrate forward or backward beyond the first handler or wholesaling 
levels. They might be organizationally structured as federated, centralized 
or a combination. They differ from Nourse I local cooperatives in that 
there is little probability of being a spatial monopolist/monopsonist in 
their geographic market.    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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New Generation Cooperatives. New Generation cooperatives are the result 
of recent collective action-oriented founders attempting to address market 
failure situations, excess supply price depression, traditional cooperative 
property rights structural weaknesses, and free rider issues. Specific 
solutions in the form of asset appreciation mechanisms, liquidity creating 
delivery right clearinghouses, proportional patronage distributed control, 
base equity capital plans, and membership policies controlling entrance, 
are established in their by-laws and operating practices. 
 
 
Current Strategies 
 
Post-1985, U.S. agricultural producers addressed their organizations' 
economic dilemmas by pursuing one of three generic user-oriented strate-
gies: (a) conversions, (b) refinement of traditional cooperative practices 
and principles, and (c) formation of new generation cooperatives. 
Conversion refers to the strategy taken by cooperative members 
whereby they restructure themselves as investor-oriented corporations, 
sell the business, or reorganize segments of the business as ordinary 
corporations with minority public ownership. According to Schrader, 
1989, and Collins, 1991, the economic rationale for conversion lies in the 
inability of financially successful farmer cooperatives to reward equity 
capital in the traditional form of return on investment. Conversion is a 
producer investment strategy that has gained increasing attention since 
the mid-1980s in countries such as Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, and Canada (Barton, 1992). 
Most U.S. cooperative organizations have opted, however, for the 
refinement of cooperative structure rather than conversion to the investor 
oriented model. The refinement strategy maintains that with some 
adjustments to the current structural model independent producers are 
best served by the cooperative model – especially if the maintenance-
founder issue is addressed (Cook, 1992a). Adjustments have ranged from 
radical restructuring in the form of rationalizing assets, establishing 
strategic alliances, and redefining ‘singleness of purpose’ to addressing 
the horizon-portfolio-undercapitalization problem by implementing 
innovative equity acquisition-redemption policies to proportionalizing the 
‘current’ ownership and control mechanisms. Certain scholars argue that 
the optimal or near optimal refinement strategy is the ‘proportionality’ 
solution (Royer, 1992; Barton, 1989; Dunn, 1988). Royer, 1992, however 
argues that some of the refinement measures being adopted are not only 
economically and legally unsound, but inconsistent with the 
proportionality solution. 
The third cooperative organization strategy gaining importance in the 
U.S. since the post-1985 period is the formation of ‘new generation coop-
eratives.’ Producers in adapting ‘value-added’ strategies encouraged by 
the same forces creating the industrialization phenomenon and reacting to 
structural-organizational weaknesses of traditional cooperatives, are Organizational Structure and Globalization: User Oriented Firms  
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organizing and financing a new form of cooperative organization. By 
formally defining property rights, this new generation cooperative 
addresses the free-rider, horizon, and portfolio constraints encountered by 
traditional cooperatives (Cook, 1993). In the past several years producers 
and their cooperatively owned lenders have invested more than $1 billion 
in these new cooperative ventures in the upper Midwest (Egerstrom, 
1994). 
 
 
Globalization 
 
The food and fiber sector is becoming increasingly global in both scope 
and behavior. At the global level, the value of further-processed or value-
added trade in food products surpassed the value of commodity trade 
during the 1980s. Continued domestic and global consolidation and 
integration have vaulted a number of investor oriented food processing 
and marketing firms into the global rankings for total sales volume and 
profit. Most of these firms established considerable market share strength 
in their domestic markets before successfully expanding into global 
ventures. Meanwhile, cooperatives in Europe, Japan and the United States 
concentrated on building domestic market share positions in commodity-
related first handling levels, and in some cases, processing levels. A small 
number of cooperatives in the advanced agricultural countries have been 
active in establishing well-defined global marketing strategies. This is 
especially true for U.S. agricultural cooperatives. Before addressing the 
challenges this industry and firm strategic set of issues create, a brief 
review of globalization from a U.S. point of view is presented. 
 
 
Global Industry Environment 
 
Increasingly, firms competing in the food chain are becoming less domes-
tic in their strategic choices (Henderson and Handy, 1993; Van Zwanen-
berg, 1992; Shaw, 1992; Taylor, 1992). Not only are these firms becoming 
more export-import goods trade oriented, but also more foreign invest-
ment driven and more international commercial relationship seeking. But 
in this acceleration toward globalness a high degree of variability in 
degree and scope of competitiveness among commodity and agricultural 
input food products is observed. In other words, the pattern of inter-
national competitiveness between industries differs considerably. The 
recognition that each international industry as a distinct competitive 
environment creates complex strategic challenges for agricultural and 
food firm decision makers. 
Industries have been classified at the extreme as being ‘multi-domestic’ 
or ‘global’ (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1987; Porter, 1986; Prahalad and Doz, 
1987). Multi-domestic industries are characterized by competitive forces 
that are constrained structurally by country. Consequently, national    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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competitive environments are isolated and competition is analyzed in 
much the same way as domestic competition. The international industry is 
essentially a set of domestic industries although a number of the 
competitors may be multinational firms who extract little advantage from 
being multinational. ‘Multi-domestic’ international industries include 
many types of retailing, wholesaling, life insurance, consumer finance, 
and consumer food products (Porter, 1990). 
At the other extreme are global industries. They can be characterized as 
a series of linked domestic industries where structural forces combine to 
produce a single competitive arena which transcends national competitive 
environments. Competing in a global industry exposes decision makers to 
an interdependent competitive environment where strategic actions taken 
in one country affect competitive situations in other countries. Therefore, 
an important difference between the international multi-domestic and 
global industry is the degree of interdependency existing across national 
borders. Market interdependencies result when a competitor that 
internationally externally or internally integrates operations compels 
rivals to respond in kind or risk a loss of competitiveness. In a global 
industry firms compete against each other on a worldwide basis, utilizing 
competitive advantages that grow out of their entire network of global 
activities. Businesses coordinate advantages created at their home base 
with others that result from a presence in many nations, such as 
economies of scale, the ability to serve multinational and multi-origin 
customers, and a transferable brand reputation. Global industries, as 
defined here, include textile machinery, semiconductors, oil field 
machinery, civil commercial aircraft, and insecticides and fungicides. 
Since World War II industries have become increasingly global (Porter, 
1990). In identifying these industries as global, trade flow levels as well as 
considerable degree of tangible and intangible asset linkages are 
important conditions. Even though globalization is accelerating, most 
industries are not global (Morrison and Roth, 1989). 
 
 
Global Food Firm Strategies 
 
A g r i c u l t u r a l  a n d  f o o d  f i r m  d e c i s i o n  m a k e r s  h a v e  f o u r  b as ic  o p t i o n s  t o  
consider when analyzing the role of globalization or internationalization 
in their future competitive strategies: (a) importing, (b) exporting, (c) 
foreign direct investment, and (d) commercial relationships. 
U.S. agricultural exports and, to a lesser extent imports, are classified as 
to how close they are to their final consumer form. There are three 
categorizations: bulk (basically unprocessed such as wheat, cotton, coarse 
grains); intermediate (partially processed such as soybean meal and cattle 
hides or used as inputs on the farm such as seed and animal feeds or used 
by food manufacturers such as sweeteners and flour); and consumer 
oriented (primarily shipped for consumption in the retail market and food 
service sectors such as frozen dinners, processed meats, fresh fruits and Organizational Structure and Globalization: User Oriented Firms  
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vegetables). In the 1960s, 70 percent of U.S. food and agricultural exports 
were in bulk form. By 1990 approximately 50 percent were shipped in 
bulk form, 25 percent in intermediate form, and 25 percent in consumer-
oriented form. The pattern is reversed for most European countries. Since 
1990 export growth of intermediate and consumer-oriented products have 
grown at 6 percent a year and bulk exports have continued to decline 
(Greene, 1994). 
Foreign direct investment is a strategy primarily designed to exploit 
cost differentials and coordination efficiencies across countries. Such 
options as investing in countries with low factor costs, minimizing tax 
liabilities through favorable transfer pricing, or investing in countries 
which offer passive or direct investment incentives are unique to busi-
nesses with international operations (Cook, 1992b). In the U.S. alone, food 
manufacturers supply their products to foreign market consumers 
primarily through investments in local production in foreign markets. In 
1992 processed food sales from U.S. owned foreign affiliates totaled $89 
billion – almost four times U.S. export sales of processed foods. Even 
though U.S. exports of processed foods continued to grow, the gap 
between them and foreign affiliate sales more than doubled between 1982 
and 1992 (Malanoski, 1994). 
International commercial relationships is the fourth strategy option 
available to food firms. They often take one of the following forms: co-
packing, joint ventures, coventures, franchising, or licensing of trade-
marks, patents, and copyrights. Henderson and Sheldon, 1992, expand on 
the advantages of commercial relationships – particularly licensing. They 
identify three particularly important factors: ownership, location, and 
internationalization. Their findings also suggest that U.S. food firms were 
more aggressive in outbound licensing than inbound licensing. 
In observing trends in food firms' global strategies, Henderson and 
Handy, 1993, conclude the following: (1) as firm size increases, food firms 
tend toward foreign investment and away from product trade; (2) as firm 
dominance in its home market increases, food firms tend toward foreign 
investment and away from product trade; (3) as the diversity of food 
products produced by a firm increases, the firm tends toward foreign 
investment and away from product trade; (4) a firm's investment in 
intangible assets is positively associated with its investment in foreign 
operations, but has no significant impact on product trade; (5) the greater 
a firm's specialization in food, the greater its tendency for foreign sales 
through both exports and overseas operations; and (6) international 
commercial relationships in the form of licensing, joint ventures, and 
strategic alliances appear to be an increasing part of food firms' global 
strategic portfolio. 
What does this global industry and food firm strategy analysis mean for 
agricultural cooperatives?    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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Cooperative Structure and Globalization 
 
The process of increasing global competitiveness appears to create a par-
ticularly complex strategic challenge for cooperatives. As discussed in 
previous sections, agricultural business organizations have found that 
competing in a global environment is more than expanding exports from a 
single origin base in commodity form. Because of more open markets, 
domestic-oriented firms have found that reacting to increasing inflows of 
competitive import demands as much attention and resources as efforts to 
expand exports. In expanding overseas sales, the firm must decide 
whether to produce at home and export to a foreign market or to locate 
production overseas. This decision is normally based on a comparison of 
delivered costs, and is a function of production costs, transport costs, 
tariff-nontariff barrier considerations, fiscal issues, and transaction costs. 
But for the agricultural cooperative the analysis is usually more complex. 
According to the aforementioned definitions, most of the industries in 
the food sector would be considered multi-domestic rather than global. 
Nevertheless, as previously documented, certain industries within the 
food sector are rapidly moving toward becoming more globalized. Coop-
erative decision makers in confronting this challenge will have to over-
come the following constraints if their objectives are to benefit their 
member owners through globalization. These constraints include: (a) 
mission clarity, (b) single origin, (c) capital availability, and (d) 
governance. 
 
 
Cooperative Globalization Constraints 
 
Mission Clarity 
‘Cooperatives are counter-culture alternatives to mainstream business’ 
and are ‘hard-headed economic enterprises differing from investor-
oriented firms in small details regarding ownership and voting structure.’ 
In addition, ‘cooperatives are exotic fringe phenomena’ and sometimes 
‘prominent community institutions.’ They are also ‘methods for correcting 
market failures’ and ‘seeds of a new society acting as agents to social 
progress while holding over pre-industrial values.’ Fairbairn et al., 1991, 
in this facetious manner reminds cooperative leaders how important and 
difficult it is to have a clean mission – a singleness of purpose. 
Agricultural cooperatives in the U.S. are increasingly faced with the 
dilemma of balancing community needs and commodity organization bot-
tom line. Consequently, cooperative leaders are constantly addressing the 
‘boundary of the firm’ challenge – a narrow set of products or a 
multipurpose organization. Additionally, determining the organization's 
optimal allocation of resources is more complex because a single ‘return 
on investment’ mission statement objective immediately raises the query 
of ‘Who's ROI?’ Staatz, 1987, suggested that the scope of optimization in a 
cooperative is broader and more diffuse than it is for a comparable IOF. Organizational Structure and Globalization: User Oriented Firms  
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He argues that most members prefer a joint profit optimization (a 
combined farm and cooperative objective function rather than 
optimization of separate profit functions). The scope of optimization is 
more diffuse because the cooperative must treat each member as a 
separate cost locus giving rise to collective choice problems. 
Perhaps agricultural cooperatives do not deem it necessary to compete 
in the global marketplace as do investor-oriented firms and therefore 
more vaguely defined missions are justified. Or, perhaps the mission, 
objectives, and/or goals of the cooperative organization really are 
different from investor-oriented firms. Fulton and Ketilson (1991) argue 
that the role of cooperatives is not limited solely to economic considera-
tions. Their findings conclude that cooperatives provide an important 
collective action function which has both social and economic conse-
quences to member and community development. This ‘mission is differ-
ent’ view of agricultural cooperatives might have significant strategic 
implications for Nourse II federated multipurpose cooperatives if their 
Nourse I locals opt for community-social objectives while they choose the 
global commodity-product direction. 
As U.S. agricultural cooperatives consider entering the globalization 
foray, streamlining and achieving focus in the mission becomes an impor-
tant strategic step. 
 
Single Origin Constraint 
A second possibility as to why cooperatives move cautiously into global 
competition is because they are ‘single origin’ in that their objective is to 
optimize the utilization of their member owners output, not to originate 
products in another area or country. Being single origin for a cooperative 
is rational because of the member owners' high degree of physical, site, 
dedicated asset and temporal asset specificity. This asset specificity comes 
in the form of investments, land, machinery, perishable output, and 
location whereby their value in the next best use is often significantly 
lower. Consequently the member owner is most interested in extracting 
maximum rents from his/her asset specific investments. Owners of 
immobile assets, such as land, have fewer choices in playing the global 
game. With reluctance to participate in foreign direct investment, 
cooperatives are limited to remaining single origin exporters, thus limiting 
flexibility and subject to frequent periods of being ‘out of the market.’ 
Limiting their options to those of a single origin firm (similar to 
parastatal marketing boards) agricultural cooperatives have significant 
difficulties achieving scale economies in generating and utilizing global 
intelligence and risk management. Caves and Pugel, 1982, argue that these 
are the two most important factors for achieving economic success in 
international bulk commodity trading. It is near impossible to achieve 
these two scale economies without operating in a multiple-port, multiple-
origin organizational structure. U.S. cooperatives have paid a very high 
price to learn the Caves-Pugel law. 
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Capital Availability 
To strategists, globalization usually implies growth in one or more key 
performance measures. Investor-oriented firms grow in order to survive – 
that is, in order to attract equity capital from market sensitive risk capital 
investors. Numerous cooperative researchers argue that growth in the 
cooperative form of business, however, is constrained because of the 
tendency to underfinance the cooperative (Staatz, 1987; Peterson, 1992; 
Porter and Scully, 1987). The members' disincentive to contribute risk 
capital is the result of a set of vaguely defined property rights. These 
constraints manifest themselves in the form of horizon problems, free 
rider problems, and portfolio problems. Fulton et al, 1995, in examining 
the largest U.S. and Canadian cooperatives, conclude that over the past 50-
plus years their sample experienced little or no growth as measured by 
total assets. 
Many cooperative managers and writers have agreed that the most 
difficult challenge in contemporary cooperative management is acquiring 
equity capital. Staatz, 1987, condenses their arguments to the following. 
Members are reluctant to contribute more equity capital to the cooperative 
because (1) the return on investment at the farm level is greater than 
return on investment in the cooperative; (2) for free rider reasons or 
because of heavy discounting of patronage refunds, the member under-
estimates the value of the cooperative; and (3) the member overvalues 
return on investment on the farm. Additionally, geographic and commod-
ity scope may limit number of members and consequently the amount of 
capital that could be raised. As mentioned earlier, these arguments have 
been contested by numerous studies summarized in Lerman and Parlia-
ment, 1993. 
Whether cooperatives are under-financed or not, the process in acquir-
ing equity capital is considerably different from raising equity in an IOF. 
There is no entrepreneurial incentive unless delivery rights accompany 
membership entry, and there is no capital market interested in providing 
capital because of the illiquidity and nonappreciability characteristics of 
cooperative stock. Therefore, the cooperative decision maker in his/her 
resource allocator role must treat equity with extreme care. This difficulty 
in acquiring equity and the inherent conflicts created by the horizon 
problem have been blamed for the scarcity of cooperative investment in 
capital-intensive and global industries. 
Other differences between the equity acquisition and redemption 
methods of IOFs and cooperatives have effects on the resource allocation 
role of management. In attempting to address the horizon problem, coop-
erative managers quickly encounter the fact that if equity is to be retired, 
new equity capital must be acquired just to maintain the same capital 
structure and level of working capital. If growth is an objective, the equity 
that is retired plus the incremental needed for growth must be added. 
Given the limited sources of equity capital, it is easy to understand why 
those who favor growth become attracted to the development of 
permanent equity reserves. Another difference in resource allocation Organizational Structure and Globalization: User Oriented Firms  
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might arise in the process of developing the capital expenditure budget. 
Where the board is elected on a one-person, one-vote basis in many cases, 
small-in-number but large-in-patronage members might face difficult 
hurdles in attempting to move the cooperative in a new or more global 
customer/supplier-oriented direction. Cooperative management – usually 
a proponent of growth for numerous agent and non-agent reasons – must 
referee this potential conflict objectively (Cook, 1994). 
Because of site asset specificity (especially in Nourse I, II, Sapiro II, and 
New Generation cooperatives), cooperative members tend to pursue risk-
conservative strategies when dealing with diversification and global 
investment. This risk averseness is reinforced by the fact that an 
investment in a cooperative is an investment in a related industry, thus 
decreasing diversification. These two factors could influence cooperative 
management to concentrate the allocation of resources less on portfolio or 
boundary assets and more on improving operating efficiencies – an influ-
ence that has important implications for globalization strategy choice. 
Given slow growth, disincentives for providing risk capital and single 
origin constraint and the ‘mission is to move our members output – no 
one else's,’ globalization strategies beyond the exporting function will be a 
challenge. Foreign direct investment will be considered only for narrowly 
defined objectives – usually related to improving the return on the 
members' output. 
 
Governance 
A final limiting factor in cooperative global venturing might be the 
importance and structure of membership control. Caswell's research 
demonstrates that investor-owned corporate agribusiness firms main-
tained significantly higher levels of director and firm contact through 
board membership than did U.S. agricultural cooperatives. She concludes 
that this absence of a range of outside directors on cooperative boards 
serves the principle of democratic control but may have adverse effects on 
the breadth of board decision making (Caswell, 1989). Given the 
uncertainty and rivalous nature of global market decision making, 
expectations regarding strategic information is a potential area of conflict 
between management and boards of directors. 
Cooperative boards and members as user-owners of a tied-equity type 
of organization have high expectations as to how much operating and 
strategic information should be made available for their perusal. Lack of 
reliable third-party measures of organizational performance, the economic 
importance and inter-relatedness of the cooperative and their farming 
operation, and the mobility-decreasing influence of capital illiquidity in a 
cooperative are some arguments offered by members as justification for 
their high information expectations. 
Management, on the other hand, takes the position that the more 
competitive the environment, the more valuable undistributed strategic 
information becomes. They add that cooperatives invest heavily in 
member communication, media, and networks, and their innovative com-   Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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munication methods should receive more respect and appreciation. To do 
more, they might argue, is too costly. Increasing heterogeneity of the 
membership increases the complexity of fulfilling this critical role, and it is 
probably a given that managers of user-oriented organizations will never 
be relieved of the pressure generated by continual demand for strategic 
and operation information. A critical challenge for producer-oriented 
organizations is to build a cooperative knowledge base within the 
membership. 
 
Globalization Advantages 
U.S. agricultural cooperatives have a long history of being export oriented. 
But as the commercial environment becomes increasingly globalized, 
cooperative decision makers are reexamining their competitive 
advantages. They appear to be building their global strategies around 
three self-declared strengths: (a) access to the raw material supplier 
(Sapiro II) or customer (Nourse I and II), (b) reputation for assured supply 
and quality, and (c) persistent innovation in a rivalry intense set of 
industries. 
 
Access to Supplier/Customer 
As the market share percentages suggest, U.S. cooperatives have close 
member contact in the milk, grain, oilseed, cotton, certain fruits, and the 
nut subsectors. They also have high market shares in plant food, feed, and 
long term credit. Most of the perishable commodities handled are subject 
to contract assurances. Increasingly the nonperishables are also moving to 
more formalized coordination mechanisms including marketing and 
production contracts. Lang, 1994, states it from the producers point of 
view, user value creates a relationship between cooperative and producer 
that is difficult to sever. 
 
Reputation 
Anecdotal evidence is offered to justify this advantage. Baccigaluppi, 1994, 
states that Sapiro II cooperatives are “generally quite savvy and sometimes 
ahead of the rest of the U.S. industry in developing international markets ... In 
general, however, cooperatives are U.S. trade leaders rather than followers. 
SunMaid Growers, Riceland Foods, Sun Diamond Growers, Blue Diamond 
Growers, Calcot, Diamond Walnut, Sunsweet Growers, Goldkist, Harvest States, 
Sunkist, Ocean Spray, and Tri Valley are just a few cooperatives that derive 
substantial revenue from international business – up to two thirds in some cases.” 
 
Persistent Innovation 
Particularly in Sapiro II cooperatives, the mandate is to find new markets 
for increased production. It is argued that without that pressure IOF firms 
would optimize rents and consequently be less aggressive in international 
market expansion. 
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How Global are U.S. Agricultural Cooperatives? 
 
A comprehensive overview of the degree of U.S. agricultural cooperative 
globalization is not available. Numerous partial studies on the role of 
cooperatives in grain or specialty crops exist, but they did not employ the 
taxonomy suggested in this preliminary paper nor were the globalization 
definitions used (Spatz, 1992; Bunker and Cook, 1980). A few studies, such 
as Reynolds and Spatz, 1991, and National Council of Farmer 
Cooperatives, 1995, attempt to analyze the property rights constraints role 
in fostering or inhibiting progress toward globalization. Table 2 is the 
author's qualitative attempt at strategically describing where U.S. 
agricultural cooperative might be on the globalization continuum. 
 
Table 2  Degree of Globalization by Type of U.S. Agricultural Coopera-
tive 
 
  Sapiro I  Nourse II  Farm Credit  New Generation 
          
Export very  active  active  active  NA 
   (Bulk)  M  M  M 
 
Export very  active  limited  active  potential 
   (Inter)  I  I  M 
 
Export active  non-existent  active  potential 
   (Processed)  I    M   
 
Import very  limited  active  limited  limited 
 I  M  M  potential 
 
F.D.I. extremely  limited  under  very 
 limited    exploration  distant 
 I  I  I 
 
Common active  light  activity  facilitative  potential 
   Relationship  I  I  I 
M = maintaining  Rural utilities, Sapiro I and Nourse I are not  
I = increasing  internationalized to any significant degree. 
NA = not applicable 
 
Building on the work of previous cooperative and global strategy 
researchers, the argument contained in this paper is that the success of 
user-oriented agricultural firms in an increasingly globalized industries 
food sector will depend upon (a) their ability to understand the property 
rights constraints faced in attempting internationalization, (b) their ability 
to understand their sustainable competitive advantages, (c) their ability to 
develop globalization or multi-domestic strategies that are consistent with 
their constraints and advantages, and (d) their ability to create new 
institutions that simultaneously facilitate the enhancement of member 
needs and develop sustainable competitive advantages. 
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Notes 
1  Aaron Sapiro, a California attorney who promoted a centralized, single commodity, enforced 
commitment, market power oriented type of producer cooperative, was instrumental in the 
formation of many cooperatives in the 1920s. 
2  Edwin Nourse, a Midwestern economist, advocated the competitive yardstick philosophy implying 
the correction of market failures by increasing the number of participants in the market.  
 
6  Implementing the Sixth Reason for 
Co-operation: New Generation 
Co-operatives in Agribusiness 
 
Gert van Dijk 
 
 
 
This paper discusses changes in the agro-food markets with respect to the 
incentives to co-operation between farmers. The ‘Sixth Reason’ denotes 
that the historical reasons as such are no longer valid. It is concluded that 
each of the five historical reasons has taken on a meaning which is 
different from the past. The Sixth Reason indicates that each of the five 
historical reasons are to be regarded in a changed context. Thus the Sixth 
Reason consists of the following five elements: 
•  Co-operation is to create a firm that is to act as an interface between 
highly sophisticated and globalised food industries and ecologically 
sustainable farming in economically sustainable rural areas. 
•  Co-operation is a means to create a network economy which is indis-
pensable to make fast moving technologies accessible. 
•  Safe and diversified food products require systems of passport produc-
tion from the grass-roots to the final consumer; cooperatives are well 
equipped to manage such production systems. 
•  In more liberalised market conditions co-operatives can lower trans-
action costs to realise a diversified risk management among farmers. 
•  Diversification is an expression of entrepreneurial activity; entrepre-
neurship is expressed in new forms of co-operation. 
 
A number of new generation co-operatives are discussed. Some were 
newly engineered, some were recently re-engineered. It is concluded that 
the historical co-operative principles are no longer valid. The NGC is the 
expression of smaller groups underlying homogeneity. Certain principles 
are reinvented. Others are about to disappear. Among these are open 
membership or free entry, and the one man one vote rule if there are 
differences in the enterprises controlled by the members. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When studying the theory and practice of co-operatives, particularly in 
agribusiness, the student inevitably is confronted with the issue of the co-
operative principles. Apparently founders and leaders of co-operatives 
had to adhere to structures and rules of conduct for co-operative 
managers and members without which the co-operative would go astray 
and thus would be in danger of loosing its ‘raison d'être’. All the empirical The Sixth Reason for Co-operation: New Generation Co-operatives 
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evidence and practical experience from history brought co-operative 
organisations to a number of principles (Inter-national Joint Project, 1995). 
These were meant as an advanced warning: ‘If you, co-operative leader, 
do not adhere to such and such rules you will surely fail. Learn from 
history how to set up and control a co-operative’.  
Sometimes people and organisations went even further. The principles 
became rules: ‘If you do not stick to these principles you should not call 
yourself a co-operative’. Yet we see in the last decade of the 20th century 
the birth of co-operatives which are structured in such a way that many a 
co-operative idealist would hesitate to call them co-operatives. If 
questioned ‘Are you a co-operative?’ the member of such a co-operative 
would probably respond by ‘I guess this is as close as we can get’.  
First, five historical reasons for co-operatives are discussed. Then, I 
argue why a good deal of these co-operatives features are now behind the 
horizon. Third, the Sixth Reason is described. Finally, the question is 
asked as to whether new principles are likely to emerge in the future. 
 
 
Historical Reasons for Co-operation 
 
Undoubtedly the need for countervailing power has been the most impor-
tant historical reason for why farmers and horticultural producers have 
set up their co-operative enterprises. Co-operatives were created at a time 
when farmers began to integrate in the market economy. Their trade 
partners were private companies with superior market information who 
enjoy monopoly power vis-à-vis the farmers. By joining forces, the farmers 
were able to influence the market structure and the market behaviour of 
the buyers and/or suppliers. Many examples exist where cartels were 
dismantled due to co-operative firms (CFs) entering the market1. Thus, 
cut-throat price competition among farmers was mitigated and replaced 
by functional and quality-oriented competition.  
When considering this First Reason for cooperatives it must be kept in 
mind that at that time markets for agricultural products and food 
products were, apart from crises, buoyant. From the point of view of farm 
inputs such as farm implements and fertiliser, the demand by farmers was 
growing strongly. Henceforth, a Second Reason for farmers to start co-
operatives was to gain access to industrially produced goods and services. 
What should be mentioned in particular is the access to credit at 
favourable interest rates. The latter example is still today clearly visible in 
the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There is 
little doubt that in The Netherlands co-operative banking has been a 
crucial factor in agribusiness and farm development.  
Like all other co-operatives, the co-operative banks could realise their 
goals due to economies of scale. By the sheer large scale characteristic of 
their activities they were able to bring the steady outflow of capital from 
farming and rural communities to a halt. Especially co-operative banks    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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may be seen as forms of organised trust underlying modernisation and 
expansion of agribusiness.  
The realisation of efficiency in processing co-operatives was and still is 
essential. Almost all agricultural products are of a bulky nature. Therefore 
unit costs of processing decrease sharply by expanding the operations of 
the CF. Hence, efficiency by economies of scale is the Third Reason for the 
creation of a co-operative. Co-operative auctions in flower, fruit and 
vegetable marketing have as their core business the market management 
under conditions of transparency. Market management yields competitive 
conditions so that the price system is efficient and in order that the right 
incentives are realised. Of course, intensive competition and prevention of 
monopoly positions is a prerequisite number one. 
Time and time again it has been proven that accumulation of supplies 
(or suppliers) causes accumulation of demand (or buyers). Therefore co-
operative auctions represent a very good example of both effectiveness 
and efficiency due to size of operations.  
The Fourth Reason for a co-operative is risk management. No doubt 
CFs had to find their place in the market by gradual quality improvement 
involving all members. So on the one hand CFs reduced competition 
among members as was discussed under the First Reason, but on the other 
hand competition was based on such marketing elements as quality of 
farm products. It helped farmers to introduce continuity in delivery and 
achievable quality standards. This contributed to the farmers’ knowledge 
the market and more stable conditions of investment. In addition, it must 
be said that there has always been an element of mental solidarity among 
co-operative members. 
There is certainly a transaction cost element behind risk management 
and solidarity. CFs are more able to mitigate opportunistic behaviour and 
uncertainty. When CFs integrate with farmers, there is less fear that one of 
the parties will behave in an exploitative manner. Because a CFs are 
owned by its patrons it is less likely to default on agreements.  
The Fifth Reason, finally, improvement of members’ income and the 
rural economy. This aspect was the desired outcome of all activities men-
tioned above. In particular, however, it was realised by managing excess 
supply. The management of excess supply was in virtually all markets 
solely the activity of co-operatives.  
Most of these reasons are not as acute as they once were. However, in 
many market structures the need for co-operation would reappear if CFs 
would disappear. 
 
 
Changing Market Conditions 
 
Co-operative agribusiness is operating under very different conditions in 
the industrialised market economies as compared with conditions when 
co-operatives were still social and business innovations. In, for instance, 
The Netherlands and Denmark co-operative agribusiness is characterised The Sixth Reason for Co-operation: New Generation Co-operatives 
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by export-orientation, an increasingly internationalised industry and 
pursuit of direct foreign investments. 
The CFs are commonly U-form, that is to say they do not integrate 
different main products into conglomerate co-operative companies. Dairy 
co-operatives are not involved in meat, and potatoes are not marketed 
together with grains by one CF. The farm supply co-operatives are usually 
more diversified. In countries with sparsely populated areas like Ireland, 
it is more common to integrate more products in one co-operative 
structure. 
Under normal market circumstances co-operatives play the role of price 
leader. As a matter of fact they almost automatically become price leaders 
if they are founded for the reason of creating countervailing power in the 
market. A second reason is that they become price leaders because of their 
cost leadership. The costs in co-operative processing are decreased by 
efficiency. Efficiency-strategies always have been of key importance to co-
operatives in agriculture. In most processing firms in agribusiness a one 
percent decrease in costs has the same effect as a 10 percent increase in 
demand. Co-operatives naturally would raise prices paid to members 
according to their performance. Henceforth the price to be paid to the 
farmer by the CF has a buffer function to the CF in that a price leader-CF 
will distribute its results on the basis of the proportionality rule. Risks are 
expressed in price. In other words, price performs the income and risk 
allocation role. When looked at from the point of view of the CF as a 
business, this buffer is comparable to risk bearing equity share capital in 
an IOF. Price being a performance allocator, it can be said that members 
share liability and risk on a transaction basis. Adverse market results in 
first instance means lower prices to the members. To them it means lower 
returns on investments in their farm (see Figure 1). Own equity in the CF, 
however, can have lower solvency than in IOFs because CFs are backed by 
members. Increasingly co-operatives seek for more permanent forms of 
risk bearing capital. Mostly the interests or dividends paid on such capital 
are related to capital markets. Thus they represent fixed, accountable costs 
to CFs, leaving risks to be born by members. 
 
Figure 1  Difference between IOFs and Co-operatives 
 
 user (supplier of
raw material)
                         market                                              market
investor owned firm co-operative firm
investors member user member owner
 (supplier of
raw materieal)
HERE IS THE DIFFERENCE
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When markets become more international and competition more inten-
sive, traditional co-operative price leadership in the sense of market 
correction loses its traditional rationale. When standardised qualities of 
the raw product can be imported or exported, and the EU or world mar-
kets are effective, CFs can only pay a better price than IOFs to their 
members when at least one of the following conditions apply: transaction 
costs are low, and quality is superior, in the sense that it better fits in the 
value-added chain system. Each of these leads to better margins for the CF 
and thus better dividends to the members. 
If the CF has the lowest costs by far in comparison with competitors or 
when the CF has a market position, e. g., with branded products which 
brings it in a monopolistic position, this means that membership repre-
sents extra-value. Such extra-value is not likely maintained under condi-
tions of free entry of new members. Instead CFs which enjoy monopoly 
powers will not continue to follow free entrance policies. Members will be 
accepted on the basis of market opportunities and are expected to share 
risks by capital investment which is proportional to the amount of product 
to be processed and marketed by the CF on their behalf. Members try to 
avoid that value added operations on behalf of themselves are diluted. 
Monopoly power is mostly based on market positions in the consumer 
market. In agribusiness they are closely related to specialised resources. 
The most crucial resource is genetics. For many products the genetic basis 
is essentially determining costs of production, costs of managing the inte-
grated chain, costs of processing and consumer acceptance. So monopoly 
power in the agro-food sector is gained by moving to either the starting 
point or to the end of the chain. Or to both, of course. 
CFs (and their members) which have achieved such monopoly power 
will normally limit production and limit the entry of new members.  
But the market laws also work the other way round. Farmers operating 
in a market with stiff competition for their products or where the 
suppliers of their inputs are in intense competition will judge the per-
formance of their CF on normal market parameters: price, quality, service, 
new market opportunities on behalf o f  i n p u t s  e n g a g e d  i n  t h e  f a r m  
enterprise and returns on capital ‘invested’ by the CF’s members.  
Closely related to the foregoing is the observation that co-operatives by 
their very nature cover an over-normal transaction span in the market 
chain. Farmer-members begin to ‘correct’ their market partners at both 
ends of the agro-food system. They continue to seek a better position by 
integrating both forward and backward. It is also necessary to take into 
account the special nature of farming. 
In farming long periods with low returns are not unusual. Therefore, 
farmer-members are inclined to seek continuity in their CF. Investments 
made in times of depression pay off in times of market booms. For co-
operative members this is only realised if they commit themselves. Thus 
co-ops can become monopsonists due to member commitment. This 
phenomenon is underpinned by the fact that usually the co-ops have 
realised considerable economies of scale in processing which makes the The Sixth Reason for Co-operation: New Generation Co-operatives 
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entrance of new competitors difficult because of large investments 
needed. That CF then has a monopoly or a monopsony position. If CFs are 
achieving real competitive advantage which provides them with market 
leader positions, members will not want to restrict their CF to the home 
market nor to processing and marketing the members' product only. 
Members rather will let their CF expand with foreign members or let it, be 
it partly, go as an international IOF.  
When a CF becomes a monopsonist there is at first glance a danger too, 
namely that the CF takes on a monopsonistic position vis-à-vis its own 
members because there are no other firms which compete for the mem-
bers' product. Should not the farmer who sees his product processed by 
only one CF fear that the absence of competition in the market may even-
tually cost him his market position? Such conditions are more likely to 
occur when markets are protected from foreign competition by market 
policies of the government. Under conditions of international trade lib-
eralisation such situations are likely erased, however. Notably the effects 
of the GATT negotiations on international competition will be open 
markets for foods and agricultural products. The effect for farmers will be 
that a wider range of firms will compete for their raw material if their 
farming is price competitive. Competition on quality and decreasing 
transaction costs will likewise become more important.  
There is a condition under which farmers and their CFs work in a way 
so that market competition is excluded. No other firms are interested in 
buying the farm produce and the CF is not allowed to stop processing the 
members' production. The reasons can essentially be twofold. One reason 
is that the firm is highly specialised and cost of entry at the processor’s (= 
CFs) level is prohibitively high. In this case the competitive position of the 
CF in the consumer market will determine the returns on investment for 
the co-operative: both at the level of the farm and the CF. The other reason 
can be that the CF and the co-operative members have built a strong 
system in which transaction costs are so low as to create a monopoly 
power for the system as a whole. In this case the entrepreneurial power of 
the co-operative market system will be decisive for the future which is 
ultimately in the hands of the farmer-owner/investor. The land rents have 
an opportunity value which is determined by other productions and the 
willingness of farmers to invest is determined by the opportunity cost of 
capital outside the co-operative farming business as compared with its 
returns within. 
The reason to co-operate under these conditions will be that otherwise 
the competitive farmer cannot reach the market, but because participation 
in his CF will yield better returns than just selling the raw product or than 
from stopping farming altogether.  
Finally, co-operatives originally were established on the concepts of 
countervailing, ‘negotiation-driven’ power and of partial integration by 
which the markets between farmers and their CF were replaced by 
‘system-driven’ markets. In the ‘system-driven’ markets market prices are 
more or less based on formula pricing, the elements in the formula being    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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the performance of the CF in its own market, risks, costs, quality, equity 
formation and member liability.  
The markets in which the CFs’ performance was to be realised were 
mostly ‘negotiation-driven’ markets. The members’ ‘system-driven’ mar-
kets were normally based on homogeneous membership. Besides, as most 
agricultural inputs and products are of a bulky nature the economies of 
scale to be gained stimulated open membership and homogeneous mem-
ber-business. This has changed considerably. In the first place most CFs 
have developed strategic alliances, joint ventures, and forward and 
backward integration contracts with their suppliers or buyers. The result 
is that the agro-food market has changed towards a ‘system-driven’ right 
through the chain. In the second place more segmentation in the market is 
creating member segmentation. In the study ‘The Co-operative Enterprise 
- Perspectives of Development in Denmark Towards the Year 2010’ an 
example is given in which eggs are segmented into cage eggs, free range 
eggs, non-cage eggs and ecological eggs. Each of these are produced by 
four different producer groups.  
Such an example shows that the markets have also changed in the sense 
that the consumer behaviour is felt more directly at the farm level. The 
characteristics of investment in the CF and the farm are becoming more 
specialised and of a short term nature. Therefore we see that equity 
formation by unallocated reserves is less fashionable and is being replaced 
by member investments with higher rates of depreciation. 
 
 
The Sixth Reason for Co-operation – The Historical Reasons Revisited 
 
Have the historical reasons for co-operation lost their meaning for the 
efficient, competitive farms? From the preceding paragraphs it can be 
concluded that open, competitive markets for agricultural products are 
the effect of a trend towards globalisation and liberalisation of 
international trade policies. Many observers conclude from this 
development that there is no need for co-operatives in the classical sense, 
since market information is precluding monopolist behaviour. Firms 
cannot protect their markets and governments will remove sheltering 
effects by abolishing protective national trade policies. 
This is not to say that farmers can survive financially without co-
operation. When governmental trade policies are liberalised it is still 
impossible for individual farmers to influence the market behaviour of 
industrial trade partners in the market chain. It is hoped that international 
competition will create more market opportunities. On the other hand 
during recent years there has been a strong trend towards concentration in 
the food retail industry. Not only have retail organisations in their country 
of origin merged to the effect that three to five supermarket chains may 
control 50–70 percent of food retail sales, the supermarket enterprises 
have also become international. Moreover, there are several instances of 
retail chains operating in purchasing organisations and developing The Sixth Reason for Co-operation: New Generation Co-operatives 
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products jointly. The Federation of Danish Cooperatives concludes (1996, 
p. 4):“There is an increase in the use of private labels, the chains strive to 
differentiate in relation to each other by establishing their own individual product 
profiles. Often, the retail chains are at the head of a considerable portion of the 
development activities regarding these products. When the chains became larger 
and international, their strength increases face to face with the societies supplying 
the food”. 
There are, however, new opportunities for farmers to develop market-
ing structures by which farmers can keep pace with new demands of mar-
kets. Among these are differentiation, vertical integration, alliances, joint 
ventures and collaboration between co-operatives across the national 
borders. Therefore the historical First Reason has obtained a new content. 
This is the creation of a new interface between the highly sophisticated 
and globalised food industries and the primary farms, which seek 
sustainable methods in a sustainable rural economy.  
A similar observation holds for the historical Second Reason. Co-op-
erative banking provides us with a good example. On the one hand, with 
the exception of newly established market economies in Eastern Europe, 
farmers have all desired the bank products made available to them. So at 
first glance it would seem that it is no longer acutely necessary for farmers 
to have co-operative banks to gain access to financial markets. On the 
other hand, the capital markets still need re-engineering to operate 
efficiently towards the farm sector. This is true when looking at co-
operatives themselves. Co-operatives are in need of permanent, risk-
bearing capital first from members, but possibly also from non-member 
sources. In the last case members do not want to give away their control. 
Therefore, farmers would prefer other capital markets for their co-
operatives rather than the stock exchange where they have to comply with 
general rules concerning ROI and allocations of plants and business 
centres. 
Co-operatives are also bound to certain regions where the businesses of 
the members are located. This means that the Second Reason for co-
operation, namely the access to capital and money markets is also 
supplemented by a Sixth Reason. With changing market conditions for 
farm products as mentioned before and the steep rise in the use of infor-
mation technology, the financial markets become the heart of the econ-
omy. Each sector will make its own use of these opportunities. Farming is 
characterised by varying scale and by great variation in natural conditions 
over relatively short distances. Therefore the financial servicing has to be 
adjusted to the various farm sectors and to regional differences. 
Co-operative banking can contribute to farm adjustment by making 
new services available and by assisting the members to develop strategies 
and to manage these. For banking the core-business will be the manage-
ment of information flows on financial markets and economic develop-
ments that are relevant at individual firm level and at industry level. 
Such networks need the input of both the co-operative banks and their 
members. A good example is provided by the German car industry BMW. 
They realised that individual freedom is a meaningful concept only if it is    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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in harmony with freedom of others. Therefore, a ‘Co-operative Traffic 
Management System’ was developed. A co-operatively financed system 
was installed by the car industries, government, municipalities and 
transport organisations to develop sophisticated computerised informa-
tion system for managing the logistics of cars, buses, trains etc. The system 
should take into account the functioning of public and private transport 
under the condition of road space, public transport capacity and 
environment as the scarce resources. Such a co-operatively managed 
system can only succeed when all partners contribute. The concerns are 
with up-to-date information supply on plans and restrictions faced with. 
So the new content of the Second Reason is the creation of a network 
economy by which access and keeping up with fast moving techniques 
can be secured – both to the CF and the member firms 
Under conditions of open competitive markets the historical Third 
Reason does not seem to be affected. Probably it is significant for process-
ing the farm product and inputs at lowest cost today as it was during the 
genesis of co-operatives. However, new requirements emerge. The new 
demand is that diversification and variety at the consumer level not only 
affects the processing but also the production methods, plant breeds and 
animal breeds at the farm level; ‘passport’ or system-integrated 
production is the new element added to the historical Third Reason. 
Here, we should mention the role of technology, and especially that of 
biotechnology in reshaping the agro-industrial complex. Seed and agro-
chemicals, primary agriculture, and food processing are more likely to be 
co-ordinated to achieve food with functional requirements matching con-
sumer preferences for health, convenience and low cost. As goverments 
withdraw from funding agricultural research, co-operatives have to bear 
the costs of R&D, if they want to reap the benefits of process and produce 
innovation. But it is here that economices of scale appear to be relevant. 
The huge costs and risks of biotechnology require large scale of operation 
and purposeful strategic alliances. Access to new technology is an irre-
versible option for co-operatives if they want to penetrate the food chain 
(Kyriokopoulos et al., 1996) 
The historical Fourth Reason is risk management. In the past this had to 
do with member solidarity, especially concerning the handling of sur-
pluses. There is little doubt that the changing conditions on the food and 
agricultural markets have changed the risk profiles of co-operatives and 
their members. As food markets become more mature, branding and mar-
ket segmentation has set the scene. At consumer markets the profit mar-
gins are higher with more value added. However, risks are also higher. As 
CFs are becoming larger it is their ‘natural’ business to integrate forward 
and to expand geographically. The risks are born by the members. Their 
risk profile is changing fast with forward integration. At the same time 
forward integration is a means to reduce risks run by farmers as trade 
liberalisation decreased the effect of income protection policies by the 
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Increased risk has in some sectors stimulated new forms of ownership 
and special company structures with subsidiary companies and holding 
companies (Federation of Danish Cooperatives, 1996; van Dijk and 
Mackel, 1994). New forms of risk management while a variety of business 
alliances and abstracts emerge is the present content of the Fourth Reason.  
Historically, co-operatives accepted all products delivered to them. The 
management’s job was to find market outlets and realise the best prices 
possible. This need to take all produce has been dealt with in three ways 
(van Dijk and Mackel, 1994): 
•  Maximising the use of public support measures to minimise commer-
cial risk, (e.g., grain co-operatives in France and their use of the 
intervention/subsidised export schemes); 
•  Trading freely with a range of suppliers using price as the method of 
procurement rather than group discipline; and 
•  Organising an auction system in an attempt to optimise price trans-
parency for producers and to create a focal point for the market distri-
bution system. 
 
The Fifth Reason, namely to handle situations of oversupply, has taken on 
a different road as excess supply is less likely, farmers being contracted 
and markets probably operating more efficiently. The seeking of income 
improvement is likely to assume a more entrepreneurial character. 
Farmers may have to undertake more diversified entrepreneurial 
activities to prevent their rural economy from marginalisation. 
There are a number of cases where co-operatives were transformed into 
corporations to finance future investments. Where the circle of owners is 
expanded with non-user members who also bear risks, this causes the 
original member-user owners to lose influence. However, it also opens 
new ways of entrepreneurship to members in relation to their CF.  
The changing market conditions and their impact on the relationships 
between members and co-operatives can be illustrated by the example of 
flower auctions. Market gardeners invest heavily on their farm enterprises 
and as a result they become more demanding with respect to marketing 
activities of their CF. Flower auctions, limiting themselves to a ”price 
discovery” function, are anable to take an elaborated marketing activities. 
Thus, dynamic and market oriented growers resort to direct agreements 
with private companies, surpassing the co-operative auction.  
From the foregoing is concluded that the historical five reasons for co-
operating have changed their nature quite considerably. The above con-
siderations therefore gave rise to formulating the Sixth Reason. This Sixth 
Reason will lead to new policies concerning the relationship between the 
CF and the co-operative member.  
 
 
The Sixth Reason – New Generation Co-operatives (NGCs) 
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The Sixth Reason represents the need for new member strategies as a 
result of the changed nature of the classical reasons for co-operation. 
In this section the characteristic elements are listed first. Second, 
examples of new member strategies are discussed in order to make the 
concept more comprehensible. The Sixth Reason in essence is to let CFs 
create new market opportunities for the co-operative members under the 
conditions of investor-driven membership, diversified membership and 
market fragmentation. The Sixth Reason is to make investments in such a 
way that new markets are created in which the members can add value 
with their land, labour, capital investments and skills. The Sixth Reason 
thus is the combination of the original reasons for co-operation in a state 
of flux. New conditions have stirred farmers to co-operate in new ways 
and have caused long-standing co-operatives to re-engineer. They are the 
so-called New Generation Co-operatives. 
CFs that were set up (Nadeau and Thompson, 1996) for the Sixth Rea-
son are called New Generation Co-operatives. Egerstrom (1996), Cook 
(1996), Nadeau and Thompson (1996) give a number of examples for the 
US, van Dijk (1996) gives examples from The Netherlands. Below some 
characteristic examples are described.  
A group of Saskatchewan grain farmers, all members of The 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP), are faced with a threat of excess supply 
of wheat in the lower quality ranges. Therefore they invest in a feed lot of 
approximately 25.000 head of cattle and a bio-ethanol plant, a by-product 
of which is also used as a feed-component for the beef cattle. The farmers 
hold 56 percent of the shares. SWP holds 22 percent and the company in 
the bio-ethanol business (Mohawk) holds the other 22 percent (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2   Co-maker Co-operative: Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
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From the very start the founding farmers decided that they would sell 
their wheat at market prices, but that the shareholders would receive a 
First Right of Refusal to deliver at that price. During the starting period all 
required raw material was delivered by the original ‘members'. The 
amount they could deliver was agreed to be proportional to their invest-
ment (shares). Presently this still is the case, but now far more wheat is 
needed than members can deliver.  
As a result of the business structure, the performance of the ‘CF’ is 
expressed in the value of the shares linked by a wheat-delivery right and The Sixth Reason for Co-operation: New Generation Co-operatives 
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their dividends. The members have reached their goal: demand for feed 
quality wheat is enhanced and a profit is made.  
This co-operative is a joint investment activity by farmers. The CF is 
both a market leader and a price leader. New members cannot enter un-
less they buy stock and delivery rights. The Board of Directors elected 
democratically. The other board members are appointed by their share-
holding companies. When questioned, however, it turns out that these 
farmers are presently more interested in expansion and profits than in 
having votes. 
The University of Saskatchewan Centre for the Study of Co-operatives 
(cited in Cook, 1996) concludes that the New Generation Co-operatives 
have two common bonds. The first is that their major focus is value added 
processing, representing a departure from the main objective of 
commodity marketing held by their predecessors. “Rather than acting as 
clearing houses for the product, a NGC is restricted to only accepting a 
predetermined amount of product from its members. In fact a ‘two-way’ contract 
exists between members and the co-operative that requires the member to deliver a 
certain amount of product by the co-operative and requires the co-operative to take 
delivery of this product” (Cook, 1996, p. 145).  
The examples of NGCs given by the authors Egerstrom, Cook, Nadeau 
and Thompson all have in common that open membership is not the 
normal rule, except in cases where people in a community co-operate to 
avoid its economic decline. But product oriented co-operatives have the 
system of limited access. Shares are coupled with delivery rights and are 
tradable. There is proportionality in most cases between shares and user 
transactions. Democracy is maintained as much as possible. There is no 
fundamental objection to making profits and to distribute these on the 
basis of share capital.  
In sum, the new co-operatives follow an investor-driven strategy. ‘You 
have to pay to play’. There is closed membership, or it is better to say, 
“there are membership-policies controlling entrance in the venture in by-laws and 
operating practices (....). The NGCs have resolved issues to co-operative property 
rights and ‘free rider’ memberships, have asset appreciation mechanisms, delivery 
right mechanisms, proportional patronage distribution, base equity capital plans” 
(Egerstrom, 1996, p. 148). 
 
 
The Sixth Reason – Re-engineering the Co-operatives 
 
When the Sixth Reason conditions prevail co-operatives seem to follow 
either of these two routes: the CFs can convert to IOFs in order to gain 
better access to equity and pursue growth policies. There are examples in 
Ireland in which co-operatives members have released their control for 
this purpose. Or the co-operative’s member relationships are strengthened 
on a new basis. The latter route is inevitable when market competition 
makes the CF too much dependent on the members. It is also inevitable 
when the members have become too dependent on their CF. In both cases 
the balance of business between member firm (farm) and CF is lost. In    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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both cases members ceased to regard the CF as ‘their’ CF. Nor are they 
committed through a ‘united we stand, divided we fall’ attitude to their 
business. Instead members judge the co-operative at its competitive per-
formance vis-à-vis the members as if it was an IOF. This holds especially 
in countries where CFs and IOFs exist in the same market. A timely re-
engineering and re-inventing policy is then necessary. Interestingly 
however the CFs begin to value the membership of their clients or 
suppliers. It is increasingly regarded as an asset by the managers rather 
than a nuisance. Below some successful or at least very promising cases of 
re-engineering/re-inventing are described. These are Harvest States 
(USA), The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (Canada), Dumeco (The Nether-
lands), Campina Melkunie (The Netherlands) and Friesland Dairy Foods 
(The Netherlands).  
Harvest States changed its constitutional by-laws to give the co-op-
erative greater flexibility in forming subsidiaries, joint ventures and 
strategic alliances with local co-operatives. Harvest States is transforming 
to a Holding Company in which farmers-investors-users can participate 
on their own terms. Harvest States thus does not pay so much attention to 
their members as the normal member-users, but as investors. The Harvest 
States Investment Plan provides producers and co-operatives an 
opportunity to increase their returns from the Harvest States food 
processing operations by investing in ‘equity participation units’ in those 
areas. Investments would be available on a ‘per bushel’ basis. Capital 
raised by selling the equity participation units to member-investors 
provides a stronger, more feasible financial base, designed to improve 
returns and redemption of exiting member equity. The infusion of capital 
also enables Harvest States to expand existing operations and launch new 
value-added activities.  
The plan is simple. Eligible investors (producers or co-operative of 
producers) invest in a specific Harvest States value-added food processing 
activity by purchasing equity participation units. This investment carries 
with it a right and obligation for the member-investor to deliver the 
bushels involved to an authorised delivery point, normally a nearby 
member-co-operative or Harvest States facility. So members can choose to 
participate in the earnings of a specific value-added operation. In this 
sense the plan is quite similar to that of Canadian farmers who are also 
member of the Pool. The remaining earnings are divided in the traditional 
way over the member-users of Harvest States (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3  Re-engineering the Co-operative Harvest States 
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Equity participation is subject to depreciation and appreciation in value 
and shares are tradable to eligible producers and co-operatives. The 
background of the plan is that Harvest States' overall grain volume has 
increased much faster than its processing capacity. As a result returns 
from these value-added operations have been diluted.  
A second example of re-engineering the co-operative due to the Sixth 
Reason is the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool. Faced with ageing membership, 
few new entrants and world market influences The Pool decided to go 
public. In this way The Pool effectively prevented a large outflow out of 
the agribusiness sector. Besides the new business of members with The 
Pool gives the right to shares options. Here again the proportionality 
principle is introduced. When looking at the present member admini-
stration it can be concluded that The Pool is as close to co-operative prin-
ciples as a co-operative can possibly get given the Sixth Reason.  
The third example is the Dutch Meat Company Dumeco that was re-
engineered in 1995 out of two traditional meat co-operatives and an IOF in 
the meat business. The co-operatives had both been faced with unusual 
market circumstances. Due to over-capacity in the slaughtering plants 
both in The Netherlands and Germany price competition for slaughtered 
hogs grew very intensive. So the situation arose that members gave up the 
balance between delivery right and delivery obligation and the obligation 
required from the CFs to accept the member produce was released. The 
latter situation of course was natural since also the CFs were competing 
intensively for the hogs to be supplied by the members. The result was 
that the co-operatives more or less dissolved. Virtually no member 
commitment remained and it became increasingly difficult to finance the 
C F  f r o m  m e m b e r  c a p i t a l .  A s  t h e  C F s  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  g o  b r o k e  a  r e -
engineering plan was established. 
The result was a merger between the two CFs and a successful smaller 
IOF. The CEO of the IOF became the CEO of the new company. This new 
company was set up as an IOF in which farmer-users of the former CFs 
were invited to become member-investors. This was realised via a new co-
operative of member-suppliers to Dumeco IOF. The Dumeco co-operative 
became the owner of 30 percent of the shares. The other shareholders 
consisting of two big co-operatives operating in the feed industries 
(Cebeco and Cehave). The fourth and fifth parties are the IOF and a 
farmers’ union. 
The interesting feature of this operation is that the establishment of the 
Dumeco co-operative was very much stimulated by the management of 
the Dumeco IOF. The relationships are based on transaction cost reduc-   Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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tion, investor-owned relations and co-makership between the members of 
Dumeco co-op and Dumeco IOF. New contracts were established stating 
that co-makership has the following elements: 
•  Acceptance by the members of Dumeco IOF as a price leader; 
•  Delivery contracts where number of pigs to deliver, plant they shall be 
delivered to, and time of delivery are specified in order to achieve 
efficiency in logistics and smooth us of available capacity; 
•  Transaction cost reductions by members to be remitted to them; 
•  Dumeco IOF accepted as a leader of the production-marketing system 
concerning quality requirements, time of delivery, place of delivery. 
 
Profits are distributed in the form of co-maker fees to members on a pro-
portional-to-transaction basis. The co-maker fees are not paid in cash but 
are transferred as certificates of shares. These certificates are transferable 
among members but in the future non-members can be included (Figure 
4). 
The fourth example is Campina Melkunie, the largest dairy co-opera-
tive in The Netherlands. As a primary co-operative Campina Melkunie 
has maintained its role as price leader. This CF is managed on the basis of 
adding value to the member produce. This means that members also 
accept the roles of their CF. These risks are expressed in the milk price. 
As the CF requires more long term equity, a new financial product was 
designed in the form of bonds issues by the CF to members. The bonds are 
compulsory and are proportional to the volume of milk delivered. 
However, bonds are transferable, also to non-members. In this way 
Campina Melkunie established market conditions for capital supplied by 
the members without having a situation in which the investor-relationship 
between the CF and the member becomes paramount.  
 
Figure 4  Co-maker Co-operative Dumeco 
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A fifth example is Friesland Dairy Foods (The Netherlands). Becoming 
increasingly internationalised it decided that high milk prices due to good 
results in Asia causes distortion of incentives to farmers. Therefore the 
FDF follows the weighted average of the five best paying dairy firms in 
the country. In other words, foreseeing the Sixth Reason to become 
effective in a few years time also in the milk and dairy sector of Europe, 
FDF decided to anticipate this change. At the same time members are 
invited to become shareholders in the Far East activities. The Sixth Reason for Co-operation: New Generation Co-operatives 
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In FDF the control is still exerted by members on the basis of milk 
transactions. The unallocated reserves were transferred in the A-shares 
held by the FDF co-operative. Members can have B-shares in the FDF IOF 
without a proportionality-to-milk restriction. B-shares are tradable to 
other milk supplying members only. B-shares have no voting power.  
These are examples of co-operatives where the Sixth Reason caused a 
re-engineering. If members are looked at and treated as business partners 
with co-makerships and investment interests they contribute to the co-
operative firm and can reap the benefits. Membership is no longer undi-
vided. It distinguishes transaction costs and how to minimise these, 
investment relationships and how to secure the returns (on price or on 
capital) and how to build a market organisation to realise continuity of the 
farm and the rural economy.  
 
 
Co-operative Principles under the Sixth Reason – What is Left? 
 
Like theory, co-operative principles are based on long-standing practices 
and experiences. People learned to introduce rules of conduct in order to 
strike a balance between rights and obligations, freedom and risk versus 
commitment and security. 
Open membership and education no doubt had important effects in 
times when co-operatives were locally based and information was scarce. 
The co-operative principles were the outcome of a development towards 
both vertical and horizontal expansion. The co-operatives, at least most of 
them, were product oriented, not capital oriented. Members were seeking 
countervailing power and access to scarce goods and services. The 
common interest was to maximise the return on the resources owned by 
the members. The tradable product on the basis of the resources was 
regarded as the scarce resource. All other productive factors like labour 
and capital were to earn their returns on the basis of a fair price. Fair deals 
presuppose solidarity and democracy on a one member – one vote basis. If 
people live near subsistence it is important that there is no outflow of 
capital out of the neighbourhood. Instead the capital should remain ‘in the 
family’. This is the basis for co-operative banking. 
It seems that under present conditions members start re-engineering 
processes in their co-operatives because the old balances have changed. 
Different markets cause members to become heterogeneous. Farmers con-
trol not only fixed resources but also capital goods with higher rates of 
depreciation and turnover. Risk profiles differ strongly between indi-
vidual entrepreneurs. Consumer pressure also contributes to the disequili-
brium between farmer interests and the CF. For the scarcely populated 
areas it must be added that farmers see the natural end of horizontal ex-
pansion. It is only with new ventures and alliances with companies else-
where that the rural economy can be maintained at satisfactory per-
formance. Therefore NGCs are investor- and system-driven. Such condi-
tions demand that acceptance of entrepreneurial risks are rewarded. Thus,    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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there exist closed membership and depreciation and appreciation of co-
operative shares. 
New balances between solidarity, democracy and competition will 
appear. However, it is likely that a considerable time period will have to 
elapse before we dare to speak of principles of NGCs and re-engineered 
co-operatives. 
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Note 
 
1  By CF is meant a co-operative firm, which is a from like all other businesses except that it 
is owned, used and controlled by the members. Members are representing businesses. 
The Member Firm (MF) is called farm, horticultural firm, or just member, interchangably. 
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Agricultural and horticultural cooperatives operate nowadays in a rapidly 
changing environment. The Dutch Cooperative Council (Nationale 
Coöperatieve Raad, 1990) distinguishes three developments. Production 
of a large number of products has reached self-sufficiency at the level of 
the European Union. Many markets are not characterized by shortages 
anymore, but by firms having large inventories or idle capacity. The 
agricultural policy of the EC tries to cope with this situation of over-
production by adopting instruments like quotas, leave fallow, lower prices 
and less subsidized exports. The implication of these policies for firms is 
that expensive adjustments have to be made in order to eliminate excess 
capacity. A second development is that a different product assortment is 
required in order to be successful in a market which has changed from a 
seller's market to a buyer's market. Strategies like expansion of production 
and competition on the basis of prices are nowadays less important than 
product differentiation, market segmentation, specialization and 
diversification. Finally, the emergence of the internal market in Europe 
induced many merger activities which has resulted in a few large, 
multinational private corporations. These developments are not uniquely 
Dutch or European. Californian cooperatives also face consumers 
demanding more variety and markets which expand rapidly by 
transcending national borders due to trade agreements like NAFTA. 
These developments have increased the demand for funds by coopera-
tives. First, product differentiation and diversification are necessary to 
meet the changing demand by consumers. It requires large sums of 
money. Second, the increasing size of markets has resulted in a few large 
players. Cooperatives try to prevent that the strength of their bargaining 
position decreases in favor of multinationals and concentrated retailers. 
However, they have problems to adopt the same policy as multinational 
corporations because financial funds are mostly acquired by retained 
earnings. This way of financing expansions is viable in slowly growing 
markets, but it has a hard time to deal with a jump in market size of the 
extent of European integration or NAFTA. They have been able to gener-
ate these funds up till now mainly by designing new internal financial 
instruments through relaxing the requirements regarding liability and 
exit. However, empirical evidence (van Dijk and Poppe, 1992) indicates 
that the limits to the sources of self-financing seem to be almost reached. 
The use of external funds like bank debt and outside equity seems inevi-   Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
 
112 
table. External funds may be acquired by issuing equity or using debt or 
some hybrid source of funds. 
The Nationale Coöperatieve Raad (1990) identifies the domination of 
control by the members of the cooperative as the prime distinguishing 
feature of this organizational form. Dutch law provides possibilities for 
securing control by members (ter Woorst, 1989) because it provides the 
possibility that the members write in their charter that “up to two thirds of 
the boards of directors may be appointed from the members of the cooperative”. 
This definition allows for more cooperative forms than the ones surveyed 
in Bonin et al. (1993). They distinguish the labor managed firm or 
production cooperative (PC) and the investor owned or conventional firm 
(CF). A PC is characterized by worker participation in firm decision 
making, profit sharing and employee ownership. Worker's decision-
making right is a necessary condition in their definition. However, PCs are 
relatively rare in the Netherlands, whereas the agricultural and 
horticultural cooperatives are common.1 These latter cooperatives are like 
a CF, with the difference that it is mainly financed by the input suppliers 
or buyers of the output. One way of defining an agricultural or 
horticultural cooperative is that it is either a certain group of input 
suppliers or a certain group of customers which owns a CF at another 
stage in the production column (marketing chain), either upstream (a 
purchasing cooperative) or downstream (a marketing cooperative). We 
restrict ourselves to marketing cooperatives in this article and refer to 
them as MC. Notice that the members of an MC own and decide upon the 
assets of an MC, but that the MC doesn't have any ownership rights 
regarding the assets of individual members which are used at the up-
stream stage. Another way of formulating this feature is that each member 
of an MC owns assets at two stages of production. First, the farmer makes 
his own investment decisions and owns the resulting assets at his farm 
(the upstream stage). Second, the ownership of the assets which are used 
to process the produce of farmers at the downstream stage is in the hands 
of all the members of the MC together. Figure 1 summarizes the 
differences between the PC, MC and CF mode of organization. This article 
analyses the differences between an MC and a CF. 
 
Figure 1  Organizational Forms 
 
Residual claimant                                      Organizational form 
 PC  MC  CF 
 
Input  suppliers  no yes no 
Employees yes  no  no 
 
The implications of the feature of member domination in MCs is analyzed 
from a contract theoretic perspective. The starting point in the economic 
theory of contracts is a conflict of interest between the parties (owner of 
the firm and supplier of external financial funds) and asymmetric 
information (firm has superior information regarding the circumstances of Marketing Cooperatives as a System of Attributes 
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stances of production). The guiding principle is that differences between 
financial instruments can be explained best by analyzing the incentives of 
the various parties. Financial instruments differ because they imply 
different incentives for the parties involved. The relationship between 
financial structure and organizational form is established by the 
observation that both involve a certain allocation of control rights. This 
implies that the choice of financial structure and organizational form will 
respond to a change in the optimal level of asset specificity, which is due 
to changing market circumstances. 
Already Nourse (1922) explained the vertical integration aspect of an 
MC along the nowadays familiar lines of transactions-related costs 
associated with asset specificity2 or sunk costs of investments at the farm 
(Williamson, 1985): 
“Let us say that a small fruit-producing section has just been brought to 
bearing. The area is far from any large market, the product is perishable, and 
hence both risk and expense are high. Volume is not large enough to attract a 
private distributor. But success or failure, the salvaging of their investment, or 
the continuance of their life work may be at stake on the part of the growers. 
Hence it is argued (and demonstrated in practice) that the cooperative association 
of producers frequently achieves results where private outside entrepreneurship 
fails.” 
Ex post opportunistic behavior regarding the contract terms by one's 
trading partners (i.e. post-harvest ‘hold-ups’) is reduced by vertical in-
tegration (Klein et al., 1978). Another advantage is that the downstream 
part of the MC has lower transaction costs in acquiring inputs. 
There are also issues of asset specificity regarding the investments of 
the MC. MCs face a trade off between reducing post-harvest holdups of 
highly perishable farm products at the upstream part and getting at-
tractive terms on outside funds for the investments of the downstream 
part of the MC. We will focus on the investments at the downstream part 
of the MC and argue that the increasing level of asset specificity, especially 
investments in brand names, has reduced the viability of the MC.3 
Another way of characterizing our results is to formulate them as a 
contribution to the Coase program. The celebrated Coase theorem (1960) 
states that every assignment of property rights results in a Pareto efficient 
allocation in the absence of bargaining inefficiencies and wealth 
constraints. The implied research agenda is that a fruitful starting point 
for research on organizations consists of the investigation of the assump-
tions of efficient bargaining and/or no wealth constraints. This paper 
addresses the viability of the MC by analyzing the impact of the lack of 
sufficient funds (wealth constraint) of MC members on the outcome of an 
efficient bargaining process between the parties associated with an MC 
regarding the level of asset specificity of new investments. Insufficient 
funds may prevent that an MC realizes a Pareto improvement in the 
allocation of control rights. 
A successful cooperative is a unique construction: the triad of 
(common) interest, (common) finance and (common) control, realized in a 
twofold construction: a society (of members) and a company (economic    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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institution). Organizations are viewed as a cluster of attributes between 
which complementarities have to be realized (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; 
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994).  
The next two sections characterize an MC and a CF as two distinct clus-
ters of attributes. Thereafter, several stylized facts of an MC are identified. 
Organizational attributes are distinguished, while the two following 
sections identify the circumstances in which a particular system of 
attributes ( i.e. either a CF or an MC) is more efficient than the other 
cluster of attributes. An incomplete contracting account of MCs and CFs is 
formulated. The next section addresses the viability of the MC. Conclu-
sions and some avenues for future research are formulated at the end. 
 
 
Stylized Facts of MCs 
 
MCs exist in many variations. This is to a large extent due to differences in 
the nature of their produce, e.g. milk is collected every day, whereas 
potatoes are harvested only during a certain season. However, there are 
also quite a few commonalities between MCs. This section lists several 
stylized facts of MCs and provides an account of its governing bodies. 
The residual claimants of MC (i.e. the input suppliers) are usually faced 
with a number of obligations that differ from those of residual claimants 
of a CF. Five financial differences are distinguished. Members of an MC … 
•  have a large personal financial stake in the MC, because a considerable 
share of the profits is added to the internal financial reserves of the MC 
each year; 
•  are to a certain extent personally responsible for financial losses4; 
•  are faced with the non-transferability of return claims during the 
membership period (i.e. ‘money in the dead hand’); 
•  don't face in general financial barriers to acquire membership. New 
members have immediately costless access to the resources of the MC 
and have the same rights as established members to the returns when 
the MC is liquidated; 
•  do face exit barriers. 
 
Two closely related differences regarding the product portfolio are dis-
tinguished. Members of an MC… 
•  are usually organized around one raw material, e.g. potatoes, sugar, 
beets, wheat, milk, etc.5; 
•  are reluctant to diversify the product portfolio of the MC. 
 
Five organizational differences are observed. Members of an MC … 
•  have in many cases 100% delivery requirement of their inputs to the 
MC; 
•  enjoy 100% purchase assurance of their produce by the MC; 
•  are faced with an increasing average age of their members due to 
declining entry of new, young members; Marketing Cooperatives as a System of Attributes 
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•  allocate voting power according to one member, one vote; 
•  face institutional differences regarding the Board of Directors. 
 
Figure 2  The Organization of an MC  
 
Members
General Assembly
Board
Directorate
Financial Control Committee
 
 
Ter Woorst (1989) describes several institutional differences between an 
MC and a CF. The Dutch law requires that the MC has a General Assem-
bly, a Board of Directors and a Financial Control Committee. The General 
Assembly is the most important, because ultimately it determines the 
policy of the MC and evaluates the execution of the policy by the Board. In 
many cases, because of the large number of members and the vast region 
of the MC, regional committees are elected which form together the 
General Assembly. (This is often called the Members Council6.) The 
General Assembly chooses the members of the Board and the Financial 
Control Committee and has the power to replace them. Members of the 
Board and the Financial Control Committee are almost always members 
of the MC. One explanation is that their own financial interest coincides 
with that of the other members. This secures members' trust in the Board. 
The Board is ultimately responsible for the governance of the MC, 
culminating in the exclusive authority to determine the prices, dividends, 
or tariffs paid to or by the members. However, though the Board actively 
determines the strategic decisions and interferes with major 
organizational ones if necessary, a Directorate is appointed to run the MC 
in its day to day operational business. In regular joint meetings the Board 
monitors the Directorate, discusses possible options, decides on those and 
gives clear instructions to the Directorate. Figure 2 illustrates the 
relationships between the different bodies in an MC. 
 
 
System of Attributes 
 
Enterprises can be considered as a system of attributes.7 Good 
performance requires that the attributes/decisions are matched. Each 
specific system of matched decisions is considered an organization and 
carries a specific name. For example, an MC is considered as a system of 
matched attributes regarding the allocation of control, democratic decision 
making, culture, and so on. A CF is a system with the same attributes as 
an MC, but the value of each attribute differs.    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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Enterprises with two attributes can be represented by a matrix with the 
two decisions as entries and the payoffs in the cells of the matrix. 
However, an enterprise consists usually of more than two attributes, 
which is problematic from the viewpoint of graphical representation. This 
is resolved in Figure 3 by flattening an n-dimensional representation into 
two dimensions. The symbols x1,...,xN indicate the various deci-
sions/attributes of an enterprise and the MCs (CFs) indicate the match of 
decisions which comprises an MC (CF). The rest of this section identifies 
attributes of an enterprise, either an MC or a CF, which are related and 
therefore have to be matched. The definition of each attribute is chosen 
such that a CF is associated with a low value and an MC with a high 
value. 
 
Figure 3  CF and MC 
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Control by Providers of Input 
 
An MC has (by definition) a high level of control by input suppliers, 
whereas a CF has not. Enterprises have to take into account which other 
parties are associated with it, like owners, suppliers, financiers, consumers 
and labor. MCs and CFs are expected to react differently to their 
environment due to their different objectives. The members of an MC are 
special in the sense that they are both suppliers of raw materials and Marketing Cooperatives as a System of Attributes 
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capital. A member of a cooperative in his role of supplier of raw materials 
is interested in receiving a high price for his input, a high price for the 
produce of the MC and a high return on the invested capital and likes to 
pay a low remuneration to the suppliers of outside capital. Their interests 
as a provider of funds are different, i.e. low prices of raw materials and a 
high return on capital. These considerations result in a different objective 
function of members of an MC than those of shareholders of a CF.  
 
 
One-Member-One-Vote 
 
Voting power in an MC has traditionally been allocated according to the 
one-member-one-vote principle. It is often seen as a crucial ingredient in 
strengthening the ‘organized trust’ perception of an MC because all mem-
bers are treated equally. However, differences in size between members 
have gradually resulted in differentiated voting rights, although there is 
still a maximum number of votes per (big) member. Voting power in a CF 
is allocated according to one-share-one-vote. 
 
 
One Product 
 
MCs are usually organized around one product. This is viewed as a basic 
element for a successful cooperative, because it creates a common clearly 
perceived interest and a resulting common willingness of producers with 
a weak market position to work together. In case: combined processing of 
products realizes economies of scale and substantially combined product 
supply realizes higher prices. It enhances a very clear and straightforward 
way of accounting costs and benefits and of distributing the results, so 
that members can control the company effectively. The one product 
feature supports and strengthens the ‘organized trust’ perception of an 
MC, which facilitates decision making. 
 
 
Democratic Decision Making and Internal Control Systems 
 
A preceding section described the prominent role of the General Assembly 
in an MC. A number of arguments can be made in favor of democratic 
decision making. First, democratic decision making is likely to generate a 
merging of opinions along the lines of the Blackwell and Dubins' (1962) 
result. Second, democratic decision making is less vulnerable to successful 
politicking because bad proposals are winnowed out (Tullock, 1992). 
Third, the huge financial involvement of the financiers in the success of 
the cooperative is in general a strong commitment to acquire substantial 
information in order to evaluate policy decisions. 
MCs seem to have a well functioning internal control system. Four 
aspects of the input suppliers are responsible. First, input suppliers have a 
large personal financial stake in the downstream firm. It turns out that    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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third parties are even willing to provide debt without any liability of the 
input suppliers when they have generated a high level of ‘inside’ equity. 
This equity stake held by agents provides a credible signal that they will 
do their job of policing internal decision making well. 
Second, the preceding section pointed out institutional features of the 
Board of Directors. They are favorable for the functioning of the Board of 
Directors in an MC. This is enhanced by the feature of personal liability of 
(internal) financiers of the MC. This provides input suppliers with strong 
incentives to collect information and force the Board of Directors to take 
decisions in their interest. These incentives seem to provide a setting in 
which the internal control system will work well. Both the organization of 
the Board of Directors and the personal liability of their members imply 
that the incentives to put forth effort in the internal control system of an 
MC are superior to those of a CF. Members of the Board of Directors of a 
CF face much weaker financial incentives to implement good policies, 
which opens the door for managers and members on the Board of 
Directors to realize certain personal goals at the expense of the value of 
the firm.8 
Third, the lack of the market for corporate control enhances the incen-
tives for members in an MC to generate a well functioning internal control 
system. Shares of an MC are not traded in the stock market. Members 
therefore face difficulties in trading their financial stakes. Stockholders can 
easily get out of a CF by selling their stock in the market. Members of an 
MC can't and therefore pay more attention to the way the MC is being 
run.9 
Finally, a similar incentive is provided by the relatively bad developed 
market for inputs.10 This reduces the possibility for an MC of comparing 
its own performance with those of rivals. It becomes therefore more 
attractive to put forth effort in the internal control system in order to 
compensate for the absence of the yardstick of the market. The lack of the 
market for corporate control and the largely absent market for inputs 
provides a commitment to participate in the internal control system. 11 
 
 
External Control System 
 
Internal as well as external control systems serve a role in disciplining 
corporate decision making. Examples of external control systems are the 
capital market, the market for corporate control and the input market. The 
capital market and the market for corporate control are addressed in this 
section, whereas footnote 9 provides references regarding the input 
market. 
MCs seem to have a different portfolio of banks from which they attract 
financial funds than CFs. It is usually much narrower. Aoki (1990) has 
pointed out the advantageous monitoring effects of having a main bank 
instead of many banks in an analysis between different economic systems. 
It seems that the same arguments can be applied to different Marketing Cooperatives as a System of Attributes 
 
119 
organizational forms in one economic system. A closer relationship 
between an investor and an extrepreneur implies that the investor receives 
a better signal regarding the bad state. It reduces the degree of 
incompleteness of ex-ante contracts. It will be argued in the next section 
that this increases the range of projects which will be implemented. 
The recent curbing of the disciplinary functions of the capital market in 
the USA frustrates corporate decision making. It is obvious that the 
importance of organizational processes and procedures has increased in 
order to compensate for the reduced disciplinary power of the MC. How-
ever, Jensen (1993) argues that they often fail in CFs. He posits that this is 
also due to the restrictions which have been imposed on capital markets. 
One of the reasons for the failure of internal control systems is “the curbing 
of what I call active investors. Active investors are individuals or institutions that 
simultaneously hold large debt and/or equity positions in a company and actively 
participate in its strategic direction. Active investors are important to a well-
functioning governance system because they have the financial interest and 
independence to view firm management and policies in an unbiased way. They 
have the incentives to buck the system to correct problems early rather than late 
when the problems are obvious but difficult to correct.” 
Capital markets in Europe and especially in the Netherlands have 
traditionally been more curbed than those in the USA (Boot, 1994). The 
rights of outside equity-holders are extensively curtailed in the Nether-
lands and new members of the board of directors are usually appointed 
by the principle of co-optation. 
 
 
Delivery/Purchase Requirement 
 
The delivery/purchase requirement assures the MC of raw materials, 
whereas CFs have to compete for inputs in the market. Another feature is 
that it used to be an important instrument in generating retained earnings. 
There was no market for inputs, because all input suppliers were member 
of an MC. This implied that the Board of Directors of an MC could 
exercise some discretion in the determination of the input price paid to the 
members in order to build up the retained earnings. This situation was 
prevalent in the fifties and sixties in Europe. Third, the delivery and 
purchase requirement prevents adverse selection problems regarding the 
quality of inputs. Fourth, it enhances the continuity of the MC and reduces 
the fluctuations in the rate of return. 
 
 
Free Entry 
 
New members of an MC have free entry, but members face an exit barrier. 
Free entry entails not only that a new member has the same access to 
resources of the MC as the established members, but also that he has 
gained equal rights to the returns in the liquidation contingency. They 
have to either pay a fee when leaving (the Netherlands) or stay for a    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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minimum number of years with the MC (Germany).12 This exit barrier 
strengthens the continuity and the predictability of the MC. Its main 
purpose, however, seems to be to prevent attracting members whose only 
intention is to free ride on the existing resources of the MC. It is a scheme 
similar to Lazear (1979) in the sense that wealth constraints regarding an 
entry fee in order to obtain membership of an MC are circumvented by 
having payments spread out over the membership period. 
 
 
Retained Earnings 
 
Fourth, members of an MC are usually required to pay every year a finan-
cial contribution (by withholding part of the paid out price) in order to 
increase the reserves of the MC. This enhances the ability of an MC to 
acquire debt at favorable terms. 
 
 
Non-Transferability 
 
Transferability differences between CFs and MCs are likely to affect in-
vestment and capital formation. Equity shares of a CF can at every instant 
of time be traded in the stock market, i.e. they are transferable. Members 
of an MC have only claims to the returns of assets during the membership 
period. They often do not have individual and transferable ownership 
rights in the assets of the MC. Returns during the membership period 
have therefore to be at least as high as returns elsewhere. This limited 
appropriability problem requires that the internal rate of return on the 
assets of MCs must be higher than that of CFs if internally financed 
investment is to be chosen when the median membership duration is 
shorter than the project's recoupment period (Bonin et al., 1993). MCs 
using mainly internal funds to finance capital will therefore ‘underinvest’ 
relative to comparable CFs when a member's individual claim to the 
returns is non-transferable. The problem is getting worse due to adverse 
changes in the demographic composition of the member population. 
Retained earnings are also under pressure because the delivery/purchase 
requirement is harder to maintain in the current market. 
 
 
Personal Liability 
 
Members are (to a certain extent or even completely) liable for the losses of 
the MC, depending on the structure of the MC. Several advantages are 
associated with this feature. First, the solvency of the MC becomes more 
sound, which creates extra possibilities to increase the amount of debt 
(Diamond, 1989). Second, it makes the MC less vulnerable to adverse 
shocks than a CF, i.e. MCs seem to have the ability to survive a longer 
period of temporary losses than CFs. Personal liability reduces the prob-Marketing Cooperatives as a System of Attributes 
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ability of liquidation. This will enhance the ability of an MC to get debt 
finance for new investment projects. 
Cost of Equity 
 
The cost of outside equity for an MC will in general be above those of a 
CF. Members of an MC have by definition the decision making power. It is 
not attractive for outside financiers to carry financial risks in an MC, 
because people with (partially) different interests are allowed to spend the 
money of outside financiers in ways they like best. Providers of equity 
have to be compensated for the lack of decision-making rights, which is 
due to the requirement of member control. 
 
 
Rights of Control 
 
This section will analyze the choice of organizational form and financial 
instruments from a rights of control perspective. The main ingredients are 
a conflict of interests and the observation that not every possible 
contingency can realistically be described in a contract. Williamson (1985) 
and Grossman and Hart (1986) argue that ownership structure can be best 
understood in terms of the control rights that it confers. Debt and equity 
are besides financial instruments also governance instruments in this 
approach. 
The starting point in the incomplete contracts literature is that it is too 
expensive to describe all possible contingencies in a contract and to 
formulate an agreement for every possible situation. Contracts are in-
complete in the sense that only the most prominent eventualities are 
usually described in the real world. Unforeseen contingencies are covered 
in an incomplete contract by assigning somebody the rights of control. 
This implies that contracts will not only consist of financial instruments 
based on verifiable information, but will also specify decision power in 
situations which are not explicitly covered by the contract.13 Each financial 
instrument specifies certain control rights and how returns depend on 
outcomes. 
An organization is viewed as a nexus of incomplete contracts with 
employees, managers, suppliers, buyers, financiers, and so on. The incom-
pleteness of contracts causes ex post bargaining problems (transaction 
costs) in situations where parties make irreversible, specific investments, 
i.e. choose assets which have a higher value within the relationship than 
outside it. The extent to which an asset is irreversible and specific to a 
particular activity is referred to as the level of asset specificity. The ex post 
bargaining positions will depend on the particular organizational form. 
Markets and hierarchies are the two extremes on a continuum of possible 
organizational forms. A following section will distinguish an MC and a CF 
as two different hierarchies. 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) stress in their analysis of the choice of 
financial instruments a conflict of interest, the incompleteness of ex ante    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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financial contracts and a wealth constraint. The allocation of control rights 
is important from an efficiency point of view in a world of incomplete 
contracts when there is a conflict of interest between the investor 
(provider of funds) and the members of the MC (entrepreneurs). It entails 
a trade-off between the optimality of ex ante investments and ex post 
efficiency. Each financial structure implies a certain control structure. 
Three financial instruments are distinguished.14 
Investor control (voting equity) is attractive in satisfying ex ante 
investment constraints regarding the provision of funds. However, it 
doesn't guarantee ex post efficiency, because the wealth constrained 
entrepreneur is not always able to establish Pareto improvements in the ex 
post renegotiation process. (The wealth constraint reflects the need of the 
members of an MC to borrow funds.) 
The attractive feature of entrepreneurial control (non-voting equity) is 
that nothing inhibits the efficiency of the ex post renegotiation process, 
because the investor doesn't face any wealth constraints. However, the 
investor might not recoup his ex ante investment and therefore not adopt 
surplus generating projects. The reason is that the members of the MC 
may advance their own interest at the expense of the outside financiers. 
They are able to do this to a certain extent because non-voting equity 
allocates control to them in contingencies not covered by the contract. 
Debt is the third financial instrument. It involves contingent control 
because the results determine who is allowed to decide. The entrepreneur 
decides as long as things go well, whereas decision power switches to the 
debtor when financial obligations can't be met. Contingent control may be 
a desirable financial instrument because it may improve upon either the 
ex post efficiency problem of investor control or the ex ante participation 
problem associated with entrepreneurial control. 
The size of inefficiencies differs between financial instruments and 
determines the range of projects, in terms of the level of asset specificity k, 
which will be carried out by a particular form of finance. The optimal 
financial structure consists of a combination of financial instruments such 
that the residual decision rights are allocated in each unforeseen contin-
gency to the right person. 
MCs have less freedom in their choice of financial structure than CFs, 
because their charter requires member control, which precludes the design 
of an efficient number of contingencies regarding the allocation of decision 
power. MCs are restricted to the use of non-voting equity and debt as 
sources of funds, because MC members feel strongly that the integrity of 
the MC is destroyed when control has to be shared with non-members. 
However, internal financial constrains may force them to acquire outside 
funds.15 This is problematic in the competition with other organizations, 
because the domination of control requirement will most likely result in a 
higher premium for outside funds. Two crucial aspects of financial 
instruments are responsible for this: the financial risk and the allocation of 
decision rights regarding the use of funds. Asset ownership, i.e. those who 
carry the business risk, does in itself not confer any decision making Marketing Cooperatives as a System of Attributes 
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rights. However, CFs assign these two aspects in the design of their 
financial instruments to their outside equity holders. The reason is that 
there is usually a negative relationship in financial contracts between the 
extent of decision-making rights and the premium received for providing 
outside capital. External financiers must be compensated with a higher 
premium when control rights are denied to them, in order to have them 
provide significant funds. The domination of control requirement puts 
MCs at a disadvantage compared to CFs in the competition for external 
funds, because they do not allocate the decision-making rights regarding 
the use of outside funds to the outside financiers. An inefficient level of 
asset specificity of new investments may be the result. Another way of 
formulating this result is that there are investment projects with levels of 
asset specificity k for which a CF will use outside equity, whereas it is 
efficient (but only second best) for an MC to use other financial 
instruments. 
One of the stylized facts of an MC is that a significant amount of inside 
equity is provided by keeping a considerable share of the profits as 
retained earnings each year. This is often seen as a major advantage of the 
MC, because it provides an inexpensive source of funds. However, it also 
has a disadvantage in the sense that it is a governance structure which is 
more ‘forgiving’ than debt. Inside equity provides weaker incentives than 
debt to perform well. 
 
 
MC versus CF 
 
Markets for agricultural and horticultural products have evolved from a 
growth period to a period of saturation. Current markets require specific 
investments of an MC in order to meet the specific demands in the many 
niches of the market. The optimal value of asset specificity of the MC 
investments is increasing. The choice of organization will be analyzed 
with respect to the change in market conditions, i.e. the viability of the 
MC-cluster of attributes will be addressed as a function of the level of 
asset specificity k of the investments of an MC. 
The delivery/purchase requirement of many MCs seems to be attrac-
tive in shortage markets. However, markets for raw materials of MCs are 
quite different today. Excess supply is common, which is especially 
problematic for MC. In processing and in selling, growing output made 
high investments in new capacity necessary in order to absorb the deliv-
eries of their members. This made MCs especially vulnerable to down-
ward changes in input volumes, resulting in lower prices paid to mem-
bers.16 Another effect is that it undermines the ‘organized trust’ perception 
of the members, which may result in more cumbersome democratic 
decision making and a reduced willingness to approve investment 
projects with a long horizon. It is further undermined by the tendency of 
MCs to respond to these new circumstances by restricting free entry into 
the MC, limiting personal liability, relaxing the one-member-one-vote    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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feature and reducing the non-transferability of return claims. The viability 
of the MC seems therefore questionable when the attractiveness of the 
purchase/delivery requirement is reduced. 
A disadvantage of democratic decision making in an MC is that the 
process of opinion- and decision-making regarding important policy shifts 
is more time consuming than in other organizational forms. This problem 
seems to be increasing when markets become more complex. There are 
also problems in a strategic context. First, a consequence of the time 
consuming democratic decision making process is the wide spread 
practice of MCs to determine and fix their input price once a year. Mem-
bers want to know and cash this price, which is the remuneration of their 
deliveries to the MC, as soon as possible. A first mover disadvantage in 
the competition with rivals is implied, especially when an MC has a high 
market share. A rival CF finds itself in a comfortable position in that it is 
able to choose its price later, sometimes at a different level. Second, an 
increase in the degree of asset specificity (k) exacerbates the disadvantages 
an MC has to face. Investments with a higher k entail less involvement of 
the members, because they lack the specific knowledge to form an opinion 
and give their fiat. Higher outlays are therefore required for a well 
functioning democratic process of decision making and the preservation 
of the ‘organized trust’. The process of decision-making will also take 
more time because the degree of complexity probably increases with a 
higher level of asset specificity, especially in a globalizing economy. Third, 
if k increases without a direct relation with the original activities of the 
MC (and thereby with the basic activities of the members), members will 
be more pessimistic regarding the corresponding value and risks than 
shareholders of a CF. 
This causes reluctancy amongst members to accept that a large part of 
the surplus will be kept as retained earnings, unless an acceptable rate of 
profitability on other investments (including their own farm) will be 
realized. 
The driving force behind the choice of financial instruments mentioned 
above is that the impact of the wealth constraint of entrepreneurs differs 
for each financial instrument. It is obvious that a relaxation of this 
constraint by the internal generation of funds reduces the hold-up prob-
lem of the use of non-voting equity by the MC. There are two sources of 
internal MC funds: financial contributions by MC members and retained 
earnings. These sources are under pressure in surplus markets. 
The delivery/purchase requirement and the personal liability features 
are in principle able to compensate for disadvantages of the MC, but the 
change in market circumstances has undermined the strength of these two 
mechanisms. An inefficient level of asset specificity of new investments 
may be the result. This applies especially to situations where the size of 
the market grows faster, due to e.g. European integration, than the growth 
of organizations based on internal means.17 The limited transferability of 
ownership rights by the members of an MC will result in underinvestment 
when mainly internal funds have to generate the required capital. The Marketing Cooperatives as a System of Attributes 
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problem is getting worse due to adverse changes in the demographic 
composition of the member population. Retained earnings are also under 
pressure because the delivery/purchase requirement is harder to maintain 
in the current market. 
Notice that the superior functioning internal control system of the MC 
either creates some leeway for either the input suppliers to advance an 
input price which is above the market price, or not to provide the efficient 
level of attention in the internal control system, or slack, or increase the 
financial reserves of the MC. However, the extent to which these activities 
are allowed by the market depends on the level of asset specificity. Figure 
4 summarizes our account of the differences between MCs and CFs. Two 
hierarchical governance modes are distinguished: an MC and a CF. A 
hierarchy is a cost minimizing governance structure when the degree of 
asset specificity of investments is higher than k1.18 The MC and CF are 
examples of hierarchies and have therefore to be analyzed in this domain. 
The curve of an MC is below (above) the curve of a CF when the 
advantages of a cooperative outweigh (are smaller than) the disad-
vantages. The curve of an MC is steeper than curve of a CF. 
 
Figure 4  MC versus CF  
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Figure 4 reflects a situation in which an MC may be an efficient govern-
ance structure. The conclusion is that MCs may be a viable organizational 
form for intermediate levels of asset specificity, i.e. k1 ≤ k ≤ k2.19 (An MC 
will not emerge or disappear when the costs of its governance structure 
are higher than those of a CF for every value of k higher than k1, i.e. k2 ≤ 
k1.) Figure 4 also indicates that the members of MC have some leeway to 
advance their interests as input suppliers when k1 < k2. This is costly for 
this governance structure. However, market demand and competition by 
CFs provides an upperbound to the achievement of these interests (Hart, 
1983; Scharfstein, 1988). The robust hypothesis which emerges is that an 
increase in the level of asset specificity will not result in a switch from the 
CF-cluster of attributes to the MC-cluster of attributes.    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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Conclusions and Further Research 
 
This article has investigated some aspects of the viability and financial 
structure of the MC. Contract theoretic notions and system complemen-
tarities have been used to analyze MCs. We have argued that an increase 
in the level of asset specificity of the investments of an MC will never 
result in a switch from a CF to an MC. The MC is likely to be an efficient, 
even superior, governance structure for intermediate levels of asset 
specificity in markets which are characterized by shortages. However, it 
seems that the transition of an economy from shortage to surplus markets 
together with the limited financial capabilities of the MC members 
reduces the (contract theoretic) viability of the MC. First, the 
disappearance of the shortage situation makes members less indispensa-
ble for the MC. Second, the delivery/purchase requirement can't be 
maintained anymore, which results in cream skimming by downstream 
firms and undermines the triad of (common) interest, (common) finance 
and (common) control. Third, lower margins and technological advances 
have had an adverse effect on the demographic composition of the mem-
ber population, which drives MC into activities with an emphasis on short 
run returns. Finally, the twofold construction of a society (of members) 
and a company (economic institution), i.e. ownership of an adjacent stage 
in the production column with the requirement of member control, limits 
the asset specificity range of projects which outside financiers are willing 
to fund. 
An important topic for future research is to investigate the possibility of 
designing financial instruments which on the one hand maintain the 
special cooperative character and on the other hand eliminate the in-
efficiencies associated with this organizational form. Section Rights of 
Control has addressed in this respect some interesting developments in the 
financial literature. This seems not only applicable to the feature of 
domination of control by the members of the MC, but also to the feature of 
the voting power of the members and the Board of Directors. Voting 
power in an MC is usually not related to the amount of money invested 
but to membership. Shares in a privately owned company determine the 
voting power of the owners, but this strong link between financing and 
voting is missing in an MC. Each member in an MC has one vote, regard-
less of the financial stake of a member. This seems problematic with 
respect to maintaining the largest, and usually most efficient, farmers as 
members. However, they are a crucial element in the viability of the MC. 
Most solutions which are nowadays considered within the MC structure 
consist of some differentiation in the financial terms being offered to 
members. Examples are participating preferences share and quantum dis-
counts. It takes account of the variety between the members and may 
resolve the horizon problem. This seems inevitable, even though it 
undermines the principle of equity of members. Marketing Cooperatives as a System of Attributes 
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However, the MC will most likely continue to face problems in com-
peting successfully with a CF. Both the low degree of indispensability of 
MC members in markets without shortages and the low degree of com-
plementarity (Hart and Moore, 1990) between the post-harvest holdup 
problem and the specificity of assets regarding the final product renders 
the vertical integration aspect of an MC as an unlikely outcome from an 
efficiency point of view. Other solutions for the problems of MC challenge 
the viability of the structure of the MC. Different organizational 
arrangements (association, participation company) may have to be con-
sidered to address the specific problems of enterprises in agricultural and 
horticultural markets, such as the lack of countervailing power when the 
MC is abandoned. It is obvious that an integrated approach to organiza-
tional form and financial structure has in addition not only to take issues 
like those mentioned in footnote 3 into account, but also fiscal and judicial 
aspects. 
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Adrie Zwanenberg are gratefully acknowledged. 
1  There are nowadays substantial differences in market share, from 100% in potato starch 
production, 90% in credit, 85% for coops in dairy processing to ± 38% in meat processing 
and purchase coops. Purchase and selling coops play a dominating role in trading and 
processing of agricultural products in the Netherlands. Due to economies of scale and 
scope in production and marketing as well as the need to decrease the costs of govern-
ance and control, there has been a big concentration tendency. In the period 1975–1993 
the number of coops dropped by more than 40% to 1048 (Zwanenberg, 1993). The value 
of current sales is around $ 37 billion. (The credit cooperative accounts for 744 coopera-
tives with annual sales around $ 17 billion.) 
2  Williamson (1985) distinguishes four kinds of asset specificity: site specificity, physical 
asset specificity, human asset specificity and dedicated assets. 
3  Many aspects of MCs are not dealt with in this article, but are addressed in the literature, 
e.g. competitive yardstick (Nourse, 1922), stability (Sexton, 1986), entry (Sexton and 
Sexton, 1987), spatial dimensions (Sexton, 1990) and ethical attitudes (Zusman, 1993). 
4  MCs in the USA don't have this feature. A recent Dutch example in which this feature 
was exercised is in the dairy MC Heino Krause (NRC Handelsblad, 1994). Each member 
had to pay about $ 200.000 to banks in order to relinquish a huge debt, which was mainly 
due to mismanagement. Marketing Cooperatives as a System of Attributes 
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5  MCs in California and the Netherlands have this feature, whereas MCs in de Midwest of 
the USA don't. The focus of this paper is on the former MCs. 
6  Its size varies between 80 and 150 persons and it consists of members only. 7  The  notion 
of an organization as a system of attributes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) can be 
introduced by an example. Suppose an orchestra consists of a string and a wind section. 
Each section has to decide about the speed, either slow or fast, at which they are going to 
play. There are four possible combinations of these two decisions: (slow, slow), (slow, 
fast), (fast, slow) and (fast, fast), where the first component is the decision of the string 
section and the second component the decision of the wind section. The decisions (slow, 
fast) and (fast, slow) are considered terrible, whereas (slow, slow) and (fast, fast) are both 
enjoyable. (Technically, (slow, slow) and (fast, fast) are each a Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies.) The ranking of (slow, slow) versus (fast, fast) depends on the circumstances, 
e.g. an old audience may prefer the former, whereas a young audience may like the latter 
better. There are two important aspects of this example. First, good performance by the 
orchestra/system requires that individual decisions fit/match/coordinate. The 
combination (slow, fast) as well as (fast, slow) don't fit internally, whereas (slow, slow) 
and (fast, fast) do. Second, there are several combinations of decisions which form a 
mutual fit. The specific circumstances, e.g. type of audience or type of market, determine 
which one is best. 
8  These attractive features of an MC don't imply that an MC necessarily functions better 
than a CF, because its shares are not traded in the stock market. A CF with a listing on 
the stock market has committed itself to report regularly and according to certain stan-
dards about its state of affairs. Another attractive feature of the publicly traded CF is that 
additional external funds can be obtained by issuing new shares, whereas an MC often 
has to go thru cumbersome negotiations with the providers of external funds. 
9  Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) model the relationship between the liquidity of a market 
and the informational content of prices. Markets with MCs are less liquid, because its 
shares are by definition not traded. Informed traders (speculators) will spend less time on 
monitoring in these markets because it is harder for them to disguise their private 
information. An implication is that the ability to design more efficient contracts to disci-
pline managers is reduced. Notice that this doesn't affect an MC or a CF differently, 
because they have access to the same public information, i.e. the stock price of CFs with a 
listing on the stock market. However, the MC is free riding on this information, which 
seems to reduce the importance of the competitive yardstick argument in favor of MCs 
(Nourse, 1922; Sexton, 1990). Observe that this argument has probably more bite in the 
USA than in the Netherlands, because the market for corporate control hardly exists in 
the latter country. 
10  Markets for inputs are hardly completely absent, because MCs almost never have a 100% 
market share. 
11  The incentives in an MC to participate heavily in the internal control system do not only 
have favorable consequences for its functioning. The concluding section will point out 
that an often observed disadvantage of the MC is that they are rather slow and conser-
vative in their decision making processes compared with CF. This reduces their flexibility 
and creates inertia with respect to their reaction to changing market circumstances. (An 
advantage of a slow, democratic process with conservative voters may be that the 
approval of a policy decision will be carried out fast and without much sabotage.) The 
additional problem of attracting new funds is addressed in section Rights of Control. 
12  Recent court cases in the Netherlands have forbidden several exit fees, whereas cancel-
lation clauses are allowed. 
13  The similarity between the complete and incomplete contract literature is that incentive 
considerations are the main issue. Complete contracting analyses emphasize the return 
aspects of financial instruments. An example is the model by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
in which securities only vary in terms of income streams. The manager decides (i.e. has 
control rights) in all circumstances, regardless of the composition of the capital structure. 
This is in sharp contrast with the incomplete contracting framework, where issues of 
property rights and rights of control are the focus of analysis. 
       The complete contracting approach has implications for the financial structure of MCs. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that external equity is not attractive from a cost 
minimization point of view. External financiers know that their provision of funds will    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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reduce the marginal costs of non-profit maximizing activities of managers. Their 
response is to increase the rate at which funds will be made available. This observation 
applies to the members of an MC because their objective function is not completely 
aligned with those of external financiers, as pointed out in the introductory section. The 
right incentives for cost minimization are provided when the cooperative members are 
the sole residual claimants. This is established by external funds completely consisting of 
debt. Debt requires a fixed amount of money which has to be paid back after some time. 
The remaining loss or profit is on account of the cooperative. Financial structure also 
affects investment. A feature of debt associated with a CF is limited liability, i.e. share-
holders are not personally responsible for paying back the loan when the organization 
goes bankrupt. This encourages the choice of unnecessarily risky projects. Bankruptcy 
costs are carried by the providers of the external funds, whereas successes accrue to the 
owners. These considerations reduce the attractiveness of debt in favor of equity. Mem-
bers of an MC have personal liability, i.e. they are to some extent personally responsible 
for payments in the case of bankruptcy. This limits the adoption of risky projects by MC. 
(This is one explanation for the stylized fact that an MC usually concentrate on one input, 
because it reduces the portfolio of candidate projects.) The optimal financial structure 
takes both cost minimization and investment selection issues into account. Both aspects 
point towards a higher debt/equity ratio for MCs than CFs. 
14 Hendrikse and Veerman (1995) formulate differences and similarities between the 
transaction costs economics account of financial instruments (Williamson, 1988) and the 
incomplete contracting approach of Aghion and Bolton (1992). 
15  Notice that the personal liability feature of an MC reduces the probability of liquidation 
because it reduces the wealth constraint in the ex post renegotiation process. 
16  The Dutch cooperative pig slaughter houses provide an example. The 100% purchase 
requirement necessitated increasing slaughter capacity in order to process the growing 
pig production in the eighties, which absorbed thereby the largest part of the internally 
generated financial means. Investments in product and market development with high 
levels of asset specificity in the form of products with brand names could not be realized. 
Nowadays at low pork prices the MC face a tradeoff: if they pay too little for the pigs, 
they have to face underutilisation losses because farmers sell the pigs to the private 
slaughter houses, if they want to utilize capacity fully, they have to pay too much for the 
pigs. This results in a disastrous financial situation. This could be partly offset by reduc-
ing the 100% delivery requirement, but will result in adverse selection problems (Akerlof, 
1970). Members sell the inputs with the highest quality in the open market, whereas the 
remaining production is delivered to the MC (NRC Handelsblad, 1992). 
17  The low financial reserves of Irish dairy cooperatives, which is due to the poor financial 
situation of their members, forced them to drop their requirement of member control in 
order to get a listing on the stock exchange (Nationale Coöperatieve Raad, 1990). They 
were not able to generate sufficient capital in order to finance the expansion of scale and 
investments for product improvements. 
18  Market or hybrid governance is efficient when k < k1 (Williamson, 1985). 
19  MCs are predicted in the above analysis from an efficiency point of view, with asset 
specificity as the main determining variable. This hypothesis contrasts sharply with an 
evolutionary account of MCs. MCs emerge in the framework of Arthur (1989) as histori-
cal accidents and their perseverance is due to increasing returns in the form of path 
dependencies. MCs which were originally chosen became gradually locked in and were 
improved upon little by little. The notion of long run efficiency doesn't play a role in such 
an analysis because natural selection processes focus on short run survival.  
 
8  The Position of Agricultural Cooperatives 
in the Changing Food Industry of Europe 
 
 
Petri Ollila and Jerker Nilsson 
 
 
 
In connection with the decision to establish the internal market of the 
European Community, there was a wave of mergers and acquisitions in 
the food processing industry of Western Europe. This has meant a radical 
increase in the level of horizontal integration, i.e., concentration into a 
number of large conglomerates dominating many markets. Likewise, a 
trend towards concentration in the food retailing industry is on its way, 
leading to some strong Pan-European chains as well as strategic alliances.  
Special arrangements to coordinate vertical stages of the food produc-
tion-distribution chain have also increased. Long term contracts, fran-
chising, quality control through several stages, etc. are increasingly found. 
In some fields of the food industry it also has lead to vertical integration, i.e. 
common ownership in several stages. There are signs that the primary 
production to an increasing degree is included in vertically integrated 
firms. This trend towards industrialization of agricultural production is 
more evident in North America but is seen also in Europe (Coffey, 1993).  
A specific type of vertical integration is that of cooperative business. A 
large part of the food processing industry in Western Europe is owned by 
agricultural cooperatives. There is, however, a considerable variation 
between different industries. The cooperatives are, understandably, 
strongest in industries in which the major portion of the raw products is 
produced by European agriculture. Another difference concerns the coop-
eratives' stage in the production chain. The stronghold of the cooperatives 
is, of course, mainly the first stages. Nevertheless, in some industries 
agricultural cooperatives dominate far downstream along the chain, even 
in the production of ready-made consumer products such as yogurt, 
bread, wine and sausages. The dairy industry is especially worth noting.  
There are interesting differences between the European countries re-
garding the position of agricultural cooperatives, just as there are between 
Europe and the USA. American dairy cooperatives are almost as strong as 
the European ones in the first stages of the production chain, while their 
role decreases considerably in the later stages. They often sell the products 
to other processing industries, while their European counterparts take 
care of the processing themselves.  
This article is devoted to the forces which determine the structural 
development of the European food sector, and especially the role that 
agricultural cooperatives might have in this system. As these firms are 
very strong in many markets, this question is important to the entire    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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European food processing industry. Furthermore, the issue is especially 
topical in these years as European business life is changing character. With 
the introduction of the internal market, various trade hindrances were 
reduced. The food processing industry has responded through a wave of 
mergers that has resulted in large conglomerates. Within a few years, 
Western Europe might have a common currency and a common economic 
policy, and that will bring further changes to the conditions for the 
industry.  
With all these changes taken into consideration, it is justified to wonder 
if European agricultural cooperatives will develop in a direction similar to 
the American ones. As EU approaches ‘The United States of Europe’ it 
might, for example, be difficult for European cooperatives to retain their 
far-reaching degree of vertical integration and their large market shares. 
Will the agricultural cooperatives go back to their origin, i.e. collection of 
products and primary processing, and leave further processing to other 
firms?  
 
 
Determinants of Institutional Change 
 
Analyses of Vertical Integration 
 
In standard economic theory, prices are assumed to provide the signals 
necessary to regulate and synchronize economic activity in the market 
economy. “The realities of commodity subsectors, however, suggest that vertical 
coordination is one of the central dimensions of the organization and conduct of 
economic activity. Prices perform part of the coordinating task, but only part. A 
variety of other institutions and arrangements such as government programs, 
marketing orders, contracts, and vertical integration often replace or supplement 
prices in the coordination task”. (Marion, 1986, p. 53) 
Vertical integration is invoked to mean coordinating arrangements in 
which markets are replaced by contractual or ownership arrangements 
between successive stages in the production-distribution chain. Marion 
p r e s e n t s  f i v e  d i m e n s i o n s  o f  p e r f o r m a n c e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  v e r t i c a l  i n t e -
gration: efficiency (technical and allocative), equity, access to the markets 
and market information, stability, and transaction costs.  
The process of vertical integration in the food processing industry is a 
complex phenomenon. In order to achieve an understanding of this proc-
ess, a large number of conceptual starting points could be used. In this 
paper three factors influencing vertical coordination are examined, each of 
them analyzed with different conceptual tools. Evidently, these factors are 
closely related, though this is taken into consideration in the concluding 
section. The three categories of variables are:  
•  Institutional factors, policy and political reasons, as well as properties of 
consumption and circumstances at various stages in the production-
distribution chain. Hence, institutional factors include conditions that 
constitute the framework for the food processing industry at different The Position of Agricultural Cooperatives in the Food Industry 
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levels, viz. government, type of cooperative model, cultural differences 
between the countries and regions of Europe, etc.  
•  Production cost, referring to production itself, but also including costs 
for transportation, capital, administration, and other related functions. 
Technical and allocative efficiency including economies of scale and 
scope are considered as production cost factors.  
•  Transaction costs, consisting of all costs that a firm, a consumer, or any 
other actor has when exchanging goods, services and information with 
other actors. Economizing transaction costs are examined according to 
dimensions of transactions: asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency 
and externalities. 
 
 
Production Costs 
 
When explaining the organization of businesses in production cost terms, 
the core concept is economies of scale. Business activities will be con-
ducted by those organizations that are most successful to reduce their cost 
levels. The lowest costs are attained at a certain scale of operations where 
cost reductions due to increase in size are balanced by increasing 
administrative or bureaucratic costs. As economies of scale refer to all 
kinds of production activities, including transportation, financing, etc., 
this reasoning could also contribute to the understanding of localization, 
ownership structure and many other aspects of business organization.  
Dixon and Wilkinson (1986) suggest some principles to explain the 
phenomenon of economies of scale, the most essential being the following 
four. 
 
Principle of Bulk Transformations 
A product can most often be manufactured within the realm of different 
technologies, ranging from handicrafts to fully automated processes of 
production. As there are differences between the technologies concerning 
the distribution between fixed and variable costs, the cost curves have 
different shapes. A large producer has an advantage to the extent that he 
can choose between all available technologies while a small producer has 
only a few alternative choices. Hence a large producer is able to attain the 
critical mass that is necessary for a certain production – a smaller one can 
perhaps not. A large producer can choose such a technology that the fixed 
costs are divided over a large number of produced items, thereby 
reducing the unit costs more than the small producer is able to do. For 
example, a common motive for mergers is that double work may be 
eliminated – fewer resources are need to produce a larger volume.  
 
 
Principle of Massed Reserves 
Every production process is characterized by uncertainties and fluctua-
tions. As these uncertainties and fluctuations are combined, some of them    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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will level off one another, with the effect being that the input of produc-
tion factors can be reduced. For example, a large firm's warehouse can be 
smaller than the totality of the warehouses of some smaller firms whose 
combined turnover is equal to that of the large firm. A large firm can 
invest in measures that reduce the market uncertainties, even though it 
must acknowledge that there are uncertainties as to how these measures 
will succeed. The small firm is not able to conduct the same measures due 
to its limited financial strength.  
 
Principle of Multiples 
A production process is composed of a number of interlinked 
subprocesses where production factors with a certain indivisibility are 
used. The cost curves of the various subprocesses have normally different 
shapes, i.e., the cost minimum is attained at different volumes. Hence, the 
producer who has such a large volume that it enables him to combine a 
number of production processes will get the most cost effective 
production, e.g., he chooses the least common denominator for the various 
machines with different production capacities. So there is no unused 
capacity which causes costs without generating revenues. All volumes 
below this point mean that there is free capacity in at least one production 
process.  
 
Economies of Scope 
Economies of scale concern how cost levels are affected by volumes for a 
specific product while the concept of economies of scope refers to the links 
between different types of products. They support one another or 
substitute for each other whereby costs and revenues are affected. They 
have these kinds of interrelations in various types of processes: devel-
opment, production, storage, marketing, delivery, administration, etc. 
Thus, the large firms get more market power than the smaller ones, i.e., 
they become more attractive as trading partners as they can offer a 
broader product range.  
 
 
Transaction Costs 
 
Williamson (1985, p. 103) argues that although other reasons for vertical 
integration exist, transaction cost economizing is the main factor 
responsible for decisions to integrate. Despite the production and trans-
action cost reasons, surrounding conditions such as political and legisla-
tive structure, and conditions of demand, may also affect decisions for 
vertical integration. It should also be borne in mind that production costs 
and transaction costs are interrelated.  
Explanations for vertical integration having transaction cost origin may 
be examined through the dimensions of transactions, which are: asset 
specificity, uncertainty, frequency, and externalities. By transaction specific 
assets is meant such assets/investments whose value in every other 
purpose is much lower than in their intended use. Agricultural production The Position of Agricultural Cooperatives in the Food Industry 
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contains much such investments and assets. For example, an investment 
in a cow shed and milking machinery has little value in activities other 
than producing milk. Protection of such assets has universally induced 
dairy farmers to make special arrangements for downstream integration 
into milk processing.  
Agricultural production is always open to uncertainty caused by nature. 
Because of many agricultural products being rather inelastic in demand, 
the effects of production fluctuations caused by the weather may result in 
the over-reaction of prices. The uncertainty is also harmful for production 
processes requiring stable capacity in order to utilize economies of scale 
with an acceptable capacity utilization rate. Forms of vertical integration 
have been beneficial to both production and processing. 
The pace of production determines the frequency of transactions. In milk 
production, transactions have to occur many times per week. Instead of 
making a bidding round several times per week, some longer term 
contracts are likely to develop just for time-saving reasons.  
Externalities means the effects of production having an impact on other 
parties not directly involved in the exchange. For example, lower quality 
milk of one producer may spoil all the milk if mixed in the same parlor. 
Joint responsibility of quality maintenance tends to increase the need for 
integration. Quality maintenance of such products has created cooled 
delivery chains all the way to the consumers. 
Williamson (1985) argues that dimensions of transactions have consid-
erable explanatory power in examining current organizational arrange-
ments in exchange. Vertical integration as a mode of improving coordina-
tion is assumed to have transaction cost origin. 
“The cooperative is a special kind of transaction and coordination mode. The 
members of the cooperative, who, in principle, rule the cooperative, have a 
relationship with it which is close to integration, at least as a group. Thus, the 
cooperative has obligations toward its members. But the obligation is not 
reciprocal. The cooperative usually has no authority that it can exercise over its 
members (Rhodes, 1985). This means that it is not a question of vertical 
integration between member firms and the cooperative. Nor is the cooperative a 
mode of horizontal integration – although a bargaining cooperative may be close 
to it. The member firms are independently owned, represent independent profit 
centers and act independently, except when they have agreed on the joint 
ownership of the cooperative's firm(s) or have negotiated agreements to act 
collectively (Shaffer, 1986)”. (Ollila, 1989, p. 165)  
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Institutional Factors 
 
Public Policy 
 
Most countries in the world have an agricultural policy, aiming at giving 
national support and protection to the country's agriculture and food pro-
duction on the domestic market, as well as obtaining some social benefits 
such as rural development. As is evident from the Common Agricultural 
Policy, the agricultural sector becomes larger than it would have been 
without support, i.e. larger volumes are produced by a larger number of 
farmers. It can be argued that such market protection benefits the position 
of the agricultural cooperatives. The farmers do not have a very strong 
incitement for rationalization and they feel more secure. So, their 
possibilities and motives to act individually on the markets decline.  
Agricultural cooperatives have traditionally also acted as interest 
organizations influencing agricultural policy. In some cases, they were 
also used as top-down organizations. These roles have been sharply 
diminished.  
In the large EU market no specific type of food processing firm is pro-
tected or favored. Rather, there is intense competition. The establishment 
of the borderless internal market has significantly increased the 
competitive pressure and the eventual introduction of a common currency 
will lead to still stronger competition. This hampers the agricultural co-
operatives' possibilities to build up a large amount of capital, to be used 
for far-reaching vertical integration, for product development, and for 
brand positioning. It should, however, be mentioned that the present 
strong position of the agricultural cooperatives gives them market power 
and market protection and these strengths could last also into the far 
future. The possibility to earn money lies mainly in a strong market posi-
tion acquired through low prices, attractive products and effective mar-
keting. Another key to market power is the satisfaction of consumer pref-
erences for domestic, locally produced food, and here the cooperatives are 
most often strong.  
A future extension of the European Union to include also some of the 
former East Block countries is contingent upon a reformation of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy, implying a sharp reduction of the level of sup-
port. Thereby, the competition pressure increases sharply both for the 
primary producers and for the processing firms. The following structural 
changes in primary production might affect the cooperatives negatively as 
t h e  f a r m e r s  b e c o m e  m o r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  d o  b u s i n e s s  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  t h e  
processing firms, are more mobile on the markets and are less willing and 
able to finance the cooperatives. 
 
 
Food Processing Industry 
 
The wave of mergers and acquisitions following the establishment of the 
internal market has given the multinational enterprises a strong market The Position of Agricultural Cooperatives in the Food Industry 
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position. This position is further strengthened by intense product devel-
opment and effective marketing. As the multinationals are working in 
many markets, are strongly consumer oriented and purchase their raw 
products from several countries, they pose a threat to the agricultural co-
operative firms. Being owned by farmers of a specific country or region, 
the cooperatives' task is to sell the produce of these members. Thus, the 
cooperative firms tend to be production oriented; they are less advanced 
in product development in the later stages of the production chain, and 
they have often difficulties attaining a sufficient capital base.  
These differences affect the balance between the multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) and the agricultural cooperatives. The MNEs select the 
most profitable products and markets all over the EU. They market 
attractive products at high prices. They manufacture products at lower 
costs as they are free to choose any kind of raw products from any kind of 
producer. The cooperative firms might be left with the less attractive 
markets, selling less advanced products with a given fixed raw product 
base.  
 
 
Food Retailing Industry 
 
Just as the food processing industry, the food retailing industry also be-
comes multinational, though with a few years delay and not to the same 
extent. That affects the working conditions of the processing firms. 
Retailers' increasing interest in private brands is problematic for most 
manufacturers as they lose control of the market. To compensate for this, 
they could engage in heavy and expensive product development and mar-
keting efforts. Furthermore, very large retailers demand huge supplies of 
products with an even quality. All this means that the national and pro-
duction oriented cooperatives face increasing difficulties in their compe-
tition with the large multinational food processors. The cooperatives 
might very well be left as manufacturing only private brand goods to the 
large retail chains, even though this type of business implies low profit-
ability due to the exchangeability of suppliers.  
There is, however, also a counter movement to the extent that a grow-
ing group of consumers want to buy their food directly from the growers 
or from the wholesalers. The latter, i.e. buying clubs with a number of 
households as members, is a phenomenon under rapid growth in the 
USA. 
 
 
Consumer Markets 
 
Consumer food habits are changing, though slowly. At present there are 
trends towards ecological and health products and towards convenience. 
In the USA the convenience trend takes the form of fresh prepared foods – 
consumers want to eat at home but not cook. This seems to be the fastest    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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growing single trend in food consumption. Food items prepared in large 
scale kitchens are consumed outside these places. Already, two-thirds 
from fast foods and one-third from supermarket sales are consumed as 
such.  
Food cultures in the various EU countries do not, contrary to 
projections, show strong signs of equalization. Likewise, migration within 
the common market is less than was expected a few decades ago. 
Consequently, there is a reason to believe that the differences concerning 
consumption and purchasing behavior in the various regions of Europe 
will largely remain. Lessons from America confirm this – in spite of two 
hundred years of history and a common language there are still large 
differences in food culture between the various regions. 
Nevertheless, it is probable that the process towards homogenization 
becomes somewhat stronger. Among the reasons are that the markets are 
more and more controlled by the large MNEs, retail trade becomes more 
Pan-European, and market communication does not respect any borders.  
 
 
Agricultural Cooperative Food Processing Industry 
 
Cooperative firms are organized and function in quite different ways in 
the different countries of Europe, as a consequence of the national legisla-
tion on cooperation and the fact that different so-called cooperative 
principles are applied, i.e., ways of conceiving cooperative business. In 
some countries, mainly in southern Europe, the cooperatives are consid-
ered to play a social role apart from its member-orientation. To the extent 
that this ideological basis restricts their degree of freedom of action, and 
thereby the economic performance, the state could grant them certain 
compensation, e.g., in the form of tax reductions. In other countries, e.g. 
Benelux, the cooperatives are working under strict commercial conditions. 
In between these extremes there are several combinations and variants.  
Among the differences between the various cooperative models, one 
could mention those concerning financing. Quite often the equity capital 
of the cooperatives consists to a large degree of collective funds, i.e., 
capital in which the members can not claim individual ownership, and so, 
does not require payment of any dividends. Hence, the decision-makers 
may underestimate the cost of capital. Because of this, agricultural 
cooperatives tend to gather further collective capital and to utilize this 
capital in a less than optimal way. The price signals that the cooperatives 
send to their members become distorted, thereby causing a production 
volume larger than the economic optimum.  
 
 
Production Costs 
 
Economies of Scale in the Food Processing Industry 
 The Position of Agricultural Cooperatives in the Food Industry 
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Who is the best owner of a business depends on how the properties of this 
business are related to the properties of various owner-types. If European 
food processing industry is to be run by agricultural cooperatives, by mul-
tinationals, by national companies, or by local entrepreneurs is decided 
according to the production conditions of the industry, i.e., which econo-
mies of scale exist and how pronounced these are. It follows from the 
competition between the different types of owners, i.e., how their costs 
and price levels are at different production volumes and techniques.  
 
Principle of Bulk Transformations 
Still 30–40 years ago, processing of perishable items such as milk was in 
most Western countries quite dispersed. The development of cooled 
trucks allowed longer transportation and thus made it possible to utilize 
economies of scale in processing. Today's technological development also 
causes economies of scale to be more pronounced. Now it is a matter of 
various kinds of technologies, most of which are efficient at large volumes. 
It concerns proper production technology but also transportation, product 
development, administration, marketing, etc. For example, the newest 
developments in the long-life milk technology might give the largest 
producers a substantial competitive advantage. After heavy investments 
the producer could attain a superior quality at very large volumes. 
Because of low perishability and no need for refrigerated transport, the 
haulage costs become low, thereby increasing the geographical markets 
considerably.  
Apart from the technological development, there are also political 
changes to promote economies of scale, not the least the fact that the bor-
ders within the EU have disappeared. Without customs and other 
administrative hindrances, the transport becomes cheaper and faster 
which means that the markets are increasing in size, giving rise to further 
economies of scale. As a common currency is introduced all over the EU, 
the costs for trading will decrease even more.  
Hence, the large enterprises have competitive advantages because of all 
kinds of lower production and marketing costs. Due to the European 
integration, the largest firms are able to operate in all markets simulta-
neously and this will improve their chances to reap the benefits of their 
large scale in all possible technologies.  
 
Principle of Multiples 
Food processing is characterized by increasing technological content in the 
products as well as in production and marketing. Added to this is the 
development towards a Pan-European industry. A consequence of these 
circumstances is that the number of production processes increases and 
that many production processes become very specialized. As the demand 
on the enterprises' ability to create good coordination between their dif-
ferent activities become higher, large enterprises will have better condi-
tions than smaller ones.     Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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If a large firm has unused capacity in a certain production, it can easily 
make use of this capacity to produce for a new market segment. The small 
firm has greater difficulties to do the same. A large firm with its larger 
product mix is better able to fill its production capacity by producing 
different products in its plants, while the small firm runs a greater risk 
that its plants are not fully utilized. Arguments of this kind are valid for 
all types of processes, i.e., production, storage, distribution, marketing, etc.  
 
Principle of Massed Reserves 
A firm that can spread its risks is better off in a competitive situation. 
Hence, a broad assortment is advantageous, as uncertainties and varia-
tions in the sales balance one another. The same is true for a firm serving 
many markets, especially if these markets exhibit differences as to their 
level of development – as one market is saturated, one can proceed to 
another, etc.  
Thus, the European integration gives advantages to the largest firms 
which are able to work in many countries. The advantages are enhanced 
by technological development as this brings up many products that are 
quite unique and demanded only by a small consumer segment in each 
country. Actually, the technological development of products is so quick 
that technological innovativeness often overruns consumer preferences for 
unique products. As a large enough number of customers is a prerequisite 
for the possibility to utilize economies of scale, it is decisive that the total 
market is very large. This reduces the risk; if one fails on one market there 
is a chance for success on another. Furthermore, the various markets may 
supplement each other.  
Following from above, large enterprises have substantial advantages 
over small firms. First, they may be ahead in adopting new technologies 
and thereby be the first ones to present new products and production 
techniques. The fruits of these efforts can be divided over many markets, 
and it is easy to transfer innovations from one market to the other. Second, 
this kind of firm has an opportunity to use international and very efficient 
market communication.  
 
Economies of Scope 
Increased economies of scale has made the trade impersonal, which has 
increased the need of communication. Modern information technology 
provides large economies of scale in advertising and public relations. 
Branded products provide a means of connecting these abstract messages 
to physical goods. This is evident today; the number of eurobrands in-
creases, the satellites provide the same advertising to all television 
viewers, food retailing becomes more and more multinational, etc. Hence, 
the cost per consumer contact will be sharply reduced, to the benefit of 
mainly the largest producers.  
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According to some cost production theoretical arguments, agricultural co-
operative enterprises should not run food processing industries very far 
ahead in the production chain, i.e., be involved in far-reaching vertical 
integration. Some arguments support the opposite view.  
It should be noted that agricultural cooperatives can have different 
roles within a food sector, characterized by an increasing degree of large 
scale. On the one hand there are cooperatives which try to follow this 
development, i.e., investing in large scale production, product develop-
ment, international marketing, etc. On the other hand, other cooperatives 
choose a supplementary strategy. They realize that their resources are 
insufficient, and try to manage on their local or regional market, or they 
find a role as a sub-supplier to other industries, or they supplement large 
producers with some kind of niche production.  
Agricultural cooperatives have certain limitations as it comes to 
extremely large-scale operations. This is because agricultural cooperation 
has by necessity its root in the primary production as their owners are a 
group of farmers. Thereby, a certain production orientation is inherent in 
this business form, as expressed in different ways:  
•  The farmers have invested in their cooperatives for the purpose of 
getting their products marketed, and if this should be possible a certain 
degree of further processing might be needed. The further processed 
the products become, the higher are the demands for capital from the 
farmers. If the farmers themselves were to raise all the needed capital 
for very far-reaching processing, they would consider this capital very 
expensive. This is more true as the number of farmers decreases while 
food processing becomes still more capital intensive.  
•  The cooperatives are geographically bound to the country or region 
where the members are living. Even though production conditions 
were more favorable somewhere else, the production can not move 
there, except under special conditions. For example, certain agricul-
tural cooperative dairies have established production plants in other 
countries, whereby they obtain sales channels for products produced in 
the home countries. This concerns, e.g., MD Foods of Denmark which 
has substantial production in the U.K., and Dutch Campina-Melkunie 
with factories in Belgium and Germany.  
• The  agricultural  cooperatives  are  bound to the very types of product 
that the members are producing. These raw products are the starting 
point of all other production. Thus, alternative raw products, that 
competing food processing industries are working with, are rejected. It 
is not in the interest of the farmers that their cooperatives should 
operate in a variety of industries like the MNEs do.  
•  Furthermore, the agricultural cooperatives can hardly reach such a 
large size and such a high degree of diversification as achieved by the 
multinationals. Mergers between cooperatives crossing borders are 
almost nonexistent today. The future might bring some multinational 
cooperatives, but such firms would be difficult to control.     Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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•  Some agricultural cooperatives are based on an ideological element, 
whereby they are involved in certain social activities even though this 
is cost demanding. This could concern equal treatment, democracy or 
support to weaker member groups.  
 
There are, however, also production cost theoretical arguments to support 
agricultural cooperative firms' vertical integration far ahead in the 
production chain:  
•  Many agricultural cooperatives have solved their financial problems 
by building up a large amount of collective capital. The cost of this 
capital is low. But also the individual equity capital is cheap, as the 
members often reap the benefits of their membership in the form of 
good product prices instead of as dividends on the invested capital.  
•  The fact that suppliers are also owners implies that it is possible to 
coordinate certain functions and thereby reduce some costs. The 
members are often willing to adjust their operations according to those 
of the cooperative enterprise.  
•  If it is necessary, the farmers are willing to accept lower prices when 
selling to their own cooperative, at least for a limited period of time.  
 
 
Transaction Costs 
 
Explanations to Vertical Integration 
 
Transaction-Specific Assets 
Agricultural production has typically investments which have charac-
teristics of transaction specificity. Investments such as animal facilities, 
possible preparation of fields to a specific purpose, knowledge about spe-
cific conditions of such fields, etc., have very little value in any other 
purpose than in the production of the intended product. Because such 
investments may loose their value if the circumstances change, the possi-
bility of these kinds of situations is likely to be prevented by special 
arrangements, often by vertical integration. 
At the processing level, large transaction specific investments are 
sometimes made for research and product development not having alter-
native value. In order to safeguard these investments, special arrange-
ments with packaging, advertising, etc. are made. Some products such as 
certain dairy products, prepared foods and other perishable products may 
also have special, processor-owned equipment in the stores to guarantee 
the desired quality.  
Another investment is the establishment of brand name. In some prod-
ucts the environment in the retail outlets needs manufacturer control to 
guarantee the promise included in the brand name. However, reasons for 
vertical integration stemming from transaction specific investments seem 
to be stronger closer to the production level than closer to the consumer. 
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As mentioned above, a considerable source of uncertainty in agricultural 
production comes from nature. Uncertainty in agricultural production 
also has induced activities for political safeguards. Agricultural and food 
policy has increased in importance in all the Western countries which in 
turn has made it advantageous to integrate the production and processing 
to gain political influence. The influence has become even more important 
when the risk of political uncertainty in agriculture is increasing. The risk 
is large because of the comprehensive role of political influence in 
agriculture, and because of the decreasing political influence of the farmer 
population. 
Another source of uncertainty favoring integration in agriculture con-
cerns product specification. Especially considering perishable agricultural 
products, the specification at the stage of purchase may be difficult. 
Harmful effects of quality deterioration may become visible much later.  
Investments made in factors mentioned in the category of transaction 
specific investments, such as R&D and building a brand name, are long-
term commitments. Development of a new product may take years. 
Uncertainty concerning changes in the environment during that period 
(change in consumer tastes, new legislature, etc.) must be safeguarded by 
reducing this kind of uncertainty (technological imperatives, see 
Galbraith, 1967). Vertical integration is a powerful tool to control the 
entire production-distribution chain against such uncertainties. Market 
power, gained from such kinds of concentration, may be used also as a 
political tool in order to influence political decision-making. 
 
Frequency 
In the case of varying frequencies between the production and the need 
for processing, some forms of integrating arrangements are likely to be 
borne as well. If the crop ripens once a year, while the processing level 
needs products throughout the year, this may make it beneficial to both 
parties to make a contractual arrangement in order to secure the delivery 
for the producer, and the availability of raw materials for the processor. 
The importance of such arrangements even increases if the product in 
question is very purpose-specific or the need of special quality properties 
is high. 
New consumer preferences to eat at home but not cook change the 
demand towards fresh prepared foods. Manufacturing of fresh prepared 
foods requires high-frequency deliveries close to consumers. Freshness of 
products has beaten the large-scale economies in delivery, and items are 
delivered by the processor directly to the retail outlets. The need for the 
right environment has created special arrangements for deliveries. For 
example, Stouffer’s, a leading U.S. manufacturer of fresh and refrigerated 
foods, has 15 different cool chains from the processors to the selling 
outlets. The maximum time from processors to consumers is eight hours. 
This development has also increased the integration of processors to 
restaurant businesses as is the case of Domino's Pizza.  
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Externalities 
Milk as raw material is a bundle of raw materials, butterfat, protein, 
liquid, etc., which are interrelated but used for different purposes by 
varying their proportions. Coordination of various components to uses for 
different products has been easier to arrange in integrated production.  
Vertical integration because of the increase of fresh prepared foods may 
also be explained under the category of externalities. In order to prevent 
external effects, special arrangements between processors and retail 
outlets are needed. 
One of the fundamental prerequisites for the utilization of both market 
coordination through vertical integration and the economies of scale has 
been the fact that there have been enough customers sharing similar 
tastes. The development of one customer's preferences' external effects to 
others is crucial to the future organizational evolution in the European 
food systems. 
 
 
Observations Critical to Vertical Integration 
 
Transaction-Specific Assets 
The fast development of computer technology has made many trans-
action-specific assets much more redeployable. Similar kinds of such 
technology may often be easily converted into other purposes. Improved 
transportation, conservation, and packaging technology have significantly 
decreased the site-specificity of production.  
There are also signs of decreasing importance of brand label strategy. 
Consumer loyalty seems to be fading in products where the uncertainty of 
expectations is becoming less important. Despite the fact that Coca-Cola 
and Pepsi are very strong brand names, consumers are more and more 
choosing the one which happens to be on sale in the store. Another reason 
is the fast development of consumer tastes. In the U.S. the sales of salsa is 
higher than the sales of ketchup. What can a strong ketchup brand name 
such as Heinz do in the salsa market? 
 
Uncertainty 
As the consumer markets become more ethnically diversified as well as 
less predictable, large and well controlled organizations run into diffi-
culties; the consumers are continually changing their minds. If flexibility 
becomes the main indicator of successful food industries, vertical 
integration may be in trouble. 
Increasing impersonality in fresh food markets such as vegetables and 
fruits has resulted in the decreasing identity of products. For a customer, it 
is difficult to utilize experiences from past purchases while buying e.g. 
nameless vegetables. Because of the large number of producers and diffi-
culties in preserving the quality, attempts to overcome this problem by 
branding the products have not always succeeded. Personalization of such The Position of Agricultural Cooperatives in the Food Industry 
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products may require local deliveries and personal knowledge of the 
initial producer. Such deliveries are likely to by-pass an integrated system. 
 
Frequency 
Frequent transactions have created questions about the real efficiency of 
large machineries in dealing with such food items. Questions have con-
sidered e.g. the meaning of transporting agricultural products to a central 
warehouse and back, perhaps to the same village. Integrated systems have 
been good in defending their well planned and complex structures.  
Certain consumer groups have organized systems of buying items by 
circumventing the entire system. Direct sales and farmer's markets in Fin-
land are examples of such organizations. The price clubs in the U.S. have 
forced the established delivery systems to provide portions of retail store 
areas for the use of such price clubs. This movement may have an effect of 
increasing the variety of delivery alternatives in currently integrated 
delivery systems. 
 
Externalities 
The possible further diversification of tastes and ways of consuming food 
items creates a real challenge to the vertically integrated systems. Ethnical 
mixtures through migration, impulses coming from increased traveling, 
and information acquired from foreign countries by TV are increasingly 
challenging the prevailing relatively homogeneous food tastes and 
consumption patterns. 
Stronger attitudes against preservatives and industrial production, 
towards animal rights, sustainable technology, etc., favor in many respects 
smaller, non-integrated units. An increased danger of animal and plant 
diseases may also limit the extent of integrated and large scale units.  
 
 
Factors Supporting Cooperative Form of Integration 
 
In the section above, factors supporting vertical integration in general 
have been considered. It should be remembered that the cooperative is a 
special kind of integration mode. However, it is easily observed that in 
agriculture the cooperative form of vertical integration is widely used. In 
this section, reasons for choosing this form of integration are examined. 
Differing economies of scale in agricultural production and processing 
make it difficult to establish a large enough agricultural production unit to 
be able to utilize economies of scale in food processing. Experiences of 
large farms have not been supportive, e.g., in former socialistic countries. 
A natural way of integrating smaller scale production and larger scale 
processing has been the cooperative form. Cooperatives have been 
favored over farmer-owned share companies because of the cooperative 
property of controlling the firm according to use instead of capital 
invested. 
It is typical in food production that there are transaction specific assets 
on both sides, in production and in processing, and simultaneously    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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differing economies of scale. Safeguards against such assets would hardly 
be possible in any other form of governance except in a cooperative.  
The high proportion of collective equity capital in many agricultural 
cooperatives can be regarded as a transaction-specific asset. This capital is 
fixed, i.e., it can hardly be invested for many alternative purposes. The 
cooperative would have difficulties to distribute it to the members or 
anyone else, so it must remain in the cooperative. The firm can not invest 
the capital in any other assets than those which are linked to the members' 
production.  
This all means that barriers to exit are extremely high in agricultural 
cooperatives, especially if their equity consists of a high share of collective 
capital. Barriers to exit also include a resistance to major changes, such as 
decreasing the size or restructuring the activities of the firm.  
Other transaction-specific assets are those that the management, elected 
officials, and members have made as they decided to take part in the 
agricultural cooperatives. These are investments which these people have 
made in themselves: their knowledge, feelings and values. For these 
people, it would therefore be disastrous if the cooperatives were to be 
dissolved, shrink, change business form, reorient their activities, or 
undergo other drastic changes.  
In a cooperative the various sources of uncertainties mentioned above 
have been possible to transform into risk distributed to the entire mem-
bership instead of overwhelmingly affecting a few. This has been possible 
because of the relational contract nature of the cooperative, in which the 
final result is divided afterwards according to actual performance. 
Being also enhanced by political decisions, agriculture has supported 
the development of joint political efforts of agricultural producers, which 
properties have been built into cooperatives. The cooperative role as an 
interest organization is very important in many countries, as well as in 
many fields of agricultural production and processing. Along with the 
decline of the agricultural population, the need for collective action is 
expected to increase.  
There are signs that a proportion of the value added to the food items 
may be shifting back to the rural areas, even to the farms. High transaction 
costs for such small enterprises reaching distant, or even international 
markets, may be predicted. Cooperatives are effective institutions in 
lowering these kinds of transaction cost.  
 
 
Limits of the Cooperative Mode in Food Marketing Systems 
 
Many of the present food products are the outcome of combining a variety 
of inputs through complex processes. Knowledge as an input is 
increasing, while the relative importance of a single raw material is 
decreasing. Hence, the control of the entire processing according to the 
interests of one type of raw material producer becomes increasingly 
difficult. It becomes even more difficult because of the diminishing The Position of Agricultural Cooperatives in the Food Industry 
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capabilities of cooperative members to comprehend and govern complex 
processing and management processes of modern, large food processing 
enterprises.  
Increasing varieties of complex food items also require special raw ma-
terial properties (van Dijk and Mackel, 1994). Grain, milk or meat can not 
be ‘all purpose’ raw material, but its fractions have special properties for 
very specific uses. This may lead to increasing heterogeneity of interests 
among producers who formerly produced identical products. The 
interests of a farmer producing milk for a special cheese variant may be 
different from the one producing milk for consumption. These two vari-
ants also require differing incentive structures, mainly prices. Such dif-
ferential treatment within increasingly heterogeneous memberships might 
be a germ to conflicts, hampering member control. As primary production 
tends to become still more specialized, there are also increased risks in the 
production. For smaller cooperatives which are not able to spread their 
risks over several product lines, this specialization might pose a threat.  
While there might be strong arguments for vertical integration in the 
food processing chain, there are alternative ways to reach this high degree 
of coordination, other than the cooperative business form. The clear 
evidence of this is seen in the poultry industry where the primary 
production in many countries is controlled by large enterprises with their 
bases in the fodder industry or in food processing. A similar development 
is now well under way in the American pork sector, and there are also 
some European experiences of the same kind (Coffey, 1993). 
To be successful in the market, a processor should establish himself in 
this particular market. This may require decisions concerning the form of 
subsidiaries which could help the integration into the local networks of 
that market. It is very difficult for the head-quarters, located far away 
from the market, to have a sufficiently high level of knowledge about 
what is happening in various markets.  
A cooperative firm has difficulties in this respect. Firstly, foreign 
establishments require heavy investments which the members/farmers 
are hardly willing to accept. Secondly, increasing market orientation 
makes it difficult for the cooperative management to decide whether to 
listen to the members or the consumers. If the enterprise establishes a 
close connection to the markets, the effect might be that its connection to 
the members becomes weaker. It is hardly possible to have strong links in 
both directions at the same time. Observations from the USA indicate this. 
For example, an agricultural cooperative in the Midwest can easily sell its 
raw products to a processor in California, while it would have great 
problems in selling consumer products to California due to a lack of 
knowledge about the characteristics of this remote market.  
Consumer demand becomes increasingly diversified and fragmented, 
i.e., the market segments increase in number. The rising standard of living 
contributes to this heterogenization, as does technological development, 
making products still more specific and unique. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to serve these small-buyer categories, due to the fact that the total    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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market is expanding. As the small market segments in various countries 
or regions are added, the volume could become sufficiently large. 
However, agricultural cooperatives have greater difficulties to practice 
such a segmentation strategy than the large MNEs have. Among reasons 
for the favoring of MNEs are differences in sizes, capital base, techno-
logical level, and management, all of which favor advanced marketing 
procedures on international markets.  
Already today there is a tendency of declining vertical integration; the 
complex food processing stages are changing into share companies while 
the cooperatives, often owners of these companies, are increasingly 
concentrating on operations close to them, i.e., collecting and collective 
bargaining. Thus, the farmers' cooperatives get back to the basics. Such a 
development is observed e.g. in the Finnish milk processing industry.  
The farmers would have difficulties to control the cooperative firms if 
these were as large as the multinationals and had the same complex 
structure, including technological and marketing skills. The competencies 
of the farmers lie in the control of cooperatives that are working with tasks 
close to the farmers' own production.  
Especially in southern Europe, the cooperative business form is consid-
ered to contain certain ideological elements, implying, e.g., that coop-
eratives should play a role for society at large. Such ideology could pre-
vent price differentiation, regulate members' voting rights, limit the rate of 
interest on individual equity capital, distort market signals, etc. It is 
evident that these cooperatives suffer from such demands as it prevents 
them from adapting perfectly to market conditions and their long-term 
viability as business firms is at stake (Knutson, 1985; Nilsson, 1996; 
Cosgrave, 1994). To compensate for these losses in efficiency, the gov-
ernments in some countries give beneficial treatment to the cooperatives, 
e.g. in the form of tax reductions. These cooperatives are also at risk, i.e. 
strains on the state budgets might cause the governments to reduce their 
support and so, the cooperatives' relative competitive disadvantage in 
terms of efficiency will threaten their existence. No matter what type and 
nationality of the cooperative, the success of agricultural cooperatives is 
contingent upon their ability to adapt to market signals.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The developments in today's European food processing industry are 
clearly in favor of very large firms, not least the multinational enterprises. 
The on-going integration within the European Community, as well as the 
technological development, are fostering large scale production and 
marketing. In this process the agricultural cooperatives have a 
problematic position as they are inherently production-oriented, have 
often weak capital bases, and have difficulties in becoming very large.  
Still, the cooperative business form will survive because of its govern-
ance structure being superior in coordinating the primary production. The Position of Agricultural Cooperatives in the Food Industry 
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Regarding the first levels of the production process, i.e., the collection of 
products and primary processing, the cooperatives will keep their leading 
position also in the future. After the first stages of processing, i.e., getting 
the products into a non-perishable form, the relative advantage of the 
cooperative mode decreases. In addition to this, the increasing complexity 
of processing and management of a large firm makes it difficult to control 
the enterprise in the cooperative form.  
It might be expected, however, that the strong position that many 
agricultural cooperatives have today in the food processing industry can 
to a great extent be preserved. Those cooperatives which are large at 
present, will find alternative organizational set-ups in their efforts to 
preserve strength. Among these, one may imagine new financial instru-
ments, jointly-owned subsidiaries, and choice of specific types of busi-
nesses.  
Other agricultural cooperatives, which are relatively large but are not 
able to keep the pace with multinational enterprises, will choose a role as 
suppliers of private brand products to the large retail chains. This strategy 
does, however, involve great strains as the level of profitability will be 
squeezed. Hence, they are withdrawing from the most advanced levels of 
the processing chain. An attractive position for many cooperatives could 
be the one of supplier of raw or semi-processed products to investor-
owned processing firms. This strategy is a promising one as agricultural 
cooperatives have a marked competitive advantage in producing large 
volumes of products of high and stable quality (Søgaard, 1994). The trend 
of breaking up the agro-industrial system into a collecting cooperative and 
a processing share company owned by the cooperative may also be 
reinforced.  
The rest of the cooperatives, mainly the smaller ones, will try to adapt 
to their local or regional markets. They will lose a part of their sales 
volumes in the competition with the larger processors, especially the most 
profitable parts of the sales, but they will be able to survive with the 
standard, low margin products. Their resources will not suffice to develop 
very sophisticated products and to use advanced marketing techniques. In 
this category, there will probably be a wave of mergers between the 
cooperative societies.  
The development towards multinational agricultural cooperatives, i.e., 
mergers across borders, is less probable because this will create con-
siderable problems concerning the control of firms and the distribution of 
their results. Also, the degree of membership heterogeneity will increase 
to a level where it is difficult to satisfy the differing interests of all the 
members. Nevertheless, a certain number of such multinational 
cooperatives might be created.  
To the extent that the cooperatives grow extremely large, their coop-
erative character might be threatened. The membership will face in-
creasing difficulties in controlling the enterprise according to the ‘voice’ 
principle, and instead their influence is reduced to ‘exit’ possibilities, i.e., 
the members' relationship to the cooperative will resemble that of their    Part II: Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives 
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relationship to investor-owned firms. This will also reduce their 
willingness to contribute with financial resources unless they receive 
market-rate interests.  
Considering the disadvantages that agricultural cooperatives have in 
relation to the large multinationals, one could expect that there will be 
many bankruptcies among the cooperatives. However, one should bear in 
mind that there are very high barriers to exit in the cooperative businesses. 
They will keep on struggling for many years, and thus changes in the 
structure of the European food processing industries will not take place 
very rapidly.  
One might also expect differences between cooperatives in other 
respects. The cooperatives will face the greatest problems in industries 
where products and production are highly technological, capital intense, 
large scale, and complex. Likewise there might be geographical differ-
ences; cooperatives operating in markets which are less attractive for large 
companies will have greater chances for continued success, while those 
facing stiff competition from the multinationals will have a more 
problematic future.  
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Since the early 1980s, an important wave of mergers and acquisitions has 
occurred in the U.S. food industries. That wave of transactions in the 
market for corporate control may have altered industrial structure and 
corporate performance. Mergers and acquisitions among competing firms 
in the same market lead toward more concentration. However, Raven-
scraft and Scherer (1987) note that Peter Drucker observed in 1982 that 
“two mergers out of five are outright disasters, two neither live or die, and one 
works.”  Assuming profit maximizing firms, and observing the current 
heavy financial losses faced by very concentrated industries such as U.S. 
automaking or world airlines, it seems that food companies' behavior is 
difficult to understand. 
Moreover, articles in business magazines allege excessive premiums 
paid to acquire food companies – a premium is the difference between a 
target firm's takeover value and pretakeover value. These firms operate in 
industries characterized by a high level of concentration. Acquirers may 
pay a higher premium because they expect higher profits. However, such 
a theme has not been studied yet. 
 
 
Theoretical and Empirical Considerations 
 
The U.S. food industries experienced slow growth in the 1980s. During the 
years 1977 to 1987, the number of companies declined in nine of the ten 
food sectors defined at the three-digit level of SIC code, as shown in Table 
1. These reorganizations are contrary to the general movements in other 
manufacturing industries. They were motivated by slow growth in the 
demand for food. It is also likely that they resulted in operating efficiency 
gains.  
In the 1980s, acquisitions have been followed by the sell-off of numer-
ous target company divisions. On average, there were 45 divestitures 
recorded by Mergerstat Review each year in the U.S. food industries for 71.7 
acquisitions per year from 1981 to 1990. That is about 63 divestitures for 
100 takeovers, which is a very high proportion relative to the proportion of 
39 divestitures for 100 takeovers in all U.S. industries. The proportion of 
divestitures varied between 43% and 81% in the years 1981 to 1989. Data 
about divestitures are published by W.T. Grimm & Co. In the sample of 
114 mainly cash takeovers drawn from the Mergerstat Review records, 35 of Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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them involved divestitures. The proportion of divestitures also seems 
similar in both the early and late 1980s, since it varies between 15% and 
43% in the years 1981 to 1984 and between 7% and 86% in the years 1985 to 
1989. The average proportion of divestitures in the sample is about 31%. It 
is smaller than the proportion recorded for the population of takeovers 
mentioned above, because Mergerstat Review only publishes the 
transactions for which both a purchase price and the seller's earnings were 
available, while it records the number of deals on a larger basis by 
including those without price and earning information. In fact, a lot of 
takeovers involving a divestiture were friendly and no information was 
released about the terms of the transactions.  
 
Table 1  Number of U.S. Food Processing Companies at the 3-digit Level 
of SIC Code, 1977–1987 
 
SIC code  Industry  1977  1982  1987  
 
All manufacturing industries  279777  281616  310341 
  20  Food and kindred products  20616  16813  15692 
 201  Meat  products  3967  3218  2767 
 202  Dairy  products  2837  2103  1700 
  203  Preserved fruits and vegetables  1752  1642  1438 
  204  Grain mill products  2094  1915  1722 
 205  Bakery  products  2797  2165  2349 
  206  Sugar and confectionery products  990  880  918 
  207  Fats and oils  591  474  340 
 208  Beverages  2440  2019  1697 
  209  Miscellaneous food and kindred products  3794  3469  3271 
Source: Bureau of the Census. ‘Census of manufactures: General summary’. U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1977, 1982 and 1987. 
 
Those divestitures may have been motivated by two major reasons, i.e. a 
need to repay loans incurred to finance the takeover, and efficiency gains. 
Some divested parts that were acquired under the acquirer's management, 
have low expected profitability because of lack of skills and expertise in 
several different types of business. Consequently, the reduction in the 
number of food companies has lead to an increasing concentration of sales 
and assets in the hands of fewer and fewer corporations. As a result of 
horizontal takeovers and competition, aggregate concentration has 
increased sharply in U.S. food industries in the 1980s (USDA and ERS, 
1990; Marion and Kim, 1991). Marion and Kim (1991) estimated that 
concentration in six food industries (flour milling, soybean crushing, wet 
corn milling, cottonseed oil milling, beef packing, and broiler processing 
industries) increased an average 23 points during the period 1977 through 
1988. Internal growth accounted for 7.6 points, that is about one-third of 
the increase in industry concentration, and mergers and acquisitions 
accounted for 15.6 points, that is about two-thirds of the rise in 
concentration. Studying U.S. food industries, Connor et al. (1985) conclude 
that “structural oligopoly is the rule rather than the exception”. Cotterill and 
Iton (1991) evaluated the structure profit relationship in food Structure and Performance in U.S. Food Industries 
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manufacturing using the Profit Impact Market Strategy (PIMS) data base 
with observations covering the 1972 to 1987 period. They reject the 
“hypotheses that relative efficiency is the source of profits for large market share 
firms, and that increased rivalry among large firms results in lower industry 
profits”. In accordance with previous studies, they reiterate that market 
share and concentration are the primary indicators of market power in a 
market. Declerck and Sherrick (1993) show that for industries with a top-4-
firm concentration ratio (CR4) greater than 38%, profit appears to be 
increasing at an increasing rate with the degree of concentration. 
Throughout the decade, food firms in highly concentrated sectors may 
have been bought to take advantage of operating synergies (efficiency 
gains) and/or market power.  
Food companies may pay higher premiums to acquire food firms in 
highly concentrated food industries because they expect higher profits 
coming from efficiency gains and/or market power benefits. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The hypothesis of higher premiums paid for targets in highly concentrated 
sectors than for targets in less concentrated sectors is tested by an event-
study approach, as is usually done in corporate finance. Event-studies are 
based on the fact that market prices respond quickly to new information 
according to the change in investors' expectations. Stock markets are 
assumed to be semi-strong form efficient, in accordance with most studies 
(Weston and Copeland, 1986). Stock and bond prices quickly and fully 
incorporate all available public information. Therefore, it is essential to 
know the date of takeover announcements. Investors expect to earn a 
predicted (or expected) rate of return specific to each stock. However, 
expected stock performance also depends on industry and macroeconomic 
events; they are correlated with the rate of return for all market stocks 
because of firms' interdependence. Moreover, there may be some leak of 
information a few days before the official announcement. Some 
consequences of a takeover announcement may be grasped by all 
investors not immediately but over some days. Therefore, the deviation of 
a stock price from its expected price in case of a takeover announcement 
should be evaluated over a few days instead of a single day to capture 
most effects of the event.  
An acquisition premium can be estimated by measuring abnormal stock 
market performance returns for target firms. A return is the change in the 
total value of an investment in a common stock over some period of time 
per dollar of initial investment. The return of a stock on day t is based on a 
purchase on the preceding trading day (t–1) when the security had a valid 
price. The problem to solve in every event-study is to separate the 
expected return in the absence of the event from the abnormal return 
caused by the event, namely by the new information made available to the 
market regarding firm value. An event period (or event window) is 
defined in order to capture all the firm's stock returns that are associated Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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with the event, namely the takeover announcement. It is centered on the 
announcement date called day 0. For each day t in the event period and 
for each target firm i studied, expected or ‘normal’ return E(ri) is com-
puted as if there is no event. Expected return can be estimated by two 
different methodologies as given in the literature: the market model 
approach and the market adjusted return approach. Those methods usu-
ally produce similar outcomes about cumulative abnormal returns due to 
the takeover, but the market-adjusted return approach is less likely to be 
subject to substantial errors (Brown and Warner, 1980; Weston et al., 1990). 
Another method can be used to estimate the premium paid over the 
market price. It is the offer to market price approach.  
Measurement of abnormal returns is made for a short term horizon, 
namely a short event period in order to capture investors' short term 
reaction to the unanticipated information included in a particular event. 
The event window (–20 to +20) seems relevant. It is extended over a 
period from 20 trading days before to 20 trading days after the 
announcement date. It covers D = 41 trading days, i.e. one month before 
and one month after the takeover announcement. The period may allow 
for capturing abnormal returns without too much noise due to other 
events. In the selected sample, 13 out of 55 target firm stocks are no longer 
traded between the twenty-first and the fortieth day following the 
announcement day. A window (–40,+40) is not appropriate because of too 
many missing data. Moreover, such a long event period may capture most 
of the effects of the event, but stock price data includes a lot of noise. In 
contrast, a shorter window than the period (-20,+20) would capture the 
effects of a takeover announcement only partially. The pre-event period 
include days not affected by the event. It must be as ‘clean’ as possible, 
that is without price changes reflecting information about the takeover. 
This seems to be the case before the fortieth day preceding a takeover 
announcement. The period (-40,-20) does not seem ‘clean’ enough to be 
included. A pre-event period of T = 253 days is determined to cover all 
cyclical and seasonal patterns over a calendar year. The pre-event period 
(-293,-41) is chosen with respect to the takeover announcement date.  
The market model approach and the market-adjusted return method 
are chosen because they have largely shown their usefulness and good 
power. The daily return of the market is estimated by the daily return of 
the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite index which is a type of market 
value index (including all distributions) on the NYSE and AMEX 
exchanges.  
 
 
Procedures with the Market Model Method 
 
In the market model approach, the return for each firm i is determined 
from the co-movement of a firm's return with the market return. A pre-
event period, before the event period, is chosen to estimate the specific 
firm parameter bi required to compute the daily expected returns during 
the event-period.  Structure and Performance in U.S. Food Industries 
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The market model of Fama (1973) is used to eliminate the elements of 
each firm's price change that depend on the market. In market equilib-
rium, the market model expresses a linear ex-ante function between the 
return on the shares of firm i and the return of the market portfolio.  
(1) Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εit  
where,  
•  i = 1... N, is a firm index, 
•  t = 1... T, is a day index in the event-period, 
• Rit is the rate of return on firm i for day t, 
• Rmt is the rate of return on the market portfolio for day t, 
•  βi measures the sensitivity of firm i to changes in the market portfolio's 
rate of return, this is a measure of systematic risk on firm i,  
•  αi measures the mean return over the event period not explained by 
the market,  
• and  εit is a statistical error term, Σ εit = 0.  
 
The market model has its foundations in the Markowitz's micro model of 
portfolio choice. It requires restrictive assumptions on characteristics of 
assets markets and investors: 
•  One period model; 
•  Markets are highly efficient, information is freely available, assets are 
perfectly divisible, and there are no transaction costs and no tax; 
•  The market portfolio is efficient; 
• Investors  are  risk-averse and well diversified;  
•  Investors have the same expectations and can choose between assets on 
the basis of expected return and variance. Then, probability distri-
butions for asset returns are all normally distributed or the investor's 
utility function is quadratic. 
 
In most previous works, the market portfolio is estimated by the S&P 500 
Composite Index. Furthermore, if the estimates ai and/or bi evaluated in 
the pre-event period are very different from zero and one respectively, 
they may reflect that the firm i did exceptionally well or bad. The pre-
dicted return of firm i in the event period is estimated conditionally on 
what happened to the market in the pre-event period. Consequently, the 
estimation of the predicted return of firm i in the event-period assumes a 
similar firm's behavior in that period even if such a benchmark may be 
biased. Consequently, the difference between the actual rate of return Rit 
and the predicted return E(Rit) yields an abnormal return (ARit), which is 
also biased.  
(2) (ARit) = Rit – E(Rit) = Rit – [ai + bi Rmt]  
For example, if alpha is estimated greater than zero (ai>0) because firm i 
was overperforming in the pre-event period, then the abnormal return 
(ARit) computed in the event-period with such a positive ai tends to be 
negative. Inversely, if alpha is estimated inferior to zero (ai<0) because 
firm i was underperforming in the pre-event period, then the abnormal 
return (ARit) tends to be positive.  Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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Despite its shortcomings, the market model provides a simple and 
straightforward measurement and plausible results that lead to 
meaningful benchmarks by taking account of the risk (associated with the 
market) – return relationships for firm stocks. It is the most widely used 
method.  
For the market model approach, estimates of the historic parameters a 
and b in the pre-event period are obtained by regressing T = 253 trading 
days of data beginning before the announcement period, in order to cover 
all cyclical patterns related to a calendar year. For each day t in the event 
period and for each studied target firm i, the residual or abnormal return, 
(ARit) = Rit – E(Rit), is the part of the return that is not predicted by the 
market. Then, it represents the stock price change caused by the event for 
target firm i on day t.  
The abnormal returns (ARit) are cumulated over all days during the 
event period. The cumulated abnormal returns (CARi) are produced for 
each firm in the two groups of studied firms: (CARi) = Σ (ARit) for t = 1 to 
D days in the event-period. The (CARi) measures the total effect of the 
event, here takeover, for firm i.  
The abnormal return (ARit) is distributed independently of Si
2. Its vari-
ance is (σi
2 C it), estimated by (Si
2 C it). The cumulative abnormal return 
(CARi) equals Σ (ARit) for t = 1 to D days in the event-period. Its variance is 
(σi
2 (ΣCit)), estimated by (Si
2 (ΣCit)) for t = 1 to D. The statistic ωi can be 
constructed: 
(3a)  ωi = Σ (ARit) /σi (Σcit)
1/2 follows a Normal distribution N(0,1)   and  
(3b)  (T–2) Si
2 /σi
2 follows a Chi-square distribution with (T–2)  degrees 
of freedom, where t = 1 to D, day index in the forecast   (event) period.  
The average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of a sample of N firms 
is formed: 
 (4)  (ACAR) = 1/N Σ (CARi) for i = 1 to N firms in the studied group.  
Assuming that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARi) are distributed 
normally and independently across a sample of N firms, the variance of 
(ACAR) is [1/N Σ (σi
2 (ΣCit))], estimated by [1/N Σ (Si
2 (ΣCit))] for i varying 
from 1 to N. The statistic Z is constructed to test the significance of the 
average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of the N firms: 
 (5)  Z = (ACAR) /[1/N Σ (Si
2 (ΣCit))] 1/2)  
The statistic Z follows a Student distribution with (N–2) degrees of 
freedom and tends to the unit Normal N(0,1) for large N. The statistic Z 
can be used to test the significance of average cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) of N firms.  
It is also possible to compare the average cumulative abnormal returns 
(ACAR) of two samples of firms (ACAR)1 for a sample 1 of (N1) food firms 
in highly concentrated industries and (ACAR)2 for a sample of (N2) food 
firms in less concentrated industries. The two samples are independent. 
The statistic Z1-2 is constructed: 
(6) Z1-2 = [(ACAR)1 – (ACAR)2] /(V1 + V2)
1/2 Structure and Performance in U.S. Food Industries 
 
159 
where V1 = [1/N1 Σ (Si2 (ΣCit))] is the variance of (ACAR)1, and V2 = [1/N2 
Σ (Si
2 (ΣCit))] is the variance of (ACAR)2.  
The statistic Z1-2 follows a Student distribution with [N1 + N2 – 2] 
degrees of freedom and tends to the unit Normal N(0,1) for large [N1 + N2 
– 2]. The statistic Z1–2 can provide a two- (or one-) sided test of the 
following hypotheses: 
Ho: the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of the firms in the 
two samples 1 and 2 are equal;  
Ha: the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of the firms in 
sample 1 is not equal to (is greater than/less than) the (ACAR) of the firms 
in sample 2.  
 
 
Procedures with the Market-Adjusted Return Method 
 
The market-adjusted return approach differs from the market model 
method in the definition of predicted return. The predicted return for firm 
i on day t in the event period is the return on the market index for that 
day: 
(7) Rit = Rmt  
This method is an approximation to the market model where ai = 0 and bi 
= 1 for each firm i. There is no bias associated with estimates ai and/or bi 
evaluated different from zero and one respectively. Usually by the market 
model method, the estimate of ai is close to zero and the average estimate 
of bi over all firms is one, then the approximation used in the market-
adjusted return approach produces reasonably good outcomes (Weston et 
al., 1990).  
In applying the market adjusted return method, the abnormal return of 
firm i for each day t in the event-period is: 
 (8)  (ARit) = [(Rit) – (Rmt)].  
Its variance is (σit)
2.  
The average abnormal return (AARi) of firm i during the event-period 
is: 
(9) (AARi) = (1/D) Σ (ARit)  
where t = 1 to D, day index in the event period.  
The cumulative abnormal return (CARi) are obtained for each firm i: 
(10) (CARi) = Σ (ARit)  
where t = 1 to D, day index in the event period. Assuming that the 
abnormal returns (ARi) are distributed normally and independently across 
the D days in the event-period, the variance of (CARi) is (σi)
2 = Σ(σit)
2.  
The average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of a sample of N 
firms is formed: 
(11) (ACAR) = 1/N Σ (CARi) for i = 1 to N firms in the studied group.  
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARi) are assumed to be distributed 
normally and independently across a sample of N firms. The variance of 
(ACAR) is estimated by [1/N Σ(Si
2)] for i varying from 1 to N. The statistic Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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Z is constructed to test the significance of the average cumulative 
abnormal return (ACAR) of the N firms: 
(12) Z = (ACAR) /[1/N Σ(Si
2)] 1/2  
The statistic Z follows a Student distribution with (N–2) degrees of 
freedom and tends to the unit Normal N(0,1) for large N. The statistic Z 
can be used to test the significance of average cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) of N firms.  
It is possible to compare the average cumulative abnormal returns 
(ACAR) of two samples of firms (ACAR)1 for a sample 1 of (N1) food firms 
and (ACAR)2 for a sample of (N2) other food firms. The two samples are 
independent. The statistic Z1–2 is constructed: 
(13) Z1-2 = [(ACAR)1 – (ACAR)2] /(V1+ V2)
1/2 
where V1 = [1/N1 Σ(Si
2)] is the estimated variance of (ACAR)1, and V2 = 
[1/N2 Σ(Si
2)] is the estimated variance of (ACAR)2.  
The statistic Z1-2 follows a Student distribution with [N1 + N2 – 2] 
degrees of freedom and tends to the unit Normal N(0,1) for large [N1 + N2 
– 2]. The statistic Z1-2 can provide a two- (or one-) sided test of the 
following hypotheses: 
Ho: the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of the firms in the 
two samples 1 and 2 are equal;  
Ha: the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of the firms in 
sample 1 is not equal to (is greater than/less than) the (ACAR) of the firms 
in sample 2.  
 
 
The Offer to Market Price Approach and Measurement of Premium 
 
In the offer to market price approach, the premium paid over the market 
price is measured as a percent of the final offer price over the closing price 
5 trading days before the announcement date. The estimation of the 
premium by this method is usually simple because there is no computa-
tion of daily abnormal return during an event period. This method can 
only be used for target firms. For the firm i, the premium Pi is computed 
as followed: 
(14) Premium Pi = Offer Price /Market Price at day (–5) 
The average premium (AP) of a sample of N target firms is formed: 
(15) AP = 1/N Σ (Pi) for i = 1 to N target firms.  
The variance V of the average premium is estimated by: 
(16) V = [1/(N–1) Σ (Pi – AP)
2] /N for i varying from 1 to N.  
The statistic Z is constructed to test the significance of the average 
premium (AP) of the N firms: 
(17) Z = (AP) /V
1/2  
The statistic Z follows a Student distribution with (N–2) degrees of 
freedom and tends to the unit Normal N(0,1) for large N. The statistic Z 
can provide a one sided test of the following hypotheses: 
Ho: the average premium (AP) of the N target firms is equal to zero;  
Ha: the average premium (AP) of the N target firms is greater than zero.  Structure and Performance in U.S. Food Industries 
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It is also possible to compare the average premium (AP) of two samples 
of target firms (AP)1 for a sample 1 of (N1) target firms and (AP)2 for a 
sample of (N2) other target firms. The two samples are independent. The 
statistic Z1-2 is constructed: 
(18) Z1-2 = [(AP)1 – (AP)2] /(V1 + V2)
1/2 
where V1 is the estimated variance of (AP)1, and V2 is the estimated 
variance of (AP)2.  
The statistic Z1-2 follows a Student distribution with [N1 + N2 – 2] 
degrees of freedom and tends to the unit Normal N(0,1) for large [N1 + N2 
– 2]. The statistic Z1-2  can provide a one-sided test of the following 
hypotheses: 
Ho: the average premiums (AP) of the firms in the two samples 1 and 2 
are equal;  
Ha: the average premium (AP)1 of the firms in sample 1 is greater than 
the average premium (AP)2 of the firms in sample 2.  
The statistical procedure used in the offer to market price approach to 
test differences in premiums paid is also employed to test differences in 
multiples of purchase price to book value of the acquired firms.  
 
 
Data 
 
In order to test the hypotheses, data are gathered from the W.T. Grimm 
series. The Grimm series is published in the Mergerstat Review. It reports 
all public transactions announced that involved at least 10% of a firm's 
assets and was valued at $500,000 or more. One party of the transaction 
must be a U.S. company, hence foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies and 
U.S. acquisitions of foreign companies are provided. Information is 
available about the number and the size at the announcement time, not at 
the completion time. Note that it usually takes five to ten months for 
mergers to be achieved after their announcements. Canceled and divested 
transfers of ownership, medium of payment, and type of industry are 
included. Tender offers are recorded since 1974. For target firms, the series 
also report the premium paid over the market according to the offer to 
market price approach above-mentioned. The series are given both per 
year since 1963 and per quarter since 1974. Moreover, some comments and 
analyses are expressed on takeovers.  
Takeovers selected are those for which the purchase price is at least 5% 
of the market value of the acquiring firm's value. The data come from 
public announcements of tender offers or mergers, which are mainly paid 
by cash in order to control for medium of payment. A tender offer is 
recognized as successful if the bidder acquires an interest of more than 
50% of the target firm's common equity. A sample of successful takeovers 
is drawn between January 1981 and December 1989. It has not been 
possible to get the W.T. Grimm series for the year 1980.  
The announcement date of the takeover is the initial date of the first 
public proposed bid in the Wall Street Journal Index. The completion date of 
the takeover is also given in the Wall Street Journal Index, in Mergerstat Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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Review, or in Mergers & Acquisitions. Daily target stock prices observed in 
the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges are available on the tapes of 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and are used to estimate 
abnormal returns due to takeover announcements. Daily acquirer, and 
target, if possible, stock prices are used to estimate any shift in systematic 
risk associated with the takeover transaction. Target data may not be 
available because some targets are divisions of a public company that is 
making a divestiture, and because many targets are not publicly traded 
and not recorded on the tapes of the CRSP.  
The population under consideration was defined as all U.S.-based 
acquired and acquiring corporations involved in a successful tender offer 
where there were no prior significant shareholdings in the target firm 
from 1981 to 1989. Out of 161 takeovers announced in the food industries 
during that period in the Mergerstat Review, 126 bids were identified as 
mainly cash offers properly classified in the food manufacturing. Among 
those 126 deals, 114 succeeded. Among those 114 successful takeovers, 55 
target firms and 36 acquiring firms with complete information about 
announcement and completion date were publicly traded in the NYSE, or 
AMEX or NASDAQ exchanges.  
Target firms in the sample are divided into two groups according to the 
level of industry concentration at the four-digit level of SIC code. One 
group gathers the corporations which operate in sectors with a con-
centration ratio that is greater than 38.2% and the other group gathers the 
companies operating in sectors with a concentration ratio that is lower 
than 38.2%. A food firm is in a sector with a high concentration ratio if it 
mainly operates in food industries with a top-4-firm concentration ratio 
greater than 38% at the four-digit SIC code, according to the data 
published in the 1982 Census of manufactures (Bureau of the Census, 
1982). In order to minimize some arbitrary assignment of firms to one of 
the two categories, the activities and SIC codes of the firms are obtained in 
three different sources of information the W.T. Grimm series reported in 
the Mergerstat Review, the Standard & Poor's Register of U.S. Corporations, 
and the files of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Among 
the 55 selected target firms, 26 are in sectors with a high concentration 
ratio (namely a top-4-firm concentration ratio which is greater than 38%), 
called ‘highly concentrated industries’, and 29 are in sectors with a low 
concentration ratio, called ‘less concentrated industries’. For the offer to 
market price approach, the Mergerstat Review reports the premium per 
firm for 25 out of the 26 targets which are in sectors with a high 
concentration ratio and 28 out of the 29 in sectors with a low concentration 
ratio. The premium paid over the market price is measured as a percent of 
the final offer price over the closing price 5 trading days before the 
announcement date. The announcement date recorded in the Mergerstat 
Review may differ from the date mentioned in the Wall Street Journal Index. 
However, since a lot of offer prices are not reported, it is not possible to 
compute the average premium of the targets in the sample accurately. 
Then, the premiums retained in this study are the per firm premiums Structure and Performance in U.S. Food Industries 
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which are calculated and published by the Mergerstat Review. Their 
aggregation and treatment has been performed according to the 
methodological procedures mentioned above.  
Acquiring firms in the sample are classified into three categories. The 
classification is used to estimate if acquirers overpaid targets in highly 
and/or less concentrated sectors. For each takeover, the acquiring firm is 
assigned, according to the characteristics of the acquired firm: 1) acquirers 
of food company in highly concentrated industries, the target food being 
included in the targets' sample; 2) acquirers of food companies in less 
concentrated industries, the target food being included in the targets' 
sample; and 3) acquirers of other food companies which are not selected in 
the targets' sample. Among the 36 selected acquirers, 10 acquired a firm 
selected in a highly concentrated industry, 10 acquired a firm selected in a 
less concentrated industry, and 16 acquired a firm not selected in the 
targets' sample.  
Some observations of the firms' returns are missing in the estimation 
periods, namely the pre-event period in order to measure abnormal 
returns, and the pre-event and post-event periods in order to measure 
shifts in the systematic risk. The days with missing data are dropped from 
analysis. Moreover, the first observation following missing data is 
dropped in order to avoid problems of synchronicity between the firm's 
return and the return of the market index. For the firm, the observation 
following missing data is a return which reflects both the change in stock 
price during that day and the price movements during the former days 
with missing observations. In contrast, the return of the market index for 
the first day following missing observations of a firm's stock price only 
reflects the market return for that day. Then, the first observation 
following missing data is dropped in order to get returns of a firm which 
are synchronous with returns of the market. Seven out of fifty-five target 
firms have one to six missing observations in the pre-event period. Two 
acquiring firms have been eliminated from the sample because more than 
50 observations were missing.  
In contrast, problems of the firms' missing data is handled differently 
during the event-period. In that case, the first observation following 
missing data is kept. The objective is to capture any abnormal change in a 
firm's return. The problem of synchronicity between a firm's return and 
the return of the market is less important relative to any loss of informa-
tion about the firm's abnormal returns. Eleven target firms experience 
from one to three missing observations during the event-period. Most of 
these firms have one missing observation on the day before the takeover 
announcement. In case of missing observations, the program used to 
measure abnormal returns and shift in systematic risk is adjusted to get 
accurate estimates and statistics.  
Abnormal returns for an acquirer could be attributed to more than one 
acquisition. For example, in 1987 the firm Kraft, Inc. acquired All Ameri-
can Gourmet Co. for $ 295.2 million and three divisions of Quaker Oats Co. 
for $ 235 million. The event-period (–20, +20) around the takeover Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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announcement of All American Gourmet Co. lasted from 1987/05/07 to 
1987/07/06. The event-period (–20, +20) around the takeover announce-
ment of the three divisions of Quaker Oats Co. started on 1987/04/30 and 
ended on 1987/06/26. From 1987/05/07 to 1987/06/26, abnormal returns 
for Kraft, Inc. could be attributed to both acquisitions. Consequently, these 
two takeovers are dropped from the samples of acquirers.  
 
 
Results 
 
The following section provides and analyzes the abnormal returns of the 
55 targets in the selected sample. Since acquirers may have overpaid their 
targets, the abnormal returns of 36 acquiring firms in the sample are 
presented and analyzed in the subsequent section.  
 
 
Analysis of the Target Firms 
 
Most of the 55 targets selected in the sample were bought by acquirers in a 
related business or went private through a leveraged buyout and divested 
unrelated businesses as demonstrated above.  
Among the 55 targets selected, 26 were operating in food industries 
with a concentration ratio greater than 38%. Six of the 26 targets experi-
enced a leveraged buyout. Seventeen of the 26 targets were acquired by 
food firms. The three remaining of the 26 targets were bought by firms 
without major activity in the food industries.  
Among the 55 targets selected, 29 were operating in food industries 
with a concentration ratio lower than 38%. Ten of the 29 targets experi-
enced a leveraged buyout. Sixteen of the 29 targets were acquired by food 
firms. The 3 remaining of the 26 targets were bought by firms without 
major activity in the food industries.  
Average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) of target firms due to 
takeover are presented in Table 2. Results are provided using the market 
adjusted return method and the market model method. ACAR of the 26 
target firms in highly concentrated sectors, that is with top-4-firm 
concentration ratio higher than 38%, is 37.83% by the first method and 
36.80% by the second method. Both figures are significantly different from 
zero at the 5% and 1% levels. The p-value of the t-statistics is zero in both 
cases. ACAR of the 29 target firms in less concentrated sectors, that is with 
top-4-firm concentration ratio lower than 38%, is 30.52% by the first 
method and 27.07% by the second method. Both figures are significantly 
different from zero at the 5% and 1% levels. The p-value of the t-statistics 
is zero in both cases.  
The difference in average cumulative abnormal returns between targets 
in highly concentrated sectors and targets in less concentrated sectors is 
7.31% by the first method and 9.73% by the second method. Both figures 
are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The p-value of the t-Structure and Performance in U.S. Food Industries 
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statistics is 4.8% by the market adjusted return method and 1.3% by the 
market model method.  
 
Table 2  Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) of Target Firms 
 
  Market-adjusted   Market model 
 return  method    method 
 
1)   In sectors with top-4-firm concentration ratio 
  HIGHER than 38% (26 target firms) 
 
 ACARcon (average cumulative abnormal return) 
  for the event period (-20, +20) around the first  37.83%  36.80%     
  public announcement (t-statistic 
 to  test  Ho: ACAR=0 vs Ha: ACAR>0)   (11.18)   (10.97) 
  
2)  In sectors with top-4-firm concentration ratio 
  LOWER than 38% (29 target firms) 
 
 ACARnc (average cumulative abnormal return) 
  for the event period (-20, +20) around the first  30.52%  27.07% 
 public  announcement 
  (t-statistic to test Ho: ACAR=0 vs Ha: ACAR>0)  (11.33)   (10.40) 
  
3)  Difference in average cumulative abnormal returns between 
  targets in highly concentrated sectors and target 
  in less concentrated sectors 
 
 ACARcon - ACARnc =  7.31%  9.73% 
  (t-statistic to test Ho: ACARcon = ACARnc 
 versus  Ha: ACARcon > ACARnc)   (1.69)   (2.29) 
 
Premiums paid as a percent of the offer price over the closing market price 
5 trading days before the announcement date are shown in Table 3. The 
average premium for 25 target firms in highly concentrated sectors is 
52.05%, which is significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% levels. 
The p-value of the t-statistic is zero. The average premium for 28 target 
firms in less concentrated sectors is 36.51%, which is significantly different 
from zero at the 5% and 1% levels. The p-value of the t-statistic is zero. 
The difference in average premium between targets in highly concentrated 
sectors and targets in less concentrated sectors is 15.54%. That figure is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The p-value of the t-
statistic is 2.0%.  
The average cumulative abnormal returns are around 30% for target 
firms acquired in tender offers mainly paid by cash. That is consistent 
with previous works (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell et al., 1988). The 
average cumulative abnormal returns as well as the average premium as a 
percent of the offer price over the market price are significantly greater for 
target food companies in sectors with a high concentration ratio than they 
are for other food firms. It can be inferred that there has been an extra 
premium for targets acquired through takeover in highly concentrated Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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food industries during the 1980s. Therefore, such an extra premium may 
be explained by the hypothesis of future increasing efficiency and market 
power in declining markets. But, acquiring firms of targets in highly 
concentrated food industries may have overpaid them with respect to the 
amount paid for other food target firms. This objection can be tested by 
comparing the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirers of targets in 
highly concentrated sectors with the CAR of the acquirers of targets in less 
concentrated sectors.  
 
Table 3  Premium (Offer To Market Price), High Versus Low Industry 
Concentration  
 
  Premium paid over market as a 
  percentage of the offer price over 
  the closing price 5 business days 
  before the announcement date 
 
1)  In sectors with top-4-firm concentration ratio HIGHER than 
  38% (25 target firms, no computation provided for 1 target) 
   
 APcon (average premium)   52.05% 
  (t-statistic to test Ho: APcon=0 vs Ha: APcon>0) (9.50) 
 
 MPcon (median premium)   43.20% 
  (AN-statistic to test Ho: MPcon=0 vs Ha: MPcon>0 (6.29) 
  
2)  In sectors with top-4-firm concentration ratio LOWER than 
  38% (28 target firms, no computation provided for 1 target 
 )  
 APnc (average premium)   36.51% 
  (t-statistic to test Ho: APnc=0 vs Ha: APnc>0) (7.35) 
 
 MPnc (median premium)   30.90% 
  (AN-statistic to test Ho: MPnc=0 vs Ha: MPnc>0) (4.96) 
 
3)  Difference in premium over market for targets in highly 
  concentrated sectors and targets in less concentrated sectors 
   
  For average premiums APcon - APnc =  15.54% 
  (t-statistic to test Ho: APcon = APnc versus Ha: APcon > APnc) (2.10) 
 
  For median premiums MPcon - MPnc =  12.30% 
  (AN-statistic to test Ho: MPcon = MPnc versus Ha: MPcon > MPnc) (1.33) 
AN means ‘asympotic normal’ 
 
 
Analysis of the Acquiring Firms 
 
Average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) of acquirers of target firms 
included in the sample are presented in Table 4. Results are provided 
using the market-adjusted return method and the market model method. Structure and Performance in U.S. Food Industries 
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ACAR of the 10 acquirers of target firms in highly concentrated sectors, 
that is with top-4-firm concentration ratio higher than 38%, is 0.76% by the 
first method and –1.52% by the second method. Both figures are not 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The p-value of the t-
statistics is greater than 0.60 in both cases. ACAR of the 10 acquirers of 
target firms in less concentrated sectors, that is with top-4-firm 
concentration ratio lower than 38%, is 2.21% by the first method and 0.49% 
by the second method. Both figures are not significantly different from 
zero at the 10% level. The p-value of the t-statistics is equal or superior to 
0.60 in both cases.  
 
Table 4  Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) of Acquirers of 
Targets Included in the Sample 
 
    Market adjusted   Market model 
   return  method   method 
 
1)  Acquirers of target firms in sectors top-4-firm concentration 
  ratio HIGHER than 38%(10 acquiring firms) 
 
  ACARcon (average cumulative abnormal  
  return) for the event period (-20, +20)   0.76%  -1.52% 
  around the first public announcement 
  (t-statistic to test Ho: ACARcon = 0 
 versus  Ha: ACARcon different from zero)   (0.25)   (-0.52) 
 
2)  Acquirers of target firms in sectors top-4-firm concentration 
  ratio LOWER than 38% (10 acquiring firms) 
 
  ACARnc (average cumulative abnormal 
  return) for the event period (-20, +20)   2.21%  0.49% 
  around the first public announcement 
  (t-statistic to test Ho: ACARnc = 0 
 versus  Ha: ACARnc different from zero)   (0.55)   (0.13) 
 
3)  Difference in average cumulative abnormal returns between 
  acquirers of targets inhighly concentrated sectors and  
  acquirers of targets in less concentrated sectors 
 
 ACARcon - ACARnc =  -1.45%  -2.01% 
  (t-statistic to test Ho: ACARcon = ACARnc 
 versus  Ha: ACARcon different from ACARnc) (-0.29)    (-0.42) 
 
The difference in average cumulative abnormal returns between the 10 
acquirers of targets in highly concentrated sectors and the 10 acquirers of 
targets in less concentrated sectors is –1.45% by the first method and 
-2.01% by the second method. Both figures are not significantly different 
from zero at the 10% level. The p-value of the t-statistics is 78% by the 
market adjusted return method and 68% by the market model method.  
Then, the acquirers of targets in highly concentrated sectors do not 
experience lower cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) caused by their con-Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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centrated sectors. The null hypotheses that their average CAR are equal 
cannot be rejected by both the market-adjusted return method and by the 
market model method. Moreover, their average CAR are not significantly 
different from zero. That is consistent with most previous studies showing 
no gain or loss for acquiring firm's shareholders (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Jarrell et al., 1988).  
Average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) of the 16 acquirers of 
target firms not included in the sample are presented in Table 5. Results 
are provided using the market-adjusted return method and the market 
model method. ACAR of the 16 acquirers is 2.36% by the first method and 
–1.37% by the second method. Both figures are not significantly different 
from zero at the 10% level. The p-value of the t-statistics is 35% by the 
market adjusted return method and 60% by the market model method. 
Then, the cumulative abnormal returns for the acquirers of targets not 
included in the sample are not significantly different from zero. This result 
is similar to the result for the acquirers of targets included in the sample.  
  
Table 5  Average and Median Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the 16 
Acquirers of Targets not Included in the Sample 
 
 Market-adjusted  Market  model 
  return method  method   
 
ACAR (average cumulative abnormal return) 
for the event period (-20, +20) around   2.36%  -1.37% 
the first public announcement 
(t-statistic to test Ho: ACAR = 0 versus 
Ha: ACAR different from zero)   (0.96)   (-0.54) 
 
Average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) of all acquirers (of target 
firms included or not included in the sample) are presented in Table 6. 
Results are provided using the market-adjusted return method and the 
market model method. ACAR of the 36 acquirers is 1.87% by the first 
method and -0.89% by the second method. Both figures are not 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The p-value of the t-
statistics is 30% by the market adjusted return method and 61% by the 
market model method. Globally, the abnormal returns for all 36 acquirers 
of targets are not significantly different from zero. That is consistent with 
most previous studies (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell et al., 1988).  
 
Table 6  Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) of Acquirers of 
Targets Included in the Sample 
 
  Market adjusted  Market model 
  return method  method   
 
ACAR (average cumulative abnormal return) 
for the event period (-20, +20) around  1.87%  -0.89% 
the first public announcement 
(t-statistic to test Ho: ACAR = 0 versus Structure and Performance in U.S. Food Industries 
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Ha: ACAR different from zero)   (1.05)   (-0.51) 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the acquiring firms have been motivated by 
managerial synergies, operating synergies, and market power in order to 
focus on businesses they know and manage best. They have paid more to 
acquire food firms in highly concentrated markets because synergies and 
market power profits are expected from those companies. The results 
document that shareholders of targets in highly concentrated food indus-
tries obtained higher cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and offer to 
market price than shareholders of targets in less concentrated food 
industries in the 1980s. Shareholders of targets in highly concentrated 
food industries obtained an extra-cumulative abnormal return between 7 
and 9% on average, an extra-premium as a percentage of offer to market 
price of 15% on average. This premium is related to efficiency gains and/ 
or market power benefits that can be obtained by food firms in industries 
with high top-4-firm concentration ratios.  
Investors on the stock market did not think that the acquirers paid 
excessively large premiums to shareholders of targets in highly concen-
trated food industries relative to shareholders of targets in less concen-
trated food industries. The findings about the acquirers indicate that they 
did not get any abnormal returns significantly different from zero either 
when they purchased a target in highly concentrated food industries or a 
target in less concentrated food industries. Consequently, the hypothesis 
is confirmed.  
The results provide evidence that explain some remarks in the financial 
press and enlarge theoretical literature. Some articles in business 
magazines argue that premiums paid for food companies are excessive, 
but the findings show that larger premiums are justified by profit oppor-
tunities in highly concentrated food industries. This is the first academic 
study demonstrating significantly larger cumulative abnormal returns and 
premiums in highly food concentrated industries than those in less 
concentrated food industries. Efficiency gains and market power benefits 
have not been emphasized enough in the existing literature, since this is 
the first time a study proves that cumulative abnormal returns and 
premiums significantly differ among firms according to the degree of 
industry concentration.  
Further study could try to separate efficiency gains from market power 
benefits in food industries, taking into account the fact that those indus-
tries are heterogeneous. Moreover, consumer wealth created by food firms 
under the protection of some market power could be evaluated and com-
pared with consumer loss due to allocation inefficiencies.  
The results may be useful to shed light on the takeover activity in food 
industries in the 1990s, especially in the framework of the European Single 
Market. 
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10 Economic and Financial Performance of 
Cooperatives and Investor-Owned Firms: 
An Empirical Study 
 
Anastassios Gentzoglanis 
 
 
 
Economists and financial analysts have long been preoccupied by the 
question of evaluating performance of economic organizations. Although 
their tools for evaluating performance differ, they generally agree that 
market transactions are much easier to evaluate than non-market ones. 
Cooperatives offer a number of services to their members for which no 
price exists. The performance of cooperatives is thus more difficult to 
evaluate than that of investor-owned firms (IOFs). Given, however, the 
changing economic and financial structure of cooperatives, it is now 
possible to proceed in an evaluation of their performance using the tradi-
tional economic and financial tools1. 
Traditionally, cooperatives have been considered as being ‘equity 
bound’. However, they have undergone many structural changes in the 
1980s. They have used internal and external sources of financing more 
intensively, realizing high growth rates and equity accumulation. Pre-
liminary statistics indicate that the equity base of cooperatives in the U.S. 
has increased at an annual average rate of 14.7% while that of IOFs at only 
7.6% between 1971–872 (at least for the sample examined by Parliament et 
al., 1990). 
The financial restructuring of cooperatives during the past decade or so 
r e f l e c t s  s w e e p i n g  c h a n g e s  t h a t  h a v e  o c c u r r e d  w o r l d w i d e .  G o v e r n m e n t  
regulations, environmental factors, business strategies, the appearance of 
new financial instruments, etc., have all changed dramatically, altering 
economic conditions and the business environment. The tendency 
towards more economic integration accentuates the adjustments 
undertaken lately by both cooperatives and IOFs especially in the context 
of the European Union and the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). 
In this unstable and unpredictable business environment economic 
agents, including cooperatives, must reconsider their strategies. The for-
mation of strategic alliances, joint ventures, R&D (the development of new 
products and production techniques), mergers and acquisitions, down-
sizing, etc., are some of the strategies employed by firms for getting a 
competitive advantage against their competitors. Lower aggregate 
demand, increased competition and increases in costs arising from the 
restructuring process of many organizations have reduced firms' profit 
margins and increased the number of bankruptcies of less efficient firms. 
Innovative firms able to bring new products or production processes into Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
 
172 
existing markets and/or develop new market niches are rewarded with 
extra profits and high growth rates. Survival and eventually growth is the 
immediate goal of most firms. An evaluation and a comparison of the 
cooperatives' performance with that of IOFs is becoming imperative under 
these circumstances. One wonders whether cooperative principles give 
rise to performance differences between these two types of organizations. 
This study examines empirically the economic and financial perform-
ance of cooperatives and compares it to the performance of IOFs. A num-
ber of important financial ratios from 1986 to 1991 are calculated and one-
way variance analysis is applied to a sample of data composed of six 
major cooperatives and six IOFs both belonging to the dairy industry in 
Canada. To the best of our knowledge this study is the first one to apply 
financial ratio analysis to cooperatives and IOFs in the Canadian context. 
Moreover, the results of this study are compared to the earlier studies 
(European and the U.S.) offering thereby an integrated approach to the 
problem examined. Such studies which investigate the issue of 
cooperative performance serve two major purposes. First, they lead to a 
better understanding of the present cooperative debate, i.e., whether 
cooperatives perform as well as IOFs (Sexton and Iskow, 1993). Second, 
they identify policy options which, if adopted, may increase productive 
efficiencies and competitiveness in an industry where the pace of deregu-
lation and its integration into the global economy poses tremendous 
challenges to both managers and policy makers as well.  
The paper is organized as follows. The following section examines the 
theoretical analysis employed for comparing economic and financial per-
formance of cooperatives and IOFs. The description of the sample used 
and the comparison of the main characteristics of cooperatives and IOFs 
are presented in the next section. The following section presents the 
methodology and comments and compares, in some detail, the results of 
this study with the ones obtained from previous studies. The final section 
concludes and provides policy recommendations. 
 
 
Theoretical Analysis and Performance Comparisons of Cooperatives 
and IOFs 
 
It is widely accepted that traditional principles and values of cooperatives 
give rise to a financial performance that may differ significantly from that 
of IOFs (Staatz, 1984; Caves and Peterson, 1986). Contrary to IOFs, 
cooperatives are generally regarded as a separate form of business 
organization. They are dealing directly with their owners/member-
patrons, they serve them and distribute profits or surpluses according to 
patronage and not according to investment. Furthermore, they provide 
services and goods for which market values may not exist (for instance, 
education to their members, community development and the like). These 
distinctive characteristics make cooperatives different from the other Economic and Financial Performance of Cooperatives and IOFs 
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forms of organizations suggesting thereby that their objectives may be 
entirely different from the ones pursued by the IOFs. 
It is generally believed that differences in goals may be reflected in the 
strategies adopted by cooperatives and IOFs3 and give rise to different 
financial performances4. Ratio analysis is widely used to evaluate financial 
performance. Within the theory of industrial organization there exists 
formal measures of performance which are well established (Porter and 
Scully, 1987; Ferrier and Porter, 1991); however, their application is 
difficult because of the unavailability of required data. Despite its 
limitations5, ratio analysis is a solid tool commonly used in finance to 
provide valuable comparisons between economic and financial analyses. 
We rely therefore on the analysis of financial ratios and on the comparison 
of these ratios between cooperatives and IOFs. 
Financial ratio analysis is extensively used by short-term and long-term 
lenders, banks and other financial institutions to evaluate the future 
capacity of a borrower to repay its debt. It is also one of the most 
important tools used by Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Canadian Bonds 
Rating Service in rating the bonds of corporations. 
Ratio analysis conveys information on certain crucial facts about a 
firm's operations and financial situation. The people whose job it is to 
analyze a firm's financial position will differ in the ratios they find useful. 
Short-term creditors are primarily interested in the firm's short-run 
performance and its holdings of liquid assets that can provide a ready 
source of cash to meet current cash requirements. Long-term creditors and 
stockholders, on the other hand, are concerned with the long-term as well 
as short-term outlook. Management is able to use activity and profitability 
ratios as well as liquidity and leverage ratios to measure its own 
performance. Ratio analysis is therefore a useful managerial tool. 
Theoretical economic and financial analysis demonstrate that the 
performance of cooperatives, measured in terms of profitability, leverage, 
solvency, liquidity, and efficiency, may be entirely different from the one 
of IOFs. A number of reasons have been advanced to explain this 
phenomenon6. 
Cooperatives are generally considered to be service-to-members 
maximizers subject to a profit constraint, while IOFs are rate of return to 
equity (at a given risk level) maximizers7. This difference in objectives 
results in a lower rate of return to equity for the cooperatives. This out-
come, however, should not be considered particularly bad for the coop-
eratives since members still can receive a rewarding payoff in terms of 
higher prices for their product, lower input prices or better marketing 
channels. 
Cooperatives also tend to have higher leverage8 ratios than IOFs. This is 
so because cooperatives are ‘equity bound’ and therefore rely more on 
debt financing in order to finance growth. Moreover, cooperatives, 
especially the small ones, tend to use more leverage compared to IOFs for 
reasons of moral hazard9. That is to say, due to the cooperative principles 
of ‘risk sharing’ and ‘mutual responsibility’, financially weaker Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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cooperatives may use debt extensively, knowing that the cooperative 
principles provide them an ‘insurance policy’ (stronger cooperatives 
would bail them out) in case of adverse business outcomes. Cooperatives 
could thus use more leverage than IOFs given that the latter do not have 
this type of insurance policy. Higher risks are thus assumed by the coop-
eratives. 
Given that cooperatives have the tendency to use more debt than IOFs, 
their solvency10 ratios should differ as well. High solvency ratios imply 
that cooperatives would have a high likelihood of default on debt service 
payments and higher prospects of bankruptcy11. The moral hazard 
behaviour of the cooperatives' managers may also affect the degree of 
liquidity12. Generally, cooperatives would accept lower liquidity ratios 
than IOFs. This again increases the risk of default. 
Cooperatives and IOFs tend to have different efficiency ratios13 because 
the former, due to moral hazard behaviour, tend to overinvest in fixed 
assets resulting thereby in a greater asset base for the same sales. A less 
efficient use of the assets results from this type of cooperative behaviour. 
These measures and their expected relationship between cooperatives and 
IOFs are presented in Table 1. 
Thus, theoretical analysis indicates that financial and economic per-
formance of cooperatives may be greatly determined by the cooperative 
principles of risk sharing and mutual responsibility and may affect 
productive and economic efficiencies in a manner such that their financial 
performance would be different from the one realized by IOFs. 
An empirical evaluation of the performance of cooperatives and IOFs 
should be of value to creditors, lenders, financial analysts and firms' 
managers as well as to governments and to those who are interested in the 
financial and economic performance of cooperatives. 
The question whether cooperatives perform indeed differently from 
IOFs is central to the current debate. In a recent article, Sexton and Iskow 
(1993) argue that “more research in this area is clearly needed”. This research 
by examining and identifying empirically the differences and similarities 
in performance between dairy cooperatives and IOFs in Canada is 
shedding new light on the current debate. The statistical information 
provided thereby should be of great value to policy makers and the 
organizations concerned. 
 
 
The Sample 
 
Two groups of companies were identified for the purposes of this study. 
The first one includes six major Canadian cooperatives belonging to the 
dairy sector. The second contains six Canadian IOFs belonging to the same 
industrial sector. 
The common characteristics of the two groups of companies are the fol-
lowing. They both belong to the same industrial sector and both produce 
similar products. They mainly process fluid milk for wholesale and retail Economic and Financial Performance of Cooperatives and IOFs 
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distribution and they specialize in the production of value-added dairy 
products, such as fine yogurt, ice cream, cheese and butter. Second, they 
both use the same raw materials and similar production methods.  
 
Table 1  Economic and Financial Performance of Cooperatives and IOFs 
 
Performance Ratio  Definition  Expected   
criteria     relationship 
 
Liquidity  Current ratio  Current assets      co-op<IOF 
    Current  liabilities                    
  Quick or acid ratio  Current assets -  co-op<IOF 
      Inventories          
    Current  liabilities               
  Coverage of current  Current assets -  co-op<IOf 
    assets with working    Current liabilities 
      capital  ratio  Current  assets                    
  Cash ratio  Cash                      co-op<IOF 
    Current  liabilities                    
  Undepreciated fixed  Undepreciated fixed assets co-op>IOF 
    assets to total capital  Total capital employed 
    employed ratio 
Leverage  Debt to equity  Total debt co-op>IOF 
    E q u i t y                     
  Debt ratio  Total debt                      co-op>IOF 
    Total capital employed 
Solvency  Coverage ratio  EBIT      co-op<IOF 
   Interest 
Profitability  Rate of return to  Net profit after taxes co-op<IOF 
      e q u i t y   a f t e r   t a x e s   E q u i t y                     
  Rate of total capital  Net profit before  co-op<IOF 
    employed before    interest and taxes        
    interest and taxes ratio  Total capital employed                         
  Return on total capital  Net profit after taxes    co-op<IOF 
    employed after taxes ratio  Total capital employed 
 
Third, they both function more or less in the same economic and business 
environment. Fourth, most of the companies in the sample are vertically 
integrated. Fifth, their size measured in terms of assets is comparable, as 
indicated in Table 2. Indeed, between 1986–1991, the sample period under 
investigation, the mean value of the assets for the six cooperatives was $89 
million, while the mean value of the assets for the six IOFs was $95 
million. It is worth noticing that for both the cooperatives and IOFs the 
largest firm possessed about two thirds of the group's total assets. Table 2 
reports some simple descriptive statistics for the two groups of firms. 
The analysis is restricted to the dairy industry for a number of reasons. 
First, appropriate levels for financial ratios depend to a large part upon 
the risk characteristics of the industrial sector in which the firm operates. Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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Thus, financial ratio analysis is industry-specific. Second, several prior 
U.S. studies have examined the financial performance of the dairy 
industry. Consequently, our results will be more comparable to these 
prior studies. Third, many Canadian cooperatives are concentrated in the 
dairy sector. Thus data is relatively abundant and easily attainable. 
Fourth, dairy cooperatives are quite large (measured in terms of assets) 
and easily comparable to the IOFs of the same industry. 
 
Table 2  Assets, Sales and Earnings of Cooperatives and IOFs in the 
Canadian Dairy Industries (Mean Values, 1986–1991, in $1000)  
 
 Assets:  Earnings:  Sales:   
  Mean Values  Mean Values  Mean Values 
 
Co-ops: 
  Agropur  352 943  5 785  782 577 
  Gay Lea  43 152  1 525  152 974 
  Agrinove  32 024  1 799  153 998 
  Purdel  44 122  3 737  247 388 
  Nutrinor  34 135  1 337  79 681 
  Scotsburn  30 013  928  117 123 
  Grand Mean  89 398  2 518  255 649 
 
IOFs: 
  Delisle  388 825  5 450  501 742 
  Guaranteed  32 543  351  45 395 
  Eplett  31 424  899  136 114 
  Becker  35 421  3 753  391 292 
  Saputo  49 124  1 926  62 389 
  Champlain  33 175  949  30 536 
  Grand Mean  95 085  2 221  194 578 
 
The data used to calculate financial ratios are obtained from the annual 
reports of the cooperatives while for the IOFs they come from Dun & 
Bradstreet, as well as from CANCORP service. The financial ratios 
calculated from these data are indicated in Table 3. 
For the purposes of our investigation only large-sized cooperatives and 
IOFs were chosen, given that they typically use similar financial 
instruments to fund their operations. This makes it possible to compute 
financial ratios which are consistent between the two groups. Smaller 
organizations often do not have the same financial instruments available 
to them, consequently the calculation of certain financial ratios is often 
impossible. 
The list of the Top 50 Canadian cooperatives, published annually by the 
Government of Canada, was used to choose nine (9) dairy cooperatives 
from a list of twelve (12). Three (3) of them were excluded on the basis that 
they were too diversified to be included in the sample. Two (2) dairy 
cooperatives responded negatively to our request for their Annual Reports 
on the pretext that they do not release this information to the public. A 
merger of two cooperatives further reduced our sample to six (6) dairy 
cooperatives. Economic and Financial Performance of Cooperatives and IOFs 
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Data for IOFs were collected from Dun & Bradstreet and CANCORP 
applying the same criteria. That is, to make the sample comparable, IOFs 
with less than $ 30 million dollars in assets in 1991 and more than $ 500 
million were excluded from the sample. Their main activity was in the 
dairy industry. Thus, purely diversified IOFs were excluded from the 
sample. Twelve (12) IOFs could satisfy our criteria. The restructuring 
process reduced the number of firms either because some of them were 
converted to private firms at the end of our sample period, or because 
they merged with others. Therefore, no data was available for them for the 
whole time period under investigation. Finally, six (6) IOFs were chosen 
for which the complete series of data was available. 
 
Table 3  Ratio Analysis 
A. Liquidity ratios 
  V1 =   Current assets    R1 =  Current ratio   V1/V2 
  V2 =   Current liabilities    R2 =  Quick or acid ratio  (V1-V3)/V2 
  V3 =   Inventories    R3 =  Coverage of current assets  (V1-V2)/V1 
        with working capital ratio 
  V4 =   Cash    R4 =  Cash ratio    V4/V2 
  V5 =   Undepreciated    R5 =  Undepreciated fixed assets  V5/V6 
  fixed assets      to total capital employed ratio 
B. Leverage ratios     
  V6 =   Total capital employed    R6 = Debt ratio    V7/V6 
  V7 =   Total debt    R7 = Debt to equity ratio  V7/V8 
C. Profitability ratios     
  V8 =   Equity    R8 =  Return on equity   V9/V8 
          after taxes ratio   
  V9 =   Net profit after taxes    R9 =  Return on total  capital  V10/V6 
          employed before interest  
        and taxes ratio   
 V10 =   Net profit before     R10=  Return on total capital  V9/V6 
  interest and taxes       employed after taxes ratio 
 
Methodology and Results 
 
Appropriate values collected from published balance sheets and income 
statements for both cooperatives a n d  I O F s  w e r e  u s e d  t o  c a l c u l a t e  
liquidity, leverage (gearing), and profitability ratios. Means for the two 
groups of companies were compared for each financial ratio by using one-
way analysis of variance (Koutsoyiannis, 1983). Table 4 presents results of 
the tests. 
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Table 4  Results of the Analysis of Variance 
 
Variables  Group means (1986–1991)  Level of significance 
Ratio co-operatives  IOFs  (5%) 
  
R1 1.016  1.227  Y 
R2 .893  1.117  Y 
R3 .277  .128  Y 
R4 .180  .395  Y 
R5 .617  .645  N 
R6 .946  .659  Y 
R7 1.118  1.555  Y 
R8 .089  .071  N 
R9 .081  .081  N 
R10 .063  .050  N 
The results are revealing. It is found that dairy IOFs and cooperatives 
differ significantly in a number of ratios, such as the liquidity ratio 
(current and acid ratio), cash ratio, and finally total debt, and total debt to 
equity ratio. The differences found in liquidity may be explained by the 
fact that IOFs and cooperatives follow a different working capital 
management. Apparently, IOFs use low levels of inventories and other-
than-inventories current assets. On the contrary, cooperatives hold high 
levels of inventories and overinvest in other-than-inventories current as-
sets. This seems to confirm the theoretical assertion presented in Table 1. 
Cooperatives' and IOFs' indebtedness differs significantly. IOFs are 
using less debt than cooperatives, for the sample examined, confirming 
the theoretical relationship established in Table 1. This difference is 
nonetheless surprising given that cooperatives have more difficulties in 
obtaining loans and/or are generally more risk averse than IOFs 
(Gentzoglanis, 1993; 1996). It should be noted, however, that the period 
under investigation was characterized by a frenetic use of junk bonds but 
there is no evidence that the IOFs under investigation have used this type 
of financing. This may explain why the differences in profitability ratios of 
cooperatives and IOFs are not statistically significant14.  
As far as the ratio of undepreciated fixed assets to total capital 
employed ratio is concerned, it seems that both cooperatives and IOFs 
invest more or less the same proportion of total capital to fixed assets. This 
may suggest that both groups of companies use good quality equipment 
and are keeping up with the evolution in technologies. Their objectives to 
become more export-oriented and the fierce competitive forces in 
domestic and international (U.S.) markets may be the reasons explaining 
this phenomenon. Moreover, this may reflect the similarity of long-term 
development and growth objectives of their managements. This probably 
explains as well why the differences in profitability ratios between 
cooperatives and IOFs are not statistically significant. 
Table 5 compares the results of this study to earlier ones which have 
used a similar methodology and have examined the same industrial sector 
(Venieris' study, however, employed a different industry, the wine 
industry in Greece)15. Empirical estimates made by Chen et al. (1985) and 
Schrader et al. (1985) confirm the theoretical hypotheses exposed in Table Economic and Financial Performance of Cooperatives and IOFs 
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1. It should be noted, however, that Parliament et al. (1990) found that 
cooperatives' and IOFs' performance differ in terms of liquidity and sales-
to-total-assets and indebtedness, while their performance was comparable 
in terms of the return on equity. The present study demonstrates that 
cooperatives' and IOFs' performance indices such as profitability and 
technological abreast, do not differ significantly, while for others such as 
liquidity and leverage, there is a statistical difference. These results are 
comparable as well to the ones obtained by Lerman and Parliament (1990) 
for fruit and vegetable processors in the U.S. 
The results of Chen et al (1985) and Venieris (1989) are also quite simi-
lar. Surprisingly, these studies refer to cooperatives involved in different 
economic activities (dairy and wine respectively) and in different business 
environments and corporate cultures (U.S.A. and Greece respectively). 
According to Venieris, cooperatives in Greece are overgeared because they 
use borrowed capital interest-free from government agencies, while IOFs 
borrow at the market interest rate. It is then not surprising to observe that 
Venieris' empirical findings confirm the theoretical ones (as exposed in 
Table 1). “The reasons of the differences found in profitability among the various 
groups of companies examined are due to the different borrowing conditions and 
fiscal policy regulations that public companies have to put up with” (Venieris, 
1989, p. 134). 
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Table 5  Comparison and Evaluation of the Economic and Financial 
Performance of Cooperatives and IOFs 
 
Perfor-  Ratio  Theoretical     Empirical findings as expected theoretically 
mance   Expected  Parliament-  Chen Venieris  Present 
criteria    Relationship  et al, 1990  et al. 1985  1989  study  
 
Liquidity Current  ratio  Co-op<IOF  --  --  N  Y 
 
  Quick or acid   Co-op<IOF  N  --  Y  Y 
 ratio 
 
 Coverage  of  Co-op<IOF  N  --  N  N 
 current  assets 
 with  working   
 capital  ratio 
 
 Cash  ratio  Co-op<IOF  --  --  N  N 
 
 Undepreciated  Co-op>IOF  --  --  Y  N 
  fixed assets to 
 total  capital 
 employed  ratio   
  
Leverage  Debt to equity  Co-op>IOF  N  Y  Y  N 
 Debt  ratio  Co-op>IOF  N  Y  Y  N 
 
Solvency Coverage  ratio Co-op<IOF  N  --  --    -- 
 
Profita-  Rate of return to  Co-op<IOF  N  Y  Y  N 
bility  equity after taxes 
 
  Return on total  Co-op<IOF  N  Y  Y  N 
 capital  employed 
 before  interest 
  and taxes ratio 
 
  Return on total  Co-op<IOF  N  Y  Y  N 
 capital  employed 
  after taxes ratio 
 
Our results are comparable to the ones found by Parliament et al. (1990). 
Probably, the similarity of government regulations in the two countries, as 
far as cooperatives are concerned, the closeness of business and economic 
environment, and the geographic proximity of the two countries as well as 
the level of competition exercised between them in the dairy sector may 
explain these similarities. 
It would appear that the dairy cooperatives in the sample examined 
have learned rapidly from the changing economic and business environ-
ment and have managed quite well during the transitional period. It 
remains to be seen whether they will be able to keep up with economic 
evolution and fierce competition. Nevertheless, the results of this study 
are encouraging. They show that cooperatives adjust themselves to new Economic and Financial Performance of Cooperatives and IOFs 
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challenges by adopting management methods which permit them to per-
form not differently from IOFs. 
 
 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
This study has examined empirically the financial and economic per-
formance of cooperatives and IOFs. The goals were to verify whether the 
traditional cooperative principles give rise to different financial per-
formance between cooperatives and IOFs and to examine and compare 
their differences in performance. 
For the sample and period examined, the results indicate that the 
economic and financial performance of cooperatives and IOFs are compa-
rable. The two groups of companies show no major differences in profit-
ability, productivity and the use of new technologies, while significant 
differences seem to exist in liquidity and working capital management. It 
should be noted that this analysis does not take into account the non-
market dimensions of cooperatives. Should they have been taken into ac-
count, significant differences in performance might have been observed. 
These findings corroborate the growing recognition that the financial 
performance of cooperatives may be comparable to the one of IOFs 
despite the differences in their organizational structure. All in all, the 
traditional cooperative principles are not as stringent as is commonly be-
lieved. They do not represent a burden to cooperatives and they do not 
hinder them in achieving productive efficiencies and good financial per-
formance. An explanation of this phenomenon may be that cooperatives 
have, in the last decade or so, accumulated equity at a faster rate than the 
one experienced by IOFs. Although there is no evidence that the IOFs in 
our sample have used debt excessively, many IOFs have nonetheless, in 
the 1980s, accumulated debt due chiefly to the emergence of new financial 
instruments such as junk bonds16. It can then be concluded that the use of 
equity capital and other forms of market instruments have provided 
cooperatives with a competitive advantage permitting them to show year-
end performance not different than the one realized by IOFs. 
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Notes 
 
1  Some care should be taken, however, to allow for the non-market transactions of cooperatives (See 
Parliament et al., 1990, for an excellent presentation on this point). 
2  Since 1979 IOFs have increasingly turned to long-term financing through the high-yield bond market 
(junk bonds). In the U.S.A. the value of this market was $85 billion in 1988. 
3  The debate concerning how differences in goals and strategies affect firms' performance is well 
known and can be found in many writings of many traditional neoclassical theorists. 
4  It is important to notice that available economic and financial tools do not allow complete evaluation 
of the performance of cooperatives. This is mainly due to the fact that there are not as yet tools 
allowing for the non-market dimensions of cooperatives (See Sexton and Iskow, 1993, for an excellent 
critique of studies failing to take into account the non-market dimensions of cooperatives and the bias 
they introduce into the relative performance calculations of IOFs). 
5  See Sexton and Iskow (1993) for a critique of the ratio analysis. 
6  For a review of the literature on this issue see Sexton and Iskow (1993). 
7  The rate of return to investors’ equity is the most widely used measure of profitability. 
8  Leverage is calculated as the ratio of debt to equity in a firm's capital structure. It results from the use 
of external sources of financing. 
9  The problem of moral hazard can best be viewed in the case of insurances. When one gets full 
insurance and the insurance company with limited information cannot accurately monitor the 
behaviour of the insurant, the latter, by changing its behaviour, may affect the probability or the 
magnitude of the event that triggers payment. 
10  A firm's capacity to service debt, which is measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) to annual interest expense, indicates its solvency ratio. 
11  There are more reasons to expect that cooperatives would have a higher likelihood of default than 
IOFs. For details see Parliament et al. (1990). 
12  The adequacy of current assets to meet current liabilities is measured by liquidity. 
13  The ratio of sales to total assets is a measure of efficiency. 
14  If we take into account the additional services cooperatives may provide to their members, we may 
conclude that cooperatives' and IOFs' profitability differ significantly. 
15  There is a number of other empirical studies comparing the economic performance of cooperatives 
and IOFs, but they use a completely different methodology and occasionally different industrial 
sectors. Their results therefore are not directly comparable to ours (see for example the studies by 
Porter and Scully, 1987; Ferrier and Porter, 1991; Stafford and Roof, 1984; Babb and Boynton, 1981; 
Hollas and Stansel, 1988; Schrader et al, 1985; etc.).  
16  Junk bonds have substituted for bank lending and during the 1980s a lot of IOFs have become more 
leveraged. While greater leverage reduces a firm's tax burden (due to the tax deductibility of interest 
payments), it increases its probability of default as well. This riskier capital structure may negatively 
affect a firm's profitability performance. 
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The food self-sufficiency rate (in calories) in Japan declined to 37% in 1993. 
Japan is probably one of the largest importers of agricultural products in 
the advanced countries. In addition, the Japanese Diet ratified the WTO 
agreements which included the liberalization of rice imports. That will 
deal a serious blow to Japanese farmers and agricultural co-operatives. 
Under the import-liberalized process for agricultural products, the 
Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives in Japan decided in 1988 to 
promote mergers and structural reorganization. About 4,000 multi-
purpose co-operative societies were in existence in 1988. The number, 
however, has been sharply declining, and a target figure for the year 2000 
is 1,000 societies. As the primary co-operative societies are enlarged by 
mergers, their affiliated organizations are going to be reorganized by 
being reduced from three tiers to two tiers. 
With the mergers and structural reorganization, the characteristics of 
Japanese agricultural co-operatives are changing. Multi-purpose co-
operatives, by which Japanese agricultural co-operatives have often been 
characterized, are advancing in a direction by which their multi-purpose 
characteristic in itself will be lost, despite Dr. Laidlaw's praise for this 
feature in his report ‘Co-operatives in the year 2000’ (1980). A balance 
among the functions of each business, such as marketing, finance and 
supply, has already been lost, and financial business has become a central 
business because of its profit-making. As marketing business and farm 
guidance activities are showing a tendency to be neglected, the gap 
between co-operative businesses and the needs of farmers is expanding. 
The model of amalgamation, which is presented now, is based on one as 
reasonable as a financial company's. This trend will furthermore expand 
the imbalance among the functions of businesses. In addition, structural 
reorganization into two tiers is advancing separately in each business, and 
is being carried out by the vertical system of two tiers. 
 In this paper, the distinctive features of recent mergers and structural 
reorganization of agricultural co-operatives in Japan are clarified. 
(Fujitani, 1991; Madane, 1992; Ienohikari, 1994) 
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What was the Japanese Type of Agricultural Co-operative? 
 
Agricultural co-operatives in Japan are classified into multi-purpose 
societies and single-purpose ones. Table 1 indicates the change in the 
number of multi- and single-purpose societies. Though there are more 
single-purpose societies than multi-purpose ones, the latter have had a 
dominant position in Japan, because multi-purpose co-operatives are 
found in virtually all municipalities across the country, and also cover all 
farmers in their districts. They have carried out a wide range of business, 
including guidance in farming and better living, marketing, purchasing, 
credit service and mutual insurance, and the handling of all major crops, 
especially rice, in their respective districts. Such multi-phase activities are 
geared to the actual needs of Japanese farmers who are often engaged in 
mixed farming. On the other hand, single-purpose societies are organized 
by farmers of specific crops and in specific areas, and marketing is their 
principal business. Almost all members of single-purpose societies are 
concurrently members of multi-purpose societies. 
 
Table 1  Change in the Number of Agricultural Co-operative Societies 
 
  Multi-                Single-purpose co-operatives                              Total 
  purpose  Seri-   Live-  Horti-  Sett-  Rural   Others  Total   
  co-ops  culture stock culture lers    industry   
 
 1960  12,050  6,293  3,052  679  4,789  597  1,436  16,846  28,896 
 1970  6,049  2,557  2,670  571  3,484  334  925  10,541  16,590 
  1980  4,528 1,190  2,216 557  452 214  562 5,191 9,719 
  1990 3,574 533  1,947  523 323  191 506  4,023  7,597 
  1991 3,373 515  1,934  521 318  192 497  3,977  7,350 
  1992 3,073 503  1,908  513 315  192 490  3,921  6,994 
 *  3,073  33  1,054  461  186  172  181 2,087 5,160 
 **  --    470 854  52  129  20  309  1,834  1,834 
1992/60     26%  8% 63% 68%  7% 32%  34%  23%  24% 
Source:  ‘Statistics on multi-purpose agricultural co-operatives’, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). 
  *  1992 with share capital 
  ** 1992 without share capital  
 
The Japanese type of agricultural co-operatives (i.e. multi-purpose co-
operatives) had a variety of features (Otawara, 1992). Firstly, they were 
involved in wide-range and comprehensive businesses. There were 
linkages and integrated approaches among businesses to improve farm 
production and the life of their members. The farming and life cycle of 
members, i.e. farm plans, procurement of funds and materials, production, 
marketing, savings, and the purchase of consumer goods corresponds to 
this wide range of co-operative businesses. 
Secondly, each multi-purpose co-operative had its territorial zone that 
coincided with a municipality, and covered all farmers in its zone. At the 
time of the establishment of co-operatives, a hamlet had been the initial 
unit of each co-operative society, and this unit became the base of the 
organization of membership after mergers. Therefore, these past multi-Mergers and Structural Reorganization of Cooperatives in Japan 
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purpose co-operatives had been characterized as traditional co-operatives 
based on a village community. Thirdly, multi-purpose co-operatives had 
functioned as a governmental administrative institution. They had been 
exclusively located in the government's control system for rice as a 
collection agency, under the recently abolished Staple Food Control Law, 
and they had also been a financing agency located in the government-
programmed loans for agriculture. This feature of agricultural co-
operatives was the background of territorial coincidence between a co-
operative society and a municipality.  
The three features described above had a mutual linkage, and, in gen-
eral, we could also say that traditional ‘sociality’ and ‘collectivity’ were 
characteristics of Japanese agricultural co-operatives. However, with 
enlargement of co-operative business and diversification of members' 
needs,  ‘individuality’ (Nilsson, 1986) has gained force over and above 
traditional ‘sociality’, and a new bureaucracy of modern business 
enterprise is being generated to replace the old one as a governmental 
administrative institution.  
Table 2 indicates that, during the three decades from the 1950s, agri-
cultural co-operative amalgamation reached the size of a municipality. In 
1950, the number of multi-purpose societies almost corresponded to the 
number of municipalities. But owing to the Town and Village Merger 
Acceleration Act, the number of municipalities decreased drastically to 
less than half by 1955. The number of multi-purpose societies also de-
creased under the Amalgamation Aid Law, and was almost as low in 
number as the municipalities by the 1980s. So, during the one decade from 
the mid-1970s, the number of cases and societies participating in amal-
gamation had decreased. But, at the end of the 1980s, it increased again 
because the Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives decided to pro-
mote the merger. The recent amalgamation, which goes beyond the extent 
of a municipality, is different from the previous one in its aim as 
mentioned above. Therefore we have a new stage of mergers, and agricul-
tural co-operatives are also losing their third feature as an administrative 
institution. 
Regarding the first feature, multi-purpose co-operatives have already 
lost their balance of functions within businesses. Figure 1 demonstrates 
the differential growth in co-operative businesses. Mutual insurance and 
credit businesses have grown vigorously, while marketing business has 
been stagnant. 
The same point is shown in Table 3. The number of employees in 
charge of financial and purchasing businesses has increased rapidly from 
the 1970s to the aggregate of 67% in 1992, while marketing and guidance 
have been stagnant, only 14%. Financial business has become a central 
business because of its profit-making, while marketing business and farm 
guidance activities have shown a tendency to be neglected because of their 
low profit, in spite of their importance as co-operative businesses. 
 Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
 
186 
Table 2  Change of Amalgamation in Multi-Purpose Societies  
 
  No. of  No. of societies   No. of  No. of 
  cases of  participating  multi-purpose   cities, towns  
  amalgamation  in amalgamation   societies  and villages 
 
1950       13,314  10,414 
1955     12,985  4,8131 
1960 211  947  12,050  3,511 
1961 137  541  11,5862  
1962 210  912  10,813   
1963 216  967  10,083   
1964  237 1,066 9,135   
1965  578 2,599 7,320 3,376 
1966 35  135  7,209   
1967 58  169  7,074   
1968 218  829  6,470   
1969 99  378  6,185     
1970 42  162  6,049  3,276 
1971 102  439  5,688   
1972 101  393  5,488   
1973 67  285  5,198   
1974 119  434  4,942   
1975 60  225  4,803  3,257 
1976 25  65  4,763   
1977 56  160  4,657   
1978 31  101  4,583   
1979 18  54  4,546     
1980 35  85  4,528  3,256 
1981 65  172  4,473   
1982 44  116  4,3733  
1983 27  77  4,317   
1984 17  49  4,303   
1985 19  55  4,267  3,254 
1986 24  75  4,214   
1987 38  126  4,072   
1988 62  250  3,8984  
1989 92  306  3,685     
1990 60  187  3,574  3,246 
1991 54  221  3,294   
1992 94  385  3,105     
Source: Yearbook of Agricultural Co-operative and the Population Census. 
1 Owing to the merger of towns and villages under the Town and Village Merger 
Acceleration Law. 
2 Amalgamation Aid Law was enacted. 
3 Amalgamation Aid Law expired. 
4 The Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives decided to promote amalgamation.  
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Figure 1  Growth in Multi-Purpose Co-operative Businesses (1970=1) 
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Table 3  Change in the Number of Employees by Business in Charge 
 
  1964 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 
 
Credit  43,109 58,796 68,184 75,515 78,169 77,187 76,715 
  (22.9) (23.8) (25.1) (26.4) (26.3) (25.9) (25.6) 
Mutual  7,235 11,589 14,741 17,327 19,904 22,866 24,287 
    insurance  (3.8)  (4.7)  (5.4)  (6.0)  (6.7)  (7.7)  (8.1) 
Purchasing  47,649 71,522 85,185 91,419 98,319 98,836  100,199 
  (25.3) (28.9) (31.4) (31.9) (33.1) (33.2) (33.4) 
Marketing  16,858 18,539 19,063 19,648 19,299 19,299 19,367 
  (8.9) (7.5) (7.0) (6.8) (6.5) (6.5) (6.5) 
Guidance  14,086 17,490 18,318 20,955 22,719 22,603 21,286 
  (7.5) (7.1) (6.8) (7.3) (7.6) (7.6) (7.1) 
Other  33,439 35,686 28,488 22,285 20,341 19,587 20,447 
    business1  (17.8)  (14.0)  (10.5) (7.8) (6.8) (6.6) (6.8) 
Other  26,078 34,514 37,220 39,228 38,344 37,081 37,861 
  (13.8) (14.0) (13.7) (13.7) (12.9) (12.5) (12.6) 
 
Total  188,454 248,136 271,199 286,377 297,095 297,459 300,162 
    surveyed  (100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0) 
Source: ‘Statistics on multi-purpose agricultural co-operatives’, MAFF.    
1  Agricultural warehousing, transportation, processing and manufacturing, utilities, 
  supplying home-lots and others, etc. 
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Decreasing the rate of rice in the marketing business of co-operatives is 
one reason for losing the balance from the 1970s. As we can see in Table 4, 
the rate of rice in marketing turnover has decreased from about 51% in 
1970 to 32% in 1992, owing to a policy of reducing cultivated acreage for 
rice under overproduction. Until 1970, the rice had accounted for more 
than 50% of marketing turnover. The marketing of rice and a large sum of 
rice proceeds which was paid directly to co-operatives' savings account 
had brought a high profit. After the 1970s, instead of rice, livestock 
products, vegetables and fruits have been grown, but the growth stopped 
in the early 1990s. Under a background of urbanization in rural areas, as 
marketing business has not brought a profit compared with financial ones, 
co-operatives have been inclined to intensify financial business. As a 
result, they have gradually left members such as farmers behind. 
 
Table 4  Marketing Turnover of Multi-Purpose Co-operative  
  (100 Million Yen) 
 
  Commodities  1955 1960 1970 1980 1990 1992 
 
 Rice    2,956  3,662  10,812  19,766  20,027  20,129 
  (66.9) (61.0) (51.3) (35.9) (31.2) (32.4) 
 
 Wheat  414  479  311  1,277  1,611  1,306 
  (9.4) (8.0) (1.5) (2.3) (2.5) (2.1) 
 
  Cereals      100 126 186 589 761 736 
    and pulses  (2.3)  (2.1)  (0.9)  (1.1)  (1.2)  (1.2) 
 
 Potatoes     125  152  301  697  609  575 
  (2.8) (2.5) (1.4) (1.3) (0.9) (0.9) 
 
 Silk         177  250  702  1,000  308  188 
    cocoon  (4.0)  (4.2)  (3.3)  (1.8)  (0.5)  (0.3) 
 
 Vegetables     172  1,766  8,258  13,422  12,640 
  184.0  (2.9)  (8.4) (15.0) (20.9) (20.3) 
 (4.2) 
  Fruits    291 1,989 5,659 7,804 7,760 
    (4.9)  (9.4) (10.3) (12.2) (12.5) 
 
 Livestock    105  485  3,998  13,805  14,295  13,108 
    products    (2.4)  (8.1)  (19.0)  (25.1)  (22.3)  (21.1) 
 
 Others1  357  382 1,023 3,956 5,274 5,681 
  (8.0) (6.4) (4.9) (7.2) (8.2)  (9.1)   
 
 Total        4,418  5,999  21,080  55,009  64,113  62,123 
  (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
Source:  ‘Statistics on multi-purpose agricultural co-operatives’, MAFF. 
1 Flowers and ornamental plants, industrial crops, green tea and others. 
 
Table 5 shows the membership of multi-purpose societies, and in par-
ticular indicates the increase of associate members without voting rights. 
Regular members are farmers, while associate members are non-farmer Mergers and Structural Reorganization of Cooperatives in Japan 
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inhabitants living in the locality where the co-operative society in question 
is situated. The proportion of associate members has increased from about 
12% in 1960 to 38% in 1992, i.e. about two-fifths of multi-purpose co-
operative members are non-farmers, mainly in financial business. 
 
Table 5  Membership of Multi-Purpose Co-operative Societies (in 1000s) 
 
                             Regular members  Associate   Total   Rate of  
          Total     Households  members   C =    associate  
  A (1,000)    (1,000)    B (1,000)  A+B  member B/C 
 
1960 5,780  5,072  756  6,536  11.6% 
1965 5,837  5,266  953  6,790  14.0% 
1970  5,889 5,304 1,387 7,276  19.1% 
1975  5,773 5,253 1,899 7,672  24.8% 
1980  5,641 5,088 2,244 7,885  28.5% 
1985  5,542 4,968 2,526 8,068  31.3% 
1990  5,544 4,859 3,065 8,609  35.6% 
1991  5,533 4,837 3,203 8,736  36.7% 
1992  5,514 4,806 3,329 8,844  37.6% 
Source:  ‘Statistics on multi-purpose agricultural co-operatives’, MAFF. 
 
 
Structural Reorganization - a Case of Purchasing Business 
  
Concurrently with merger development, the present three-tier system of 
agricultural co-operatives is reorganizing into a two-tier system. The 
present three-tier system is described below (see Figure 2). 
Primary societies have corresponding federations at the prefectural 
level, organized by function. Federations are therefore classified into two 
categories:  
•  Those mainly composed of multi-purpose agricultural co-operatives 
such as prefectural economic (marketing and supply), credit, and 
mutual insurance federations, and  
•  Single-purpose agricultural co-operatives such as dairy and horticul-
tural co-operative federations, and so on.  
 
Each of the 47 prefectures in Japan has a prefectural union whose 
members are primary societies and prefectural federations. Each prefec-
tural federation has a national counterpart, such as the National Fed-
eration of Agricultural Co-operative Associations (ZENNO), etc. The 
Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (ZENCHU), whose mem-
bership is held basically by primary co-ops, prefectural unions and fed-
erations, and various national federations, is a nationwide organization.  
In this three-tier system, the upper two tiers are organized separately by 
business; however, co-operative business has been carried out compre-
hensively in an integrated manner at the primary level. As the business 
scale became enlarged, each business became organized by a vertical 
system and, as a consequence, those business functions have been 
virtually carried out separately in the primary societies. In addition, Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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structural reorganization into two tiers is advancing separately by 
business. In many businesses, such as the supply of fertilizer, agricultural 
chemicals and livestock feed, the functions at the prefectural level will be 
dismantled into primary and national levels. But the purchasing business 
of consumer goods is an exception, in which the voluntary A-co-op chain 
stores of the primary societies is reorganizing into a regular chain store by 
prefectural economic federations. 
 
Figure 2  Structural Organization of Agricultural Co-operatives 
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The A-co-op chain store was organized in 1973 in order to survive grow-
ing competition with other chain stores; however, member stores were 
owned and managed by their respective co-operatives and only A-co-op 
brand products were distributed. Member stores were bigger and more 
standardized than the other co-operative stores. Table 6 shows chrono-
logical changes of member co-ops and stores. In this table, there are num-
ber of notable points. Firstly, A-co-op chain stores have grown rapidly 
during the decade from 1973. Consequently, aggregate sales by member 
stores have had three-fourths of the total sales of agricultural co-operative 
stores, despite the number of member stores being only one fourth of the 
total of agricultural co-op stores. Secondly, after 1985, however, A-co-op 
chain stores have remained stagnant in the number of member stores and 
in the rate of sales (B/D). This is the background of the recent 
consolidation of A-co-op chain stores to the prefectural level.  Mergers and Structural Reorganization of Cooperatives in Japan 
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Table 6  Change in the ‘A-Co-op’ Chain Store of Agricultural Co-ops 
 
 1973  1975  1980  1985  1990  1991  1992  80 85 90 
               75 80 85 
 
No. Affiliated co-ops  346  846  997  1202  1131  1080  1038 1.18 1.21 0.94 
No. Member stores           A  714  1471  1812  2065  1813  1764  1668  1.23  1.14  0.88 
Sales area/store (m2)  214  254  308  330  388  396  412 1.21 1.07 1.18 
Sales of A-co-op (100M¥) B  800  2743  5884  8602  9629  9972  9787  2.15  1.46  1.12 
Agricultural co-op stores C  -  9936  8961  8394  7696  7382  7258  0.90  0.94  0.92 
Sales of (100M¥)               D  4397  6763  9025  10849  12687  13222 12884  1.33  1.20  1.17 
        A/C    -  14.8  20.2  24.6  23.6  23.9  23.0   --   --  -- 
        B/D  18.2  40.6  65.2  79.3  75.9  75.4  76.0   --   --  -- 
Source: Data of National Federation of Agricultural Co-operative Associations and ‘Statistics 
on multi-purpose agricultural co-operatives’, MAFF.  
 
Reorganization of A-co-op chain stores is now advancing in several pre-
fectural federations. Instead of primary societies, those prefectural 
federations are beginning to administer member stores, though those 
owners are still primary societies. Moreover, as store employees of agri-
cultural co-operatives, exclusively store clerks, also go on loan to the 
federations, head offices of A-co-op chain stores in the federations start to 
administer personnel affairs beyond the extent of primary societies. So far, 
in general, employees of primary societies, not only store clerks but also 
the persons in charge of marketing and guidance activities, etc., have been 
engaged in multifaceted businesses by turns every several years. Hence 
they have had many opportunities to make contact with member farmers. 
They may improve their expertise as store clerks by becoming A-co-op 
staff exclusively, but opportunities to make contact with members will 
thus unfailingly decrease. Moreover the authority of primary societies in 
store administration will be lost.  
New A-co-op stores which come under member articles are more 
restricted to the larger scale stores, while the other smaller stores are 
consolidating and being abolished. Table 7 shows that small stores of less 
than 100 m
2 decreased drastically through the 1970s and 1980s, and the 
number of small stores in 1992 were reduced to less than half. In general, 
co-operative small stores are located in the old hamlets, and they function 
as a haunt for members. But those have been consolidated into bigger ones 
in suburban areas, and stores with upwards of 300 m2 gradually have 
been increasing in number. This tendency is going to be strongly affected 
by the current structural reorganization. Structural reform of co-operative 
stores will be accelerated, and the functions of store administration will be 
carried out by federations which have no system of direct member 
participation. (Kawaguchi, 1993) 
 
 
New Movements of Agricultural Co-operatives 
 
The increasingly larger scale of co-op societies is, in itself, not problematic, 
because large-scale co-operatives do not always have weak member Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
 
192 
involvement. For example, Japanese consumer co-operatives successfully 
combined the development of business operations and movement through 
member participation. But we could say the above-mentioned process of 
mergers and structural reorganization has left membership behind and 
resulted in the development of ‘enterprises’ separated from membership. 
(Craig 1986) 
 
Table 7  Number of Agricultural Co-operative Stores by Sales Area 
 
    1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 
 
 –100m2  8021 6867 5564 4834 4173 3949 3748 
    (77.6) (69.1) (62.1) (57.6) (54.2) (52.7) (51.9) 
 100–300m2  1815   2580 2640 2487 2490 2400 
    (17.6)   (28.8) (31.5) (32.3) (33.2) (33.2) 
 300–500m2     522 611 740 746 739 
      3069** (5.8) (7.3) (9.6) (9.9)  (10.2) 
 500–1500m2    500*  (30.9) 269 288 274 291 308 
    (4.8)   (3.0) (3.4) (3.6) (3.9) (4.3) 
 1500m2 –            26  21  22  22  26 
       (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) 
 
  Total  10336 9936 8961 8394 7696 7498 7221 
  (%)  (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
*  Applies for sales area 300 m2 and greater 
** Applies for sales area 100 m2 and greater 
Source: ‘Statistics on Multi-purpose Agricultural Co-operatives’, MAFF. 
 
When intensifying the pursuit of profit-making in the business of agri-
cultural co-operatives, the so-called ‘Suishin’ activity (a quota system of 
sales that must be fulfilled by an employee in addition to his/her regular 
work) has been stressed. For example, each employee has to sell out 
his/her quota, such as a few suits, jewelry or long-term insurances, etc., 
within a given period of time. Many members used to keep away from 
employees during a ‘Suishin’ period, because of fear of getting into a fix of 
buying unnecessary things. Employees are also inclined to get into a fix of 
buying the remaining quotas out of their own pockets. We can find a 
reverse form of ‘dialog’ system in the ‘Suishin’ activity. (Böök, 1992; 
Tanaka, 1992) 
Recently, there has appeared a movement based on a demand for work 
that is worth doing as a co-operative employee, i.e. useful work for 
member farmers, in the labor union movement of agricultural co-op work-
ers. A strong demand by agricultural co-operative employees who want to 
d o  w o r t h w h i le  w o r k  is  c h ang i ng  t h e  c o nst ru c t i o n  o f  c o - o p er at i v e b u si -
nesses into those based on members' needs. Co-operative business organi-
zations should contain the system of member participation, and co-op-
erative employees are in a crucial position between business and mem-
bers. Co-operative works worth doing are those based on members' needs, 
and farmer members hope to foster the local development of agriculture, 
not the pursuit of profit-making first. Accordingly, marketing business has 
come to play an important role among co-operative businesses in some 
societies, and in the societies in which farm guidance activities for raising 
local farm products and marketing efforts have been strengthened.  Mergers and Structural Reorganization of Cooperatives in Japan 
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Besides this movement, a lot of direct transactions of agricultural co-
operatives with consumer co-operatives have appeared and a new agri-
cultural co-operative whose purpose is exclusively direct transactions has 
also come into being. Influenced by the background of a health-oriented 
diet in urban areas, direct transactions with consumer organizations have 
linked up with organic farming in many cases. It is another important 
point to combine marketing businesses of agricultural co-operatives with 
nearby consumer organizations and promote mutual reliance of co-
operative members in order to vitalize the organization and survive the 
fierce competition.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Under the recent import-liberalized process for farm products, we have a 
new stage of agricultural co-operative mergers and structural reorganiza-
tion in Japan. The model of mergers, which is presented now, is based on 
one as reasonable as a financial company's model. Marketing business of 
co-operatives have shown a tendency to be neglected, while financial 
businesses have grown vigorously. Multi-purpose co-operatives are 
advancing in a direction by which their multi-purpose characteristic in 
itself will be lost. This trend will furthermore expand the imbalance 
among the functions of businesses. 
In addition, structural reorganization into two tiers is advancing sepa-
rately in each business, and is being carried out by the vertical system of 
two tiers. Multi-purpose co-operatives in Japan are dissolving into each 
part of the business organizations by the structural reorganization.  
 
References 
 
BÖÖK, S.-Å. 1992. Co-operative Values in a Changing World, International Co-operative 
Alliance, Geneva.  
CRAIG, J.G. 1986. ‘Business Success and Democratic Process’, Co-operatives Today, Inter-
national Co-operative Alliance, Geneva. 
FUJITANI, C. 1991. Agricultural Co-operative Reform (in Japanese),  
IENOHIKARI, 1994. ‘Japan's Agricultural Cooperatives’, In: Agriculture and Agricultural Policy 
in Japan, the Committee for the Japanese Agriculture Session, 21 IAAE Conference (ed.), Tokyo, 
1991. 
KAWAGUCHI, K. 1993. ‘Development Model of the Co-operative Movement – Japan Type’, 
Journal of Co-operative Studies, 12.  
LAIDLAW, A.F. 1980. Co-operatives in the Year 2000, International Co-operative Alliance, 
Geneva. 
MADANE, M.V. 1992. Agricultural Cooperatives in Japan – The Dynamics of Their Development, 
ICA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, New Delhi (second revised edition). 
NILSSON, J. 1986. ‘Trends in Co-operative Theory’, Co-operatives Today, International Co-
operative Alliance, Geneva.  
OTAWARA, T. 1992. ‘Affiliated Reorganization and Reform of Agricultural Co-operative’ (in 
Japanese), Nobunkyo, Tokyo.  
TANAKA, H. 1992. ‘Business and Movement’, In: Co-operative Organization – Its Structure and 
Innovation at a Turning Point in History, Co-op Research Institute, Yokohama.  
 
12 Diversification, Vertical Integration  
  and Profitability in the Greek Food 
Manufacturing Industries* 
 
Constantine A. Bourlakis 
 
 
The present chapter assesses the importance of diversification and vertical 
integration strategies as determinants of performance in the Greek food 
manufacturing industries. The analysis is conducted using a panel of 540 
firms observed annually over the period 1986 to 1992. The analysis of the 
results suggests that diversification is a source of competitive advantage 
in the local food industry. Although a diversification strategy is a distinct 
evidence of higher profitability in the full sample, diversification activity 
per se is not. Concentric diversification seems to be a profitable option for 
smaller food manufacturing companies that adopt such a strategy, but it is 
not a profitable option for larger food manufacturing companies that raise 
their profitability via the conglomerate diversification alternative. 
Expansion strategies in the form of vertical integration seem to be 
associated with negative pay-offs for firms involved. However, a 
combined strategy of vertical integration and conglomerate diversification 
for larger firms and a combined strategy of vertical integration and 
concentric diversification for smaller firms shows superior performance 
for the relevant companies. 
 
 
Diversification and Performance 
 
Although a diversification strategy is, in principle, the production of more 
than one product or service by a company, it is convenient to narrow the 
concept somewhat to the following definitions: 
•  In a concentric diversification strategy, the company adds a number of 
new related products or services. 
•  In a conglomerate diversification strategy a firm produces products or 
services which are seemingly unrelated in production or demand. 
 
Vertical integration describes the overall degree to which different business 
activities in a value chain are brought under the management of a single 
company. There are two categories of vertical integration: 
•  Backward or upstream integration is the case where the company is 
seeking increased control or ownership of its suppliers. For the pur-
pose of the present chapter, it refers to the extent to which a single 
business (product) company is moving into the raw materials and 
inputs market, either via vertical merger or by setting up new produc-
tion facilities. Diversification, Vertical Integration and Profitability  
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•  Forward or downstream integration describes the situation where the 
company moves towards final production and distribution. In that 
kind of integration the company may also gain ownership or increased 
control over distributors or retailers, as it carries on successive stages in 
the processing and distribution of a product. 
 
The motives behind company diversification can be classified into two 
broad categories: (a) the utilisation of specific physical and/or human 
assets, and (b) the reduction of financial risk. The first incentive is related 
to economies of scope or in general to the utilisation of an asset or assets 
that can produce a number of goods and services. The second motive is 
associated with pecuniary economies arising from large firm size per se 
and also in keeping a balanced portfolio of products or services in order to 
stabilise the company's profitability over time. The implications of the 
previous arguments are numerous. The diversified corporation should be 
able to allocate resources among divisions more efficiently than the ex-
ternal market, and the latter should be greatly enhanced by the existence 
of a vertical organisational structure. We can expect a diversified 
corporation to enjoy higher profitability than its non-diversified rivals 
over time. Secondly, since the main rationale for diversification is the 
reduction of a firm's unit costs by producing two or more goods or 
services jointly rather than separately (economies of scope in common 
inputs and the transfer of skills among divisions), related (concentric) 
diversification should be more profitable than unrelated (conglomerate) 
diversification. 
There is an extensive literature on the diversification-profitability 
relationship following the seminal work of Rumelt (1974). The main 
interest and research in corporate strategy has focused on how different 
types of diversification strategies may impact upon company perform-
ance. In particular, a number of studies examined the influence of a com-
pany's strategy and organisational structure might have on performance. 
Rumelt (1974) found that while diversification per se was not a profitable 
activity, firms that pursued market related diversification were more 
profitable than companies that diversified into markets that were 
unrelated to their main activity. In addition, Rumelt (1974) pointed out 
that both conglomerates and vertically integrated companies were the 
least profitable among the 500 industrial companies examined between 
1949 and 19691,2. A number of authors have subsequently confirmed the 
superiority of related over unrelated diversification, although industry 
specific factors seem to play an important role in raising the profitability 
in the case of related diversification3. Other studies have found unrelated 
diversification to be a more profitable strategy than related diversification 
(Michel and Shaked, 1984; Luffman and Reed, 1984; Dubofsky and 
Varadarajan, 1987). Belkaoui and Pavlik (1992) find a significant 
nonmonotonic relationship between performance and ownership 
structure and a positive direct relationship between performance and 
related and unrelated diversification. The findings of Grant et al's (1988) Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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for Britain showed that diversified companies were more profitable than 
specialised companies up to a point in their index of product diversity, 
after which further increases in diversification were associated with 
decreasing profitability4. 
The main bulk of the vertical integration literature is rooted in the 
theory of industrial economics and is basically concerned with the ‘gains 
and losses’ or with the various ‘incentives and disincentives’ associated 
with such a strategy. There is a market failure-transaction costs literature, 
a technology/cost savings-economies of scale approach, and thirdly a 
structure-conduct-performance/five forces of competition/supplier-buyer 
‘strategy approach’5. Evidence for the profitability of vertically integrated 
corporations is rather scarce, and although information on horizontal 
mergers or integration is relatively easy to obtain, strategists tend to look 
at horizontal mergers or integration as a conglomerate diversification 
strategy. However, even if we ignore potentially beneficial cost savings 
associated with vertical integration, integration will eventually allow the 
integrated producer to capture – at least part of – the monopoly profits 
and perhaps to raise barriers to entry in one or more stages of production. 
Therefore, the long-run profitability of a vertically integrated producer 
should be above the average industry level.6 
Following this discussion, a number of propositions are formulated as 
follows: 
•  Proposition 1: Diversified companies are more profitable than their non-
diversified counterparts; 
•  Proposition 2: Related (concentric) diversification is more profitable 
than unrelated (conglomerate) diversification; 
•  Proposition 3: Vertically integrated companies are more profitable than 
their non-integrated rivals; and 
•  Proposition 4: A ‘combined’ strategy of diversification and vertical 
integration should greatly enhance profitability. 
 
Modelling Firm Profitability 
 
The data used in this study are food company account information taken 
from the ICAP Directory for Greek companies registered as Limited 
Liability (LTD) and Public Limited Companies (PLC). The data used 
constitute a panel of 540 food manufacturing companies that survived 
during the financial years 1986 to 1992 (ICAP Directory for Greek Com-
panies, Issues 1988 to 1994). Companies in Greece are not required to pub-
lish a detailed breakdown of their sales by market and there is no publicly 
available information on the issue. Therefore, to estimate company 
diversification, I inspected company annual reports from the ICAP 
Directory for Greek Companies that contains information on every com-
pany's operation for all products and markets down to the 4-digit level of 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). 
In order to investigate the empirical validity of Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 
4 and the effect of a number of company related characteristics on Diversification, Vertical Integration and Profitability  
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performance, the following ordinary least squares estimating (OLS) 
equation is specified: 
 (NI/TA)jt =  C0 + C1 DIVERSIFICATION1JT + C2 VERTICAL INTEGRATION 2jt + 
C3 SIZE 3jt + C4 EXPORTER 4jt + C5 DIVERSIFICATION AND VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION5jt + Ujt  
where Ujt is an independently distributed error term with zero mean and 
constant variance [E(Ujt) = 0, VAR(Ujt) = s2]. The subscript j stands for the 
540 firms in our sample (j = 1,...,540) and the subscript t indicates the 
financial years 1986 to 1992 (t = 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992). 
The dependent variable (NI/TA)jt is measured as net income before tax 
deductions and net from any income brought forward from the previous 
year over the value of total assets. Total assets includes the fixed capital of 
the company, at inflation-adjusted acquisition price, plus the value of its 
circulating capital and reserves. 
The set of regressors used to explain the company profitability includes 
the following variables: 
DIVERSIFICATION. A dummy variable that takes on a value of unity if the 
company is engaged in diversification, zero otherwise. The 
DIVERSIFICATION variable incorporates the addition of new related prod-
ucts and services (concentric diversification) and the addition of new un-
related products and services (conglomerate diversification). A company 
was defined as being diversified if it was operating in two or more 4-digit 
food markets. 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION.  A dummy variable that takes on a value of 
unity if the company has a vertically integrated structure, zero otherwise. 
A company was defined as being vertically integrated if it was operating 
in two or more stages in the production of the final product. Companies 
were involved in forward integration (normally towards downstream 
retailers) and backward integration (normally towards an upstream 
supplier or input) in the production process. 
SIZE. This is a measure of firm size and it is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the company's number of total assets (Grant and Jammine, 
1988). If large company size gives rise to economies of scale, pecuniary 
economies and capital intensity related technical efficiencies, then a 
positive relationship is expected between size and performance (Hall and 
Weiss, 1967). 
EXPORTER. A dummy variable that takes on a value of unity if the 
company is an exporter, zero otherwise. A positive association is expected 
between exporting activity and profitability if exporting is associated with 
economies of scale in production and/or the achievement of market 
power in the local market. 
DIVERSIFICATION AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION.  A dummy variable that 
measures the combined effect of diversification and vertical integration. 
The DIVERSIFICATION AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION variable takes on a value 
of unity if the firm is engaged in both vertical integration and 
diversification, zero otherwise. Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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CONCENTRIC DIVERSIFICATION. A dummy variable that takes on a value 
of unity if the company is engaged in concentric (related) diversification, 
zero otherwise. 
CONGLOMERATE DIVERSIFICATION. A dummy variable that takes on a 
value of unity if the company is engaged in conglomerate (unrelated) 
diversification, zero otherwise. 
 
Statistical Results 
 
Combining the various years' data in a pooled cross-section regression 
presupposes that the relationship in all years is the same. In order to test 
the homogeneity of the relationship between profitability and 
diversification between 1986 and 1992, an analysis of covariance based on 
a technique described in Dhrymes (1971) is used. The assumption of 
homogeneity was confidently accepted in all regression estimations, hence 
all results reported below are pooled samples of the 540 companies over 
the 7 year period 1986 to 1992. The various sets of results are reported in 
Tables 1, 2 and 3, where the estimated regression equations are 
heteroscedasticity robust as suggested by White (1980). 
 
Table 1  Regression Analysis of the Effect of Diversification on Profitability for 
the Years 1986–1992 in the Greek Food Industries 
 
Variables Regression    equations   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
 
Intercept 0.2029  0.1957  0.1927  0.1866 
 (2.659)***  (2.564)**  (2.519)**  (2.379)** 
Diversification 0.0451       
 (2.012)** 
Concentric   0.0419     
   diversification    (1.928)*    
Conglomerate     -0.0107   
      diversification     (-0.240)  
Vertical integration  -0.0409  -0.0364  -0.0224   
 (-1.773)* (-1.692)* (-1.681)*  
Size -0.0122  -0.0117  -0.0114  -0.0129 
 (-1.958)* (-1.869)* (-1.823)* (0.269) 
Exporter 0.0029  0.0046  0.0052  0.0041 
 (0.192)  (0.308)  (0.346)  (0.269) 
Diversification and  0.1006  0.0987  0.0811  0.0299 
   vertical integration        (1.996)** 
 
R2 0.1006  0.0987  0.0811  0.0813 
F-statistic 3.587++ 3.221+ 2.637+ 2.844+ 
Mean of dependent  0.03465  0.03465  0.03465  0.03465 
   variable         
Number of firms  540  540  540  540 
Heteroscedasticity robust (White, 1980) estimated t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
*, **, ***: indicates t-statistic significance at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels,    respectively, on a 
two-tailed test. 
+, ++: indicates F-statistic statistically significant at the upper 5 per cent and 1 per cent    points, 
respectively. Diversification, Vertical Integration and Profitability  
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The first set of results is set out in Table 1 and the estimated equations are 
reported in columns (1) to (4) in Table 2. The mean rate of return on 
capital for the 540 food companies is 0.03465 (or 3.465 per cent). As Table 1 
suggests the DIVERSIFICATION and CONCENTRIC DIVERSIFICATION dummy 
variables have a positive and statistically significant effect on profit rates 
in columns (1) and (2) respectively. Column (3) shows that a 
CONGLOMERATE DIVERSIFICATION strategy does not seem to be a profitable 
strategic option. In addition, a policy of VERTICAL INTEGRATION seems to 
lower the profitability of the companies involved, a finding that is in 
contrast with the Proposition 3. The negative sign of the VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION regressor is a bit puzzling, but it is consistent with other 
studies that observed a negative and significant relationship7. A plausible 
explanation can be that a number of companies may be (or have recently 
been) in a process of backward and/or forward integration that requires 
high capital expenditure, and that the potential benefits of integration are 
yet to be fully materialised. The SIZE variable is negative and statistically 
significant in the formulated equations in columns (1) to (4). Negative 
associations between size and profitability, as well as between market 
share and profitability, have been detected by the author in most sectors of 
the Greek manufacturing industries (see Bourlakis, 1992a and 1992b). 
Finally, Table 1 illustrates that exporting (EXPORTER) is not an important 
factor in raising profitability for the domestic food companies. In general, 
diversification seems to be an element of competitive advantage in the 
food industry. The strategy of related diversification is also superior to the 
strategy of unrelated diversification. The joint regressor DIVERSIFICATION 
AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION turns up with a positive and significant 
regression coefficient, suggesting that vertical integration can be a 
reasonably potent option if combined with diversification8. 
In order to test for potential differences in diversification practices be-
tween smaller and larger food companies, the 540 food manufacturing 
firms are broken down into two groups. The first group consists of the 
larger food companies that operate above the average minimum efficient 
firm size in relation to the size of the market, and the second group con-
sists of the smaller companies that work below the average minimum 
efficient size in relation to the size of the market. By classifying our sample 
into smaller and larger companies, I expect that the detection of potential 
differences in diversification strategies will be greatly enhanced. The 
estimation of the average ‘minimum efficient scale of production’ was 
made as follows: 
Average ‘Minimum Efficient Scale of Production’ = The average size of the 
largest companies accounting for 50 per cent of total assets in the food 
manufacturing industries as a percentage of total assets in the food manu-
facturing industries9. 
According to this definition, 39 food manufacturing companies were 
found to be above the average ‘minimum efficient scale of production’, 
and 501 food manufacturing companies were found to be below the aver-Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
 
200 
age ‘minimum efficient scale of production’. The second and third sets of 
results are reported in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. 
 
Table 2  Regression Analysis of the Effect of Diversification on Profit-
ability for the Years 1986–1992 for Companies Operating Above 
the Average ‘Minimum Efficient Scale of Production’  
 
Variables Regression  equations   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  
 
Intercept 0.5928  0.5808  0.8421  0.8552 
 (1.004)  (0.994)  (1.429)  (1.447) 
Diversification -0.0029 
 (-0.732) 
Concentric   0.0033     
   diversification    (0.759)     
Conglomerate     0.2277  
   diversification      (5.984)***  
Vertical integration  -0.0079  -0.0109  -0.0113 
 (-0.175)  (-1.246)  (-0.280) 
Size -0.0316  -0.0308  -0.4769  -0.0490 
 (-0.831)  (-0.818)  (-1.253)  (-1.289) 
Exporter -0.0649  -0.0646  -0.0699  -0.0716 
 (-2.314)** (-2.366)** (-2.623)** (-2.840)*** 
Conglomerate 
   diversification and        0.2273 
   vertical integration        (5.972)*** 
 
R2 0.0805  0.0806  0.1801  0.1788 
F-statistic 2.458+  2.482+  4.819++  4.012++ 
Mean of dependent  0.03940  0.03940  0.03940  0.03940 
   variable         
Number of firms  39  39  39  39 
Heteroscedasticity robust (White, 1980) estimated t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
**, ***: indicates t-statistic significance at 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively, on a 
   two-tailed test. 
+, ++: indicates F-statistic statistically significant at the upper 5 per cent and 1 per cent 
   points, respectively. 
 
Table 2 sets out the empirical findings for the 39 larger companies that 
were found to operate above the average ‘minimum efficient scale of 
production’ in the food manufacturing industries. The results in column 
(1) and column (2) indicate that there is no statistically significant impact 
of DIVERSIFICATION u p o n  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  o f  C ONCENTRIC 
DIVERSIFICATION  upon profitability for the 39 larger companies in the 
sample. However, as can be seen in column (3) of Table 2, profitability is 
increased via a conglomerate diversification strategy. The CONGLOMERATE 
DIVERSIFICATION dummy variable indicates that the benefit associated with 
such a strategy is a substantial one. Holding the other variables constant 
in column (3) in Table 2, a 10 per cent increase in the C ONGLOMERATE 
DIVERSIFICATION variable increases profitability by 2.277 percentage points. Diversification, Vertical Integration and Profitability  
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Table 3  Regression Analysis of the Effect of Diversification on Profit-
ability for the Years 1986–1992 for Companies Operating Below 
the Average ‘Minimum Efficient Scale of Production’ 
 
Variables Regression  equations   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  
 
Intercept 0.2738  0.2681  0.2626  0.2501 
 (2.658)*** (2.608)*** (2.549)** (2.392)** 
Diversification 0.0486 
 (2.012)** 
Concentric   0.0452 
   diversification    (1.988)** 
Conglomerate     -0.0446 
   diversification      (-1.839)* 
Vertical integration  -0.0433  -0.0387  -0.0230 
 (-1.783)* (-1.803)* (-1.859)* 
Size -0.0183  -0.0179  -0.0174  -0.0184 
 (-2.165)** (-2.120)** (-2.062)** (-2.179)** 
Exporter 0.0078  0.0100  0.0111  0.0107 
 (0.499)  (0.639)  (0.709)  (0.684) 
Concentric 
   diversification and        0.0322 
   vertical integration        (2.128)** 
 
R2 0.0762  0.0742  0.0863  0.0675 
F-statistic 4.407++  4.116++  2.485+  2.954+ 
Mean of dependent  0.03428  0.03428  0.03428  0.03428 
   variable         
Number of firms  501  501  501  501 
Heteroscedasticity robust (White, 1980) estimated t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
*, **, ***: indicates t-statistic significance at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, 
   respectively, on a two-tailed test. 
+, ++: indicates F-statistic statistically significant at the upper 5 per cent and 1 per cent 
   points, respectively. 
 
Finally, although VERTICAL INTEGRATION and SIZE have no significant 
impact on profitability, a significant negative association between 
profitability and exporting (EXPORTER) is observed in Table 2. 
In column (4) of Table 2, I add the joint CONGLOMERATE DIVERSIFICATION 
AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION term where: CONGLOMERATE DIVERSIFICATION 
AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION = A dummy variable that measures the 
combined effect of conglomerate diversification and vertical integration. 
The CONGLOMERATE DIVERSIFICATION AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION variable 
takes on a value of unity if the firm is engaged in both conglomerate 
diversification and vertical integration, and is zero otherwise; The 
combined effect of CONGLOMERATE DIVERSIFICATION AND VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION dummy variable turns up with a positive sign and very 
significant at the 1 per cent level in column (4)10. The joint term suggests 
that a combined strategy of vertical integration and conglomerate 
diversification is a successful strategic option for the 39 larger local food 
manufacturers. Part III: Performance in Business Sectors 
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Table 3 reports the estimated regression equations for the 501 smaller 
companies that operate below the average ‘minimum efficient scale of 
production’. The added interactive term in Table 3 is defined as follows: 
CONCENTRIC DIVERSIFICATION AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION = A dummy 
variable that measures the combined effect of concentric diversification 
and vertical integration. The CONCENTRIC DIVERSIFICATION AND VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION variable takes on a value of unity if the firm is engaged in 
concentric diversification and vertical integration, and is zero otherwise. 
Column (1) in Table 3 reveals that diversification in general matters in 
raising profitability for smaller companies, while column (2) shows that 
CONCENTRIC DIVERSIFICATION raises profitability and can be used as a 
competitive weapon by smaller firms. Column 3, on the other hand, 
suggests that VERTICAL INTEGRATION and CONGLOMERATE DIVERSIFICATION 
strategies have negative pay-offs for smaller competitors. The SIZE 
variable is also negative and significant, while the EXPORTER variable has 
no significant influence on profitability. As column (4) in Table 3 depicts, 
the joint regressor CONCENTRIC DIVERSIFICATION AND VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION is positive and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level11. 
The computed average profitability for 120 smaller incumbent companies 
that were found to fall in the CONCENTRIC DIVERSIFICATION AND VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION category was 0.05701, a rate of return on capital higher than 
any other group of firms in the local food manufacturing industries. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter gives an analysis of the effects of diversification and vertical 
integration strategies on firm profitability in the Greek food manu-
facturing industries. The analysis was conducted using a panel of 540 
firms observed annually over the period 1986–1992. The findings reveal 
that concentric and conglomerate diversification strategies are a potential 
source of competitive advantage in the local market, with the former 
favouring the smaller food manufacturers and the latter benefiting the 
larger food manufacturers. Vertical integration does not seem to be 
directly beneficial as it lowers the companies' profitability. However, firms 
that combine vertical integration and diversification manage to reverse 
such a trend. In particular, manufacturers of food in the local market that 
operate at a large scale of production seem to enjoy higher rates of return 
via conglomerate diversification strategies or a combined conglomerate 
diversification and vertical integration strategy. The latter means that 
larger food manufacturing firms in Greece not only have a stake in a 
number of unrelated markets outside their core (food) activity 
(conglomerate diversification), but they also exploit their upstream 
(backward) and downstream (forward) activities across marketing 
channels to their full advantage. Smaller food manufacturing companies 
raise their profitability via concentric diversification strategies. Concentric 
diversification strategy is highly beneficial for smaller food manufacturers Diversification, Vertical Integration and Profitability  
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if used alongside a vertically integrated structure. The results suggest that 
neither vertical integration nor conglomerate diversification are 
necessarily losing propositions. On the other hand, concentric 
diversification can be a winning proposition among competitors with 
relatively low ‘deep pocket’ resources.  
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Notes 
 
*  I am grateful to Peter M. Jackson for valuable comments received.  
1  See for example Berry, 1975; Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Bettis, 1981; Rumelt, 
1982; Varadarajan and Ramanujam, 1987; Itami et al, 1982; Lecraw, 1984; Singh and 
Montgomery, 1987; Amit and Livnat, 1988; Haverman; 1992; and Hamilton and Shergill, 
1993, where the relative superiority of related diversification in terms of financial per-
formance is confirmed. 
2  Simmonds' (1992) study on 73 Fortune 500 firms over a ten year period ranked diversifi-
cation classifications according to their profitability from best to worst: (1) Internal 
Related, (2) External Related, (3) Internal Unrelated, and (4) External Unrelated.  
3  In particular the studies by Christensen and Montgomery (1981) and Bettis (1981) show 
that industry specific factors such as advertising, capital intensity and research and 
development were important factors in raising the profitability of companies arriving in 
those markets via a related diversification mode of entry. Interestingly enough, the study 
by Christensen and Montgomery (1981) shows that vertically integrated companies were 
the least profitable. 
4  According to Grant et al's (1988) findings, a value of around four (4) in their index of 
product diversity was associated with the maximum return on net assets. 
5  For an extensive treatment on the vertical integration literature see Davies (1987). 
6  For example, Rumelt (1974) and Christensen and Montgomery (1981) point out that 
vertically integrated companies were the least profitable. 
7  Biggadike (1979) states that new business ventures take, on average, 7 years to restore 
profitability.  
8  The combined effect of concentric diversification and vertical integration was found to 
have a positive and significant impact on profitability, while at the same time the joint 
effect of conglomerate diversification and vertical integration on profitability was found 
to be statistically insignificant. 
9  Total assets is defined as the sum of fixed assets (the value of land, buildings, machinery 
and equipment), investment and long term receivables, and total current assets 
(inventories, receivables, securities bills, cash and cash equivalents). 
10  The combined effect of concentric diversification and vertical integration on profit rates 
was statistically insignificant in Table 2. 
11  The combined effect of conglomerate diversification and vertical integration on profit 
rates was negative and statistically significant in Table 3.  
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By the 1990's, the European food industry had undergone a number of 
important structural changes. Merger and acquisition activity had sharply 
increased market concentration causing the smaller, under-resourced, 
operators to become increasingly vulnerable, not least because of the trend 
towards expensive branding activities.  
The balance of power between the food manufacturers and retailers has 
been shifting. In most European countries there has been a rising trend in 
the sale of retailers' own brand products, for example in Germany, 
retailer-controlled brands climbed from 5% of food sales in 1980 to 
approximately 15% in 1990. In the U.K., however, own brands already 
accounted for 17% in 1980 and this had risen to 35% by 1990 (Corstjens 
and Corstjens, 1995). In many situations, the degree of market 
concentration is such that further expansion by acquisition would proba-
bly fall foul of either domestic or E.U. competition regulations. Therefore 
grocery retailers have turned to alliances, forming international buying 
groups, in order to achieve greater dominance over suppliers.  
Turning to the U.K., it is only in recent years that the domestic food 
retailers have started to feel the pressure from outside competitors. The 
largest food retailers in the U.K. are J. Sainsbury, Tesco, Argyll, Asda, 
Somerfield and Kwik Save. Sainsbury, Tesco and Argyll are quality 
supermarkets, Kwik Save is a food discounter; Asda and Somerfield lie in 
between the two categories. Discount operators have proved that selling 
large volumes of goods at permanently discounted prices is a profitable 
strategy, if costs are kept at a minimum by the use of cheap sites, 
minimum staff and low investment in shop fittings. The quality super-
markets have invested heavily in sites, buildings, fittings and people as 
they have pursued high margins through a strategy that emphasises 
service and enhances the quality of the shopping experience. The arrival 
in the U.K. of more aggressive discounters from continental Europe and 
the U.S., into a market that is getting close to saturation point, has severely 
tested customer loyalty and the quality supermarkets have responded to 
this competitive threat by introducing a range of low priced own brands, 
for example Tesco's ‘Value Lines’. In the twelve months to July 1994 food 
prices in the U.K. fell for the first time in twenty years. However, the 
quality supermarkets are still in a strong position with high market shares, 
Sainsbury and Tesco both over 12% whilst Kwik Save, the major UK Part IV: Market Challenges 
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discounter has under 4%1; own brand sales for Sainsbury were 65.8% of 
turnover, Tesco 56.1% and Kwik Save only 13.4%. 
Although these quality supermarkets have clearly been able to preserve 
their superiority, it has not been easy. The quality image is no longer 
enough to guarantee customer loyalty and in the past few years there have 
been quite dramatic changes in the competitive environment which have 
resulted in revised strategies. 
Planning restrictions have halted the move from town centre sites to out 
of town retail parks, so the quality multiples have turned to new shopping 
formats and non-food superstores, for example the petrol station with 
attached convenience store and do-it-yourself stores. The reduced 
opportunities for expansion in the U.K. have encouraged the acquisition of 
food retailers overseas. As a counter to the threat from discounters some 
of the quality supermarkets have introduced shopper loyalty cards and 
used them in the related development of customer intelligence databases. 
The legalisation of Sunday trading in the U.K. has been a mixed blessing, 
Tesco, Asda and Argyll have benefited, but Sainsbury loses market share 
on Sunday and the volume of trade is still well below that of the worst 
weekday. 
To assess the impact of this rapidly changing environment, this paper 
compares the performance of the two leading U.K. food retailers, 
Sainsbury and Tesco, and explores the links between strategy revision and 
financial performance. The key financial performance indicator, return on 
equity, is decomposed to show how a discounter, Kwik Save, has achieved 
comparable returns from pursuing an entirely different strategy. 
 
 
A Framework for Analysis 
 
The continued success of today's major companies depends on their 
ability to gain and maintain at least one source of competitive advantage 
over their actual and potential rivals (Porter 1980). More recent advice to 
managers responsible for strategic decisions is to return to basics and 
focus on the search for sustainable competitive advantage (Day and 
Wensley, 1988; and Cravens, 1988). In today's intensively competitive 
markets a successful company must constantly reassess its sources of 
competitive advantage, ensure that the company's key success factors are 
regularly reviewed, effectively communicated throughout the 
organisation and reinforced and monitored through the performance 
measurement system. Moreover, to preserve their competitive position in 
the face of increased intensity of global competition, companies need to 
constantly monitor the market place and consequently managers should 
be increasingly interested in information about the present performance 
and future strategy of not only those already operating in the same market 
but also those with the potential to enter any of the company's markets.  
The supply of such relevant information remains problematic, but some 
management accountants are beginning to shake off their preoccupation Competition, Strategies and Performance in U.K. Food Retailing 
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with inward looking systems and are developing systems that focus much 
more on the external environment of the company, its current and 
planned markets and present and potential competitors. Such approaches 
have been described in the U.K. literature under the title of Strategic 
Management Accounting, defined by Bromwich (1990) as: “The provision 
and analysis of financial information on the firm's product markets and 
competitors' costs and cost structures and the monitoring of the enterprise's 
strategies and those of its competitors in these markets over a number of periods.” 
The Strategic Management Accounting (SMA) focus on external envi-
ronmental factors (Figure 1, taken from Ward, 1992) points to a daunting 
need for competitor ‘intelligence’ and hence the literature has concen-
trated on information that is difficult and costly to collect. Simmonds 
(1981) suggests that a “new camera could be of more value than another office 
calculator”, but perhaps this ‘industrial espionage’ image is dissuading 
accountants from adopting the SMA approach. Bromwich and Bhimani 
(1994) suggest that SMA has generated limited excitement because the 
revisions required to current management accounting systems are much 
more radical than those needed to implement other recent innovations, 
such as Activity Based Costing. 
 
Figure 1  External Environmental Factors 
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Moon and Bates (1993) would suggest, however, that the sourcing and 
cost of information need not always be considered such a major obstacle, 
as for an SMA analysis essential information includes “a quantitative 
assessment of sales, costs and profits for close competitors” and such an 
assessment can be made by utilising the annual accounts of competitor 
companies. They consider that the published annual report is “an excellent 
source document from which to estimate and extrapolate such data whilst 
avoiding prohibitively high collection costs.” They claim, however, that what 
has been missing is a comprehensive framework for the interpretation of 
financial statements that focuses directly on key sources of competitive 
advantage. They introduce such a framework, the CORE framework for Part IV: Market Challenges 
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appraisal, and provide a comprehensive example of how it could be 
utilised by Sainsbury to appraise the strategic performance of Tesco, its 
nearest rival in the UK food retailing sector. 
In this paper we further consider the potential utility of both the 
financial and non-financial information provided in annual reports in 
appraising the strategic performance of competitors and we highlight the 
need for greater guidance on the choice and interpretation of ratios than is 
presently provided in accounting texts. We briefly review the CORE 
framework and its advantages as a strategic appraisal tool, show how the 
financial implications of chosen strategies can be identified by using the 
framework and demonstrate particular techniques that can be used in an 
analysis of key players in the U.K. food retailing sector. 
We argue that such an approach provides the basis for a comprehensive 
analysis of the effects that the intensified competitive pressures in the U.K. 
food retail sector have had on strategies of leading companies and on their 
recently reported and future financial performance. 
 
 
Use of Annual Report and Accounts 
 
There is a large amount of information in U.K. annual reports (Both 
Tesco's and Sainsbury's ‘Annual Report and Accounts 1994’ run to 58 
pages whilst Kwik Save's is discounted to 40 pages) and the information is 
not restricted to financial data, as along with the audited financial state-
ments is an analysis of the year's trading and future prospects in the 
Chairman's statement, and in addition there is likely to be a statement of 
corporate objectives and a review of the activities of each of the business 
divisions. This may be ‘of interest’ to shareholders or potential investors, 
the primary recipients of a U.K. company's annual report, but is the 
information disclosed in a competitor's annual report likely to be of any 
real value to management? 
The non-financial ‘additional’ information included in the annual 
report and accounts is un-audited, it may also be selective and will inevi-
tably be somewhat biased with an emphasis on marketing the company to 
investors. Despite this, it does give a detailed and valuable insight into the 
company's current and proposed activities and a fairly clear vision of the 
company's strategy. Whilst the broad context of a company's competitive 
environment can be gleaned from economic forecasts and national 
statistics and trends (as detailed in Ellis and Williams, 1993) the 
company's chosen strategy for dealing with competitive pressures can 
only be gleaned from company specific information and here the annual 
report and accounts is a most valuable source. The true value of both 
financial and non-financial data relies on the ability of the user to 
accurately interpret the financial results in the light of the company's 
strategy and so produce a meaningful evaluation of the company's per-
formance as a competitor and hence an estimate of the extent of the 
‘threat’ posed. Competition, Strategies and Performance in U.K. Food Retailing 
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Meaningful interpretation begins with the application of a 
“comprehensive framework for the interpretation of financial statements that 
focuses directly on key sources of competitive advantage.” Moon and Bates 
claim that the CORE framework of analysis fills a gap left by the 
accounting texts where “the coverage is a rather ad hoc listing of a series of 
ratios, without much emphasis on their relative importance, interrelationship and 
interpretation.” Stead (1995) sets out a framework for analysis of companies 
through their Annual Report that is designed to be used by investors and 
considers “strategy to be fundamental to any analysis”. However, he then 
states  that “the analysis should be completed by a summary review which 
addresses the question of the company's apparent strategy and the developments 
that are likely to take place in the next one of two years, as viewed after the ap-
praisal” (p.15, our added emphasis). Whilst we applaud the inclusion of 
strategy identification as a fundamental part of making a forward 
projection we question the exclusion of a more detailed analysis of strat-
egy as a first step in the whole appraisal process. This analysis of strategy 
is key to the CORE framework which we briefly outline below. 
 
 
The CORE Framework for Strategic Performance Appraisal 
 
The title CORE is derived from the four stages of analysis: context, over-
view, ratios and evaluation. The context stage has two aspects as it 
involves gaining a thorough understanding of both the external profile of 
the company and its related business environment and also the company's 
internal profile. A detailed knowledge of the external environment enables 
the analyst to assess the likely impact of imposed market conditions on the 
organisation's achievements. The internal profile relates to the 
organisation's own strategic positioning within its sector and the critical 
success factors that underlie its performance. The overview stage focuses 
on the financial statements themselves and involves the identification of 
trends in the key financial figures (e.g. sales, profits, major assets and 
liabilities). No formal calculations are required at this stage as it is 
concerned with highlighting the factors that may have a significant impact 
on the presentation and content of financial statements. These include one-
off events (e.g. acquisitions) and accounting policy choice, as comparison 
between companies will only be valid if consistent accounting policies are 
used or, if not, the figures have been adjusted accordingly. 
The ratios stage involves skill and judgement in choosing only those 
ratios that help to evaluate the achievement of the company's strategic 
objectives as identified in the first stage of the analysis. The analyst should 
resist the temptation to calculate all known ratios, or even a set list of 
preferred ratios, but instead should concentrate on those ratios that may 
prove revealing in the particular case, often the most unconventional 
ratios can prove to be the most enlightening. The final stage is the 
evaluation, which involves the interpretation of the carefully selected ratios 
to disclose how the company has performed in the key areas of strategic 
importance identified. This stage should involve a complete reiteration Part IV: Market Challenges 
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through the three previous stages to ensure that all questions raised have 
been answered and the analysis has remained firmly focused on the 
effectiveness of strategy. 
In the remainder of this paper we develop the CORE framework further 
by introducing additional techniques that can be utilised in the ratios and 
evaluation stage of the appraisal process. A key measure of shareholder 
value is the primary ratio Return on Equity (ROE), but this ratio only 
shows the overall result of the previous period's trading, and thus 
indicates what has happened but gives no clue as to why it has happened. 
We will demonstrate how disaggregation of ROE can be used to 
determine how the application of the company's strategy has influenced 
its ROE performance and how the precise way ROE is broken down 
should depend on the particular element of strategy that requires inves-
tigation.  
We will initially utilise the example of Sainsbury appraising its nearest 
rival Tesco but to reflect the intensifying competitive climate and the 
added competitive threat now posed by the discounters we will also 
consider Kwik Save, as an example of a competitor with a somewhat 
different strategy. Our example is by no means a complete one as other 
competitors would need to be included and in particular the potential 
threat from the foreign discounters would have to be comprehensively 
analysed. What we hope to demonstrate is the framework and type of 
techniques that can be utilised in the necessary full analysis and to 
highlight the dynamic nature of the CORE framework of analysis by 
showing how it gives the analyst the freedom to react to the sort of 
developing and changing competitive situation that is clearly so charac-
teristic of the U.K. food retail sector. 
The key issue we wish to develop is the need for ‘comparison’. Sections 
on interpretation of ratios in many texts point to ‘ideals’ which we feel are 
of extremely limited value as they totally ignore the context within which 
the company is operating. Many texts concentrate on the interpretation of 
a single company in isolation and hence compare only to the previous 
year, this ‘inward focus’ has little application in the real world where 
success depends on the ability of a company to beat its competitors' 
performance not just improve on its own previous performance. The texts 
that advocate comparison with industry averages are at least recognising 
the presence of competition, but only a below average company will gain 
from comparison with the industry average, whilst all companies would 
benefit considerably from direct comparison with close rivals. This type of 
‘strategic perspective’ is advocated by Wilson et al (1994) who stresses the 
need to ‘view’ an enterprise's position relative to competitors' positions. 
The most useful approach will be to compare the various different aspects 
of the company's performance to several different competitors with the 
ultimate aim of matching (or beating) the best performance in each area.  Competition, Strategies and Performance in U.K. Food Retailing 
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With the importance of comparison in mind we describe a useful tech-
nique for the comparison between competitors of any set of key ratios, we 
call the technique ‘Polygon Analysis’ after the diagrams that are utilised 
for comparison. A regular polygon highlights that two companies are 
producing similar ratios from similar strategies whilst the more irregular 
the polygon the greater the contrast in strategies and consequently in 
ratios although the overall resulting return on equity may be similar. 
We now develop the above approach by examining the specific case of 
the food retail sector. 
 
 
Context: External Profile 
 
A detailed report on retailing, The Economist March 4th 1995, claims that 
“economies of scale and information technology have given the top retailers 
awesome power”. The report highlights how retailing has undergone a 
many-sided revolution over the past 15 years and how retailing firms 
have been transformed from parochial businesses requiring little 
management skill, to leaders in business innovation and the management 
of complexity, wielding enormous power over manufacturers and 
consumers, and over urban, suburban and rural environments the world 
over. The two main reasons for the retail revolution are the rise in 
disposable incomes and more recently the shift in control of the distribu-
tion chain from manufacturers and wholesalers to the retailers themselves. 
The retailer's main competitive advantages used to lie in skill at 
merchandising and closeness to the customer, for it was manufacturers 
who decided what goods were available, and in most countries even the 
price. Not so today after a string of innovations have each provided the 
customer with more choice, or greater convenience, or better quality, or 
lower prices, or a combination of any or all of these things.  
The impact of advances in information technology must not be under-
played, the Economist survey makes the following point: “Computers have 
also allowed retail managers to exercise closer control over much more extended 
store chains and .... with the lowering of trade barriers around the world, ... 
European supermarkets [are poised] to start transforming themselves into global 
businesses.”  
It is clear that competition between rivals in the food retail market place 
is intensifying and this is influencing each company's strategy. Further 
evidence of this is provided by comments in the Chairman's statement of 
Sainsbury's annual report for 1994: “The UK food retailing environment has 
become increasingly competitive in the past year due to the repositioning of major 
competitors and the continuing expansion of discount formats.” 
The Chairman of Tesco, in his statement for the same period, goes into 
more detail as follows: “The past year has seen significant changes in the food 
retail market in the UK. There has been fierce competition between the superstore 
majors as consumers have become more demanding than ever about value for 
money. Price has become increasingly important as a competitive tactic as Part IV: Market Challenges 
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superstore operators have also sought to reduce or eliminate the price differential 
established by the discounters on a limited range of basic groceries.” 
Kwik Save chairman notes that “competitive pricing activity reached an 
all-time high during the year, with all of our competitors making long-
term price reductions in one form or another”, and goes on to say that 
“our challenge is to maintain the ‘real’ difference between ourselves and 
our competitors, so that we can protect and grow our customer base.” This 
‘real’ difference is Kwik Save's competitive advantage which we need to 
probe in our analysis. 
 
 
Context: Internal Profile 
 
Again, the annual report and accounts can provide insight to the response 
and strategy of each of the companies. There is no secret about Sainsbury's 
strategy for dealing with the increased competition as the chairman states: 
“.....we have reinforced our leadership in quality and innovation, strengthened 
our price competitiveness and taken action to enhance customer service and 
reduce costs.” 
It is also clear that there are limits to growth within the UK food retail 
market which have forced both Sainsbury and Tesco to turn to more risky 
expansion strategies. Shareholders in both Sainsbury and Tesco have come 
to expect rising profits and dividends. The scope for future rises in either 
of these from the U.K. food retailing market appears limited due to their 
already considerable market share, the entry of foreign based retailers and 
increasing difficulty in obtaining planning consent for out of town 
locations, see for example Murphy (1994) and Buckley and Tailor (1994). 
The two companies have made differing responses to this challenge. The 
introduction of the Tesco Clubcard, offering discounts for regular 
shopping whilst providing the company with detailed information 
concerning purchasing habits, shows that there is still a need for new 
ideas in the traditional UK food market if only to maintain market share in 
the face of greater threats from traditional rivals and new entrants to the 
UK market from overseas. 
Both Tesco and Sainsbury have launched town centre formats called 
Metro and Central respectively and Tesco has also moved into stand alone 
petrol stations with convenience stores attached (Tesco Express). 
Sainsbury have increased their investment in the U.K. home improvement 
sector with the purchase of Texas adding to their Homebase chain. In 
addition to these moves in the U.K., both companies have also looked 
overseas. Sainsbury have made two substantial investments in food 
retailing in the U.S. and have also entered into a partnership with three 
other European food retailers to increase purchasing power. Tesco have 
invested in food retailing in France and Hungary. 
With reduced opportunity for new store development, large players in 
the U.K. food retailing market should be able to generate considerable 
surplus cashflows to undertake new ventures either in the U.K. or over-Competition, Strategies and Performance in U.K. Food Retailing 
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seas. This scenario is dependent on their ability to retain both margin and 
market share in the face of increasing competition. The recent purchase by 
Sainsbury of Nurdin and Peacock's Cargo Club food warehouse chain, in 
order to close it down, highlights the difficulties of entering the market 
and Sainsbury and Tesco's capacity to respond to the threat of foreign 
competitors by erecting barriers to entry. 
 
 
Overview 
 
This stage of the analysis focuses on the financial statements themselves, 
with the aim of forming an overview of performance. The degree of 
understanding can be adversely affected by companies changing 
accounting policies or the advent of one-off events, for example take-
overs, or write-offs. The initial ratio analysis below focuses on the finan-
cial years ending in 1993 for Sainsbury, Tesco and Kwik Save due to 
changes in accounting policies and property write-downs in 1994, a topic 
returned to at the end of the paper. 
A glance at the 1993, and previous, accounts reveal high levels of 
capital expenditure by both Sainsbury and Tesco over many years, as both 
increased the quantity of floor space and the average store size. This high 
level of reinvestment appears to have reaped the reward of increasing 
sales and profit. From the relative sizes of the financial figures, it would 
seem that it is normal practise for Sainsbury and Tesco to own their sites 
rather than lease them. Leasing is however a normal activity at Kwik Save; 
in 1994, for example, the annual report states that only 40% of new stores 
were freehold, that is purchased outright. 
 
 
Ratio Analysis 
 
Moon and Bates (1993) studied a broad range of ratios for a complete 
analysis; here we investigate one particular ratio and examine how it can 
be broken down to enhance understanding in a particular industry. 
 
Disaggregation of Return on Equity 
A key measure of performance for any quoted company is that of return 
on equity. This compares the profit available for shareholders, either to 
retain in their company or to be paid out as dividends to themselves, with 
the level of investment by the equity holders in the company. Whilst this 
may be taken to give an indication of the success or failure of a company 
over the previous period, it does not reveal the reasons, or causes, behind 
the performance achieved. To improve understanding of the underlying 
factors behind a return on equity ratio, the figure needs to be broken down 
into component parts. One possible disaggregation of the ratio (see, for 
example, White et al, 1994) is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2  Disaggregation of Return on Equity 
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Equity
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     Net income 
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The ratios resulting from the breakdown of return on equity for Kwik 
Save, Sainsbury' and Tesco, for their accounting years ending in 1993, are 
shown in Table 1. For companies in a similar line of business, with similar 
strategies and reasonably comparable accounting policies, one might 
expect a set of ratios that show a high degree of similarity, which does 
seem to be the case for Sainsbury and Tesco, whereas Kwik Save shows a 
significantly different result. It is difficult to make a meaningful 
comparison from the figures alone and hence we present a polygon dia-
gram as a useful technique to help in such a comparative analysis. The 
polygon diagram, Diagram 1, shows the comparative ratio performance of 
Sainsbury and Tesco, taking the Sainsbury ratio and dividing by the Tesco 
figure; hence where Sainsbury out-perform Tesco, the comparator is 
greater than one. The chart shows a near pentagon with all comparator 
values around one, so showing visually a high degree of comparability 
between Tesco and Sainsbury's performance. The polygon diagram is an 
adaptation of an idea presented in Steele (1993).  
 
Table 1  Return on Equity Disaggregation, 1993 
 
 Sainsbury  Kwik  Save  Tesco 
 
Return on Equity  17%  25%  15% 
    equals 
Sales  Margin  8% 5% 8% 
     times 
Asset Turnover  184%  397%  170% 
    times 
Interest Cover  97%  100%  91% 
    times 
Tax Cover  69%  68%  71% 
    times 
Gearing 174%  181%  192% 
Sainsbury's higher return on equity can be seen to be due to achieving 
more sales relative to balance sheet asset values, a higher interest cover 
and a higher financial gearing effect. These factors are partially offset by 
Tesco's slight advantage on sales margin and tax cover. 
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Diagram 1 Sainsbury and Tesco Comparison, 1993 
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Both Tesco and Sainsbury have invested heavily in more expensive floor 
space, hence reducing asset turnover, as a route to improving their sales 
margin; this trade-off is demonstrated in an X-Y chart, Diagram 2, plotting 
Tesco's asset turnover against its sales margin. The iso-return (in this case 
return on assets) curve of 12% shows how the trade off has not been 
completely self-cancelling but has been beneficial in improving returns 
over the period. 
 
Diagram 2 Tesco; Margin against Asset Turnover 
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Adapting the Analysis 
Whilst it can be argued that analysis and disaggregation of the return on 
equity ratio is relevant for any company with commercially orientated 
shareholders, there is still much to be gained by adapting the ratio 
structure to include industry relevant performance measures. Two key 
statistics, quoted by each of the leading players in the UK food retailing 
industry, are that of sales floor space and sales per square foot. The second 
of these can be integrated into the analysis by further disaggregation of 
ROE. Asset Turnover is broken down into two component ratios, firstly 
the familiar sales per square foot and secondly ‘Asset Footage’, which is 
the proportion of a square foot that is supported by £1 of total assets, 
including both fixed and current assets. The second ratio is the inverse of 
the effective investment in assets per square foot of sales space. This 
revised disaggregation framework is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3  Disaggregation of Return on Equity (2) 
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Using this enhanced framework, the polygon diagram comparing 
Sainsbury and Tesco can now be redrawn, Diagram 3. This shows that 
Sainsbury's advantage on asset turnover was not caused by higher sales 
per square foot, but by providing its sales area at lower cost in terms of 
asset investment. We would clearly need to investigate how this has been 
achieved, one useful step in analysing this ratio further would be to split it 
into two parts, investigating the fixed asset and current asset investment 
relative to square footage. 
The usefulness of the introduction of floor area into the analysis is 
further highlighted if we compare Sainsbury with Kwik Save, the U.K.'s 
leading food discounter, rather than Tesco. Kwik Save's ROE is 25% 
compared to 17% for Sainsbury – why is this so when Sainsbury has 
higher sales margin and sales per square foot? The key reason for Kwik 
Save's higher return on equity is the asset footage ratio, where each square 
foot in Kwik Save requires one third of the investment of that in 
Sainsbury. Indeed, in Kwik Save's 1994 annual report, the managing 
director and chief executive states “We will continue to apply strict cost 
control over our investment per square foot.” Diagram 4 clearly shows 
Kwik Save's emphasis on investment control.  Competition, Strategies and Performance in U.K. Food Retailing 
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Diagram 3 Sainsbury and Tesco Comparison, 1993 
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Diagram 4 Sainsbury and Kwik Save Comparison, 1993 
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If we now go back 10 years and examine the relative ratio decomposition 
for Sainsbury and Tesco in 1984, we find that there is a similarity between 
Tesco's position at this time and Kwik Save's in 1993. Sainsbury had a 
considerable margin advantage over Tesco at this time and higher 
turnover per square foot, but Tesco had a substantial advantage in the 
relative asset footage ratio (Diagram 5). Tesco's strategic shift away from 
the discount end of food retailing is supported by the reporting of the sale 
of the Victor Value discount store chain in their 1986 report and accounts. 
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Diagram 5 Sainsbury and Tesco in Comparison, 1984 
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Evaluation 
 
The evidence from the financial statements points to a shift in Tesco's 
strategic position in order for it to become more closely aligned with 
Sainsbury. Assuming this to have been Tesco's strategic objective, then it 
would appear to have been largely achieved by 1992. Sainsbury remains 
more profitable, that is delivering a higher return on equity to share-
holders, although having only a small advantage in market share. 
Sainsbury's slight advantage seems to be due to a lower level of invest-
ment per square foot. 
The comparison with Kwik Save highlights that there are still al-
ternative routes to retailing success in the U.K. and that a well-managed 
discounter can achieve excellent returns. The question raised here is 
where do Sainsbury and Tesco go next, with perhaps little opportunity for 
market share or market size growth and the increasing difficulty of 
obtaining planning permission for new sites. If their sales margin figures 
remain at these internationally high levels, then there are conclusions to 
draw. Firstly, that if the companies do not wish to, or are unable to, 
reinvest capital in U.K. food retailing at the rate they have in the past, then 
they will have considerable cash flows available for expansion elsewhere. 
Secondly, comparable returns made by overseas food retailers (see for 
example Corstjens and Corstjens, 1995) will not, at first sight, seem 
attractive to either the management or shareholders of the two companies. 
Whilst there may be specific opportunities, global retailing is generally a 
less profitable business. The alternative reinvestment path is to move into 
fields where key business strengths can be employed to good effect; 
Sainsbury's involvement in home improvement retailing could be viewed 
in this category. The final possible use for the cash flow would be to 
increase dividend payments substantially and leave the question of 
investment strategy with the shareholder. Competition, Strategies and Performance in U.K. Food Retailing 
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International Issues 
 
The above highlights the increasing internationalisation of the food re-
tailing market, like many others. This must bring us to question the often 
recommended approach to inter-company analysis as shown in Figure 4, 
taken from Ellis and Williams (1993). The four steps suggested in this 
approach start with the need to identify the core activity of the company 
being examined. The second step requires the assembling of a database of 
competitors in this activity. The following step requires the analyst to 
reject all competitors from the database that do not have broadly similar 
accounting policies to the company being examined. If the accounting data 
is not comparable then the results of comparative analysis will be invalid 
and potentially misleading. The final step asks whether the competitors 
operate mainly in the same product markets.  
 
Figure 4  Choosing Companies for the Purpose of Intercompany 
Comparisons (Source: Ellis and Williams, 1993) 
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With the internationalisation of markets, it can be argued that it is no 
longer adequate to reject all competitors for analysis who do not meet data 
comparability criteria. All present competitors and identified future 
competitors must be included in the analysis and the problems over 
'comparability' of information must be tackled and overcome. Accounting 
policies should be scrutinised and the figures adjusted appropriately, so 
that essential comparisons can be made, albeit with due care. Exclusion of 
a competitor or a potential competitor on the grounds of incompatibility 
of data is not a practical option. 
Despite European accounting directives and wide adoption of interna-
tional accounting standards, there is still considerable difference in the Part IV: Market Challenges 
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calculation of reported accounting figures. The requirement for those non-
U.S. domiciled companies with stock exchange quotes in the U.S. to pre-
pare accounts under U.S. accounting principles offers a route to compari-
son for a limited number of generally large companies. However, the E.U. 
may attempt to find a further answer; Mogg, director general of DG XV 
has been quoted as follows. “It would not be acceptable for Europe to delegate 
the setting of accounting standards to the U.S.” (Kelly, 1995) 
Hence, at present, the comparison of retailers from different European 
countries is difficult, but is becoming increasingly important as the degree 
of internationalisation of the industry increases. The fact that the 
companies that are to be compared are of the same nationality does not 
make their comparability a foregone conclusion. The accounting policies 
of Kwik Save, Tesco and Sainsbury are broadly equivalent, but have 
altered over time, particularly between 1993 and 1994.  
 
 
Caution in Interpreting Inter-Company Comparisons 
 
The analysis above has been based on the 1993 results of the three com-
panies examined. Attempting to analyse the 1994 figures serves as a 
reminder for the need to be cautious in interpretation and to be clear in 
determining what is to be measured. 
Both Sainsbury and Tesco reduced the value of some of their land assets 
due to changes in the commercial environment from the 1993 results to the 
1994 ones and introduced depreciation for buildings. Sainsbury took the 
whole write down as a deduction in their 1994 result, Tesco assessing the 
need for a smaller overall reduction spread it between 1993 and 1994, by 
restating their 1993 accounts in their 1994 reports. The analysis above has 
been based on the originally published Tesco figures. The result of these 
adjustments and of the different methods of implementation causes a 
major shift in the relative ratios calculated. The polygon diagram 
(Diagram 6) shows the unadjusted comparison of Sainsbury and Tesco for 
1994 and suggests, on superficial examination, that Tesco significantly 
outperformed Sainsbury in providing a return to equity holders and that 
this was caused by a higher sales margin and a better, lower, effective tax 
rate. The latter signals that there may be something unusual with the 
figures as one would expect, a priori, that two comparable companies 
governed by the same tax regime would have similar tax burdens. 
Sainsbury's profit is being reduced by a large deduction for land value 
write-downs which is not allowable against tax by the UK authorities.  
If we remove the asset value adjustments from the results for both 
Sainsbury and Tesco for 1994, a more familiar polygon diagram emerges 
(Diagram 7). It could be argued that this diagram gives a more meaningful 
picture of the underlying retail performance for 1994 rather than reflecting 
the changes in net wealth of the shareholders compared to the previously 
reported figures and hence may be significantly more reliable as a basis 
for predicting future performance. Competition, Strategies and Performance in U.K. Food Retailing 
 
223 
 
Diagram 6 Sainsbury and Tesco in Comparison, 1993 and 1994 
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Diagram 7 Sainsbury and Tesco in Comparison, 1994, adjusted 
0
0,5
1
1,5 Sainsbury/ Tesco,
unadjusted,1994
Sainsbury/ Tesco,
adjusted, 1994
Sales Margin
Gearing
Tax Cover Interest Cover
0.65
1.07
1.11
0.56
Asset Turnover
0.97
1.05
1.05
1.06
0.92
1.05
Relative return on equity: 1.05
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The central theme behind CORE analysis is that the reason and back-
ground for an investigation needs to determined and researched before 
attempting a meaningful ratio analysis. Here we have demonstrated this 
by concentrating on the identification and comparison of strategies and 
suggesting techniques useful in the evaluation of their effectiveness. 
On many occasions the analysis is being undertaken with the aim of 
inter company comparison or for a meaningful assessment of one 
company, which we argue can only be achieved by comparison with its 
peers. Tools such as the polygram diagrams assist by presenting a 
comparison visually, and hence in making numbers that are difficult to Part IV: Market Challenges 
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interpret readily understandable by those performing the analysis and by 
those to whom they report. 
The integrity of the analysis depends on the comparability of the 
financial figures being examined. This problem is not just one caused by 
differences in international accounting frameworks and practices, but also 
of individual company accounting policy choice and of changing 
circumstances for the companies involved. 
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14 Internal and External Coordination and 
Organizational Structures: The Case of a 
Leading European Company in the 
Canned and Frozen Vegetable Market 
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The performance of the vegetable processing industry is directly depend-
ent on the efficiency of the supplying farmers. The productivity of the 
industrial processes depends largely on the suitability of the vegetables 
for processing and the homogeneity of batches. In addition, a regular and 
smooth supply of raw materials is required for the optimal functioning of 
the processing site. The factors determining the quality of processed 
vegetables are closely linked to those of the raw vegetable. The appear-
ance of the final product (form, color, marks) and the organoleptic and 
hygienic qualities (presence of residues) correlate closely with the char-
acteristics and age of the raw material.  
The dependency of the processor and the specificity of the product are 
moral hazards for the industrialist who does not know the competence of 
his supplier, the quality of his work or the effort he puts in. The risk of 
opportunism caused by this asymmetry of information is reinforced by the 
minority position of vegetable production in farming (never more than 
15%), its speculative nature and the low specific investments it requires. 
This gives the farmer a wide scope to maneuver in his strategic choices. 
This is not in the best interests of the processing industry which requires 
consistent collaboration.  
Technological dependence, the specificity of transactions and moral 
hazards are all obstacles to price being the sole mechanism regulating 
supply and demand. An agreement more complex than a simple commer-
cial buying/selling contract is required to eliminate the uncertainty asso-
ciated with the transaction. The preparation, negotiation, execution and 
monitoring of such agreements raise the problems of transaction costs and 
organizational structures appropriate to minimize such costs (William-
son, 1985).  
This is not a new issue (Larousse, 1991), but as in many sectors of the 
economy (Cohendet and Llerena, 1990), this problem has presented new 
facets since the 1980s. In the current competitive climate, there are new 
demands on organizational structure. For example, it has to be able to 
respond cheaply to widely diverse consumer requirements and quality 
objectives that vary with time and between geographic regions. The 
organization has to be flexible to control production and the supply of the 
raw material, while making best use of, rather than eliminating, the 
variability of supply.  Part IV: Market Challenges 
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These new, or renewed, problems (Ponssard and Tanguy, 1989; 
Thévenot, 1993) raise questions about forms of industrial organization, 
management strategies for supply and interaction with suppliers, 
methods of strategic management and the tools used for management. In 
this article, we examine these issues through research in collaboration 
with a leading European company in the canned and frozen vegetable 
market (excluding tomatoes and mushrooms). We will call this company 
‘V’. For some years, V has been involved in a major process of learning 
with respect to organization, in order to establish new forms of internal 
coordination and to develop new forms of coordination with vegetable 
suppliers (external coordination).  
The role of research is to help this learning process. It is principally the 
directors of the company that are involved, but other levels of the 
company are also implicated (factory heads, the people responsible for 
supply). All these individuals attend meetings with the research team to 
discuss progress and results.  
We first examine the types of internal organization and external coor-
dination used by the company while the market was growing, and how 
they have become inappropriate in the current highly competitive envi-
ronment. We then analyze the issues surrounding the design and putting 
in place of new forms of internal and external coordination: these meas-
ures are still underway.  
 
 
Centralized Coordination and Business Strategy 
 
The processed vegetables sector in France developed an original solution 
in the 1960s to stabilize transactions between the processing industry and 
farmers (Valceschini, 1991). The ‘économie contractuelle interprofes-
sionelle’ (interprofessional contractual economy) as laid down by the 
government combined cooperative and hierarchical organization. In the 
1980s, this approach was completely dismantled.  
 
 
Cooperation and Hierarchy in a Growing Market 
 
The Interprofession commission was a cooperative organization. It was 
made up of national representatives of agricultural producers and the 
processing industry. In collaboration and by negotiation, they laid down 
the rules for transactions. They established yearly or longer agreements 
which set:  
•  Specifications for raw materials suitable for processing, and the quality 
grades; 
•  Prices of raw vegetables as a function of their quality; 
•  National minimum prices paid to farmers;  
•  Methods for determining indemnities for unharvested vegetables;  Internal and External Coordination and Organizational Structures 
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• Production quotas allocated to each business during periods of 
surplus;  
•  Conditions for monitoring fulfillment of contracts.  
The Interprofession commission acted as a central agency imposing a 
hierarchical organization on farmers and the processing industry. The 
interprofessional agreements were then accredited by government and all 
vegetable producers and processors were obliged to respect them. They 
took the form of a standard contract, identical for everyone, signed by 
local representatives of the farmers and factories for every supply net-
work. These local representatives formed a ‘commission mixte’ (bilateral 
commission) which represented the Interprofession commission locally.  
In the strategic issues of the market and production, the central 
authority made decisions aimed at restricting competition. By setting 
national prices based on the prices for alternative crops, and designed to 
distribute added-value competition was avoided between farmers and 
between factories for access to vegetables. The collective definition of 
standards of quality and the quota system considerably reduced down-
stream competition. Thus the choice of organizational structure was not 
determined solely by cost reduction, but also by increasing income 
through a better control of the market.  
Operationally, the production units planned supply and controlled 
productivity and quality. The companies' ‘agronomic services’ are 
departments responsible for supply, management of the farming network 
and technical advice to farmers. Together with the ‘commission mixte’, 
but hierarchically with respect to individual farmers, these departments 
fixed dates for planting and harvesting, and chose the varieties grown, 
technical monitoring and the characteristics of fields suitable for growing 
a particular crop.  
The interprofessional contractual economy brought stability to trans-
actions. However, stability also depends on four factors which to a large 
part cannot be controlled:  
•  The stability of the outlets for the processing industry: growth in 
demand and the creation of a national market.  
•  Inter-annual stock, used during periods of inflation to balance rela-
tively predictable demand with highly variable agricultural production 
volumes (Albert et al., 1987).  
•  Changes in the industrial sector: the companies most favorably placed 
agriculturally, and those which are most innovative can acquire others, 
which is the same as buying market share.  
•  European agricultural policy (CAP): The contractual economy was 
legislatively independent, but the Interprofession commission implic-
itly referred to the CAP when setting the price of vegetables (by 
reference to alternative crops, such as cereals).  
 
 
Volume Strategy and Multifunctional Organization  
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The combination of cooperative and hierarchical organization greatly 
restricts the autonomy of individual agents, whether growers or indus-
trialists. It also determines to a large part the rules for strategic and 
operational action. However, this does not mean that the competition 
between companies was eliminated. Indeed, it was intense, but limited to 
one domain: industrial production costs. The decisive competitive battles 
were thus over improved productivity through economies of scale, plant 
performance, know-how, and technical expertise of the suppliers 
(technological quality of the raw material and agricultural yields).  
In this environment where competition was based on production, 
company V emerged in the 1980s as a leader in the sector. It was initially a 
regional company, and the capital belonged to one family. It gained a 
competitive edge through its agro-industrial performance. From the 1960s, 
it increased volumes through a strategy of growth based on:  
•  Establishing production sites in regions with the highest agricultural 
productivity (Northern France).  
• Investing  in  large-scale  industrial production capacity thereby reduc-
ing unit costs by economies of scale and technological expertise.  
•  Rapid external growth, by buying competitors. This also increased 
market share and diversified supply zones.  
 
To pursue this strategy, V centralized and organized according to function 
(production and supply). V also used the margins for maneuver left by the 
Interprofession commission to reinforce its competitive advantage in three 
ways, by:  
•  Production and promotion of brand-name products; 
•  Exporting to rapidly growing and profitable markets; and 
•  Diversification into the new market for frozen foods.  
 
 
Restructuring of the Market and Destabilization of Types of Organization 
 
Developments in the structure of the market and the economic environ-
ment posed problems to the forms of organization in the sector from the 
beginning of the 1980s. The new elements characterizing the market were:  
•  Concentration: currently three companies are responsible for 85% of 
the production in France. 
• Saturation  of  global  demand, product diversification, multinationalism 
and fragmentation of markets. 
•  The progress of supermarkets with own-brands and who now hold 
more than half the market. 
 
Retailers are now in a strong position in relationships with the processing 
industry to which they subcontract the production of their products 
(Alcouffe and Poncet, 1991). The competition in the processing industry is 
no longer confined to industrial costs, and now includes commercial con-
siderations. Competition has become hotter and differentiation strategies Internal and External Coordination and Organizational Structures 
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have become pronounced. Thus farmers and industrialists no longer 
control the sector. There are two major effects resulting from this:  
•  The distribution of added-value has changed. This brings into question 
the method of setting prices. 
•  The retailers are in a position to make demands in terms of standards 
of quality, and this is not consistent with the Interprofession commis-
sion defining the standards.  
 
In addition to these changes within the sector, there have been profound 
alterations in the economic and institutional environment. 
First, the construction of the single European market and the suppres-
sion of barriers to intra European competition (Valceschini, 1993) is com-
pletely irreconcilable with a national minimum price determined by the 
‘Interprofession’. Indeed, the practice was judged anti-competitive and 
prohibited in 1990; the government lifted the obligation to conform with 
the Interprofessional agreements (Lorvellec, 1991). Each company has 
since been free to negotiate vegetable prices. 
Second, the reform of the CAP is a major destabilizing factor. The fall in 
cereal prices, the changes in relative prices of different crops and now land 
set aside and direct grants to support farmers' incomes mean that cereal 
prices are no longer an appropriate reference for vegetable prices.  
In these areas, buying the raw materials and selling the finished 
product, competition has been reintroduced into the market. The system 
of combining cooperative and hierarchical organization within the sector 
has been destabilized. It is now not possible to control the uncertainty 
about the economic behavior of the various players by coordination to 
eliminate competition. Similarly, it is out of the question to remove 
uncertainty about the performance of agricultural suppliers or the quality 
of the raw materials by a strictly hierarchical organization of production 
(Valceschini and Papy, 1991).  
 
 
Strategies of Differentiation and Multi-Division Structure 
 
Company V has played an active role in restructuring the sector. Both in 
agricultural prices and in adaptation of quality to market requirements, 
the company has continually tried to increase its autonomy of decision: it 
has vigorously contested the authority of the Interprofession commission. 
The company pushes for decreased agricultural prices, and buys in more 
and more diverse areas. The company questions the Interprofession 
commission's rules more or less openly. This arouses the suspicion of the 
farmers, who in consequence continually ask for the strengthening of the 
contractual agreements, in particular those concerning monitoring. This 
illustrates the development of approaches based only on self-interest, or 
opportunism. V has benefited from the move towards concentration. The 
company has grown substantially by acquisition. It is now an industrial 
group including 15 processing plants in the North and South-West of Part IV: Market Challenges 
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France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and more recently in Central Europe. 
Diversification into different European regions allowed breaking into new 
markets, and reducing costs for agricultural products by setting up in the 
most productive areas, and playing the interregional competition.  
This external growth has mainly been by acquisition of other busi-
nesses. However, towards the end of the 1980s, the company also entered 
into alliances with two large cooperatives in the South-West of France. 
These joint ventures were to expand into a new producing region while 
limiting the costs associated with finding suppliers, and minimizing 
investments. It also allowed the diversification of the product range, one 
of the main strategies to counter the stagnation in the market.  
This strategy for growth encountered three difficulties in the 1980s: 
• The strategy of growth was dictated primarily by agro-industrial 
production logic, which is unsuitable for large multinational, varied 
clients with demands that change and grow in specificity.  
•  A presence in many different agro-industrial sites makes centralized 
functional organization obsolete; this system is not likely to optimize 
coherence between local initiatives and the overall strategy of the 
group.  
•  The dismantling of the Interprofession contractual economy gives the 
processing plants growing autonomy of decision in negotiations with 
farmers. This has led to an uncontrolled increase in the number of 
individual contractual transactions.  
 
Starting in the mid 1980s, company V reorganized itself with the aim of 
creating a multi-divisional structure (Chandler, 1977). The first move in 
this direction was to form separate canning and freezing divisions, each 
responsible for its own technology and products. This approach was 
quickly abandoned, as it did not correspond to a true strategic structure: 
production remained dominant while the particularities of the clients in 
different countries were not addressed. Following an analysis by Porter 
(1985), the group adopted new tactics:  
•  The market was given priority over upstream considerations, by taking 
the particularities of clients into account. 
•  Differentiating the company, by changing the product range: launching 
new products, promotion of brand names. 
•  A European strategy, addressing the particularities of each national 
market. 
•  Vigorous price competition, aimed particularly at increasing market 
share within the brand-name market. 
 
The resulting divisional structure was thus based on profit centers. Each 
profit center (or division) corresponds to a region and contains all the 
factories in that region (Northern France or South-Western France for 
example). The factories may nevertheless produce for different markets 
(such as frozen food for retail sale, own brands, or restaurants and institu-
tions). Internal and External Coordination and Organizational Structures 
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This organization also proved to be unsuitable for various reasons. 
First, it did not allow expertise in the dynamics of each market. Second, 
problems in one market for a given profit center could be obscured by its 
performance in another market. Third, each division made parallel 
investments in industrial equipment, and thus the allocation of resources 
across the group was not optimal. Fourth, the different centers of profit 
became competitors on some markets. 
In 1992, the company started to organize according to ’activity’. The 
aim was to disassociate commercial from productive structures, so as to 
assure the downstream stages controlled production. The geographical 
organization was abandoned and divisions created according to strategic 
market/product segments.  
Company V is thus restructuring both internal and external relation-
ships. The role of research is to supply analysis methods and management 
tools which can ensure the coherence of the system as a whole. The aim is 
to design a structure in which decentralization of decision making and the 
centralization of information can be reconciled (Aoki, 1990). 
 
 
Planning and New Methods of Coordination 
 
The structure of the company into divisions based on product/market 
pairs aims to give a better view of the markets and improve sales forecasts 
(Anastassopoulos and Ramanantsoa, 1988). What is the best way to define 
the workings of the organization and the management tools appropriate 
to the market dynamics as perceived through this structure? 
Two concepts were used to establish a working plan with the company: 
•  The search for rational procedures, that is a satisfactory way of making 
the organization work (Simon, 1969). This requires addressing the issue 
of strategic management of the company (Tanguy, 1989), and 
analyzing interactions between: commercial planning, agro-industrial 
planning, the appearance of new constraints on markets or production, 
and modified commercial planning or agro-industrial organization. 
•  Strategic management supposes coherent control of the coordination 
between the various players within the firm, and relationships with 
external agents, particularly the growers. 
 
 
The Key Position of Planning Problems 
 
Competition imposes the need for rapid responses to developments and 
changes in demand. However, it is not straightforward to translate a 
change in demand into changes in production and the supply of raw 
materials. There are two reasons for this difficulty:  
1) Production of vegetables is a slow process (up to one year between 
buying seed and harvest), as compared to variations in the commercial 
situation. Thus, as commercial agreements are planned 12 to 16 months in Part IV: Market Challenges 
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advance to allow rational seed-buying by the farmer, the forecasts are of 
necessity approximate at this early stage, and subject to subsequent modi-
fication. This is difficult as production of the raw material is underway 
and costly or impossible to reverse.  
2) Industrial forecasting is never perfect. It has improved over the last 
ten years, due to the increased reliability of plants, flexibility in pro-
duction systems and developments in agricultural techniques and varie-
ties giving more predictable yields. Despite these improvements, the 
predicted quality and quantity may not be achieved. This can cause 
difficulties, particularly if no buffer stocks are held. The organization of 
the company into product/market divisions aims to improve commercial 
forecasts.  
What is the best way to find and exploit methods of ‘regulation’, to 
allow management in uncertainty both upstream and downstream? What 
types of hazard can be dealt with by the methods available? Which 
hazards require changes of plan, reconsideration of contracts or changes to 
the agro-industrial structure? The validity of strategic planning is 
dependent on its ability to reply to these issues. To do so, or at least to 
ensure that the company is ready to do so, the planning methods must be 
analyzed in detail.  
Thus, strategic management of the firm is heavily dependent on the 
production planning process. Planning aims to minimize the gap between 
demand for the products and supply of raw materials. The 
product/market pairing strategy structures the company for this process. 
However, the company can also adjust its strategy according to its control 
of the planning process and the way in which the agro-industrial system 
responds to commercial requirements (the response could be to modify 
the system for example by relocating production).  
Various players are involved in this planning process. Coordination is 
required at two different levels. First, internal coordination, that is 
coordination between the heads of divisions who define demand, the 
factory directors who plan production and the agronomists who plan 
supply. Second, external coordination between factory agronomic units 
and the farmers.  
 
 
New Forms of Internal Coordination 
 
Coordination and more generally the functioning of the organization have 
three groups of objectives:  
•  Price: minimize costs, in particular the price of raw materials, the cost 
of transport from the field to the factory and delivery of the products.  
•  Conformity: minimize the gap between plans and the actual perform-
ance both in terms of quality and quantity.  
•  Flexibility: absorb any modifications of programs required by unfore-
seen commercial needs. 
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For a given product, for example, there could be two different markets 
each requiring a different batch. The corresponding divisions will each 
communicate their needs expressed as specifications for, for example, size 
and color, amount, retail price and delivery dates. The production facility 
must then optimize its production schedule to fulfill these two different 
demands. This immediately raises two problems: 1) Should factories 
specialize in a product/market pair? 2) Are intermediary levels of 
planning desirable?  
 
Should Factories Specialize in a Product/Market Pair? 
Factories, and their supply network, can either specialize in a production 
process (specialization) or aim to supply a particular market (non-
specialization). Both these approaches have advantages and disadvan-
tages.  
Specialization in a process gives a minimization of costs, quicker reac-
tion to unforeseen events due to shorter lines of communication, and sim-
pler and more efficient translation of product specifications into raw 
material specifications. This type of organization is inflexible from two 
points of view. First, specialization of a factory in one process or a single 
brand means that it is only able to use a part of the raw materials available 
as the characteristics of agricultural products are variable. The result is, 
that unharvested crops and vegetables of unsuitable quality are rejected at 
the factory. This requires indemnities to be paid to the farmers. This 
system cannot use the rejected raw materials for other products. Second, 
organization according to process implies a particular positioning of 
markets relative to each other, in terms of price and quality required. Each 
factory's plant and supply network becomes dedicated to a particular 
process. Obviously, changes in the market change the demand for the 
process and where the system is highly specialized, the required 
modifications can be extremely expensive (closure and reconstruction of 
factories and raw material supply networks, etc.).  
Non-specialized factories in part avoid these two problems. Raw ma-
terials of diverse quality can be used by different processes within a single 
site. Changes in agricultural supply logistics can be balanced by 
temporary or permanent changes to factory activities or supply networks.  
However, the increased number of different specifications for a given 
factory makes production and supply planning difficult. It is also more 
difficult to assess the performance of each process within the overall 
activity.  
 
Are Intermediary Levels of Planning Desirable?  
The specialization of factories in a single process implies the dis-
appearance of intermediary levels of planning. The commercial programs 
are directly translated into agro-industrial plans for the factory, and this 
requires only very short lines of communication.  
A hierarchy, with intermediary levels to balance overall demand and 
allocate factory activity, reduces the reactivity of the system due to the Part IV: Market Challenges 
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long decision-making circuits. A solution to this problem is a matrix 
organization, allowing the company to react rapidly to commercial 
dynamics while maintaining or developing cooperation between sites. In 
this type of structure, factories specialize in a process but there is inter-
action between factories to respond to commercial pressures and thereby 
maintain overall coherence.  
Strategic management in a matrix organization poses the problem of 
constructing appropriate management tools (Soler, 1993). What are the 
management rules for ensuring both efficacy (price/conformity) with 
regards to commercial demands and agro-industrial opportunities, and 
also flexibility to adapt to unforeseen developments in the market and the 
agro-industrial environments of production sites? What tools are suitable 
for constructing and updating the appropriate rules? These questions 
open a large field of research. 
 
 
New Forms of External Coordination 
 
External coordination (with growers) aims to guarantee quality and 
quantity of supply, while remaining within costs appropriate for the 
product (or the market for particular processes). There are two questions 
to answer:  
•  Now that the Interprofessional commission does not run this activity 
nationally, what are the systems to put in place? That is, how does one 
determine, for each supply network, price and the division of jobs and 
responsibilities between the farmer and factory?  
• Should  technological  and  organizational functions be contracted to 
outside agents to minimize costs and if so, which functions? The need 
for flexibility to respond to market changes, and the maintenance of the 
relationship between the farmer and factory have to be taken into 
account.  
 
The answers to these questions involve a contractual supply policy. We 
have identified the elements that constitute this type of policy. First, we 
will analyze the functions governing the supply of a processing unit 
(Valceschini, 1991; Caneill, 1993). We will then describe the types of 
coordination currently used at different production sites in company V.  
 
Factory Supply: The Main Functions 
Factory supply functions fall into two categories: 
1) Operational and organizational functions. These aim to control activity 
in light of provisional planning. They include: 
•  Sowing plans to adjust production in the supply network in terms of 
quantity and for each quality class to fit with the provisional plans 
made by the processing unit. The vegetables and their varieties to be 
grown and the fields and methods to be used are defined in these 
plans.  Internal and External Coordination and Organizational Structures 
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• Sowing and monitoring consistent with assuring that the best 
techniques are used, and conformity with the specifications.  
•  Several functions associated with harvest. The harvest date has a direct 
effect on the quality of the vegetable, the flow of supply to the factory 
and the level of payment to the farmer. Who pays the costs has to be 
determined. The choice of who does the harvesting is important, as the 
performance (waste harvested, percentage of crop not harvested, 
proportion of the harvest damaged) can vary significantly according to 
the machines used, and their operation.  
•  Transport of harvested crops. Loading costs are generally paid by the 
grower, and transport by the processor. The processor is thus largely 
responsible for transport, which is essential to the smooth working of 
the factory.  
•  Measuring the quantity and quality of the vegetables arriving at the 
factory. This requires sampling, and instruments for measuring and 
testing. It is often at this stage that fluctuations in supply are ironed 
out.  
 
Each of these functions is important in terms of cost or risk. The technical 
and economic efficiency of the factory, and the farmer's income are at 
stake. There is obviously scope for conflict between the farmer and the 
factory, and for opportunism or sharp practice. Compromise is necessary 
both in terms of operational and organizational authority, and in inter-
preting assessment and measurement rules.  
2) Strategic functions. These are medium-term functions associated with 
making the best use of technical developments, choosing production 
structures for the supply network and determining the prices of raw 
materials. They include:  
•  Choosing suppliers. For example, using local climatic variations to 
stagger harvests. The most productive and most reliable farmers have 
to be chosen. This process is also used as a barrier to entry into the 
sector (‘production rights’ are granted to farmers).  
•  Making best use of technical innovation. This mainly involves testing 
for the species and varieties most suitable for the commercial aims, for 
chemical crop treatments and the conditions for their application, for 
the best harvesting equipment, and to develop methods for predicting 
the yield and quality of products.  
•  Determining the price paid to farmers. This is not a mechanism for 
a d j u s t i n g  s u p p l y  a n d  d e m a n d  ( a n d  i s  t h u s  n o t  a  t r u e  f r e e  m a r k e t  
system). Rather, it has several roles: remuneration for the farmer's 
work, encouraging production efficiency, payment for farming risks 
and possibly distribution of added value.  
 
These functions are strategic for both the farmer and the factory. They 
cannot be assumed by the processing industry alone: negotiation and con-
tracts are required. Crops have to be planned, as does farm organization. 
These transactions thus have two dimensions: they are bilateral com-Part IV: Market Challenges 
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promises between individual farmers and the factory. However, there is 
also agreement between farmers collectively and the factory. Thus, the 
form of the collaboration between farmers affects the transactions.  
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Variety and Developments in External Coordination 
The expansion policy of company V has consequences for the geography 
of its overall supply. The processing sites and their supply networks have 
become more varied in terms of vegetable production capacity and plants, 
and also in terms of types of coordination with farmers. The dismantling 
of the Interprofession commission in France has contributed to the 
differences between sites. The diversity is currently very large, and more 
the result of expediency than strategic choice. Coordination between 
factories within company V and their suppliers can be classed into six 
types:  
•  The processor has complete operational authority. In these cases, the 
farmer makes land available for use. The agronomic service of the 
factory chooses field, crop and harvest specifications. The farmer is 
paid a fixed sum, or the yield (quantity and quality) may be taken into 
account. In this system, the farmer's freedom of action is small. The 
agronomic service of the factory has total control of the supply, and 
assumes a large part of the risks.  
• Individual contracts between factory and associations of farmers. 
Supply is governed at two levels: first, the choice of farmer, and 
second, contracts with individual farmers to ensure supply and 
remuneration.  
•  Alliance between the processing site and a farming cooperative. The 
cooperative owns half the factory and finances half the supply. For 
logistical reasons, the cooperative is located on the factory site. It 
chooses the farmers, and the contracts are negotiated by the two 
parties. Thus, like the previous case, there are two levels of agreements: 
one with the farmers as a group and the other with the farmers 
individually. This system involves the farmers in commercial and 
industrial constraints. Its characteristic feature is that the farmers have 
to invest in the factory. This investment is a sort of membership fee, 
giving the farmer stability of outlet for his product.  
•  Agreement with a cooperative of specialized vegetable producers. The 
supplier is a group of farmers who contract to supply according to a 
predefined program of quantities and qualities either at the factory or 
in the field. Thus, transactions are solely between the factory and 
farmers collectively.  
•  One-off agreements with particular farmers. The contracts are annual, 
and specify the area to sow, the technical specifications and the 
calculation of payments (generally according to simplified rules). This 
system is rare and mainly used for particular vegetables required in 
small volumes, or as a method of applying pressure.  
•  Buying from middlemen who in turn buy either from the market or 
direct from farmers. The relationship is strictly commercial, and allows 
flexibility and the fine-tuning of supply.  
 
Each of these systems corresponds to a particular type of management, 
and spreading farming risks between the farmer and processing industry. Part IV: Market Challenges 
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They are not mutually exclusive, and can be used to complement each 
other, although one is always dominant in any one site. The disappear-
ance of the Interprofessional contractual economy, and the expansion of 
company V to new sites has considerably increased the complexity of 
possible combinations, both within each site, and between different sites.  
There appears nevertheless to be a general tendency along three lines: 
•  Place and aims of negotiation. Negotiation is becoming decentralized, 
and takes place within factory/supply network units. Operational, 
organizational and strategic considerations are all addressed. Part of 
the agronomic activity of the factories is being contracted outside the 
company, and authority is given to farmers' organizations.  
•  Players in negotiations. The relationships between factory and farmers 
are moving from individual collaborations to collaboration between 
factories and groups of farmers. Supply cooperatives or associations of 
producers are now in control. They manage the land, choose the 
suppliers and develop new techniques. This is a radically new 
situation.  
•  Nature of agreements. Essentially tactical contracts (specifying what to 
produce, at what price, on which date etc.) are being replaced by more 
strategic contracts. The new contracts define conditions for the 
continuation of the collaboration between farmer and factory, based on 
the type of effort put in by the farmers and the factory to remain 
competitive, rather than simply on results.  
 
As we have observed, the current evolution changes the nature of the 
relationships between the company and the farmers. For some products, 
the need to master technical learning processes permanently, the need to 
obtain a certain level of flexibility of agricultural practices, lead to new 
forms of contracts between factories and farmers. These ‘alliances’ not be 
set up neither at the national level, nor at the individual farmer level. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The new constraints faced by the farmers and the food industries today 
may lead to an adaptation of both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ coordination 
arrangements. The way of posing these two problems are not so different. 
In both cases, coordination arrangements must be designed according to ... 
•  the balance between a ‘market logic’ (competition between plants 
inside the company; opposite interests of farmers and firms) and an 
‘organizational logic’ (common rules inside the company, and common 
rules between farmers and firms); and 
•  the balance between autonomy (of plants and farmers) and control (of 
plants and farmers). 
 
Taking into account Williamson's hypotheses, it appears that the problem 
is to adapt consistently to internal and external coordination. The Internal and External Coordination and Organizational Structures 
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efficiency and the flexibility of the firm depends on this consistency. For 
management researchers, this means to propose tools, evaluation criteria 
and analysis frameworks to help the firms in implementing this 
consistency in concrete terms. 
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The membership in the European Union and the internationalization of 
the food business mean a great change for the Finnish food system. The 
new competitive environment affects all stages of the food chain. Agri-
culture has been a regulated and subsidized sector. About 60% of the food 
processing industry has belonged to the closed, protected sector of the 
economy with hardly any export competition. The firms have formulated 
their strategies under the assumption of market stability. During the past 
years, the food processing industry has been strongly rationalized, 
resulting in the concentration of market structure. The concentration ratio, 
however, varies greatly among subindustries. The bakery and meat 
processing industries, for example, are fragmented, whereas the sugar and 
dairy industries are characterized by, respectively, monopolistic and 
oligopolistic competition. Farmer-owned cooperatives have the market 
shares of about 90% in dairy and 70% in meat processing.  
On the one hand, lack of foreign competition may allow monopoly 
profits for leading food manufacturing firms. On the other hand, it may 
lead to overcapitalization, lower operating efficiency due to organizational 
bureaucracy, and a reduced ability to generate product and/or process 
innovations (Russo, 1992). To a large extent, the ability of firms to increase 
their international competitiveness is affected by 'good domestic 
competitors’ (Porter, 1980). An industry therefore requires a rich variety of 
firms, which constantly seek innovations, in order to maintain its long-
term health (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Food processors can no longer 
launch a broadside of standardized products on a mass market and be 
assured of marketing success. Due to the changing lifestyles and 
consumption patterns of consumers, there is a growing need for finding 
market niches (Drabenstott, 1994). The fragmentation of consumer 
segments also changes structures and strategies in food retailing. In the 
Finnish food chain, the retailing sector is highly concentrated. The two 
co-ops and the two quasi-integrated chains account for 95% of all food 
sales. Theory suggests that buyer concentration, inter alia, restricts 
alternatives open to sellers, and weakens the dynamics of competition 
throughout the whole food chain (Tirole, 1988).  
The changing consumption patterns, stronger processors and 
concentrating retailing sector are bringing changes to agriculture. First, to 
satisfy consumer demand, processors want more specific farm products. 
There is a need for a closer relationship between the farmers and Strategic Behavior and Interrelationships in the Food Chain 
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processors (Shaw, 1994). A great part of the agricultural production 
nowadays takes place through production contracts between farmers and 
industry. Second, from the farmers' point of view, an increasing 
concentration in processing and retailing means monopsony or 
oligopsony on the buyer side. Theory suggests that 
monopsony/oligopsony may produce large farm-retail price spreads 
(Rogers and Sexton, 1994).  
 
 
Theoretical Background 
 
Porter's Diamond as a Determinant of Industry Competitiveness 
 
Traditionally, the concept of competitiveness has been seen as price or cost 
competitiveness. As product differentiation has become common, the 
importance of technology and a firm's ability to innovate rapidly has 
become an important element in competitiveness. Porter (1980, 1990) sees 
industry as the appropriate unit when analyzing competitiveness. Seeking 
to explain competitiveness only at the national level or at the firm level is 
too narrow a viewpoint. Porter explains the dynamics of competitiveness 
using the concept of the value chain, the five forces of competition (the 
nature of competition) and the diamond model.  
The diamond model tries to give a holistic framework to the analysis of 
the determinants of the competitive advantage in the context of national 
settings. Porter's approach emphasizes the meso-level analysis. It also 
stresses the interrelationships between the industry, input sectors such as 
agriculture, and services.  
The diamond is Porter's answer to the question of what the attributes 
are that shape the environment influencing a company's ability to create 
and sustain competitive advantage. The diamond is made up of four 
determinants, i.e., factor conditions, demand conditions, related and sup-
porting industries, and firm strategy, structure and rivalry. There are also 
two ‘outside’ forces: government and chance. At their best, these elements 
of the diamond form a mutually reinforcing system. The interlinkages and 
the interaction between the determinants promote industrial clustering, 
i.e., the formation of several competitive industries which are related and 
mutually supporting. In an industrial cluster there are several firms that 
are linked via commercial networks. Porter's (1990) cluster chart is a good 
tool to describe the interlinkages of the industry.  
According to Porter (1980, 1990) the nature of competition is embodied 
in five forces, 1) the threat of new entrants, 2) the threat of substitute 
products, 3) the bargaining power of suppliers, 4) the bargaining power of 
customers, and 5) the rivalry among the existing competitors. The firms 
influence and respond to the industry structure. They also have to choose 
their position within the industry. At the heart of positioning is 
competitive advantage.  Part IV: Market Challenges 
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Competitive Advantage 
 
Much of competitive strategy research draws on Porter's (1980) generic 
strategy typology, examining under what conditions cost leadership, dif-
ferentiation and a focused strategy generate positional advantages. 
Competitive advantage is ascribed to industry structural characteristics 
and competitive forces rather than to internal firm-specific resources 
(Caswell, 1992; Conner, 1991). In an examination of strategies and per-
formance at the level of the firm, the generic strategy typology may lose its 
explanatory power (see e.g. Dess and Davies, 1984; Hill, 1988). By 
integrating concepts from economic theory and organizational behavior, 
the resource-based view on competitive advantage looks inside the firm 
and its resources in exploiting market opportunities (Barney, 1991; Con-
ner, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Wernerfelt (1984, p.172) broadly defines a resource as “anything which 
could be thought of as strength or weakness of a given firm”. By nature, these 
internal strengths can be managerial skills, competencies as well as 
tangible and intangible resources (Day and Wensley, 1988). These terms 
have often been used interchangeably. Resources refer more to ‘having’ 
while skills and competencies characterize more ‘doing’ (Barney, 1991). 
For the purposes of this study, tangible and intangible resources as the 
fundamental sources of competitive advantage are more relevant.  
Transforming inputs into outputs requires the deployment of tangible 
resources such as working capital, highly automated production equip-
ment, advertising and product development expenditures, and a broad 
distribution coverage. For example, technological superiority and mar-
keting resources provide a firm with the capability to generate new 
processes/products faster than competitors. On the other hand, intangible 
resources can be illustrated by a variety of characteristics such as 
reputation, brand images, the relationships to suppliers and buyers, and a 
good knowledge of customer needs (Yao, 1988). These intangible 
resources can accumulate over time (provided that the environment 
remains relatively stable), which can then make the current rate of 
spending more effective (Porter, 1991). In many industries, successful dif-
ferentiation is therefore based on intangible ‘hidden’ resources. It should 
be noted that competitive advantage does not arise from better resources 
per se, but from a firm's ability to reconfigure different resources in spe-
cific ways (Penrose, 1959). Valuable, rare, non-imitable, and non-substi-
tutable resources are strategically the most important (Barney, 1991). In 
the study, competitive advantage is described in terms of resource-based 
activities aimed to create customer value, and that the firm performs 
particularly well or differently relative to rival firms within a similar 
product-market domain.  
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Bargaining Power  
 
Two important forces that affect competitive advantage are the bargaining 
power of suppliers and buyers (Porter, 1980). In the distribution channels 
context, the conventional analysis of bargaining power is based on power-
dependence theories (Gaski, 1984). In both views, an important origin of 
power may stem from increased dependency due to the concentration of 
purchases/sales on one or a few trading partners. The importance of a 
business partner and the associated switching costs, the degree of product 
substitutability, and the threat of vertical integration may also be the 
origins of bargaining power. For example, an important supplier can exert 
power over its buyer(s) by threatening to raise prices or reduce the quality 
of raw materials. If the output market of a firm is dominated by a small 
number of distributors, flexibility to choose alternative trading partners 
decreases. In the vertical chain, powerful firms can squeeze the 
profitability of downstream or upstream firms (Tirole, 1988). Bargaining 
power refers here to the perceived ability of a firm or a group of firms to 
influence other firms' decisions and actions in the vertical chain 
concerning what is traded, where, in what quantities, at what prices, and 
on what terms.  
 
 
Organizational Performance  
 
Performance is a multidimensional concept and may be characterized in a 
number of ways, including profitability, efficiency and effectiveness. Most 
prior studies on strategy have described performance in terms of 
profitability, either alone or together with other performance indicators 
(Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). However, the empirical verification 
of financial measures (that are influenced by actions taken in many 
previous time frames) shows that these may not be adequate to predict 
‘excellence’ (Chakravarty, 1986), and may actually undermine current and 
future strategic advantages (Bhargava et al, 1994; Day and Wensley, 1988). 
Access to accounting data on privately-held firms can also be severely 
restricted. Thus, performance measurement in strategy research is a very 
thorny issue. In this study, organizational performance is described in 
terms of subjective and self-reported objective measures that reflect 
profitability, efficiency, and effectiveness criteria (Dess and Robinson, 
1984). Efficiency indicates input-output ratios internal to the firm while 
effectiveness reflects 'how well an organization relates to its environment’, 
for instance by successfully expanding its product-market scope.  
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Cluster Structure, Strategic Behavior and Interrelationships in the 
Finnish Food Chain 
 
Research Methods  
 
Porter's (1990) approach uses, as a primary tool, a cluster chart. In his 
study, industries appearing in the chart were chosen according to their 
success in exports. Industries are grouped into primary goods, machinery 
used in making them, and specialized inputs that are associated with the 
goods and their production. Successful industries are grouped into sub-
categories most closely related by end-use in order to expose the nature of 
clustering.  
Porter's model can, in spite of its wide usage, be criticized especially 
when it is applied to regulated industries. The framework was chosen as a 
starting point, but the method has been adjusted for our purposes. Porter's 
original method to select competitive industries is based on export shares. 
This has been criticized by many authors (see Bellack and Weiss, 1993; 
Rugman and D'Cruz, 1993; Cartwright, 1993). In our study Porter's 
method to select internationally competitive industries has modified in 
several respects.  
Porter's method focuses on the industry level and lacks quantitative 
measures. It can also be criticized because it attempts to generalize from a 
few particular cases (see Yetton et al., 1992; Bellak and Weiss, 1993). 
Because of the lack of quantitative measures, the method is in many 
respects subjective and descriptive. We try to increase the accuracy of the 
description of interrelationships by the aid of input-output calculations. 
When studying the competitive advantage and bargaining power, a 
resource-based view is used.  
 
 
The Structure of the Food Cluster 
 
In order to describe the food system as a whole, we first formed a cluster 
chart involving a broad category of products. The share of exports of total 
production is only 9 per cent and many of the export products are 
subsidized commodities. Therefore, Porter's principle to choose only in-
ternationally competitive primary products was abandoned and all food 
products were considered as primary goods. The products were classified 
into established, potential and latent according to their success in export 
(Figure 1). The share of unregulated products of total foreign trade has 
been about one third until the last years. Due to the rapidly increased 
exports to Russia, the share of unregulated products of total exports was 
in 1994 42 per cent. Therefore, subjective evaluation has been used when 
classifying products into the potential export products and domestic 
products.  
Some case studies have been made concerning every group. Established 
export goods are products where exports are greater than imports. Poten-
tial products are such that their imports are greater than exports but the Strategic Behavior and Interrelationships in the Food Chain 
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exports have increased considerably during the last years. Latent goods 
are exported only in small quantities.  
Due to the regulation of foreign trade, there are only few industries 
which have been successful in export markets. Sugar confectionery and 
chocolate, crispbread, vodka, baby food and sucrochemical products are 
examples of successful product groups. Due to the free trade agreements 
between Finland and the EFTA and EC areas, exports of these goods have 
increased considerably. However, imports have also increased. Exports of 
basic commodities like meat and dairy products have been regulated. 
Only a few dairy products (ice cream, flavored yogurts) have been on the 
list of free trade products.  
When defining specialty inputs, machinery or services, Porter's original 
method relies on export shares. We have first tried to find the functional 
links and then examine whether there is export success. Supporting 
industries are not very strong and there are only a few export products. 
 
Figure 1  The Food Cluster 
 
SPECIALTY GOODS  PRIMARY GOODS  BUYERS 
 
Agricultural inputs  Established Domestic  wholesalers 
Enzymes, ingredients  export products  and retailers 
Packages -chocolate,   
 -sugar  confectionery 
MACHINERY  -crispbread and biscuits  Domestic industry for 
 -baby  food  intermediate usage 
Equipment for low  -vodka 
temperature transport  -sucrochemical products  OECD-countries 
Blenders  
Cooking machinery  Potential export products:  Russia and 
Conveyers equipment  -liqueurs  Baltic Countries 
Industrial washing  -beer 
equipment etc.  -ice-cream 
Packaging machinery  -cheese 
 -malt 
 -juices  RELATED  SERVICES 
BY-PRODUCTION -berry  products 
 
  Latent export products:   Storage and low- 
-pet food industry  -fish products temperature  transport 
-paper industry  -bread, cakes  Consulting 
 (starch)  -pasta  Process automation 
-chemicals  -soft drinks  Academic research 
 (sizing)    Biotechnological R&D 
-pharmaceutical industry  Products for domestic sale  Catering, restaurants 
  -butter and milk   
-fodder industry  -vegetables   
 -sugar   
 -meat   
 -egg  products   
 -ready-made  meals   
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Interrelationships Within the Cluster 
 
The links within the cluster are measured with the help of value added in 
different parts of the cluster (Figure 2, Figure 3) and with input flows in 
the cluster. The advantage of using calculations based on input-output 
studies is that they eliminate double counting and provide data within a 
consistent accounting framework.  
 
Figure 2  Value Added Within the Food Cluster, Billions FIM1 
 (Source:  Input-output  tables 1992 and National Accounts) 
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Final use in consumer prices 72.1
Private consumption Public consumption Exports Increase in stocks
in Finland in Finland and statistical  error
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A considerable part, 42 per cent, of the value added is created in the 
agricultural and other input sectors (Figure 2). The share of agriculture is 
steadily diminishing. In 1985 23 per cent of the value added in the whole 
food system was created in agriculture and in 1992 18 per cent. The share 
of food processing, restaurant and other input sectors has increased 
respectively. The share of whole sale and retail trade has been constant, 
about 17 per cent. The increasing share of input sectors can be explained 
by specialization. Food processing companies buy services like transpor-Strategic Behavior and Interrelationships in the Food Chain 
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tation or cleaning from other companies instead of doing it within the 
company.  
Input flows do not go only from input sectors to agriculture and from 
agriculture to the processing industry, but also from input sectors direct to 
the processing industry and restaurants. The strongest links are, however, 
between agriculture and the processing industry.  
 
Figure 3   Input and Output Flows Within the Food Cluster 1992,  
   in Billion Finnish Markka (Source: Input-output tables 1992) 
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Because of the regulation, the dependence on domestic inputs is great. 
About 93 per cent of inputs used by the processing industry are domestic 
(see Figure 3). The share of imported inputs is small also in other parts of 
the cluster. Due to the tax system, subsidies obtained by the industry are 
considerable.  
The relationships between farming and the other input supplying 
sectors are of special importance. The fertilizer industry and some agri-
cultural machinery industries are suppliers of the agriculture. Thus, Part IV: Market Challenges 
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agriculture has close connections to the chemical industry. The food 
processing industry also utilizes different related services i.e. there are 
links to the storage and the transport and to the paper industry through 
packaging (Figure 3). The output of the food system is used mainly for 
domestic consumption. Only a small part is exported. 
I n p u t - o u t p u t  c a l c u l a t i o n s  g i v e  a n  i m p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  m o n e t a r y  f l o w s  
between the different parts of the food sector. They do not, however, tell 
much about the nature of the relationships behind these flows. In order to 
understand the nature of competition we should understand the key 
driving forces of the environment. On the other hand, to understand how 
individual firms do develop competitive advantage, we have made a field 
study.  
 
 
Field Study and Measures  
 
In this part, the strategic behavior of Finnish food manufacturing firms is 
analyzed. For the empirical study, firms operating in the meat processing, 
soft drink, and milk processing industries were selected as the most 
appropriate data sources. The total value-added contributed by these 
three subindustries is about 45 per cent, suggesting that they are relevant 
sectors in our food industry. In total, 88 operating firms were identified, 
and all of them were selected for empirical exploration. This setting 
permits the examination of relevant questions applicable to diverse firms 
while controlling for circumstances that might otherwise vary greatly 
across industries. There are firms of differing sizes that operate in 
different market segments. This should ensure enough variability to study 
strategic behavior. 
A semistructured questionnaire was mailed either to the chief executive 
officer, chief marketing executive, or to the owner of the company.2 58 
firms represented the meat-processing industry, four firms operated in the 
soft drink industry, and three firms represented the ice cream industry. 
The firms averaged 204 employees and 32 years in operation. Small firms 
employing less than 10 persons accounted for one third of the sample. A 
total of eight firms had operated less than four years.  
To provide a general profile of competitive advantages, production, 
purchasing, marketing, distribution, and finance variables are all repre-
sented in the strategy scale that consists of 19 items (see Table 1). 
Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which their firm 
emphasized each of the listed ‘success’ factors or methods of competing. 
Seven point scales with values ranging from one (not at all important) to 
seven (extremely important) were used. The instructions to the respon-
dents also stressed that they should use their major competitors as a frame 
of reference, and that they should selectively emphasize particular 
competitive methods.  
  Three measures were developed for bargaining power. The manufac-
turer's power in input markets (i.e., the primary and secondary suppliers Strategic Behavior and Interrelationships in the Food Chain 
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of raw materials) was measured with two items. The response scale 
ranged from one (extremely low) to seven (extremely high). Because 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient, which reflects the unidimensionality or 
internal consistency of a scale (Nunnally, 1978), did not meet the critical 
value of 0.70 for a narrow construct, the item measuring power relative to 
the secondary suppliers was deleted. Hence, the final scale consists of one 
item. Using an identical seven-point scale, the manufacturing firm's power 
relative to its distributors was measured with seven items altogether, 
reflecting different channel types. One five item scale showed the 
manufacturer's bargaining power relative to the four leading wholesalers 
and the customer retailers. Cronbach's alpha for the scale was 0.79, 
showing adequate internal consistency. The five items were then 
combined into a summated scale. Another two item scale measured the 
manufacturing firm's power in relation to its industrial and catering 
customers. Coefficient alpha for the scale was 0.71. As earlier, a summated 
scale was formed.  
Organizational performance consists of three indicators that reflect 
profitability, effectiveness, and efficiency. Following the recommendations 
of Dess and Robinson (1984), a self-reported scale on profitability was 
developed in the following way. Each manager indicated to what extent 
their firm had realized its performance objectives concerning the 
following five criteria: sales growth rate, gross margin, operating margin, 
net profits from operations, and return on shareholder equity. The 
response options for the scale ranged from one (highly dissatisfied) to 
seven (highly satisfied with the realized result). The scale had a high 
internal consistency (alpha = 0.87). For the analyses which follow, the five 
items were combined into a summed scale measuring overall financial 
performance. The sales growth rate over the last five years measures 
effectiveness. Efficiency was defined as sales turnover/the number of 
employees working in food processing. 
The study also includes some variables indicating marketing-related 
resources as well as two contextual variables (size and age of the firm).  
 
 
Identification of Competitive Advantages 
 
Evaluation of Industry Effects 
Prior to aggregating the firms independent of their industry classification, 
a comparison was made of the competence and performance variables 
among the firms grouped by the three industries. ANOVA results 
indicated that there were significant differences in only two of the 19 
competence variables. To identify the industry category sources for this 
variation, the Scheffe multiple comparison test was performed. It revealed 
no paired comparisons significant at the 0.05 level. No significant 
differences were found among performance variables by industry, either. 
Thus we may conclude that the industry effects are minimal in this study, 
and therefore it was appropriate to aggregate the responses.  Part IV: Market Challenges 
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How do the food manufacturing firms compete?  
The strategy variables were refined through factor analysis in order to 
identify the most important dimensions of competitive advantages. An 
orthogonal rotation (VARIMAX) of the initial principal components factor 
matrix yielded five factors. A combination of minimum eigenvalue 
criterion and scree test were used to determine the number of factors.3 The 
results of the factor analysis are shown in Table 1.  
Marketing differentiators (factor I) compete with a broad product range 
typically involving specialty products and with a strong emphasis on 
product development and new technology. Direct advertising, brand 
marketing and a skilled sales force are also important dimensions of 
marketing differentiation. Distributor orientation (factor II) suggests an 
especially strong commitment to ‘push marketing’ and a large marketing 
and sales organization necessary for its implementation. These firms 
emphasize serving specific market segments; e.g., they manufacture 
distributor brands for the integrated retail chains. Image and product 
development (factor III) shows high loadings on good corporate image, 
tight quality and cost control, and product development and innovation. 
This combination suggests a strategy based on efficiently producing a 
narrow line of niche products. Production and supplier orientation (factor 
IV) is characterized primarily by cost advantages based on economies of 
scale. This focus on large-scale manufacturing is combined with a strong 
emphasis on the quality and availability of raw materials, the control of 
distributors, and operating efficiency including new technology. Factor V 
called ‘low-priced products with no brand identity’ was of minor 
importance in the factor structure. These firms do not manufacture well-
known brands (negative loading); their strength is in price competition. 
 
Competitive Advantages, Bargaining Power and Organizational Performance 
The data showed that the number of primary suppliers of raw material 
ranged from 1 to 10. Sample median was four suppliers, and 17.5% of food 
manufacturers purchased over 50% of their raw materials directly from 
farmers. As to buyers, two thirds of the total food sales is channeled 
through retailers and wholesalers, and the rest through industrial and 
catering channels (Hyvönen, 1993). The correlations between the five 
strategy patterns and the food manufacturer's bargaining power in input 
and output markets are presented in Table 2.  
In terms of organizational performance, Table 2 indicates that the 
production- and supplier-oriented strategy is positively related to overall 
financial performance as well as to efficiency. The strategy emphasizing 
low-priced, nonbranded products is also positively correlated with overall 
financial performance. Marketing differentiation, distributor orientation, 
and image and product development are not significantly related to 
performance measures. While the correlations showed a negative 
direction, we complemented the analysis by correlating these three 
strategy patterns with the self-reported profitability measure: net profits Strategic Behavior and Interrelationships in the Food Chain 
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from operations. The results (not reported here) showed that the 
marketing differentiation-based advantage, distributor-based advantage 
as well as the strategy focusing on image and product development, were 
all negatively related to net profits from operation.  
 
Table 1  Factor Structure of Competitive Advantages (Values ≥ [.42]) 
 
  Factor loadings  
 
 I    II  III  IV  V  H2 
 Marketing    Distributor  Image  Produc-  Low- 
  differen-  orien-  and   tion and  priced 
 tiation  tation  product  supplier  products 
    develop-  orien-  with  no 
    m e n t   t a t i o n   b r a n d  
      identity 
 
Emphasis on production 
   processes and   
   new technology  .46      .51    .71 
Strong marketing and 
   sales organization  .46  .72        .79 
Continuing product 
   development and  
   innovation  .54    .48      .75 
Focus on specific 
   market segments    .80        .71 
Broad range of products  .87          .80 
Capability to manufacture 
   specialty food products  .55          .52 
Depth  of  product  range,       .76 
   large number of items  .79 
Advertising 
   expenditures above  .67          .69 
   the industry average 
Manufacturing of 
   distributor brands  .47  .45        .55 
Good  corporate  image    .81    .69 
Product  quality  control    .70    .64 
Continuing concern for 
   lowest cost per unit      .56      .65 
Competitive  pricing      .85  .77 
Economies of scale based 
   on mass production        .42  .43  .74 
Building brand 
   identification          -.53  .69 
Finance and operating 
   efficiency        .68    .74 
Major effort to ensure 
   the availability of        .87    .84 
   raw materials 
Emphasis on trade 
   marketing    .70        .68 
Control of distribution 
   channels        .42    .64 
Eigenvalue  7.01 2.10 1.76 1.40 1.07 
Percentage of cumulative Part IV: Market Challenges 
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   variance accounted for  36.9  48.0  57.3  64.7  70.3 
Table 2  Relationships Between Food Manufacturer's Competitive Ad-
vantages, Bargaining Power and Organizational Performance 
 
Type  of  Manufac- Manufac- Manufac-  Overall  Effici-  Effecti- 
advantage  turer's power  turer's power  turer's power  financial  ency  veness 
  relative  to relative  to relative  to  perfor- 
 wholesalers  industrial  primary  mance 
  and retailers  and catering  suppliers of 
   customers  raw  materials 
 
 Marketing 
   differentiation  .27*   -.04   .19   -.11  -.05  .05  
 Distributor 
    orientation  .09   .05  -.21*  -.05  .17  -.14 
Image/product 
   development  -.08   -.23*  .15  -.09  .08  -.02 
Production/supplier 
   orientation  .05  .16  .24* .34***  .26*    -.13 
Low-priced products 
   with no brand 
     identity  .05  .29**  .03  .23*  .10  .10 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05;  
  Largest pairwise N = 65  
  Smallest pairwise N = 58 
 
Only the strategy focusing on marketing differentiation is positively 
related to the bargaining power in relation to wholesalers and retailers. 
On the other hand, a low-price strategy with no brand identity is posi-
tively related to the bargaining power in relation to industrial and catering 
customers, while the strategy based on image and product development 
shows a negative correlation with power in these non-traditional channels 
of distribution. There is a positive relationship between the production- 
and supplier-oriented strategy and the manufacturer's power vis-à-vis the 
primary suppliers of raw materials, while the correlation between 
distributor-oriented strategy and the manufacturer's power in the input 
market is negative. 
 
 
A Taxonomy of Strategies in the Food Industry 
 
To identify possible differences in the strategic profiles of competitive 
groups, the factor scores obtained from the above analysis (Table I) were 
utilized as the input variables to classify the firms. A six cluster4 solution 
was found to maximize the distances between cluster means across the 
five factor patterns. The pattern of mean scores that emerged from the 
cluster analysis shows relatively high and positive scores on several 
alternative strategy types. This may indicate the possibility of emphasis on 
more than one strategy within the groups of firms.  
Next, differences between clusters on strategic variables not utilized on 
bases of classification are described. In particular, marketing-related Strategic Behavior and Interrelationships in the Food Chain 
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resources and organizational characteristics were examined using 
ANOVA. Duncan's multiple range test was used in order to determine 
which group means were different from each other. Table 3 shows the 
strategic profiles of the six groups of firms along with F-statistics and 
Duncan's tests. 
Cluster 1: Distributor-oriented, low-price strategists are larger food 
manufacturing firms that operate on a regional and national scale. These 
firms had launched an average of 11 new products during the previous 
two years. A relatively high proportion of lower-priced campaign prod-
ucts (an average of 49% of product range) is an indication of a strong 
distributor orientation. The marketing organization averages 17 staff 
members. Cluster 1 accounted for 16 percent of the sample.  
 
Table 3  A Taxonomy of Competitive Advantages in the Finnish Food 
Industry 
  Cluster  1 2 3  4 5 6  F-stat   
 Distri--  Utilizers  Marke-  Innova-  Produc-  Distri- 
 butor  of  ting  ting  tion  butor 
 oriented,  differen-    differen- differen-  and  cost-  oriented 
 low-  tiation  tiators  tiators  oriented  image 
  price  and cost- lacking  lacking  strategists  and 
 strategist  based  cost-based    cost-  lacking  product 
   advan-  advan-  based  marke-  develo- 
   tages  tages  advan-  ting  com-  pers 
      tages  petence 
 
Number of new 
   products launched  10.7   13.2  50.0   14.9   11.7  24.4  2.400* 
Proportion of  
   low-priced  
   campaign products Ê48.6  12.4  65.0  40.0  10.3  56.7  4.417*** 
Advertising  
   expenditures  (%) 
   of sales  turnover  1.7  0.7  2.6  0.8  0.9  2.0  4.173*** 
 Trade marketing  
   support (%) of  
   sales turnover   1.4  0.5  4.3  1.4  1.2  6.1   2.143^ 
 Size of marketing 
   and sales 
   organization   17.5  7.9   53.6  17.6  1.2  44.7  3.708** 
 Years of operation   26.6  29.0  46.4  22.8  48.5  52.6  2.176^ 
   Sales turnover,  
   mill. FIM  236.2  58.0  291.3 161.1  32.6  397.1  1.970^ 
 Overall financial 
   performance    3.8  4.1  3.8  4.3  4.8  3.4   n.s.  
 
% of sample   16%   22%  14%   24%   8%   16% 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; ^ p < .10 
Duncan's comparison (p < .05): 
  Number of new products  CL3 > CL1, CL5, CL2, CL4; 
  Proportion of campaign products CL3, CL6, CL1, CL4 > CL5, CL2;  
  dvertising expenditures CL3 > CL2, CL4; 
  Trade marketing support CL6 > CL2, CL5, CL1, CL4; 
  Size of marketing organization CL3, CL6 > CL5, CL2, CL1, CL4; 
  Years of operation CL6 > CL4; Part IV: Market Challenges 
 
254 
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Cluster 2: Utilizers of differentiation- and cost-based advantages are 
smaller and medium-sized firms which have no clear strategic orientation. 
During a two year period, new product introductions numbered 13 but a 
low-price strategy is not widely adopted in this group of firms. This 
cluster has the lowest advertising and trade marketing expenditures. The 
marketing organization consists on an average of eight staff members. The 
‘stuck in the middle’ group captured 22% of the sample.  
Cluster 3: Marketing differentiators lacking cost-based advantages are 
large firms. The firms compete with a broad product range, having 
launched on an average 50 new products over the past two years. The 
proportion of campaign products is large, averaging 65% of product 
range. Consequently, a low-price strategy is commonly adopted by the 
firms. Cluster 3 contributes heavily to trade marketing. Advertising 
expenditures are the highest, and the marketing organization the largest, 
averaging 54 employees. The cluster accounted for 14% of the sample.  
Cluster 4: Innovating differentiators lacking cost-based advantages are 
medium-sized and smaller firms. The group had launched an average of 
15 product innovations during the previous two years. While the 
proportion of lower-priced campaign products accounts for an average of 
40% of the product range, to some extent the group emphasizes a low-
price strategy. Advertising and trade marketing expenditures are rela-
tively low. The marketing organization is, however, relatively large, 
averaging 18 staff members. Cluster 4 accounted for 24% of the sample. 
Cluster 5: Production- and cost-oriented strategists lacking marketing 
competence are small firms that have a very small marketing organiza-
tion, averaging only 1.2 persons. The group had introduced an average of 
12 new products during the previous two years. A low-price strategy is 
not common in this group. The cluster captured 8% of the sample.  
Cluster 6: Distributor-oriented image and product developers are very 
large firms that have operated long in the business; firm age averages 53 
years. The group most strongly emphasizes a push strategy oriented to 
their distributors, which can be seen from the high proportion of trade 
marketing expenditures. A relatively high proportion of lower-priced 
campaign products demonstrates a focus on competing with price in the 
channels of distribution. In the group, the size of the marketing organi-
zation is the second largest, averaging 45 staff members. Cluster 6 
accounted for 16% of the sample.  
With regard to overall financial performance, the analyses of the data 
showed that clusters 3, 1 and 6 fell below the sample average. Cluster 2 
appeared to have a performance level roughly equivalent to the sample 
average while clusters 4 and 5 are ‘high performers’. The data revealed 
that some firms in clusters 3, 4, and 6 manufactured distributor brands 
(the results are not reported here). This explains, in part, their focus on 
distributor orientation. Differences in marketing variables by cluster 
provide some confirmation of the validity of the cluster solutions. As 
Table 3 shows, ANOVA reveals significant group differences on four Part IV: Market Challenges 
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marketing variables, and three of them were marginally significant (p < 
0.10).  Strategic Behavior and Interrelationships in the Food Chain 
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Conclusions and Implications 
 
Increasing Rivalry and Competitive Strategies in the Food Industry 
 
The Finnish food sector has been dominated by the targets of domestic 
agricultural policy, i.e. self sufficiency and income parity between farmers 
and workers. The sheltered and protected environment has shaped the 
nature of competition at the industry level. Domestic inputs have mainly 
been used. Exports are small. It appears that the food processing industry 
has not been able to build many supporting industries around the 
processing. Related goods and services are oriented to the domestic 
market. Machinery is in many cases imported. Producer-oriented 
government policy and the lack of keen foreign competition characterize 
the competition environment.  
The strategies in the Finnish food industry are largely home market-
oriented, to which, inter alia, a distant location and trade barriers have 
contributed. Now, membership in the EU introduces new adjustment 
requirements into the food chain; the period of stability is history. Data 
from the food manufacturing firms in three subindustries show that the 
largest firms tend to follow either a differentiation strategy in mass 
markets competing with a broad product range, or a distributor-oriented 
strategy with an emphasis on price competitiveness and trade support. 
We find a group of medium-sized innovative firms that emphasize a 
differentiated strategy in regional market segments. There are also a 
group of smaller firms that have no clear strategic orientation, and a group 
of very small local firms that are purely production-oriented.  
Although the leading national firms now have bargaining power in the 
food chain as well as considerable economies of scale, the importance of 
cost-cutting will increase in a deregulated market situation. It is generally 
thought that (gradually) opening markets may give new export 
opportunities especially for large-scale standard food producers, and for 
the manufacturers having strong brands. This surely is true, but the seg-
mentation process of consumer markets and new requirements for 
product development increasingly tend to favor differentiation. We can 
see that consumer segments are becoming more and more heterogeneous 
and smaller. In larger firms, differentiation based on fewer but stronger 
brands to focused segments would be more profitable than widening the 
product range. Price always remains important to consumers, but quality, 
safety and ethics of production will become increasingly important. There 
is a growing consumer segment that is health and environment conscious 
and not so price conscious. These trends favor small-scale specialty 
producers in domestic as well as in foreign markets.  
In the light of the structure of the European food industry in general, it 
is unlikely that small-scale and medium-sized food companies will be 
outcompeted by market leaders (Dijk and Mackel, 1990). While most 
smaller firms may remain domestic, their success may then be largely 
dependent on the bargaining power of integrated wholesalers and retail-Part IV: Market Challenges 
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ers. Market entry, however, may be difficult because of the requirements 
of large-scale production and ‘megabrands’ of integrated retail chains. The 
share of retail brands is also on the increase, tightening competition. Our 
findings show that only marketing differentiation may increase a food 
manufacturer's bargaining power vis-à-vis retail chains. This kind of 
competence is primarily based on a broad product range, strong brands, 
and heavy advertising. At the firm level, brand marketing creates a power 
advantage in terms of a consumer pull, while the manufacturers of less 
clearly identified products generally suffer considerable erosion in 
bargaining power (Watkins, 1986). Because brand strategy is expensive, 
alternative strategies for smaller and medium-sized food manufacturers 
would be the development of collaboration with local retailers and direct 
distribution through own outlets.  
However, a tradeoff remains. The study implies that the firms 
emphasizing marketing differentiation or distributor orientation are ‘low 
performers,’ while the firms following a low-price strategy with no brand 
identity or a production- and supplier-oriented strategy are ‘high 
performers’ relative to competitors. In fact, there are pressures to lower 
marketing and distribution costs in the Finnish food industry (Hyvönen, 
1993), which are found to be somewhat higher than in some European 
countries. Our findings also reveal that the production-oriented firms 
have bargaining power in relation to the primary suppliers of raw mate-
rials. It is common, for example, that these manufacturers secure a direct 
and regular supply of raw materials through contracting with farmers.  
Our study demonstrates that production-oriented firms may outper-
form market-oriented and distributor-oriented firms. The strategies that 
are differentiated are usually assumed to be the key to a firm's chances to 
earn above-normal profits (Rumelt, 1987). However, there is some 
evidence to indicate that, if the market is protected from active compe-
tition (such as our setting), production orientation with its overall lack of 
marketing skills and resources can then be superior (Snow and Hrebiniak, 
1980).  
In a mature industry such as food, a sustainable competitive position is 
not only a function of a firm's absolute size. As consumer needs and 
preferences are changing, it is the relative size of the firm in a specific 
market segment, associated with unique competencies, that become 
important. From a consumer's point of view, structural concentration can 
have negative impacts on the long-term functioning of the whole food 
chain. As Nelson and Winter (1982) maintain, to gain positional 
advantages, survive and grow, firms within an industry need competitors 
that constantly seek innovations.  
In order to satisfy the demanding consumer, firms should be able to 
deliver customized products at separate market niches. This brings new 
challenges to the relationships between farmers and industry. There is a 
shift to production contracts. For example, all the Finnish poultry pro-
duction is already based on contracts. Farmers prefer production contracts 
because they ensure the marketing of their products. In addition, farmers Strategic Behavior and Interrelationships in the Food Chain 
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appreciate the advisory services concerning for example breeding and 
medication of the animals offered by the industry. 74 per cent of farmers 
believe that production contracts help to improve the quality of farm 
products.  
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Notes 
 
1  The figures in the boxes describe the value-added created in the respective sector and the 
figures between the boxes the net input flows between the sectors. There are minor 
differences between Figure 2 and Figure 3, because in Figure 2 all taxes and subsidies are 
collected together so that the figures between the boxes are net figures without taxes and 
subsidies. 
 
2  The two mailings and personal contacts resulted in a sample of 65 usable questionnaires, 
a response rate of 73.4% (65/88). A comparison of early responding firms and late 
responding firms showed that these groups do not differ in terms of years of business, 
number of employees, or firm performance. The questionnaire was developed according 
to the general approach recommended by Nunnally (1978). Several iterations of the 
research instrument were made prior to an actual field test. The relevance of the items 
was ascertained through the use of extensive interviews in 12 firms, which led to several 
improvements in both the wording and the composition of lists of variables. 
 
3  Because of the potential instability of factor scores with 65 firms and 19 strategy 
variables, the factor analysis was performed five times to (n-1) cases in order to test 
whether a changing of sample composition would alter the factor loadings (Kim and 
Mueller, 1978). The analysis results were the same or similar in all runs. 
 
4  In the following, the word ‘cluster' is used in the statistical sense. Ward's hierarchical 
centroid method based on squared Euclidean distances was used to form clusters. This 
method is considered to be one of the most accurate hierarchical cluster methods (Everitt, 
1980). Ward's method produces a grouping of relatively homogeneous groups of firms 
which have maximum between-group variance and minimum within-group variance 
(Punj and Stewart, 1983).  
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Products1 
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The consumption of animal foods has been declining in the Western 
World for a long time and this fundamental change in demand has 
increased competition. This change in the pattern of consumer spending is 
among other things caused by increased attention on quality and the 
nutritional content of products. Consequently, the consumption of meat 
products has not only been declining in general, there has also been a 
change in consumption in the direction of white and comparatively 
healthier meat such as poultry. As the Danish food industry primarily 
sells their production in western markets, the Danish meat processing 
companies became aware of an increased competition. As a means to 
obtain a higher quality and thereby a competitive edge, the ISO 9000 
certification of the company's quality control system has often been 
mentioned and introduced. 
Therefore the question is as follows: Will an ISO 9000 certification, in 
itself, be important for marketing and thereby affect customer preferences? 
If the ISO 9000 affects customer preferences, the certified suppliers of 
processed meat products will be able to achieve an advantage at the 
expense of suppliers with no ISO 9000 certification. If, on the contrary, one 
or more of the customer groups do not attach essential importance to an 
ISO certification, the supplier has to compete on other and more value-
adding criteria in the choice of suppliers. 
If we are to estimate whether a factor is a competitive advantage or not, 
it is important to analyse whether or not this factor is considered by 
various customers when choosing/rejecting suppliers. We must also ana-
lyse the importance of this factor in the decision-making process. More-
over, we have to consider if more weight will be attached to this factor – 
will it become more important in the years to come and will it possibly 
become a necessary condition for being considered a supplier at all. 
Consequently, in this presentation we are going to analyse how differ-
ent groups of customers in different countries purchase – choose/cultivate 
their suppliers of meat and processed meat and determine the position of 
an ISO 9000 certificate. It may be so that demands on hygiene and quality 
control exceed what a certification will guarantee, so that such a certificate 
would in fact be of no value at all to the supplier as it is of no importance 
for the customers' choice.  
A logical start will be to examine the ISO 9000 quality certification and 
set up some hypotheses on the supposed value of a certificate for the Part IV: Market Challenges 
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company's customers. These hypotheses will then form the basis of an 
empirical investigation, in which various groups of customers in different 
geographical markets are interviewed about their criteria and processes 
for choosing a supplier, and their opinion of the present and future 
importance of ISO 9000 certificates. Subsequently, the results of this 
investigation can be analysed and these analyses can then form the basis 
of guidelines for Danish producers of meat and processed meat on how to 
behave towards their various groups of customers. 
For producers of meat and processed meat products, customers can be 
divided into three main types: 
• retail  chains, 
• catering  firms,  and 
•  meat processing industries (selling their products to the first two 
groups). 
 
The three main groups of customers mentioned could again be divided by 
nationality, size, profile, degree of centralisation, degree of internation-
alisation, etc. In this presentation, we will look primarily at the large units 
in the three most important Western European markets for the Danish 
food industry, namely the UK, Germany and Sweden. Our interest is 
concentrated on these large units because of the concentration process and 
the structure-rationalisation process the three main groups of customers 
have been and still are experiencing. A large supplier of meat or processed 
meat has to sell a substantial part of his production to these units and their 
share and importance are very likely to grow considerably in the years to 
come. 
 
 
ISO 9000 Quality Certification2 
 
The Arrival and Prevalence of the ISO Series 
 
The ISO 9000 system itself is a comparatively new phenomenon. The ISO 
9000 series was published in March 1987 by ‘The International Standards 
Organisation’ ISO. Afterwards, the series has been accepted by a large 
number of countries (45), of which 16 have entered into bilateral agree-
ments with each other as a token of mutual acceptance of each other's 
interpretations of the standards. In Europe CEN, The European Standards 
Organisation, has approved the ISO 9000 series as an ES-standard, i.e. as a 
European standard. This approval includes the CEN-countries' approval 
of the ISO 9000 series as national standards without any deviations or 
reservations at all. In the European Union, the series has been named EN 
29000 and in Denmark the series is called DS/ISO 9000 in which DS refers 
to the national standardisation authority ‘Danish Standard’. The ‘Danish 
Standard’ published the ISO 9000 standards as national standards at the 
beginning of 1988. Quality Certification as a Success Factor in International Food Marketing 
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With the publication of the ISO 9000 series, a common systems 
language regarding quality understanding and quality control has been 
introduced, a political act which is intended to ease the international trade 
in goods of a certain minimum quality. 
 
 
The ISO 9000 Standards 
 
The ISO 9000 series consists of five standards and a vocabulary. The ISO 
standard contains general guidelines for the choice and usage of different 
standards for documented quality control. Documented quality control 
means that the company sets up a number of definite quality measures in 
order to make continuous corrections, if necessary, for the continuous 
securing of a homogeneous quality level. Consequently, the standard 
considers which of the three different certification models the company 
can choose. 
The ISO 9001, ISO 9002 and ISO 9003 are three distinct system stan-
dards for documented quality control by which the company can be certi-
fied. These three standards are called the requirement models as they are 
in principle designed for actual contracts between buyer and seller. 
The difference between the three models is their respective areas of 
validity. In this way one standard is no better or more distinguished than 
the other. The choice of standard will depend on the needs of the company 
and its expectations of future demands from customers. 
The ISO 9001 is the most comprehensive requirement model and 
contains demands for the functions of construction and development, 
production, installation and service. Above all, this standard addresses 
companies which have their own functions of product and process devel-
opment or any other kind of construction. The ISO 9002 consists of 
demands for production and installation whereas the ISO 9003 only 
consists of demands for final inspection and testing. 
The ISO 9004 can best be characterised as a catalogue of ideas on how 
each company, whether or not it has a certification in sight, can introduce 
documented quality control in its organisation. 
At last, it can be mentioned that the ISO 8402 is the vocabulary for the 
ISO 9000 standards. The vocabulary covers the most common quality 
concepts and their exact meaning in relation to the other standards. 
 
 
The Company Keeps its Promises 
 
The introduction of quality control by the ISO 9000 standards is an indi-
vidual arrangement where in principle special consideration is given to 
conditions of specific importance to the companies. A certification by the 
ISO 9000 standards does not necessarily mean that the quality of the 
delivered product is outstanding just because the company has an ISO 
9000 certification. As ‘Danish Standard’ states in one of its many infor-
mation brochures about the series, it is important to keep in mind that Part IV: Market Challenges 
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quality is not to be understood as a measure of quality of the final prod-
uct, but rather as a guarantee that the customers' expectations are fulfilled. 
By this fulfilment of the customer's expectations we mean the situation in 
which the company delivers the order specification agreed on by buyer 
and seller. Danish Standard puts it like this: An ISO 9000 approval means 
that ‘the company keeps its promises’. 
The customer does not necessarily have to be satisfied in order for a 
company to become and remain ISO 9000 certified. The company is 
evaluated on its ability to follow its own rules for quality control, partly in 
connection with the issue of the certificate itself and partly during the 
subsequent audits. If it does so, the company can become and remain ISO 
9000 certified. Quality is a relative concept. How quality is defined and 
experienced depends on each individual company and its relations to 
current and potential customers and/or suppliers. What is, for example, 
experienced as a satisfying quality in one situation can be found un-
acceptable in another; what is regarded as a good quality by one customer 
can be turned down as inferior by another. The ISO 9000 standards allow 
both situations. 
 
 
ISO 9000: An Advantage for the Customer and the Supplier 
 
An ISO 9000 certification will in principle include the following advantages 
for the customer: 
•  A guarantee that the supplier delivers a product or a service that fulfils 
the customer's needs and wishes. 
•  A guarantee that the supplier delivers according to the specifications 
agreed on in the contract situation. 
•  Establishment of a closer supplier-customer relationship to mutual 
advantage, for example in connection with product and process devel-
opment. 
•  Improved opportunities of introducing the JIT-principle in purchasing, 
production and sales, e.g. with the purpose of reducing storage, 
production, transport, and installation costs. 
•  Improved opportunities of reducing one's own quality costs; for exam-
ple, less comprehensive control on incoming purchased goods, reduc-
tion of supplier audits, reduction in resources used on complaints, 
correction of faults, etc. 
•  A simplification of the procedure for approval of a supplier including 
continuous control. If the customer is ISO 9000 certified, an ISO 9000 
approval of the supplier will at the same time fulfil the customer's 
formal obligation to the supplier regarding the quality control of the 
supplier. 
•  A potential marketing effect towards the customer's own customers as 
he will be able to maintain that the incoming raw materials, compo-
nents (perhaps from the main suppliers) are subordinated to certified 
quality control and thereby checked for faults, etc. Quality Certification as a Success Factor in International Food Marketing 
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For the supplier, the marketing effect of an ISO 9000 certification, caused by 
these advantages for customers, could for example be: 
•  The supplier is chosen by customers who directly require an ISO 9000 
certification, or in any other way have preference for those who have, 
at the expense of those who do not have an ISO certificate. An 
important supplier criterion is fulfilled. 
•  The supplier obtains status as main supplier with one or more present 
customers, for example as a sole supplier. That is, he obtains an 
improved status as a supplier. 
•  It becomes easier for the supplier to be approved as a potential 
supplier by future customers. 
•  The supplier keeps his present customer base but has at the same time 
improved his opportunities of extending it. This can lead to an 
increased market share. 
•  The supplier's need to compete on price is reduced in favour of the 
competition parameters ‘supplier safety’ and ‘supplier quality’, in 
broad terms. 
•  The supplier improves his export opportunities. 
•  The supplier reduces the customer's need for supplier audits which can 
lead to a reduction of costs for both customer and supplier. 
•  The supplier achieves a closer and more balanced relationship to the 
customer. This results in improved trade relations as well as in the 
equalisation of an uneven division of power between the parties. 
•  A general improvement of image. 
 
An ISO 9000 approval does not guarantee that the supplier's product or 
service is of a high quality or is able to fulfil the customers' needs in spite 
of the fact that the standards are developed with this in mind. The reason 
can be found in the demand models for certified quality control. An 
approval of these models does not contain demands on quality and 
fulfilment of needs but only on the prevention of deviation from the 
specification. 
The ISO 9000 certification does not refer to the supplier's products and 
services directly but to the quality control system that produces them. 
First of all, an ISO 9000 certification shows that the supplier through his 
quality control system documentedly endeavours to deliver the speci-
fications agreed on in the contract. Therefore, in principle, the purpose of 
an ISO 9000 certification is to increase the confidence in the supplier 
regarding the homogeneity of the goods delivered. 
 
 
An Empirical Investigation of the Marketing Effect of the Suppliers' 
ISO 9000 Certification3 
 
In the previous section we gave an explicit formulation of the advantages 
of trade with ISO 9000 certified suppliers and of how the customer's Part IV: Market Challenges 
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experience can be a marketing effect for the ISO 9000-approved supplier. 
Therefore, we assume that companies that get an ISO 9000 certification 
will have reason to believe that they will be able to observe a marketing 
effect after having received this certificate. 
However, the question is now whether the assumed advantages of an 
ISO 9000 certification in the supply link will in fact produce a marketing 
effect and whether ISO 9000 certified companies in general will be 
preferred as suppliers because of their system approval? 
We will now conduct empirical investigations on this matter by finding 
concrete answers through an investigation of the importance given to an 
ISO 9000 approval by retailers, catering firms and producers of foods in 
Britain, Germany and Sweden, in connection with their choices of 
suppliers of (processed) meat products. The data has been collected by 
means of a number of interviews with decision-makers who have filled in 
questionnaires during the interviews. 
The questionnaire, and the agenda for the interviews, dealt with three 
main points: 
•  General background information about the particular company and the 
respondent. 
•  General criteria for the evaluation of present and potential suppliers of 
meat. 
•  Specific questions about the ISO 9000. 
 
The questions assume possible effects of an ISO 9000 certification, which 
are stated above.  
As the retail trade and the manufacturing and meat processing sector 
differ from each other – the former buys processed meat products whereas 
the latter merely buys raw materials – it was necessary to modify the 
wording of some of the questions to take this into account. 
Table 1 shows that 26 interviews were completed (25 personal and one 
by telephone) in addition to 8 interviews in connection with another 
project in this research programme, in which selected questions about ISO 
were included. 
Interviews with the processing companies on the British Isles were 
completed without questionnaires, but as a discussion of their approach to 
quality control as producers. Furthermore, one of the German catering 
firms refrained from answering the questions about general purchasing 
criteria. In some cases the companies were requested to forward presenta-
tion brochures and/or annual reports in advance and in other cases we 
inquired about these things at the end of the interview. 
 
Table 1  Number of Completed Interviews 
 
 Retailing  Catering  Processing  Total 
 
Britain  6 2 3  11 
Germany  5 5 3  13 
Sweden  5 0 5  10 
 Quality Certification as a Success Factor in International Food Marketing 
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Total 16  7  11  34 
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A decision was made to conduct the first interview with the person 
responsible for the purchasing of processed meat. If it turned out to be 
impossible to get an interview because he was busy or if the purchasing 
manager refused to talk about quality control, we tried to arrange an 
interview with the technical quality control function. 
Altogether two-thirds of the respondents had mainly a commercial post 
and one-third a technical one. In Sweden all respondents were 
‘commercial’, and this was also the case in Germany with one exception. 
In the following section we will present and analyse the results of our 
investigation sector by sector. 
 
 
Results of the Investigation 
 
Retailing – UK 
 
The most important criterion for the British chains in connection, with 
their evaluation of present and potential suppliers of processed meat, is 
delivery of stable quality, at a specified level. This is interesting in con-
nection with the ISO 9000 as the very purpose of the ISO is to guarantee 
the production of a stable quality on a specified level. Delivery service (the 
ability always to deliver on time) is the second most important criterion. 
That is, they want the agreed quality at the agreed time. A high quality 
has the third highest priority but it is more important to get the quality 
desired than the absolute best quality.  
Flexibility, a well-known brand, and the fact that the supplier offers a 
modern product mix are given high priority as well. A well-known brand 
is particularly important when we talk about the brand of the producer. 
All chains, however, have their own brands as well, of which they 
demand a stable and high quality. Some chains find it important to have a 
local supplier whereas others do not attach any particular importance to 
nationality. EDI-capability is merely of medium importance to the 
interviewed chains as they are not very far in this area. 
Not much importance is attached to the ISO 9000. Oddly enough, high 
capacity does not have a high priority in spite of the remarkable size of the 
chains and thereby of the purchasing volume, but perhaps the re-
spondents have considered the fact that there are chains which are larger 
than themselves. Low price has a low priority as well, but this is partly 
due to the fact that most of the respondents of the British chains have a 
technical rather than a commercial background and position. 
The British food chains clearly attach more importance to the HACCP 
than to the ISO 9000/BS5750. The HACCP is a preventive quality control 
and in relation to this, we can add that a new EU-directive on food 
product hygiene demands that producers of food in the EU work out a 
HACCP-plan no later than 1 January 1996 (cf. article 3 subsection 2 in the 
directive).  Quality Certification as a Success Factor in International Food Marketing 
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All British chains have worked out a detailed ‘Code of Practice’, which 
suppliers are recommended to follow. The HACCP is typically in-
corporated into these manuals whereas BS5750 and ISO 9000 only are 
mentioned as an exception and used as framework for the preparation of 
the manual. All chains implement audits in order to investigate whether 
their ‘code of practice’ is followed. 
None of the British chains demand a certification of their suppliers of 
processed meat by BS5750 or ISO 9000, none of them contemplate 
demanding this within the next years although one chain had some 
doubts. This same respondent thought that BS/ISO will become a com-
mon demand from the British chains in the next three years. Five out of six 
consider it as an advantage if a supplier is in the process of becoming 
certified. Only two out of six ... 
•  prefer, all things being equal, certified suppliers, 
•  would give certified suppliers status as sole suppliers, and 
•  think that it is easier for certified suppliers to become listed. 
 
All of them are prepared to co-operate with suppliers about their Q-
systems but none of them are willing to pay more for products of certified 
suppliers. None of them have cut out suppliers who were not prepared to 
become certified. 
 
 
Retailing – Germany 
 
The trade of foods in Germany amounted to approximately DM 214 
billion in 1992, of which the first six groupings had a turnover of ca. 61%. 
Of the five chains interviewed, one found it of special importance that 
products create good sales and that suppliers are able to deliver in 
sufficient quantities. Therefore, suppliers must be of a certain size and be 
flexible in order for them to deliver at short notice. Quality control as well 
as certification are considered very important. Even though each 
individual supplier has quality control, the chain itself makes controls 
with the supplier as well. In addition to this, a spot test is made of every 
consignment. Lack of quality immediately results in the removal of the 
products from the range. 
Another chain stresses that assortment should not be widened (rather 
the other way round) as the number of products influence the financial 
position greatly. Usually a product is only introduced when another is 
removed from the assortment. Also in this case the products are above all 
selected according to their saleability. Hence it follows that the quantity is 
important. It is necessary to be able to deliver a minimum quantity if you 
want to be listed. But it is still more important that there is no shortage in 
delivery when you have been chosen as a supplier, i.e. that you are able to 
deliver the requested quantity in time. Much effort is made to control and 
improve this type of quality. As for the quality of the products, much 
importance is attached to the hygienic standard. It is essential that Part IV: Market Challenges 
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suppliers have a high degree of hygiene and are able to guarantee this. 
Therefore, great importance is attached to ISO 9000 certification. However, 
it is no condition that suppliers are ISO-certified, but a certification 
simplifies the quality control of the chain. 
Also the third chain found it important that the products are fast-selling 
and that the supplier has the necessary capacity and is able to deliver at 
short notice. It is stressed that suppliers deliver the required quality and a 
quality certification is found important. A certification is considered a 
quality stamp which is desirable in order for the chain to profile itself to 
the consumers. But also hygienic conditions and a guarantee of security in 
connection with foods are considered very important. They think that ISO-
certification will be of still greater importance in the years to come and 
that it will become a crucial criterion when purchasing goods. 
For chain No. 4, it is also crucial that the product has the right physical 
characteristics in order for them to sustain a good assortment image. The 
product is tested in their own laboratory. 
They consider quality control to be of an increasing importance but do 
not rely on the supplier's quality control although they find it an advan-
tage if he has one. Above all, they rely on their own laboratory tests 
regarding the ascertainment of faults. No importance is attached to ISO-
certification when deciding whether to approve of a supplier or not. 
However, it is considered to be a small advantage even though the quality 
control still takes place in the laboratories of the chain. They will go so far 
as to say that an ISO-certification is superfluous. 
The fifth chain has worked out its own guidelines which underlie the 
fixing of minimum demands on the purchase of meat and meat products. 
They visit the supplier's production facilities and test the quality in their 
own laboratories. Documentation and specification about the production 
process is demanded and will become indispensable demands in the 
future. 
 
 
The Swedish Grocery Trade 
 
The trade of groceries in Sweden is influenced to a great extent by the 
three large actors (blocks) on the market – ICA, the consumer co-operative 
sector and Axel Johnson (often called the third block). Together they have 
approximately 76% of the retail trade of groceries. 
The highest ranking criteria for the first block with the purchase of meat 
products are ‘Always delivery on time’ and ‘No variation in quality’. It is 
also stressed that the suppliers are Swedish and that they have the 
necessary productive capacity. It is emphasised that the import 
regulations and the demands on the Swedish farmers have worked as a 
quality assurance. On the other hand they want to be less dependent on 
Swedish farming. It is taken for granted that salmonella (and other 
bacteria) must not be found in products and the laboratories perform 
different types of bacteriological tests. On the whole, they rank the quality Quality Certification as a Success Factor in International Food Marketing 
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of the products abreast of safety of supply and ability to supply. Not much 
importance is attached to an ISO-certification. ‘The importance of an ISO 
9000 certification should not be overestimated – and it must not become a 
pretext for doing nothing.’ 
One result of the minor importance attached to the ISO 9000 certifica-
tion is that they neither demand an ISO 9000 certification from suppliers 
of processed meat nor want to make such a certification a general demand 
within the next 3 years. Another result shows that they are not willing to 
pay a higher price for products from an ISO 9000 certified supplier. Not 
one has been removed from the list of approved suppliers when not being 
willing or able to become certified. However, it is their opinion that it will 
be an advantage in the evaluation of the supplier if he is in the process of 
becoming certified just as it will be easier for a potential supplier to 
become ‘listed’ if he is certified. 
The purchasing criterion which block 2 estimates to be of the highest 
value are delivery on time and no variation in quality. This does not mean 
that the quality level is not important. They find it very important that the 
supplier has a quality which is higher than or corresponds to the market 
leader. Next, the bacteriological quality must be in order, and without 
Salmonella. There is continuous control of the products delivered. The 
supplier must have good know-how in production and a sufficient 
production capacity. If the supplier does not observe quality, he is 
rejected. 
The block does not demand that a supplier of processed meat is quality-
certified and they are not going to make it a general demand within the 
next three years. Consequently, they will not give ISO-certified suppliers 
status as sole suppliers and they have not crossed any suppliers off the list 
of approved suppliers due to unwillingness to become certified. Neither 
are they willing to pay a higher price for a product from an ISO-certified 
supplier. However, a certification does have positive features. It is 
regarded an advantage when evaluating a present or a potential supplier 
if he is in the process of becoming ISO-certified. Other things being equal, 
a certified company will be chosen as supplier. It will also be easier for a 
potential supplier to become ‘listed’ if he is ISO-certified. 
Block 3 gives its highest priority to delivery on time and no variation in 
quality. But also a large production capacity, flexibility as a supplier, and 
a modern product mix are considered as important criteria. Furthermore, 
it is stressed that the supplier is Swedish. An ISO 9000 certification is also 
considered important. The block controls everything from the supply of 
goods through the laboratory to the dispatch and follows a specific 
programme in this connection. However, they do not consider themselves 
to be as demanding as the British retail chains. The block does not demand 
that their suppliers of processed meat are ISO 9000 certified but they 
intend to make it a general demand within the next 3 years. Moreover, it is 
their opinion that it will become a common demand from the Swedish 
suppliers. Part IV: Market Challenges 
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No suppliers have been crossed off the list of approved suppliers 
because of their unwillingness or inability to become ISO 9000 certified, 
and an ISO-certified supplier will not be given status as sole supplier of 
certain subsections of processed meat. It is, however, easier for a potential 
supplier to become ‘listed’ if he is certified by the ISO 9000. They are also 
prepared to pay a higher price for a product from an ISO-certified 
company (but in the future they will only use ISO-certified companies as 
suppliers). Thus block 3 prefers ISO 9000 certified suppliers to non-
certified because they consider a certification as a sign of quality. 
Nevertheless they will still control the suppliers' quality control systems in 
spite of the fact that they are ISO 9000 certified. 
 
 
Catering – UK 
 
The British catering market has been increasing significantly as the share 
of the consumers' household expenses spent on eating outside the home 
went up from 17.8% in 1985 to 20.5% in 1992. 
The two large British catering firms interviewed attached most 
importance to high quality, followed by stable quality, delivery service 
and flexibility. EDI-capability has a relatively high priority as well. The 
following priorities were a modern product mix, a British supplier, ISO 
9000, and a low price. The suppliers' brand being well-known is of very 
little importance for one catering firm and totally irrelevant for the other. 
As for certification the catering firms agree on the following: ISO is not 
demanded at the moment but will be demanded within the next years and 
will probably become a common demand in catering. It is an advantage if 
a supplier is in the process of becoming certified although a certified 
supplier will not be given status as sole supplier. The catering firms are 
prepared to co-operate with the suppliers about their Q-systems but are 
not prepared to pay a higher price for a product from a certified supplier. 
Certified suppliers advertise certification and explain the contents but 
firms have not been invited to participate in suppliers' certification 
process and a certification is not considered as a sign of quality. The 
catering firms will check the suppliers' Q-system in spite of the fact that 
they are certified and a certification is only considered as a small extra 
plus. 
They only disagreed on two things, namely whether it is easier for 
certified suppliers to become listed or not, and whether ISO eases 
communication. 
 
 
Catering – Germany 
 
The five interviewed German catering firms have an average of 7500 
employees and more than 200 restaurants each.  
Delivery service has the highest possible priority. Flexibility has almost 
the same priority. Next comes a modern product mix and stable quality Quality Certification as a Success Factor in International Food Marketing 
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which is therefore given a higher priority than high quality, and high 
capacity. The ISO 9000 has high priority as well. 
A low price is of medium importance. The possibility of EDI, a well-
known brand, and the supplier being local are given low priority. Local 
suppliers only rank a little higher than Danish and Dutch suppliers who 
are given the lowest priority. 
All five respondents think that it is easier for certified suppliers to 
become listed, that certified suppliers advertise their certification and that 
ISO is a sign of quality. Four or five think that ISO will become a common 
demand in German catering within the next three years. Four will make 
ISO a demand within the next three years and consider it an advantage if a 
supplier is in the process of becoming certified. They prefer, other things 
being equal, certified suppliers and are prepared to co-operate with the 
suppliers about their Q-systems and check the certified suppliers' systems 
too. 
At present nobody demands that the supplier is certified and nobody 
has struck any suppliers off their list because of their unwillingness or 
inability to become certified. 
 
 
Processing – Germany 
 
The criteria for evaluation of suppliers, given highest priority among the 3 
interviewed German meat processing companies, are stable quality, 
followed by delivery service and flexibility. ISO 9000 and high quality are 
also given high priority. Large capacity and low price are of medium 
importance. 
The German meat processing companies agree that ISO 9000 will 
become a general demand within the next three years, that it is a plus if a 
supplier is in the process of becoming certified, that, other things being 
equal, certified suppliers are preferred, that it is easier for certified 
suppliers to become listed, that suppliers boost their certification, that it is 
also necessary to check the certified suppliers' Q-systems, that ISO eases 
communication and that ISO 9000 is a great advantage in their evaluation 
of the suppliers of processed meat. 
Two German meat processing companies will demand that their 
suppliers of processed meat are certified within the next three years. Only 
one would give certified suppliers status as sole supplier of certain 
categories of processed meat and only one would pay more for products 
of certified suppliers. 
None of the German processing companies demand ISO at present, 
nobody has cut out non-certified suppliers and nobody has been asked to 
participate in their suppliers' certification process. 
 
 
Processing – Sweden 
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Delivery service is given highest priority by the interviewed Swedish 
processing companies and stable quality has almost the same importance. 
A low price is given third highest priority. Next follows a group of three 
criteria which are of a bit more than medium importance, namely high(-
est) quality and if the supplier is Swedish or Danish. 
The Swedish processing companies agree that it is an advantage for the 
supplier to become certified, that they want to co-operate with suppliers 
about their Q-systems and that certified suppliers' Q-systems also should 
be checked. But at present none of them demand that their suppliers must 
be ISO 9000 certified, nobody wants to pay a higher price for goods of a 
certified supplier, and nobody has been asked to participate in the 
suppliers' certification process. 
Three prefer, other things being equal, certified suppliers and think that 
ISO eases communication. Two find it is easier for certified suppliers to 
become listed, two consider an ISO-certification a sign of quality, and two 
regard a certification as a plus in their evaluation of suppliers of meat. 
Only one will demand that its suppliers of meat are certified within the 
next three years and expect that ISO will become a common demand 
within the same period. Only one would give a certified supplier status as 
sole supplier. 
 
 
General Conclusions 
 
We can now look at the general results of the research and see whether 
there are any differences between the three countries which have been 
examined. In general the two most important criteria for choice of supplier 
in the three countries are delivery service and stable quality. The high 
priority of stable quality is interesting in connection with ISO 9000, as a 
certification should contribute to a stable quality. Customers do not 
necessarily want the best possible quality but, on the contrary, the 
specified and requested quality. Therefore, high quality is less important 
than stable quality but high quality is still as important as, for example, 
flexibility and a modern product mix. The suppliers having a large 
productive capacity, a low price, ISO 9000 and a well-known brand have 
more than medium importance. 
In Germany, ISO 9000 is considered as somewhat more important than 
in Sweden and the UK. In the UK, HACCP is considered far more impor-
tant than ISO 9000/BS 5750. 
 
 
Quality Certification and the Establishment of Relations 
 
In the previous section the results of the research interviews were 
presented. The interesting question is now how these results can be util-
ised more generally by Danish producers of foods in their marketing, in 
order to compete successfully with foreign suppliers for the same impor-Quality Certification as a Success Factor in International Food Marketing 
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tant groups of customers. This will be dealt with in the following sections. 
Special weight will be attached to marketing to retail chains whose 
structural development and purchasing behaviour has been analysed in 
greatest detail in the investigation. 
On the basis of the analysis of the structural development process in the 
retailing links in groceries, a more general model for purchasing 
behaviour in the Western European retail chains can be drawn up regard-
ing processed meat. This model can be used for a discussion of whether it 
is possible to build up more permanent relations with the individual 
chains and the conditions of this. The role of quality certification in these 
relations can be determined.  
 
 
The Structural Development of Grocery Retailing 
 
The Western European retailing in groceries has been and is undergoing a 
considerable structural rationalisation and concentration process. This 
appears, for example, from the analyses made by the retail trade in 
groceries in France, Germany and Sweden in connection with another 
project in this research programme, ‘The Role of the Distribution System 
in Product Innovation’ and from the reports of GIRAG S.A. This process is 
partly a result of the very sharp competition which has been reflected in 
new establishments, cut-rate marketing, buy-out of chains and campaigns 
of mass communication. Furthermore, the process has been intensified by 
consumer influence owing to their changed situation and by the develop-
ment of new types of shops. 
The fierce competition has implied that various actors on the markets 
have started pursuing economies of scale, e.g. regarding purchasing, shop 
fittings, staff training, mass communication and technology. In this way 
they have gone into a self-increasing process regarding structural devel-
opment. In order to keep one's position in competition, it has been neces-
sary to pursue and implement economies of scale, and the implementation 
of economies of scale has again made additional buy-outs of other chains 
possible which have increased the economies of scale even more. 
For the suppliers this process has lead to a number of demands from 
the chains for product development, low prices, listing fees, quality 
control, trademarks, packaging, JIT delivery, etc. The chains have tried to 
limit their costs at the same time as they have sought to differentiate 
themselves to the consumers through chain profiles. The described self-
increasing structural development process is shown in Figure 1. 
The result of the process of structural change has been a heavy decline 
in the traditional types of shops i.e. grocer's shops and specialist shops 
whereas supermarkets, hypermarkets and discount shops have been 
increasing considerably. At the same time, the number of actors have 
declined and each of them has developed a number of chain concepts 
which they try to profile and streamline and spread to a larger 
geographical area. Furthermore, retailing in groceries has been interna-Part IV: Market Challenges 
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tionalised to some extent. Some of the actors have crossed the national 
borders through the buy-out of chains in other countries and through the 
establishment of shops with the same chain concept as in the native 
country. Another aspect of the internationalisation has been an extension 
of the international purchasing co-operation with a view to realise even 
more economies of scale. Because of a certain homogeneity in shop 
fittings, assortment and other marketing efforts, most attempts to profile 
the individual chains have been made by attaching more weight to chain 
brands and to fresh meat products. Finally the process of structural 
change has lead to an increased use of information technology partly for 
stock management and partly for space management. 
 
Figure 1  Self-Increasing Structural Development in Grocery Retailing 
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Presumably, the described structural development creates barriers for 
new actors who may wish to enter the market. It will be impossible to start 
from the bottom. The only possibility of entering the market will be to buy 
up existing chains and this will become more and more difficult as the 
remaining chains grow in size. Consequently, it can be expected that in the 
long run a cementation of a structure of a few large, international-oriented 
groups of retail chains will take place. 
 
 
Purchasing Behaviour of the Retail Chains 
 
For suppliers of processed meat products, the above-mentioned structural 
development means that knowledge about the large retail chains' pur-
chasing behaviour, and decision criteria regarding the choice of supplier, 
will become fundamental for marketing planning. Without such 
knowledge, a well-founded marketing strategy cannot be developed 
(Grunert et al., 1996). Therefore, in this section – on the basis of the 
interviews made with decision-makers/purchasing managers in large Quality Certification as a Success Factor in International Food Marketing 
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retail chains – a more general description of purchasing behaviour with 
these chains will be made. 
The interviews made it possible to identify differences in purchasing 
behaviour dependent on nationality, size of the chain, its degree of 
centralisation and the image it wants to create. 
The national differences appear from the general conclusions above. If 
you take a look at the way the purchasing organisation of the chains is 
built up, it is characteristic that decisions are becoming increasingly 
centralised. Central listing and negotiation are common, yet there are a 
number of deviations, especially depending on whether the chains are 
voluntary or centrally owned. Within more decentralised chains more 
weight is attached to local suppliers just as the size of the supplier (the 
delivered quantity) is not so crucial. The same considerations apply to the 
size of the chains. Large chains attach more importance to the size of the 
suppliers, quality control systems and delivery service than small chains. 
The image wanted by the chain can for example influence the desired 
absolute quality and the homogeneity of the quality. 
Figure 2 shows a model for the purchasing behaviour of chains. At the 
top are the four factors which are presumed to have crucial influence on 
which criteria for supplier choice the chain finds most important. 
 
Figure 2  Purchasing Behaviour of Retail Chains 
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Figure 3 presents an attempt to generalise the prioritisation. The crucial 
condition for a product to become listed by a chain are the characteristics 
of the product, whether the purchasing organisation considers the product 
saleable, and that it fits into the assortment of the chain. 
Several chains stressed that they were not willing to widen their 
assortment due to the costs involved and this means that other products 
must be removed from the assortment if new ones are to become listed. 
Consequently new products must be estimated to create better sales than 
the existing substitutes. In connection with the decision to list a given 
product, the chain usually goes through some careful procedures of 
approval which involve controls of the suppliers' facilities, hygiene and Part IV: Market Challenges 
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quality control system. If the suggested products fulfil the chain's criteria 
for choice of supplier, they will be listed and sold, otherwise they are 
rejected. 
When one has become approved as a supplier, it is vital in order to 
remain a supplier that … 
•  the delivered products sell well, 
•  there is no variation in quality, and 
•  delivery is punctual and in the right quantity. 
 
The common marketing effort belongs under the first point, quality 
control (including the ISO 9000 certification) belongs under the second 
point, and logistics belong under the last point. 
 
Figure 3  Criteria for Choice of Supplier Within Retail Chains  
  (in Order of Priority) 
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The individual suppliers is controlled continually, including quality tests, 
and if a supplier does not keep his promises he is deleted. This can 
happen after one or more warnings, depending on the policy of the chain. 
If, on the contrary, the supplier keeps his promises, the deliveries will be 
effected continuously, and as time goes by it will be possible to build up 
closer relations between the supplier and the chain. 
 
 
Building Closer Relations 
 
As it appears from Figure 2, it will be an objective for suppliers of food 
products, who supply still fewer but very large chains, to build close re-
lationships with these chains. In doing so a substantial market share will 
become more secure because it will be more difficult and more expensive 
for the chains to find new suppliers. The switching costs will increase 
(Porter, 1980). For a discussion of building relations in a network, see 
Håkansson and Snehota (1995). The question is if whether it is possible to 
determine that an ISO 9000 certification system is a good means to build 
up closer relationships on the basis of these empirical results. 
From the investigation and from Figure 3, it appears that important 
decision criteria for the major customers are stable quality and delivery on Quality Certification as a Success Factor in International Food Marketing 
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time. These two criteria are closely connected with a quality management 
system. However, it is also very clear that an ISO 9000 certification does 
not guarantee that these criteria are met by the certified supplier. Only the 
promised quality is guaranteed. In quite a number of cases ISO 9000 
certification will be able to ease communication, which also appeared 
from the investigation. 
As mentioned above, the suppliers of food products will be interested 
in building up closer relationships with important customers, but it goes 
without saying that this does not need to be the case the other way 
around. It is true that major buyers of food products will be interested in 
close relationships with important suppliers but at the same time they will 
not be interested in relationships which are so close that it will become too 
expensive and too difficult to change supplier. It appears that, from the 
investigation, if quality in particular fails to come up to expectations time 
after time, one would want to find a new supplier. 
In such cases where there is a change of suppliers, it will be an advan-
tage seen from the customers' point of view that other suppliers have a 
quality certification. This will ease the changing process. It can therefore 
be concluded that an ISO 9000 certification would prevent close rela-
tionships rather than the opposite. Once the supplier has become accepted 
– and here a certificate can be of some help – the certifications of the rival 
companies will be a threat. 
A more efficient way of establishing a relationship between a major 
supplier of food products and important customers would be to use other 
means than a certification, which would be a condition for entering the 
market at all. Such means could be the continuous agreement for quality 
improvements and it could be a closer co-operation on logistics. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the introduction of the paper, the following question was formulated: 
Will an ISO 9000 certification, in itself, be important for marketing and thereby 
affect customer preferences? 
This question has been analysed above by means of an empirical inves-
tigation made in selected countries. In this investigation, important groups 
of purchasers of processed meat were interviewed about their criteria for 
their choice of supplier and their opinion of the significance of the ISO 
9000 certificates in this connection. 
As mentioned above, there are differences between the countries inves-
tigated, for instance Germans attached far more importance to quality 
certification than the British and the Swedes. There are also differences 
between the customer groups and within the various customer groups. 
However, a clear picture emerges of the importance large purchasers 
attach to the suppliers' quality certification. Quality control is of crucial 
importance and control is checked closely. Inferior quality in one or more 
dimensions will make the customer change supplier. This could be with Part IV: Market Challenges 
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regards to hygiene, variations in quality, delivery service or ability to 
supply. In this connection, a certification can be a means of securing the 
desired quality level. 
Through the investigation it has also become obvious that – to various 
extents – there is a positive attitude towards quality certificates. The great 
importance attached to a certificate by some of the respondents, the 
expected increased importance to some of the respondents, as well as the 
fact that some of the respondents are going to make certification a future 
demand, will make it absolutely necessary for the large suppliers of 
processed meat to become certified. 
The growing concentration on the purchasing side will make every 
large customer vital and therefore a certification will become necessary 
even though only some customers in some markets find it significant. 
Another aspect is that all important suppliers will choose to become 
certified for this very reason. In this fashion, a certification will become a 
condition for being on the market. 
An interesting aspect – seen from the suppliers' side – is whether they 
will be able to start a co-operation with selected chains and other 
important customers about the contents of the quality and the 
construction of the control system in order for both sides to save costs. 
The concentration on the customer side and also a probable adjustment 
of the structure on the supplier side will make the establishment of closer 
relations to the individual large customers vital for keeping a stable 
market share. A co-operation about the construction of the quality control 
system could be a way of strengthening relations. An important 
theoretical task is to construct models for how to establish and maintain 
such a structure of relations with large retail chains in the course of time. 
So, the answer to the main question must be that for marketing reasons, 
international suppliers of processed meat will be compelled to get 
certification as soon as possible if they are not to lose market shares. 
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Jørgensen, HHS and a managing group whose members besides Niels Jørgensen are 
Jacob Ærenlund, Tulip International A/S and Professor Klaus G. Grunert, MAPP. Ph.D.-
student Erik Lund and Carl Henrik Marcussen, research lecturers, both from HHS, have 
been assisting the project. 
 
2  This section is based on Lund (1994). 
 
3  The empirical basis of the work is interviews with purchasing managers/decision-makers 
from retail chains, catering firms and food manufacturers in three countries. These 
interviews took place in November and December 1994, and in January 1995. However, 
interviews with representatives from the retail chains in Sweden and Germany took place 
in the spring of 1994. The trade association ‘Danske Slagterier’ has placed a number of 
reports at our disposal, which have formed the basis for our selection of the persons and 
organisations interviewed. 